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ABSTRACT
High reliability entities governed by statutory regulations are required to comply with safety
guidelines and specifications. When fatalities or serious injuries occur in otherwise preventable
accidents these entities are routinely exonerated from any responsibility by claiming to have

'systemic management problems' and their managing coalitions have been able to hide behind the
'corporate veil'.

This thesis maintains that the core managerial competencies, needed to prevent preventable
accidents, can be acquired through training, particularly if their mastery is mandated by a strong
regulatory and compliance regime. The cases chosen for analysis revealed ten core managerial and
organisational competencies and compliance as issues of concern, in a small n study of
Commission of Inquiry and Coronial reports.

Other than 'acts of God', most accidents resulting in fatalities and serious injury, occur in
organisations where prior knowledge of a potential accident existed and this knowledge was not
utilised. Most accidents in high reliability organisations might have been prevented if the cascade of
events leading to the accidents could have been interrupted. The competencies, revealed by the
research as necessary to intervene in the unfolding of preventable accidents, are generally not
taught in orthodox management studies programs in higher education institutions. However, when
these competencies are inadequate they not only result in accidents but also cause orthodox
management problems such as production delays and losses, costly litigation, increasing indemnity
insurance and erosion of an organisation's credibility in the marketplace.

The central concern of this research formed around the PhD research done by the late Barry
Turner (1976), of Exeter University, which established that a lack of foresight and misinformation
were key factors leading to fatal accidents. The findings in this research also emerge as the result of
standing on the shoulders of several other scholars; in particular, Nick Pidgeon, Charles Perrow,
James Reason, Neil Gunningham and Richard Johnstone, Ian Mitroff, Andrew Hopkins, and Dan
Petersen. The original idea for the thesis began when the researcher was completing a
postgraduate degree in Management Psychology and was encouraged by his research supervisor at
Charles Sturt University to develop ideas that sprang from earlier research and consultancy work in
competency training for the aviation industry, particularly with air traffic controllers.
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The modified grounded theory methodology used in this research demonstrated that the
data from the coronial material, and boards and commissions of enquiries, were mostly
characterised as failures of 'behavioural' and 'managerial' competencies, which was congruent with
first hand experience from working in industry and with a growing body of literature. Data
compression, from the five cases selected, using HyperRESEARCH, revealed two hundred and sixty
behavioural descriptors and these codes compressed to eleven core managerial competencies that
are needed to ensure high levels of safety.

The thesis is located in the current managerial domains of organisational development and
management psychology, occupational health and safety, organisational leadership and change;
innovation and development; technology policy; regulation of safety at government level; and
managing -safety compliance at an organisational level. The competencies revealed by the research
apply to senior coalitions and the organisations they govern and manage. Competencies, such as
ethics, foresight, vigilance and judgement require specific training to ensure that they are
incorporated in operational heuristics and managerial thinking patterns so that, when
extraordinary circumstances arise, they are available as part of multidisciplinary managerial
'expertise' brought to bear on dangerous and chaotic situations. These core competencies, which
could supplement orthodox managerial training in universities and TAPE programs, can also be
readily transformed into Training and Development options for organisational consultants and
management psychologists working in the area of Management of High Reliability Organisations

RESEARCH SUMMARY
OBJECTIVE: To investigate managerial competencies of concern in the occurrence of
accidents in high reliability organisations that could have been prevented.
DESIGN: 'Small n' case analysis using modified grounded theory text analyses of reports from
Commissions of Inquiry into fatal accidents coded through HyperRESEARCH, with coding
compression suggested by salient literature sources and behavioral descriptors evident in
the data.
FOCUS OF RESEARCH: Safety system users and senior management coalitions such as
managers and directors of high reliability organisations.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Two hundred and sixty codes compressed into eleven core
competencies, which fall into four categories of concern.
CONCLUSION:
Ten core competencies and compliance skills are essential to enable
proficiency in accident prevention. Criminal sanctions for members of the dominant
coalition who prove to be incompetent are needed if high reliability organisations are to
avoid preventable accidents which cause fatalities and serious injury.
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1 Introduction
And Eeyore whispered back: 'I'm not saying there won't be an Accident now,
mind you. They're funny things, Accidents. You never have them till you're
having them.'
A.A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner.

1. 1 Introduction
This chapter engages Eeyore's phenomenological and ontological proposition as it sets out
the arc of the 'preventable accident' argument examined by this thesis. Heidegger (1927), in his
thinking about 'being', also engaged these issues of whether or not something exists and the
assumptions we have to make to assert our confidence in our hunches and their connection to
phenomena (such as accidents).

Turner (1976:25) makes the point in his PhD thesis that, "Accidents and disasters, since they
are all unintended, are all matters of surprise, violations of expectations, or failures of foresight and
judgement for some of the individuals or organisations involved in them." His thesis was anchored
in the early work of Simon (1957:198) who proposed a perspective on bounded rationality and
organised disaster. This thesis builds upon Turner's hypothesis and frames its core assumption as:

'Accidents occur because incompetent responsible personnel governing organisations ignore
available safety-critical information even though the organisations concerned espouse
compliance with current safety regulations and standards. '

Turner's thesis provides the direction for this chapter and the entire thesis in that it indicates
the significance and purpose of the study, which is to examine why dominant coalitions who have
access to information about an unfolding accident scenario and the power to intervene in its
development do not. It briefly considers the trends in the literature and introduces the research
methodology used to examine the narratives of accidents revealed in a selection of case study
reports. It suggests that this approach is a valid contribution to knowledge in the field and
proposes a vision of perfect safety (while respectfully acknowledging Eeyore's observation).

It also explains the reasons for the data choices and the method of their examination and
sets out the core assumptions of the research and proposes two guiding research questions.
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1.2 Significance and Purpose of the Study
Both the recent literature and reports of accidents reveal that the information needed to
prevent them was available and known to organisational personnel and others before the accident
(Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). They sustained an official mental model and claimed to
have an understanding of the responsibilities they purported to practice. Turner and Pidgeon
(1997:134) suggest this official understanding is often grossly in error and can lead to organisations
creating and maintaining pathological assumptions that shape safety-related decision making. This
indicates that managers in these organisations do not exercise essential pro-active management
competencies such as vigilance, foresight, judgment and balance, sufficient to anticipate and avoid
predictable accidents. It also indicates poor ethical standards and a failure to comply with safety
regulations, often in an organisation lacking an appropriate ethos of safety.

This research seeks to examine these insights in an interpretive framework grounded in
actual Australian cases heard by Commissions of Inquiry or where evidence can be drawn from
published coronial enquiries. It seeks to identify appropriate managerial competencies and
accountability procedures that may be sufficiently persuasive to act as systemic enablers of building
an ethos of safety in high reliability organisations so that accident precursors can be better
identified and appropriate interventions carried out to ensure the prevention of accidents.

The modified grounded theory methodology used in this research demonstrates that the
data from the coronial material and boards of inquiry reports are mostly 'behavioural' and
'managerial' in nature. Data compression revealed eleven core managerial competencies that apply
specifically to senior coalitions and organisations that are needed to ensure high levels of safety.

1.3 Justification and priorities revealed by trends in the
literature
There has been a significant shift in accident analysis over the last few decades of the
twentieth century. The trend has been away from blaming individual front line workers and moved
toward identifying failures in the system. The literature pointing to 'prior knowledge' suggests that
preconditions found during the incubation period of an impending accident show that both
erroneous assumptions and the minimisation of emergent danger by those involved are particularly
characteristic of 'man-made' accidents (Turner, 1976:84, and Turner and Pidgeon, 1997:170).
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However, others indicate that individuals are less to blame for accidents than the systems that allow
them to occur (Reason, 1990). Recent cases show efforts by dominant coalitions to shift the blame
away from themselves to others and they highlight the responsibilities assumed by individuals who
occupy positions of fiduciary responsibility (Sharp-Paine, 2003; Windridge, 1996:41)

The relationship between accidents and managerial competencies and compliance with
regulations by managers is under-researched. It is also well established that regulation and
compliance requirements in high reliability organisations tend to develop from the lessons learned
from previous incidents and are largely 'system' based and 'evolutionary' (Fleming and Lardner,
1999).

The cases examined in this thesis [summarised in chapter four (4.4.1.1 - 4.4.1.5)] confirm
that compliance issues are often backward focussed and do not generally account for emerging
theories nor for the dramatic development of technologies and technically complex systems. These
technology related concerns in Australia are also confirmed by Dunphy (1981, 1992) and Dunphy
and Griffiths (1998). Looking back to previous accidents may, but does not necessarily, help to
anticipate future accidents because the phenomena that trigger accidents are generally particular to
that accident and industry (Hopkins, 1999). It follows that the practical consequences for safety
outcomes are therefore highly contestable since there is little point in trying to prevent the last
incident especially when it is at the expense of sensitising the organisation to the next incident.

This thesis is directed toward enabling high reliability organisations to reach a level of safety
beyond fundamental compliance requirements by helping them to identify competencies that will
sensitise them to the next incident. The core competencies identified in this research can be readily
transformed into Training and Development options (i.e. Certificate IV level or MBA level units) for
formal studies in the Management of High Reliability Organisations.

1.4 Methodology:

examining

the

narratives

of reported

incidents of failure.
A central assumption of the research is that the exercise of good managerial judgement is
acquired through a thorough theoretical and practical education in management. Ideally, this
knowledge should then be synthesised and brought to bear on individual experiences. These
experiences can be narratively constructed and deconstructed (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994 and
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2000). Equally, the discourse of the failure of managerial judgement might also be revealed in
similarly constructed narratives of preventable accidents that have been attributed

to

managerial

failure. This thesis is bounded by an interpretive approach to narratives and analyses of actual case
reports (texts) of the failure of ten core competencies that resulted in fatal accidents. Turner and
Pidgeon (1997: xvii) suggest this is a useful approach to examine a little explored area and to use
the examination

to

build up a vocabulary, a set of concepts and a theory of the 'phenomena of

interest'.

The methodology adopted in this research elaborates and tests these concerns and, while

grounded in the data, it also relies on a modified (elaborated, according to grounded theory)
hermeneutic cycle suggested by William Dilthey (1972) as a way of understanding texts. The
methodology adapts Dilthey's principle of reasoning from the part to the whole to the part again
and is realised in these cases by discovering, through coding and interpretation, overt and covert
managerial competencies and compliance issues that have failed in five actual incidents and which,
if they had been prevented from failing, might have prevented these incidents. The texts that form

the data exist as Commission of Inquiry reports.

1.5 Significance

of

the

research

and

contribution

to

knowledge
The relationship that prior knowledge of potential accidents is predicated on managerial
competencies does not appear to have been clearly made before. This thesis brings to the current
theory of accidents a constructive approach that suggests that managers (the dominant coalition supervisors, managers, directors) who purport to be responsible should be held responsible for
the adequacy of safety systems in place in their organisations and for the consequences of ignoring
information available prior to accidents happening. While it focuses on pathologies (Coronial and
Commission reports) its aim is prognostic. It seeks to discover ways of avoiding these pathologies,
in effect going beyond systems causes to return with a new perspective to Turner's theory. This
makes a case that argues that there are critical competencies that can be identified and acquired
and, if not, that can be mandated by regulation and imposed.
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1.6 A vision of perfect safety.
Factors such as the culture of the organisation, the personality and psychological stability of
managers, the effects of power, greed, and self-protection, and the effectiveness of regulations and
compliance all appear in the case reports and the literature makes it clear that these factors form
part of the complex but often identifiable background to accidents. Therefore, by necessity, the
approach is also cross-disciplinary (utilising information from the disciplines of education, ethics
philosophy, law and management and behavioural psychology). The research attempts to do this
while taking as few risky inferential leaps as possible but that an examination of this nature
occasionally requires. For example, Ackoff (1981), Emery and Trist (1981), Ozbekham (1973-74)
and more recently Hamel and Prahalad (1994), have all emphasised the importance of taking the
future as a starting point for analysing iterations towards an idealised state (in high reliability
organisations an idealised future state would be zero accidents).

These authors all agree that while scenario building and forecasting typically start with what
is and then project forward to what might happen, the quest for foresight should start with what
could be and then work back to what might happen for that future to come about. This activity has
also been referred to as "vision building". They suggest that a clearly specified and well
communicated desired future can have a significant impact on organisational motivation, cohesion
and, as a consequence performance. The implications of the need for a vision of perfect safety will
always be set against competing forces such as expediency, greed, profit motive, poor ethics, power
seeking and shareholder returns so that trade-offs will inevitably occur. The research suggests that
an organisation's long term 'perfect' safety vision can only come into reality if it is supported by
vigilant safety systems constructed by competent managers exercising ethical behaviour in an
organisation where the ethos is constructed out of a concern for others, along with accountability
ensured by stringent compliance requirements.

1.7 Recognising both evidence and context in accidents.
It is important to understand that this research does not purport to examine accident causes

at the instrumental or mechanical level, rather it seeks to understand and reveal competencies at
senior levels of management that may have failed, which in tum lead to failure to detect,
understand or intervene in the chain of precursors that result in accidents. One of the principal
reasons for choosing to examine actual cases is that Commissions of Inquiry tend to reveal
necessary incident context as well as 'hard' evidence. It is germane to such 'context' questions that
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they often reveal failures at the level of the dominant coalitions of organisations who adopt unsafe
management priorities and agendas. Some examples of the initial contextual questions prompted
by examining actual cases include:
How did the accident occur?
Who was involved?
What technology was involved?
What were the decision antecedents to the incident?
Who made the decisions?
Was the person responsible a competent operator?
What competencies were absent?
Did any responsible person act unethically.
Were systems in place to ensure incidents did not occur?
What were the components of the systems that failed?
Why did the systems fail?
What priorities influenced the systems that failed?
Was there a review or checking process in place to update decision making as
new information became available or capacity was diminished?
Did the failed systems have vigilance indicators in place to respond to conditions
leading up to the incident?
What conditions existed at the moment of the incident?

While such questions can be asked by Coroners and Commissions of Inquiry they are not
able to be asked in post hoc PhD research questionnaires of individuals associated with fatal
accidents (because the process can breach the generally accepted ethical standards for academic
research and can lead to litigation). However, they are suggestive of a thread of reasoning and an
approach. Therefore, to consider an arc of argument suggested by these questions it is necessary to
examine the text of such accident reports. It is in these primary reports that the data for this thesis
is found. The research seeks to examine and interpret the contextual data in terms of behavioural
and competency descriptors rather than focus on matters such as 'engineering', 'statistical' and
other quantifiable data. This form of conjecture is characteristic of the research methodology
known as 'grounded theory' and is particularly relevant to examining the behaviours of individuals
and groups, such as managers and dominant coalitions, in situations where it is impossible to
apply quantitative methods.

These cases illustrate an important shift in approach to the way accidents are reported.
Rather than blaming front line operators they point to the failure of managerial responsibility. They
also make it clear that dominant coalitions can reign powerful forces against enquiries into
accidents and that senior management often acts in its own interests with hubris and contempt for
safety. If an integrating theory of safety system management were feasible, its prime principle may
well be that safety system management must be a prime function of the dominant coalition,
especially in high reliability organisations, rather than the low priority given to safety (as an
expense) demonstrated in these examples. A grounded theorist might ask if there could be
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relationships among organisational strategies, structures, and managers' personalities, as Marcus
Aurelius seems to suggest?
Remember, it is the secret force hidden deep within us that
manipulates our strings; there lies the voice of persuasion,
there the very life, there, we might even say, is the man
himself.
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) make the case that decision making, leadership, strategy
formation, structuring, and organisational change are influenced in subtle and complex ways by
"invisible," long-standing psychological forces, of which, the individual is usually unaware. These
covert forces can act to produce organisational outcomes that appear irrational and dysfunctional.
These forces can be pernicious and destructive, especially in high reliability organisations. The
cases chosen for analysis make it clear that these self interested forces are at work in many
incidents. One can make a case, based on the evidence, that high reliability organisations that tend
to close themselves off from their social milieu (a phenomena known as autopoiesis) are most
likely to experience fatal accidents. This may be a fruitful line of postdoctoral research.

High reliability organisations are generally seen as part of a larger social system. Like all
social systems, they can be deconstructed and reconstructed in response to criticism, ethical issues,
negative consequences, ineffectiveness or failure as well as the results of research, new knowledge
and insights from other disciplines. Hence, safety system management in such organisations can
never be perfect or entirely 'finished'. There seems little doubt that safety system management
must be organisation and issue specific. Each organisation must establish its own considered safety
system management goals and not rely on 'off -the-shelf or even 'tried-and-true' safety system
management solutions that may have worked for other organisations or even for different sites in
the same organisation (Hopkins, 1999).

While, the literature shows that effective safety system management arises from specific
safety system management goals appropriate to a particular environment or cultural context, stable
and predictable safety system management may be an idealised goal not possible to achieve
completely - but it is worth pursuing particularly if a few core competencies can make a material
difference.

The work should be of interest to managers, organisation development consultants, and
management training specialists. Academics teaching and studying policy, organisational behaviour,
management and other social.;behavioural sciences should also find it relevant. Its prime interest
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should be to members of the dominant coalition of HROs and their principal stakeholders. Postdoctoral research could also develop this idea further based on the idea that such managerial
competencies fall into clusters or domains. The issue of further research is addressed in section
9.6. An initial undertaking would be to construct a taxonomy of managerial competencies that
could be utilised in organisational development and managerial training programs. This thesis goes
some way toward that aspiration in that it identifies some 260 behaviours of taxonomic interest in
that they are further grouped into ten competencies and core four groups of behavioural types.

1.8 Research proposition
1.8.1 Core Assumption:

Accidents occur because incompetent responsible personnel governing organisations ignore
available safety-critical information even though the organisations concerned espouse
compliance with current safety regulations and standards.

This thesis examines factors that are repeatedly named as specific and distinctive issues of
concern by commissions of inquiry and coronial reports on actual accidents that are not adequately
treated, or are only just emerging as matters of concern, in the literature. These factors describe the
dominant coalitions of directors and managers in organisations, in relation to their Competencies

for Safety-Conscious Practice.

These competencies are regularly identified in accident and incident reports as direct
contributors to the causes of accidents and therefore tend to confirm the core assumption. If these
competencies are properly understood they may be significant enablers of organisational safety in
high reliability organisations. The research postulates two critical questions concerning
competencies and the need for regulatory compliance in the absence of competencies.

1.8.2 Principal Research Question

What significant underpinning capacities, organisational factors, and performance capacities
are revealed in accident reports, and what competencies flow from these to enable dominant
coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively engage in accident prevention?

22

1.8.3 Subsidiary Research Question

What significant factors are revealed in accident reports and key literature as being required
by dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively enable compliance with
accident prevention regulations and appropriate intervention strategies in unfolding accident
scenarios?

The aim of this thesis is to identify and determine the role of these factors, and the specific
forms of each, that contribute to safety in high reliability organisations.

1.9 Conclusion
This chapter sets out the claim that will be pursued in the body of the research that an 'ideal
of perfect safety' is not unrealistic (if not entirely achievable). It makes a case, that the following
chapters argue, that there are critical accident prevention competencies that can be identified and
acquired by dominant coalitions in organisations that purport high levels of safety. It also asserts
that if preventable accidents occur then sufficiently punitive measures should be taken against the
individuals most responsible - the senior management decision makers. Dominant coalitions ought
not to be able to hide behind the 'corporate veil' and this premise should be mandated by
regulation and imposed.

This argument is developed in the following chapters, firstly by examination of the body of
literature salient to the research questions, followed by an examination of accident case study data
using the 'grounded theory' approach.
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2 Literature Review
'If I have seen far, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants.'
Sir Isaac Newton

2. 1 Introduction
This chapter identifies relevant taxonomies (terms, discipline related idea structures, key
constructs) and state of current knowledge in the field of accident analysis. It proscribes and
theoretically frames the two principal constructs developed in the thesis - competencies and

compliance. The research identifies ten core managerial competencies and argues a role for a
compliance regime that appropriately and correctly attributes error in the event of their failure. It
can be argued that compliance skills comprise a competency and have been treated as such in this
research.

The Literature Review examines the relevant sources to authenticate, confirm and disconfirm
the case study evidence. Together the ten competencies and the need for a compliance regime is
suggestive that high reliability accidents are preventable. There is also a claim made by the case
evidence that the dominant coalition are primarily responsible for safety and the literature in this
chapter supports that finding.

High Reliability Organisations are characterised and the sources of the case-based evidence
are identified. There is a brief description of the research methodology that points to the four key
areas of competence; underpinning capacities, organisational factors, the capacity to perform in
high reliability decisional roles, and the regulatory and compliance capabilities and constraints.

Five important theoretical perspectives are examined to show how the literature views
orthodox management theory, stakeholder theory, decision making theory, organisational theory,
and sociotechnical issues in relation to preventable high reliability accidents. Several key sources,
such as Perrow's (1984 and 1999) Normal Accident theory and Hopkin's (1999) review of lessons
learned from a preventable mining accident, are examined in some depth to further illuminate
critical findings in the data analysis chapters that follow.
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Critical theoretical perspectives are then identified to establish direct taxonomic sources for
the data. These sources are considered to be emergent theoretical concepts that tie management to
the prevention of accidents in high reliability organisations and include establishing the
congruence of the competencies established in the data with industry competency standards. Prior
knowledge and misinformation, which are now considered critical factors in the prevention of
accidents, are examined and linked to concepts such as 'habitus', 'autopoiesis', 'memes', 'the
psychological fitness' for governance of high reliability organisations, and 'reflective practice'.

This chapter attempts to identify the key sources, references and related areas of knowledge
suggested by the two research questions that are central to the phenomena of interest .

2.1.1 High Reliability Organisations (HRO)
High Reliability Organisations (La Porte, 1996; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1984,
1999; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; (Roberts, 1990a, 1990b); Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts,
1987; (Weik, 1987, Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 1999) are characterised as being
reliable over time, while maintaining high levels of hazard accompanied by low risk Effective
management of such organisations results in low failure and accident rates. The effect is called the
'five-nines' principle: 99.999% accident free. This thesis examines cases in which these high
reliability capabilities were purported, or required under governing acts, to be maintained, but
were not. The organisations concerned were unable to maintain a record of safety over a long
period of time. Roberts (1999a: 160) offers the clearest view of the core capability:
One can identify this subset by answering the question, 'how many times could
this organization have failed resulting in catastrophic consequences that it did
not?' If the answer is in the order of tens of thousands of times, the organization
is 'high' reliability.'

2.1.2 Key Sources
Several sources were used in this research:
1. Commissions of Inquiry, Coronial Reports, and OH&S (Occupational Health and
Safety) legal cases along with traditional 'orthodox' management sources.

2. Qualitative analysis using modified grounded theory techniques was employed
to discover which core managerial competencies were necessary to enable
greater safety in high reliability organisations. HyperRESEARCH 1 computer data
collection and analysis identified 260 behaviours and phenomena at saturation of

1

HyperRESEARCH is a computer application that allows the researcher to identify tracts of text (and
other data) and to code the selections using common sense terms.
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data from the items in 1 (Commissions of Inquiry, Coronial Reports, and OH&S
legal cases along with traditional 'orthodox' management sources). These
sources also informed the compression of this data to ten core behaviours or

competencies.
3. Several non-orthodox theoretical sources informed and appear to be more
relevant to safety in high reliability organisations and to the concerns of the
commissions of inquiry than traditional orthodox management theory.
4. Safety in high reliability organisations suggests that if managers and directors
are not competent to run HR0s 2 (High Reliability Organisations) they must be
held accountable. Relevant documents such as Acts regulating industry safety
and theoretical legal texts related to regulating workplace safety were also
examined.
Further, more detailed literature sources are provided in the appropriate sections
of the data analysis in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.

2.1.2.1

Other sources:

Newspapers, coronial enquiries, commissions and boards of inquiry and archival records
were also consulted, such as:
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Court of Marine Inquiry (ATSB - Australia
Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Australia
Marine Incident Investigation Unit - Australia
Transportation Safety Board - Canada
Marine Accident Investigation Branch - United Kingdom
HM Railway Inspectorate - United Kingdom
National Transportation Safety Board - United States
International Transportation Safety Association
Transport Accident Investigation Commission - NZ
The Safety Network (NSCA) - Australia
National Safety Council of Australia - NSCA

2.1.2.2

Relevant aviation-specific sources consulted.
Air Navigation Orders, as amended, Australian Commonwealth Department of
Aviation, Canberra.
Air Navigation Act 1920-1960 as amended, Commonwealth of Australia, AGP.
Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation, Australia 1945/46, AGP.
Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation, International Civil Aviation
Organisation, Montreal, 4th Edition (1970).
Medical Officers Incident/ Accident Check List, Royal Australian Air Force,
Canberra (1981).
Air Accident Investigation Branch - United Kingdom
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation - Australia

2.2 Grounded Theory
Since the research is entirely text based and relies heavily on the work of the 'Grounded
Theorists' it is important at the outset to recognise that its two key theorists, Strauss and Corbin,
2
HRO's are high reliability organisations, which require reliable, safe systems to operate reliably over
time. They can generally be thought of as airlines, mines, shipping and other organisations where failure
can result in serious accidents or fatalities.
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took a relatively liberal position concerning the role of literature in the research process,
maintaining that 'all kinds of literature can be used before a research study is begun... ' (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990:56). Glaser, although repudiating Strauss' concepts (Glaser, 1992), proposed a
similar idea: 'theoretical codes' represent those theoretical concepts that the researcher has at his
or her disposal independently from data collection and data analysis' (Glaser, 1978). This
construction of theoretical concepts represents a further way in which the ten codes were
determined.

Strauss and Corbin, in Denzin and Lincoln (1994:273), define Grounded Theory as a general
methodology for developing theory grounded in data that is systematically gathered and analysed.
The central idea of the approach is that a theory evolves during actual research through an iterative
interplay between analysis and data.

The Grounded Theory approach to this research is developed in Chapter 3, Method. Key
references informing the methodological approach to the research are also largely set out there.
Issues such as hypothesis formation, coding and the approach to qualitative research as it applies
to the five cases is more fully explained and substantiated in chapter 3. The chapter also points to
the theoretical and practical advice given in the literature over time regarding 'the 'grounded
theory' approach to qualitative research and establishes the use of 'texts' as they are relevant to this
research.

2.3 Relevant taxonomy and literature.
For those who pick over the bones of other people's disasters, it often seems
incredible that (these) warnings and human failures, seemingly so obvious in
retrospect, should have gone unnoticed at the time. Being blessed with both
uninvolvement and hindsight, it is a great temptation for retrospective observers
to slip into a censorious frame of mind and to wonder at how these people could
have been so blind, stupid, arrogant, ignorant or reckless ...
First, most of the people involved in serious accidents are neither stupid nor
reckless, though they may well be blind to the consequences of their actions.
Second, we must beware of falling prey to the fundamental attribution error (i.e.
blaming people and ignoring the situational factors).
Reason J (1990:214) Human Error

This quote from James Reason reveals much of the task and direction of this research and
establishes its essential taxonomic framework. It alludes to failures of managerial competencies
such as vigilance, foresight and judgement in the first sentence (... these warnings and human
failures, seemingly so obvious in retrospect, should have gone unnoticed at the time), and then to
failures of compliance and other competencies, such as salience and particular and
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multidisciplinary performance (... people involved in serious accidents are neither stupid nor
reckless. . . blind to the consequences of their actions. . . blaming people and ignoring the
situational factors) inferring that the system itself is at fault and its responsible actors may have
prevented such accidents if they had established the necessary systemic protocols or had
intervened in the 'failure' process early enough. It is insights such as these that guide the analysis
of the cases and frame the scope of the relevant literature examined in this chapter. These insights
also suggested some of the terms and categories used in the coding and compression of the data.

The following ten competencies plus compliance are elicited from the sources identified
above and also compressed from the 260 codes identified in the HyperRESEARCH analysis outlined
in the following section and more fully in Chapter 3, Method. The codes fall naturally into four
categories: underpinning capacities, organisational factors, capacity to perform, and regulatory
compliance and intervention.
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2.4 The Ten Core Competencies Plus Compliance
In summary, ten core safety management 'competencies' as constructed through this thesis are
demonstrated by personal and organisational:

2.4.1
1.

Underpinning Capacities
ethics (organisational and individual manager's values and behaviour as they influence the

determination of right from wrong in decisions concerning safety)
2.

foresight (attitudinal 'stance' and 'intelligent looking ahead' as factors in decisions concerning

safety)
3.

vigilance (hazard perception and awareness and an alert 'way of seeing' are necessary to signal

detection)
4.

judgement (weighing up, trading off, and deciding - often in circumstances that make little sense or

meaning, are factors in all competencies)
5.

balance (psychological tenor, courage and persistence are essential in safety versus financial

decisions)

2.4.2
6.

Organisational Factors
organisational ethos (open or closed [autopoietic] organisational cultures shape hazard

management capabilities)
7.

constructing a culture of safety ('intention' to establish a culture of safety, 'ways of seeing', and

persistent personal or organisational ideas - 'memes' influence the systemic capacities for
managing safety)

2.4.3
8.

Capacity to Perform
understanding the salience of the particular situation and its context (awareness of

organisational and incident factors peculiar to particular hazardous environments)
9.

performance in a particular setting (managerial capacity to deal with stress, conflict, and

unfolding disaster in particular hazardous environments)
10.

multidisciplinary performance (bringing together skills from different and complementary
domains to manage a particular hazard)

2.4.4
11.

Regulatory Compliance and Intervention
compliance (compliance and regulatory factors, legal and other punitive responses to managerial

failure)
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2.5 Critical Perspectives
2.5.1 Orthodox Management Perspective
'Relationships between individual managerial decision making and the relative effectiveness
of organisations has been of particular interest, not only for executives and scientists, but for
society itself.' (Streufert and Swezey, 1986). The researcher will assume that the reader does not
require detailed explication of the literature in general management or postmodernist decision
theory (Burrell, 1988; Cooke and Slack, 1984; Cooper, 1989; De Michaelis, 1996; Heller, Drenth,
Koopman and Rus, 1988; McCall and Kaplan, 1990, Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979; Parker, 1992).
These and others contain little to suggest that current theories of management and the decisions
made by managers and boards of directors concern themselves with preventing accidents in
organisations or accidents caused by organisations.

The broad sweep of organisational and management theories (Shafritz and Ott, 2001;
Robbins and Barnwell, 1998; Hatch, 1997) tends to focus on how individuals, groups and entire
organisational entities are structured (morphology), how they interact (dynamics), how they are
lead and are managed, and an interest in their spheres of influence (stakeholders) and their
cultures along with the dynamics of power and politics observed within them. While these provide
perspective to the issues raised they are not central to this thesis and therefore can be taken as
fundamental givens.

2.5.2 Stakeholder Perspective
Other investigators, however, point to concerns which are relevant and do not arise directly
from traditional management preoccupations, such as the need to pay dividends to 'stockholders',
but which go the heart of much wider organisational and 'stakeholder' concerns, particularly in
high reliability organisations. For example, Kirkeby (2000) posits six core virtues that convey an
important perspective on the issues of 'ethical' responsibility and safety related managerial
competencies which are central to this research. Kirkeby's notions informed the three core
competencies, ethics (the first of the ten core competencies referred to above), balance and

judgement.
1. Euboulia, "the ability to deliberate on practical matters, both relating to one's
own private life and to public life. Placing public interests before one's own ... a
secular piety." (185-187).
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2. Enthusiasm (or euphoria), "a commitment that reduces the significance of
one's own person, of one's own personality" since the leader (e.g. Martin Luther
King or Nelson Mandela) is absorbed into the cause itself. (187)
3. Hypomone, the leader's ability to be actively patient and exhibit courage,
stamina, and endurance - the core of self management. (190).
4. Prolepsis, "the ability to enrich common knowledge with the powers of
personal experience" (192).
5. Epibole, acts of gestalt intuition rather than discursive insights in acquiring
knowledge that goes beyond simple rule following (as in Peirce's abduction as
opposed to simple deduction and induction). (193)
6. Maieutic, the art of the real leader, a form of midwifery, or the Socratic
competence of stimulating another person to seek the truth and find his own
moral character. (196).

Kirkeby observes the critical relationship between power and leadership (this research
adopts the term 'dominant coalition' to include all organisational personnel who purport
responsibility for an organisation's decisions). He points to critical theory critiques of economics
such as surplus, exchange and use-value and management's longstanding war with labour. The
'leader', according to Kirkeby (2000:xi) is suspended between human, social, and capitalist
rationalities, opposed stakeholders, and in the end 'between the realms of God and the emperor'.
The implication of this view of leadership is seen in this research, for example, in its consideration
of the stakeholder model from the perspective of a radical-normative philosophy to show that in
post-modem capitalism, dominant coalitions must deal not only with shareholders, vendors,
employees, unions, and government but also a myriad of grass-roots groups concerned with
ecology, labour rights, health effects of production and societies obsessed with consumption.

As Kirkeby sees it, the leader is not only a negotiator among claimants, but is often in the

midst of corporate public relations campaigns that seem to 'spin' issues. Moreover, Kirkeby
challenges the "Transaction-Cost-Model" of Williamson (1975) as 'idyllic ideology' and a 'na"ive
defence of the capitalist system' since it ignores both the Marxist consumption and the postmodern culture critique of subcontract networking (59). Kirkeby sees 'stakeholders' as a legitimate
part of a political economy, networking in acts of distribution, production, and consumption while
narrating a phenomenology of commodities that conspires to cause ethical dilemmas. For example,
he suggests that the dominant coalition should communicate to stakeholders how the firm deals
with environmental catastrophes that threaten natural resources and threatened species (64-65).

The dominant coalition must prove to stakeholders that production and distribution are not
adding to the problems of the third world, violating the spirit of legislation, and meets the aesthetic
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image of their brand images. This view can also properly embrace responsibilities for the safety of
people who can be affected by other hazards created by the organisation. Kirkeby also asserts that
Yuki (1994) is too cautious in refusing to set out the competencies of the 'good leader' (65). These
problems of ethical stakeholder relationships and managerial competencies have proven to be a
core challenge to this research, prompting its two primary research questions:

1. What significant underpinning capacities, organisational factors, and
performance capacities are revealed in accident reports, and what competencies
flow from these to enable dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations to
effectively engage in accident prevention?

2. What significant factors are revealed in accident reports and key literature as
being required by dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations to
effectively enable compliance with accident prevention regulations and
appropriate intervention strategies in unfolding accident scenarios?

Kirkeby's philosophical position is not far removed from Katz (1955) who also alludes to the
role of competencies in managing organisations. He claimed that real skill in working with others
must become a natural, continuous activity in decision making and day-to-day behaviour. He
reasoned that this is because everything a leader (the dominant coalition) says and does (or leaves
unsaid or undone) has an effect on his associates, his true self, will in time, show through. This
competence should be demonstrated in every action and every decision.

2.5.3 Decision Making Perspective
Decision making theory offers views on how decisions are made and provides some insights
of relevance to the prevention of accidents (Browne, 1993; Cooke and Slack, 1984; De Michaelis,
1996; Gilligan, Neale and Murray, 1983). For example, systems analysis was originally meant to
address situations where urgent and large-scale problems were beyond the capability of individual
decision makers (DeMichaelis, 1996; Leavitt, Pandy and Boje, 1973). Critics argue that systems
analysis is concerned more with technological processing of information rather than with social
structures and information processing amongst individuals (Rogers and Rogers, 1976).

In high reliability organisations it is clear that some critical problems may be beyond the
capacity of individual decision makers for a range of reasons - such as information complexity and
response requirements of the situation or organisation . and in any case even if decisions are
bounded by the assumption that people know what they want and will choose the optimal course
of action, individual and group decision makers tend to satisfice, to find the optimally best and
easiest solution (often just a hunch!) Simon (1956, 1957, 1975, 1983) and Cyert and March (1963).
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Simon (1983:13), rather cynically, describes the ideal formal machine of decision making as
proposed by economists and mathematicians (particularly Bayesian Theory) as 'a beautiful object
deserving a place in Plato's heaven of ideas'. This Subject Utility Theory he refers to makes four
basic assumptions about decision makers - identical to assumptions that surface in media reports
and critical analyses of accidents, (a) they have a clear picture of utility to the point that they can
prioritise or assign a cardinal number to each decision alternative, (b) they have an exhaustive view
of the strategies needed to implement each alternative decision pathway, (c) they can create a
consistent joint probability distribution of scenarios of outcomes of each for each strategy, and (d)
they will choose between the best alternatives in order to maximize their utility. However,
cognitive reality departs from the formalised decision making ideal when people have to choose
between ambiguous alternatives, especially when they are under significant pressure.

Real life decision making falls far short of this ideal, particularly in that human beings do not
work out all future scenarios, strategies and outcomes among alternative possibilities. Fischoff,
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs (1978) argue that important candidate alternatives are
routinely neglected in decision making and those that are considered are poorly thought through.
Simon (1983:18) says, 'particular decision domains will evoke particular values, and great
inconsistencies in choice may result from fluctuating attention.' March and Simon (1958) and
Simon (1975:198) earlier described this constrained keyhole view of a problem requiring a
decision as bounded rationality. As society moves from the information age to the knowledge age,
the complexity of business, and particularly contemporary sociotechnical systems high reliability
organisations, exacerbates the problem of information overload and the related problem of
"bounded rationality" (Hayek 1945:527).

2.5.3.1

Decision Making Models

Complicating the picture further is the evidence that other factors influence decision
making. For example, decision models reveal several factors such as: Systems Analysis (Flood,
1995; Jackson, 1992) - suggest that there should be an integration of human and technological
processes for improved creative problem solving and decision making; the Carnegie Model (March
and Simon, 1958) - introduces the concept that political coalitions form when problem
identification is ambiguous and there is disagreement amongst decision makers; the Garbage Can

Model (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) - shows that there are random interactions of problems,
solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. These elements exist independently within an
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organisation and only intersect on a random basis. This means that problems may exist without
being solved; solutions may exist without being identified; decision makers may not identify
problems; problems, though identified, may or may not be solved. Solutions are seen as a flow of
ideas and exist independently of problems. 'Choice' opportunities are occasions when decisions
are made and are usually precipitated by urgent events or problems (such as crises or accidents).
While these models offer useful insights and even suggest certain necessary managerial
competencies they do not adequately make these competencies central to implementing them in
high reliability organisations. Rather they tend to focus on other factors such as commercial and
financial effectiveness and performance rather than 'safety'. This claim is confirmed by each of the
various accident enquiries examined in this thesis.

2.5.3.2

Decision Making and Contextual Cues

Some aspects of these contributions are central to the current field of research. For example
there can be little doubt that each organisational environment influences individual decision
making performance in situations related to high reliability. Individual decision-makers do not
operate in a void (Streufert and Swezey, 1986), they make decisions within organisational
environments that contain objective information and people who operate within a structure and
set of established processes (Hogarth, 1981). This thesis considers 'influence' factors under
relevant theories such as 'autopoiesis', (Varela, 1979), that suggest that the organisation closes
itself off from its environment when under stress, forcing managers to make decisions in a void.
This claim was made concerning the behaviour over time of the Civil Aviation Authority following a
series of preventable fatalities in aviation in Australia, particularly by analysts such as Maurino,
Reason, Johnston, and Lee, (1995:51), and Westrum (1992). Similarly individual perception and
decision style undoubtedly influence decision making preferences.

Contextual cues that depend upon the specific context in which individual decision making
occurs influence decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rowe and
Boulgarides 1992). This thesis considers such 'perceptual' factors under relevant theories such as
'meme theory' that suggest that dangerous unexamined assumptions persist in organisations to
provide context for managerial perceptions and hence decisions (Blackmore, 1999; Brodie, 1996;
Dawkins, 1976, 1982; Dennet, 1991, 1995, 1998; Zohar, 1997). Reason (1990) calls such factors

latent pathogens and suggests they lie hidden in organisations but nonetheless posess the power
to become active, accident causing factors under the right conditions.
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2.5.3.3

Decision Making and Cognitive Style

Decision making is also shaped by an individual manager's cognitive style and mental
models. Analysis of information to gain a better understanding of a situation and to estimate future
outcomes is an essential component of decision making in any field. The psychological
experiments that are most relevant have been conducted with experts in such diverse fields as
medical and psychological diagnosis (Oskamp, 1965; Goldberg, 1968) and horserace handicapping
(Slovic, 1973). The experiments reflect basic human processes that affect analysis of any subject. By
controlling the information made available to a group of experts and then checking the accuracy of
judgments based on this information, it is possible to investigate how people use information to
arrive at analytical judgments. Stock market analysts, for example, commonly work with
information concerning price-earnings ratios, profit margins, earnings per share, market volume,
and resistance and support levels, and it is relatively easy to measure quantitatively the accuracy of
the resulting predictions.
When horse racing handicappers' predictions were compared with the actual outcomes of 40
races, it was clear that average accuracy of predictions remained the same regardless of how much
information the handicappers had available. Three of the handicappers actually showed less
accuracy as the amount of information increased, two improved their accuracy, and three were
unchanged. All, however, expressed steadily increasing confidence in their judgments as more
information was received. With only five items of information, the handicappers' confidence was
well calibrated with their accuracy, but they became overconfident as additional information was
received (Slovic, 1973). The same relationships among amount of information, accuracy, and
analyst confidence have been confirmed by similar experiments in other fields such as
psychological diagnosis (Goldberg, 1968). Aseries of experiments to examine the mental processes
of medical doctors diagnosing illness found little relationship between thoroughness of data
collection and accuracy of diagnosis. As in other experiments, increasing information resulted in a
strong rise in confidence but a negligible increase in accuracy (Oskamp, 1965).

2.5.3.4

Decision Making Sans Information

There is increasing evidence that failure of managerial foresight and judgement may actually be
inherent in the role of managers. This is salient because the thesis considers man-made disasters.
Turner and Pidgeon (1997:10) provide a classification of disasters in which two types of disasters
are identified, (a) natural, and (b) man-made. The classification suggests that many natural
disasters are not foreseeable but most man-made disasters are. This is despite advances in the
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understanding of work design methods for greater reliability from organisational psychologists and
human factors experts (Muchinsky, 1993; Petersen, 1996). Systemic and behavioural issues are in
effect management issues, indicating blind spots that prevent managers learning from previous
experience. Work by several organisational psychologists on vigilant information processing
indicate that people can either share or not share a vigilant approach to information processing
and this approach will affect decision-making tasks (Pugh and Morley, 1988).

2.5.4 Organisational Perspective
A cluster of faddish change management theories that suggest ways organisations might

change (reengineering and sustainability) (Belbin, 1996; Dunphy and Griffiths, 1998; Stace and
Dunphy 1994; Dunphy, 1981; Watson, 1994; Andrews and Stalik 1994), and develop
(organisational learning and knowledge management) (Argyris and Schon, 1996), made no
discernible contribution to anything and seem more theoretically than specifically useful.
Generally, these theories provide insight into individual and organisational performance rather
than accident prevention, and issues such as high reliability requirements do not appear to be
addressed by them. By 2004, change management was abandoned by most large international
consulting firms. It is now (2004) making its way into the managerial and training curricula of
many universities. One might wryly observe that when universities start to teach something, the
show is well and truly over in the real world. However, these theories are relevant to the two
identified competencies (particular performance and multidisciplinary performance.

It is significant that failure of organisational systems is a matter of concern for managers, yet
the prescriptive texts on management and organisational behaviour pay very little, if any, regard to
mitigation or prevention of systemic failure. Since the consequences of failure in high reliability
organisations are often catastrophic, it is notable that the seminal management literature treats it so
inadequately. Literature in the management field that deals with strategy and rational approaches
to planning and decision making rarely mentions failure, blunders, accidents, and disasters. The
early classical literature in the field of management provided some small discussion of health and
safety issues and the need to set up emergency plans, but these issues were treated as part of
occupational health and safety, not from the point of view of managerial competencies (particularly
foresight).

Those classical managerial and organisational behaviour texts that one would assume might
deal with the subject, such as Simon (1957); March and Simon (1958); Cyert and March (1963,
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2001); Woodward (1965, 1980); and Sayles (1964) to some extent deal with issues of constructing
rational intent but not the consequences of the failure of rational intent. Assuming it is possible to
equate rational intent with foresight then the failure of 'managerial foresight' becomes a central
focus of this thesis since more recent literature suggests understanding these competencies might
contribute to the field of accident prevention as it pertains to management of high reliability
organisations, particularly in the areas of decision making, planning, strategy, policy, and
management training.
This research recognises the long tradition of examining management competencies, such as
in the fields of 'management behaviour' and 'managerial work' (Hales 1993), which typically
required managers to keep diaries, along with activity sampling, questionnaires, and having the
researcher following managers around observing their actions. The nature of the observations is
that of dealing with 'live' specimens. The managers generally are described in terms of their
interactivity. Carlson (1951) studied nine managing directors and Mintzberg (1973) put five chief
executives under observation. Relevant to this research are Mintzberg's observations (1973 and
1975), which revealed that managers activities are generally varied, typically of short duration - less
than half an hour - and often interrupted. He also observed that little time was spent reading or
reflecting or in solitary activity. These studies generally show that managers conduct their
organising through 'live action', moving around in networks of social relationships - often in
relationships where they have no authority. This research seeks to establish a case for the
relationship between these poorly attended factors, the failure of foresight and other important
competencies and catastrophic failure.

2.5.5 Sociotechnical Perspective
Turner's (1976, 1997) 'disaster sequence model' based on his theory of 'man-made
disasters' as postulated in his PhD thesis The Failure of Foresight (1976) hypothesises that highreliability organisations contain incubating accident-prone systems in which certain phenomena
lead to disaster and crisis. In his later book on the subject (1978/97), Turner discusses disasters
that exhibit these characteristics as 'sociotechnical' disasters, with social, organisational and
technical processes interacting to produce failure.

Sociotechnical systems theory, as it relates to values, trends and the characteristics of
effective organisations, is more recently discussed in the context of organisational change by
Dunphy (1981). Dunphy suggests that planning must move from the purely technical to become
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sociotechnical in character, with multidisciplinary groups assessing the impact of technological
innovations on personnel, work groups, and the social systems of organisations. He also examines
issues of goals, structure, procedures, the meaningfulness of the work, competencies of personnel,
politics and power, decision making, availability of information, interpersonal atmosphere,
performance expectations and reality checks, reward systems and environmental relationships.
Dunphy's points may well be extended to support the argument of this thesis that individual
managers may not be equipped to make some decisions. Dunphy's work is also relevant to Weick's
(1987) observations arising from the Mann-Gulch study since he discusses roles and designing jobs
to fit people and points out the differences between traditional job-design and contemporary
sociotechnical job re-design. It may be said that the collapse of roles and the inexperience of the
fire-fighters who died, compounded by the ambiguities of leadership, described by Weick, point to
the nature of sociotechnical systems as a key aspect of understanding disasters.

A systems approach to building safety into socio-technical systems may enable a clearer
understanding of accidents than is currently possible for complex, high-risk organisations. Such a
system would emphasise the relationships between all parts of high risk systems - how the parts
interact and fit together (Ackoff, 1971). Thus, the systems approach concentrates on the analysis
and design of the whole as distinct from the parts. A social and technical view of high reliability
systems needs to be taken (socio-technical). Complex system accidents are not linear. Analysis of
accidents based on systems theory focus on the interactions among system components and
usually do not specify single causal variables or factors (Leplat, 1987). Industrial (occupational
health and safety perspective) analyses tend to focus on unsafe acts or conditions. A systems
approach takes a broader view of what went wrong with the system's operation that allowed the
accident to take place. The question then arises, 'Is complexity an adequate explanation for
accidents?'

2.5.6 Perrow and Normal Accident Theory - Technological Complexity

A nomos (Gk: law - normative universe) acknowledges the complexity of the strands that
weave through an amorphous concept such as 'safety'. One of the seminal works on the
phenomena was written by Charles Perrow (1984, 1999) and is entitled 'Normal Accidents'. It
explores a nomos of acceptance of technological complexity as the acceptable cause of
catastrophes (normal accidents). Perrow suggests that 'catastrophe' is made 'normal' and an
'inevitable' consequence of industrial activity. Such catastrophes are regretted but nonetheless
considered 'normal' and therefore 'acceptable'.
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A normal or system accident, as Perrow defines it, involves the unanticipated interaction of
multiple failures of various of the system components. This is similar to the central idea Reason
(1990) develops in his 'Swiss cheese' model. Where a system is complex its components can
interact in unexpected ways, and where it is tightly coupled (where multiple failures can occur so
quickly that there is not sufficient time to analyse and react to what is happening), then system
accidents, he says, are almost inevitable. This was also found to be true for the 'Longford',
'Seaview', and 'Westralia' cases.

Two Longford workers were killed in an explosion in the oldest of three gas processing
plants near Sale, on September 25, 1998. The explosion also cut gas supplies to about one million
homes and businesses in Victoria for almost two weeks.

On 25 July 1994, Seaview Air was licensed as a Regular Public Transport Operator. On 2nd of
October 1994 the flagship of the Seaview Air fleet, VH-SVQ crashed while on a journey from
Williamtown to Lord Howe Island. Nine lives were lost.

On 5 May 98, HMAS WESTRALIA disembarked Fleet Base West for the Western Australia
Exercise Area. At about 1030 a significant fuel leak was noticed near the port main engine, with fuel
emerging under pressure in a manner similar to a garden hose. The ensuing fire killed four sailors.

The speed of the events surrounding the Columbia shuttle lift-off, in which a booster rocket
insulation fragment hit the left wing of the shuttle, may be considered an example of this
phenomenon. The window of opportunity to abort the mission was extremely small after the event
occurred. The event was not anticipated and the focus was on getting the shuttle into orbit (no
matter what) rather than aborting the mission, and the systems were complex. 'Lift-off was the

system state, not 're-entry'.

Hopkins (1999) asserts that what became known as the 'Moura' mine explosion cannot be
analysed in these terms. Moura coal mine in central Queensland was the site of an explosion in
which eleven men died. The system was not complex in the above sense. On the contrary, there
was nothing at all surprising or unexpected about the sequence of events; the process was quite
foreseeable and had given rise to disaster on two occasions in Queensland in the past when
spontaneous combustion and a methane gas build-up-were responsible for explosions. Firstly at
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Box Flat in southern Queensland in 1972, when seventeen miners were killed, then later at Kianga,
near Moura, in 1975, when thirteen men died. Moreover, the system was not tightly coupled in
Perrow's terms. Events unfolded slowly and resolute intervention at almost any point could have
averted disaster and saved the mine. Perrow himself acknowledged that coal mine disasters could
not be explained by his theory and Hopkin's analysis of the Moura accident confirms this
conclusion. Perrow (1999:244-255) states that mining is an inherently risky task. He points to
frequent equipment failures, failures of the environment within mines such as collapses, and
operator error.

Perrow observes that mine disasters are generally avoidable and provide ample warnings of
impending disaster. Mining is loosely coupled and is more complex than linear (Perrow, 1999:97),
which suggests that when failures occur there is some room for recovery within the constraints of
time-dependent processes. Perrow clearly indicates that the dangers lie not so much in the
processes but in the many invisible, unexpected, and unplanned interactions such as the
emergence of explosive gases and complex pressures shaped by the shafts and passageways, along
which gases and explosive forces can travel. In the light of Perrow's observations regarding the
inherent dangers in mines and the propensity to blame the victims of mining accidents it is
surprising that in cases such as Moura, where warnings were abundant and similar failures had
occurred previously, that management let the lessons of these incidents and the critical hazard
signals slip by. This insight contributed to the notion of the need for regulatory compliance and
intervention.

Perrow (1984) and Mitroff and Pauchant (1990:122) point to a phenomena they characterise
as 'naturalness' in that there is an incapacity to learn from crises because of a belief in technology.
This concept is strongly indicative of the need to ensure that this competency is in place as part of
the capabilities of managers and organisations. Mitroff and Pauchant state that "there is an
insistence on 'explaining the crisis away,' focusing on a narrow set of causes that seem to 'justify'
the crisis, making it 'exceptional' or 'abnormal' or caused by 'human error', which is endemic to
the belief in the 'naturalness of technology'. They suggest that this 'denial by exception' allows us
to reinforce the basic assumption that a particular technology has emerged from nature itself and
its use is thereby obligatory, 'natural', a 'fact of life', a 'given'. Therefore, a crisis can be explained
as the result of human errors. The media initially explained the Glenbrook rail disaster on
December 2, 1999 as a 'signals failure', implying human error, then it was later attributed to speed,
also implying human error. Yet the engine drivers both had contact by radio with the Glenbrook
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signals box - but not with each other because their radios were on different frequencies. The
Commission of Inquiry identified twenty three matters that caused or contributed to the accident,
demonstrating the complexity of factors and the role for compliance interventions in accident
cascades (Venn Brown, 2001).

Turner and Pidgeon (1997:164) identify this phenomena as 'limited information available to
two parties' each of whom would have been perfectly safe if the other had not been there. This is a
similar situation to that which occurred in Bangkok (ATSB, 1999) between Qantas Flight 1 and 15,
where the pilots could not talk to each other after QF 15 had aborted the landing. The question
that immediately jumps to mind is, who ordered the train radio frequencies to be different particularly in light of the potential hazards reported to management over many years on the
Glenbrook section of the line?

The Bhopal disaster (TED Case Studies, 2000) was first 'explained away' as an act of
sabotage, Exxon Valdez (NMFS, 2004) as an alcohol problem of the captain, Chernobyl (Reason,
1987) as a failure of the power generating technology. This 'reasonable' process tends to prevent
examination of basic assumptions about how 'natural' is it to produce dangerous chemical
products in a densely populated area, or operating massive oil tankers in environmentally fragile
areas, or operating nuclear facilities in populated areas. Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) argue that as
a technology is 'made natural' it becomes invisible to the executives who manage it and its dangers
are not perceived by them, hence the need for high levels of foresight and vigilance and their
relationship to compliance measures This was also applied in the Longford case where specific
instructions regarding risk management routines were ignored by management. It may have also
been a factor in the way that NASA's 'best minds' ignored the possible consequences of the
damaged shuttle wing on Columbia. Mitroff and Pauchant claim that executives expect that
technology will simply work They point to an airline that is reported as saying: 'We do not have
executive support for enhancing our technology; in many areas we are walking right on the edge of
a major disaster.'

This research suggests that 'foresight' is critical to the relationship managers have with the
causes of accidents. In each of the above cases management should have intervened, but they failed
to exercise the necessary vigilance or managerial judgement. Gunningham and Johnstone (1999)
consider this failure of foresight in relation to the need for the Law to punish such negligence.
These issues are considered in depth in the reports on all of the accidents examined, except the
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earlier 'Lake Illawarra', which while steaming up the Derwent River to Risdon on 5 January 1975,
collided with the Tasman Bridge at about 9.25 pm and subsequently sank. Several members of the
ship's crew, as well as persons crossing the bridge, lost their lives or are missing as a result of the
collision. This event was prior to these understandings entering the literature and court
judgements.

Multiple interacting influences introduced by people, organisations, and environments often
lie behind an accident, and these often exist in the social and cultural fabric that connects
individuals in an organisation. For example, an organisation's cultural values may prevent
criticism of dangerous work practices reaching senior staff, and in some cultures senior managers
do not tell each other the truth, which was also apparent in the reports of disasters such as the
Challenger Shuttle explosion, Bhopal gas plant leak, Exxon Valdez oil tanker spillage, Chernobyl
nuclear explosion (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; Reason, 1990). Such values may have a variety of
manifestations including arrogance demonstrated by those in power, hasty propagation of
unsound ideas, inhibition of individuals' capacity for judgement, an inward and defensive outlook,
work systems that do not convey crucial information or allow accountability, masking of critical
signals concerning potential hazards, and a tendency for decisions to be based on false consensus
or group-think, and for management to blame operational staff (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990;
Mi troff and Linstone, 1993). Each of these problems is potentially capable of causing a disaster.

2.5.7 Hopkins (lessons from Moura and Longford)

Hopkins (1999) identifies seven perspectives on disaster from his study of the Moura (1994)
coal mine disaster. He suggests that each perspective illuminates different aspects of what went
wrong. These perspectives point to failures of specific managerial competencies.

Hopkins comes to the following conclusions using the headings, normal accident theory,
inevitability, the priority of production, misinformation, latent errors, the failure of organisational
memory, and management system failure. His reasoning is important to understanding the
managerial aspects of the disaster.

2.5.7.1

Inevitability

The disaster was far from inevitable. In the words of the inquiry report it was a result of
'management neglect and non-decision that must never be repeated'. It was reasonably
foreseeable and practically preventable. It could and should have been avoided.
42

2.5. 7.2

The Priority of Production

Hopkins (1999) asserts that the view that the Moura explosion stems from the priority given
to production has much more to recommend it. He observes that Moura was a mine whose
economic viability was in doubt and there was pressure to maximise production. As Counsel for
the miners put it in his final submission, ' BHP ran a dangerous race against time to extract all of
the coal from 512 [panel] in accordance with the plan'. There were numerous ways in which
production was given a higher priority than safety at Moura. Most obviously, the routine practice of
allowing men underground when a sealed panel was going through the explosive range involved a
sacrifice of safety. Hopkins points out that more subtly, shift production reports were prepared at a
higher level in the management structure than shift safety reports. Again, substantial financial
incentives were paid for production but none for the conscientious management of catastrophic
risk. He concludes (as did the Inquiry) that this led to a situation where safety did not pay for
relevant decision makers. Moura was not unusual in this respect: Bhopal and the Herald of Free
Enterprise were two other disasters where it seemed that safety did not 'pay' in the minds of
relevant decision makers.

There is also a sense in which the very structure of government implicitly gives priority to
production. Hopkins refers to the location of mine inspectorates in government departments
whose primary function is the promotion of the mining industry. This undermines the ability of
inspectorates to impose safety standards on mines. The regulator role is not congruent with the
promotional role. This problem was also identified in the Piper Alpha report (Cullen, 1990) and
led to a recommendation to relocate the offshore inspectorate within the general occupational
health and safety organisation in Britain to ensure its independence from the industry it was
supposed to regulate. This same structural problem is inherent in the regulatory regime for
offshore petroleum production in Australia and to some extent in the aviation industry.

2.5. 7.3

The Failure of Organisational Memory

.Kletz's (1994) theory that disasters occur because of a failure of organisational memory has
particular significance in the Moura context. It might be argued that its management should have
learnt from the disasters in adjacent mines. Hopkins observes that the Inquiry found BHP, the mine
operator, had experience of previous mine disasters, the most recent being the explosions at
Moura No. 4 in 1986 and at Appin in NSW in 1979. It is BHP as an organisation whose memory was
defective, Hopkins reasons, because BHP had decentralised responsibility for disaster prevention to
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individual mine sites and had no central capacity or expertise with respect to disaster prevention.
BHP's corporate memory failed to retain the lessons of the various disasters it experienced.
Disasters are often 'carbon copies.' of earlier disasters (Braithwaite 1985:34-8). If BHP had
attended to the lessons of earlier coal mine explosions, eleven men would not have lost their lives
at Moura in 1994.

2.5.7.4

Management System Failure

Hopkins (1999), observes that the system for managing catastrophic risk at Moura was
entirely inadequate. Management had not applied itself carefully and systematically to managing
the problem of spontaneous combustion. It had, of course, given some thought to the matter.
Management had installed a gas monitoring system and it was assumed that this would give
warning of any spontaneous combustion that might be occurring. But no consideration had been
given to just what would count as a warning and how the mine would respond to any such
warning. In particular, no thought had been given to how the CO (carbon monoxide) results
would be interpreted and precisely what readings would trigger action. There was no action plan,
that is, no set of procedures to be followed for dealing with a suspected spontaneous combustion.
There were no procedures specified for the use of the sophisticated detection equipment
purchased after the previous explosion. This had echoes in the recent Oan 2003) Waterfall rail
disaster where the black box installed after the Granville rail disaster had not been turned on. The
result was that this equipment lay idle throughout the critical period in both incidents. Finally, no
thought had been given to just who would be responsible for doing what.

Management system failure is perhaps the most practical of all the perspectives considered
in that it highlights management competencies in planning for disaster prevention. No doubt for
this reason it is the perspective emphasised by the Moura inquiry as well as other recent disaster
inquiries. It led to the recommendation that mines develop specific plans for the management of a
small number of specified catastrophic hazards such as spontaneous combustion and it has led
inspectorates in NSW, WA and Queensland to draw up very detailed guidelines as to what mine
managers should include in these plans.

Management system failure incorporates several of the other perspectives considered above,
notably Turner's misinformation, Reason's latent errors and Kletz's organisational memory failure.
It does not supersede these, however, since it is these other perspectives that provide the insights
into just how management systems fail.
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2.5.7.5

Organisational Failures at Moura

Hopkins concludes that:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

2.5.7.6

There was no adequate system for communication of decisions down the
mine hierarchy.
There was no adequate system of communicating information about
warning signs up the hierarchy. In particular, people at BHP headquarters
had no access to such information.
There was no feedback mechanism to ensure that those reporting
hazards or warnings were notified of what action, if any, was taken.
There was a hierarchy of knowledge that led to a misplaced reliance on
personal experience and on oral communication and a tendency to
ignore written reports.
The system for communicating production figures was more developed
than the system for communicating safety information.
There was a norm at the mine that unless warning signs were verified
and confirmed they could be ignored.
There was a series of beliefs at the mine, amounting to a culture of
denial. One belief, in particular, 'normalised' the evidence-that is, it
reinterpreted the indications of abnormality as lying within the bounds of
normality.
There were no specified actions that were mandatory when warning signs
were detected.
No one was identified as responsible for critical, safety-relevant
decisions.
The system of auditing by the company was thoroughly inadequate.
The mine was using the wrong safety indicator-the lost time injury
frequency rate. This provided no indication of how well catastrophic risk
was being managed.
There were no incentives for mine managers to concern themselves with
disaster prevention.
BHP had decentralised responsibility for the control of catastrophic risk,
along with all other aspects of safety, to the mine level. It had no
corporate expertise in disaster prevention, despite its history of mine
explosions.
The law does not in practice hold the company or its senior management
legally accountable for disaster prevention in the mine.
Coal mines inspectorates are hamstrung in their enforcement efforts by
their position in mining departments.

Communication System

Hopkins argues that the system for communicating production figures was more developed
than the system for communicating safety information. This suggests the desirability of
computerising information and transmitting it via e-mail or some other system to a range of people
with relevant expertise at company headquarters and elsewhere. Computerisation would also mean
that databases on warning signs could be maintained and patterns of warning signs easily identified
and feedback to those who initially report information could be facilitated so that these reporters
know how their reports have been received and have a chance to comment on whether the
response is satisfactory.
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2.5.7.7

Cultural Impediments

Hopkins identified the paradox that production could continue at top speed only on the
understanding that the mine was safe and this requirement generated an elaborate set of beliefs
that provided this required reassurance. A hierarchy of knowledge developed at Moura and
Longford that gave most weighting to information acquired by personal experience. Information
acquired via oral communication was next in line while written communication was least effective.
Hopkins argues that this involved an explicit belief that personal experience was the best guide and
a belief that anything of importance in written reports would be transmitted orally. These beliefs
systematically undermined the value of the written safety reports.

Hopkins observed a second cultural phenomenon that he characterised as a culture of
denial - a set of beliefs that systematically discredited indicators that something might be wrong
and nullified warnings of impending disaster. They included the following beliefs: that the mine
was safe unless it was proved otherwise; that abnormally high rates of CO were to be expected
because of the novel mining method in use; that CO rates in any case had to show an exponential
rise before there was cause for concern; that the mine was protected from spontaneous
combustion by a six-month incubation period; and that no single indicator meant anything unless
it was placed in context. This matrix of beliefs meant that the isolated and spasmodic indicators
that something was wrong could be safely discounted. This very same phenomenon was evident in
the Challenger disaster where a belief evolved that 0-ring malfunction was normal and acceptable.
This belief served to disguise the fact that safety was being sacrificed so that launch schedules could
be met.

2.5.7.8

Getting Organisations to Attend to Risk

Hopkins suggests that the whole problem can be summed up as one of organisational
inattention. The attention of the organisation was simply not focused on the control of catastrophic
risk. The failures identified above and the principles of control to which they give rise are not
specific to underground coal mining. They apply with perhaps some variations to the management
of catastrophic risks generally. Similar failures occurring in organisations that do not have the
potential for disaster nevertheless result in inefficiencies, irritations and suboptimal performance.
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2.6 Competencies
Messick (1984) and Norris (1991) assert that 'competence' is a potential and performance is
actually carrying out the task. Soucek (1993) makes the critical point that different circumstances
require different competencies. These views taken together suggest that managers require both the
potential and the capacity to perform their roles in different situations.

2.6.1 Key Competencies - Industry Competency Standards

The potential and actual capabilities that people bring to the job in the form of talents,
abilities, and capacities are the focus of the Key Competencies (Mayer 1992). On the other hand,
systemic attributes of the job itself in the form of task demands, role requirements, and what
positions demand, permit and encourage, are more closely allied to Industry Competency
Standards (National Training Board, 1991, 1992). The data analysis (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)
examines the part played by managers (using their talents and capacities - Mayer Key
Competencies) in several incidents that occurred in high reliability organisations while they
occupied dominant coalition roles of supervisor, manager or director Gob or 'systemic' situational
factors - NTB).

The essential elements of 'competency' portrayed by the Key Competencies and Industry
Standards and relevant to this thesis are:
1. 'Competency' is being able to do something: This involves not only physical or
mental manipulation or the practised ability to perform managerial tasks with
facility, but an ability to bring knowledge, understanding and skill to bear on
performance. For example, in situations where high reliability is either espoused
or expected because of the higher risk involved such as in mining or aviation or
shipping. Further, 'competency' is about being able to do something well, not
just adequately.

2. 'Competency' is multi-disciplinary: It draws on a variety of knowledge,
understandings and skills. It challenges traditional boundaries of disciplines and
knowledge areas. For instance for an Air Traffic Controller, to display
'competency' might require the fusion of radar skills with knowledge of
mathematics, interpersonal communication, spatial separation abilities and
established practice. This principle is also suggestive that safety should be
managed by people with 'complementary skills'.
3. 'Competency' is judged against contextualised criteria: The criteria by which,
say, 'competency' in mathematics is judged are derived from settings in which
the mathematics is used. The criteria by which aircraft are separated must be
judged in the setting of aircraft separation required in air traffic control. The
criteria for safety management in HROs should be judged against the setting
pertaining to each high reliability organisation.
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2.6.2 Classification of Competencies
Competencies can be characterised in many ways. The National Training Board (NTB)
specifies (a) Units of Competence) and (b) Performance Criteria). These are general specifications
but they are equally specific to managing safety systems, particularly in high reliability
organisations. An example, using the NTB guidelines, that shows how the principles and theory
outlined in this thesis could be applied to advanced and cyclical refresher training programs for
CEOs and senior managers of High Reliability Organisations, is included in Appendix 3.

(a) Units of competence are convenient collections or clusters of competencies. They
provide a structure that enables many competencies to be managed, and to provide additional
meaning to the competencies classified under them. Units may be formed to assist with definition
and to describe tasks. For example, 'salience of setting', in a particular high reliability setting may
include communication, leadership skills, and ethical judgement sufficient to demand investment
in safety in an organisational culture that traditionally invests in capital equipment or marketing.

Salience is a psychological way of seeing a 'particular' situation and the events that pertain to
it. It is necessary therefore to be able to manage the 'salient' psychological space. This leads directly
to a requirement for a capacity to then manage the 'particular' background and the 'salient'
physical factors. Managing the physical space is a different task for each operational site and
depends on the capacity to manage the psychological space. These capacities are necessary to
constructing the mental schemata needed to exercise the level of expertise characteristic of
multidisciplinary performance.

(b) Performance Criteria enable us to describe a competency in more concrete terms. The
performance criteria tell us how we would know if the person had (or had not) achieved the
competency. This is evidenced in the cases where performance by managers was found to be
wanting or in some cases negligent.

Further specifications including Range Statements and Evidence Guides are also employed.
(c) Range Statements (range of variables) put boundaries on the scope of coverage of the
competencies and their performance criteria. For example, they might indicate that the Unit of
Competency might only apply to specific materials, equipment or size of an organisation. In
general terms these should not be needed, because as far as possible, NTB suggests, competencies
should be generic (transferable to other safety systems related areas). However, the literature
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(Souceck, 1993) points to management competencies being situation specific. The cases support
this view (ie, BHP's safety protocols used in one mine failed to prevent the accident at the Moura
mine).

(d) Evidence Guides indicate what kinds of evidence would apply to measuring
competencies within a specific Unit or Cluster. Gonzci (1993) provides guidance in competency
based assessment strategies for the professions.

The ten competencies and compliance (in section 2.4) are equivalent to units of competence
. convenient collections or clusters of competencies. The 260 codes or descriptors are equivalent to
the competencies. They are a smaller grain size and because they are mostly behavioural they can
function as performance criteria to enable us to describe a competency in more concrete terms. In
accident and risk management as revealed in this research they also proscribe the boundaries of
the taxonomy of relevant competencies. The NTB model lends itself well to the design of training
programs utilising these units of competence and competencies. Two types of useful training
related data became apparent in examining the sources; performance data relating to the job or
role requirements expressed in terms of key result areas, key tasks or activities and performance
indicators; and competency data relating to skills, knowledge and attitudes expressed in observable
behaviour terms. Performance characteristics of each safety related management role are important
in the design of training curricula. This research concentrates on examining the competency data
as it illuminates the ten core accident and risk management competencies suggested by the
research questions.

2.6.3 Sources of Accident and Risk Management Competencies

Key theorists use a range of equivalent and synonymous terms and approaches to describing
the phenomena under study. There is significant agreement and triangulation from the literature,
cases, commission reports and the Mayer (1992) insights on the ten core 'capabilities' (in section
2.4) as prerequisites for safety in high reliability organisations. These capabilities and attributes
required of the person in the managerial role along with analytical ability, decision making,
problem solving, empathy, caring, establishment of relationships, interactions with colleagues and
a range of other attributes that are difficult to measure but which can be inferred from a person's
actions (Heywood, Gonczi, and Hager, 1992) form the competencies revealed in this research.
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The competencies observed in the cases is confirmed through the mainstream risk and
accident related literature, which includes the work of authors such as Perrow (1984), Reason
(1990), Turner (1976; 1978), Turner and Pidgeon (1997), Mitroff (1990), Hopkins (1999), and
Petersen (1996). It is further illuminated by emerging ideas found in orthodox organisational
theory, psychology, and law, and in non traditional management fields such as Darwinian ideas
developed in meme theory (Dawkins, 1976), autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980), and also
education and training (Mayer, 1992).

The research also shows that in each case where accidents occurred there was an amplified
concern for 'the bottom line' and 'stakeholder returns' and a range of other 'production' related
pressures, rather than safety. The accident reports make it clear that the ten core capabilities were
lacking or not employed and tend to fail or are overwhelmed when financial or production
pressures take precedence. This line of reasoning is strongly suggestive of the need for a powerful
compliance regime to ensure that such pressures do not prevail over the competencies needed to
ensure safety. Significant sanctions against such managerial and organisational lapses are suggested
by Gunningham and Johnstone (1999), particularly where fatalities occur.

These factors are at the core of the principal argument of this thesis, that if managers have
the competencies listed above and use them to intervene in unfolding accident sequences then
accidents will be less likely to occur. This claim also requires consideration of the corollary that the
organisation must also possess these competencies.

2.6.4 Competencies, Prior Knowledge, and Misinformation in Accident
Scenarios

The relationship does not appear to have been well made before in the general orthodox
management literature that prior knowledge of potential accidents is related to managerial
competencies. The key literature pointing to prior knowledge as a factor in accidents (Turner,
1984, and Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) has been developed by others to indicate that individuals are
less to blame for accidents than the systems that allow them to occur (Reason, 1990). Reason is
reflecting on Turner's observation that disasters often occur because crucial information that is
available at lower levels of the organisation is not systematically assembled in a coherent way and
not passed up the hierarchy to a point where it can be responsibly acted upon. Turner claims that
critical information: can be buried in other material, too widely distributed, limited to a few
parties, wilfully withheld, or rendered useless by being ambiguous. For example, there were
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various reports of smells and of abnormally high CO (carbon monoxide) readings prior to the
Moura mine disaster. But there was no system for capturing and collating this information, or
retrieving it for review, and so it was rapidly lost. Turner suggests that the central question to ask
is: 'What stops people from acquiring and using appropriate information?' Similarly, Hopkins
(2002), and the Longford Royal Commission (Dawson, 1999), noted that in the Longford explosion
there were continuous alarms sounding that people habituated to and ignored. The capacity to
utilise prior knowledge is dependent on the nature of the organisation and the mental world or
habitus it creates. The concept goes beyond that seen in organisational theory of 'culture'.

2.6.5 Habitus
The roots of habitus are found in Aristotle's notion of 'hexis', elaborated in his doctrine of
virtue, meaning an acquired yet entrenched state of moral character that orients our feelings and
desires in a situation, and thence our conduct . balance. This thesis uses these senses of the term in
relation to ethics (competency one) and balance (competency five) and to suggest an environment
framed by ethical and balanced schemata). However, 'habitus' is somewhat more complex and this
thesis also embraces these complexities. The term was translated into Latin as habitus (past
participle of the verb habere, to have or hold) in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas in his

Summa 1beologiae, in which it acquired the added sense of competence or ability for growth
through activity, or durable disposition (mental stance) suspended mid-way between potency and
purposeful action - the competence of balance. The term was used by Emile Durkheim (in his
course on Pedagogical Evolution in France, 1904-5), his nephew and close collaborator, Marcel
Mauss (in the essay Techniques of the Body, 1934), as well as by Max Weber (in his discussion of
religious asceticism in Wirtschaft und Gesel/schaft, 1918) and also by Thornstein Veblen (who
reflects on the "predatory mental habitus" of industrialists in 1be Theory of the Leisure Class,
1899). Turnbull (2000), later explored the notion of the influence of a predatory mental habitus on
corporate governance in Australia.

The phenomenologist Husserl (1973) defined habitus as the mental conduit between past
experiences and forthcoming actions and to that extent foreshadowed Turner's (1977, 1978, 1997)
theory of 'prior knowledge'. Husserl also developed the connection between competency and
judgement, which is examined in section 5.5 in chapter 5.
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' ... decisions taken in the highe t echelons of the system - seed organisational patbogens into the
system at large'. For example many chief executive of companies with an engineering base put up
signs listing the number of day ince the last lost-time injury and set zero accidents as a corporate
goal. Reason uggests that this is steering safety based on negative outcomes. It is an approach that
is completely counter-productive according to Reason. It suggests that safety may be equated with
avoiding injuries. Also, it acts a a powerful deterrent to anyone reporting them (Uren 2000) and
undennines trust. This research notes that that the injury rate had been halved at BHP's Moura coal
mine in the year prior to a collap e killing 11 miners in 1994. Lowering injury rates is not the same
thing as operating a safe organisation.

According to Reason between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of accidents include bu man error,
o it is not surprising that managers see their job a trying to reduce the scope for human error.
They do that by trying to reduce variability to en ure con istency of action through the application
of systems. The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and
tries to build defences to avert errors or mitigate their effects. It asserts that humans are fallible and
errors are to be expected, even in the best organisations. Errors are seen as consequences rather
than cau es, having their origins not so much in the perversity of human nature as in "up tream"
systemic factors. Toe e include failed error traps in the workplace and the organi ational processes
that give rise to them. Countermeasures according to Rea on, call for us to examine the
assumption that though we cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions
under which humans work. A central idea is that of 'system defences'. All hazardous technologies
possess barriers and afeguard . When an adverse event occurs, the important issue is not who
blundered, but how and why the defences failed.
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Figure 2.7.1 Adding the Failure of Barrier Defences to the system (Reason, 1990:208).
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Reason explains that defences, barriers, and safeguards occupy a key position in tbe system
approach (Figure 2.7.1) . High technology systems have many defensive layer : some are
engineered (alarms, physical barriers, automatic shutdowns, etc), others rely on people (surgeons,
anaesthetists, pilots, control room operators, etc), and yet others depend on procedures and
administrative controls. Their function is to protect potential victims and assets from local hazards.
Mostly they do this very effectively, but there are always weaknesses. Each defensive layer should be
intact. In reality, however they are more like slices of Swiss cheese, having many boles though,
unlike in the cheese, these holes are continually opening, shutting and shifting thelr location
(Figure 2.7.2). The presence of holes in any one "slice" does not normally cause a bad outcome.
Usually, this can happen only when the holes in many layers momentarily line up to permit a
trajectory of accident opportunity bringing hazards into damaging contact with victims.

Losses

Figure 2.7.2 Reason's Swiss Cheese Model of barriers that fail, leading to a trajectory of
opportunity, leading to system accidents (Reason, BMJ 2000, 320:768-770; Maurino, Reason,
Johnston, and Lee, 1995:25).

Reason's (1990) theory of latent and active errors states that major accidents occur when
latent failures, arising mainly in the managerial and organisational spheres, combine adversely with
local triggering events (weather, location, gravity etc) and with the active failures of individuals at
the operational interface (errors and procedural violations) (Figure 2.7.3). These ideas suggested
the organisational competencies, organisational ethos and constructing a culture of safety.
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action/interaction; while the inner rings pertain to those conditional features bearing most closely
upon an action/interaction sequence" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:161). "The researcher needs to fill
in the specific conditional features for each level that pertain to the chosen area of investigation,"
regardless of which particular level it is (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:161).
Strauss and Corbin (1990:238-239) argue that a grounded theory that is faithful to the
everyday realities of a substantive area 'is one that has been carefully induced from diverse data....
Only in this way will the theory be closely related to the daily realities (what is actually going on) of
substantive areas, and so be highly applicable to dealing with them.' Actual reports of accidents
relate the theory to the realities.

Competencies

Compliance

Continuum of
influencing conditions
intersects the
competencies and
compliance
componenets of the
research

Figure 3.4.2 Conditional Matrix according to Strauss and Corbin, (1990).

The thesis adopts this Competencies - Compliance model (Figure 3.4.2) and it is permeated,
intersected and informed by influencing conditions on a continuum. For example, the inner circle
includes compliance phenomenon and the factors that might influence it, such as 'costs' of
accident prevention and considerations of individual versus organisational and social responsibility
versus profit and cost cutting. The outer circle includes specific hazard identification, intervention
skills and managerial competencies particularly as they shape managerial priorities and capture
'prior knowledge' of accident conditions. The conditions at each level of the continuum have
relevance; for example, the inner circle managerial priorities are probably framed by the extent to
which there is a need to comply with regulations and the general ethical considerations of care and
diligence valued by both an organisation and the community. This conditional matrix sets the
conditions under which a culture of safety can be built where competencies such as vigilance
become a priority, where ethics and judgement are exercised and foresight is enacted in practical
hazard interventions.
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In summary, the 260 codes (descriptors) and eleven coding patterns (compression
categories) are derived through the researcher's impressions and perceptions of the triangulation
of 1. the raw text case data, 2. the literature, 3. the HyperRESEARCH coding process, and 4. the
Grounded Theory model, with a strong body of literature to support this approach (George and
Smoke, 1989: 171; Bennett and George, 1997:12-13; Ragin and Zaret, 1983:731; George, 1982:21;
Bennet, 1997:7-10; Richards and Richards, 1985; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 1983:111;
Strauss and Corbin, 1990:61; Becker and Geer, 1960:280; Hanson, 1965; Kelle, 1995: 39; Kelle and
Laurie, 1995)

3.5 The Model
Underpinning Capacities:

ethics (organisational and individual manager's values and behaviour as they influence
the determination of right from wrong in decisions concerning safety)
foresight (attitudinal 'stance' and 'intelligent looking ahead' as factors in decisions
concerning safety)
vigilance (hazard perception and awareness and an alert 'way of seeing' are necessary to
signal detection)
judgement (weighing up, trading off, and deciding - often in circumstances that make
little sense or meaning, are factors in all competencies)
balance (psychological tenor, courage and persistence are essential in safety versus
financial decisions)

Organisational Factors

organisational ethos (open or closed [autopoietic] organisational cultures shape
hazard management capabilities)
constructing a culture of safety ('intention' to establish a culture of safety, 'ways of
seeing', and persistent personal or organisational ideas - 'memes' influence the systemic
capacities for managing safety

Capacity to Perform

understanding the salience of the particular situation and its context
(awareness of organisational and incident factors peculiar to particular hazardous
environments)
performance in a particular setting (managerial capacity to deal with stress,
conflict, and unfolding disaster in particular hazardous environments)
multidisciplinary performance (bringing together skills from different and
complementary domains to manage a particular hazard)

Regulatory Compliance and Intervention

compliance (compliance and regulatory factors, legal and other punitive responses to
managerial failure)
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3.6 HyperRESEARCH and Coding
The raw data exists as textual reports of incidents. The 260 codes were derived from the case
reports, which were scanned and coded into HyperRESEARCH. This coding process had the effect
of triangulating the data from the literature with the actual text of the case reports and imposing an
organising discipline. However, the combination of coding compression from this
HyperRESEARCH data and a Modified Grounded Theory interrogative reading of the case reports
('working up' from data) along with the framing constraints of the relevant literature ('working
down' from theory) provided the best theoretical and practical insights.
Inferences that might be drawn from numeric frequencies of observation (code frequency)
depended on being identified in the Inquiry Reports on each case and were considered unreliable
indicators of either theoretical or practical significance. The use of numerical code frequency data
in this instance therefore provided little more of value than its pursuit as 'pseudo-science'. The full
code list is included in the Appendix as an Excel Pivot table. Table 3.6.1 below lists 36 of the 260
codes as they finally emerged from the five cases in descending frequency.
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. SumofFreauenc1es across five cases of behavioural codes.
Table 3 . 61
Code

Case

lllawarra

Lonaford

Grand
Westralia Total

Moura

Seaview

3

26

2

44

compliance

5

8

failure of responsibility
systemic management
failure

3

12

20

2

37

4

28

diligence and propriety

8
7

16

1

16

24

iudgement

10

5

8

23

prior knowledge

1

1

16

2

23

competencies

8

4

9

1

22

diagnostic failure

2

12

5

2

21

3

19

duplicitous conduct
failure of procedures

6

7
15

19
4

17

failure of regulator

1

1

vigilance

4

6

6

1

17

information failure

1

12

1

1
2

15
14

17

failure of safetv svstems

12

knowledae manaaement
safety management
svstems

10

3

1

14

5

6

5

3
9

14

trainina
ethics

1

12

5

3

inadequate response
management system
failure

1

materiel conditions

5

9

1

4
6

surveillance procedures

5

14
13

4

13

2

12
12

3
1

12

equipment defects

3

2

3

3

11

error detection
failure to exercise
competencies
knowledge management
framework
managerial
responsibility

3

3

1

4

11

1

10

11

11

11

1

multiple factors

2

6

1

11

2

3
7

8

3

11

6

4

10

4

4

2

10

4

3

3

10

poor documentation

7

3

10

serious risk ignored

2

8

10

2

6

2

10

2

3

operational deficiencies
failing to keep or supply
records
failure to enforce
regulations
failure to notify safety
concerns

situational risk factors
Turnerenergy+misi nformation

3

11

2

10

115

The method lend teouou empirical weight to the emerging theory, in that it goes some
way to confirming the frequency with which certain critical descriptors are mentioned, and
therefore considered important by those charged with investigating the accidents reported. This
approach was employed to enable testing and assist in verification through triangulation of the
theories that emerged during the research and was also adopted to assist in specifying what
evidence might disconftrm a well as afftrm an emerging theory. It also enabled cell (code)
reduction and compression.

HyperRESEARCH (http://www.researchware.com/) enables a controlled code-and-retrieve
process which consists of labelling passages of the text data (or audio, video or image data. Figure
3.6.1) according to what the theory and data itself are about or because of other content of interest
in them (coding or indexing), then it provides a way of collecting identically labelled passages
(retrieving) .

1=21

D

1~~

Image

Figure 3.6.1 HyperRESEARCH Data Analysis process

This retrieval process is researcher informed and is congruent with the categories and
patterns mentioned earlier. An example of this process is in Figure 3.6.2 on the next page. This is a
thumbnail graphic inserted here to enable a quick understanding of the highlighting technique.
The graphic is reproduced in Appendix 1 in higher resolution.
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3. 7 Conclusion
The fonnal coding process (open coding of the case data and theoretical coding of the
literature) was informed by both the computer necessitated requirements of HyperRESEARCH, by
Kelle's (1997) insights into 'indexing'9 and the approach of qualitative analysis to coding of textual
material in ongoing analysis to develop theories and hypotheses 10, and also by the analysis
processes outlined in Miles and Hubennan (1994:50-89), particularly 'pattern coding'. Code
reduction and compression from 260 codes to ten core competencies and compliance factors is
undertaken in Chapter 4 - Data Analysis (in effect, open, axial and selective coding) and reveals
pattens from the codes. The conditional matrix analysis process was also informed by Miles and
Huberman (1994: 144-171), particularly 'causal networks' and 'case ordered effects matrices' and
'causal networks in cross case analysis'.
The application of formal coding and analysis of the cases chosen imposed sufficient
methodological injunctions on the quality and selection of cases, coding and analysis, and drawing
of inferences through structured reasoning to reveal patterns of management failure resulting from
deficits in managerial competencies and failures of compliance, which are methodologically
defendable and which fit well within the proscribed boundaries of the research. The data, which is
in text form, is discussed in the framework of 'data analysis' in chapter 4, and then applied using
the methodology described here in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, under the taxonomic headings of
underpinning capacities, organisational factors, capacity to perform, and regulatory compliance
and intervention issues.

9

Kelle's paper, section 4, on 'Using Textual material for theory building: the qualitative approach',
especially section 44 on 'hypothetical reasoning' and in s. 5 on open and theoretical coding.
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4 Data Analysis
'It is a capital mistake to theorise before you have all the evidence. It biases the
judgement. Insensibly, one begins to twist facts to suit theories instead of
theories to suit facts.'
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle as Sherlock Holmes, A Study in Scarlet

4.1 Introduction to the Data Analysis Chapters (5-8)
This chapter sets out the data analysis method applied in each of the folowing four chapters.
It elaborates the steps involved in examining the data according to the Modified Grounded Theory
model set out in chapter three using the following analytical criteria: interpretation, statement of
relationships between concepts, asking generative and concept relating questions, literature, case
text data, elaboration of theory, grounding the theory through interplay with other data from the
research, and elaboration to hypothesis. It also describes a coding compression and cell reduction
process using HyperRESEARCH and sets out the core competencies and descriptors in tabular form
and makes a case for data triangulation against Whiteley's (1999) eight characteristic markers of
autopoietic organisations.
This conceptual set of analytical tools was described in chapter 3 in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
These analytical tools are based mainly on the work of Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Strauss and
Corbin in Denzin and Lincoln, (1994:273-285). The process is briefly outlined in section 4.1.1:

4.1.1 Analytical Tools
1 INTERPRETATION

Characterises the HyperRESEARCH text data and defines the boundaries of the competency,
as it is developed in this research, set against the broad sweep of the literature. It identifies the
competency descriptors derived from the HyperRESEARCH analysis to be examined.
For example, in chapter 7, the descriptors related to performance in a particular setting (the
competency being examined) are set out in the following way:
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Table 7.2.2 HyperRESEARCH Performance in a Particular Setting
Descriptors
active failures of individuals, careless navigation, communication downwards,
escape routes, failure of procedures, failure to grasp whole of system picture,
inadequate supervision, inappropriate response, inadequate response, information
overload, irrational reasoning, limited operator knowledge, operating outside limits,
specification failure, unanticipated interaction of multiple failures.

2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS

Establishes the most salient connections with the other core competencies (chapter 3,
s3.4.1)
3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS

Poses generative questions rather than competency audit questions to make further
connections between competencies. These questions are directed at opening thinking on the topic
rather than analysis of it. This section in each chapter seeks to locate concerns which may have
emerged from the broad sweep of research data including material not included but considered
relevant by the researcher. The questions are intended to be theoretical in the sense they feed into
the research analysis which follows. Generative questions attempt to generate issues of relevance
related to, or which might be construed from the research concepts (chapter 3, s3.4.1, Becker
(1993)).
4 LITERATURE

Sources that speak to the findings of the HyperRESEARCH analysis and the nature of the
competencies. This section is definitional and sets the specific competency being examined into a
framework of theoretical sources. This section is an extension of chapter 2, the Literature Review,
which sets the theoretical and taxonomic framework for the entire study.
5 CASE TEXT DATA

The HyperRESEARCH analysis of the text data source from the Commission of Inquiry
Reports and findings. The case source is in bold with underline, at the beginning of the paragraph
ie, WESTRALIA. The HyperRESEARCH code is italicised in the square brackets in each example
that follows. For example, [espoused values]. Section numbers from the original report are also
included, For example, Westralia [cultural attitude to regulations] 61...text, text, text. This
indicates that the quote is data from the Westralia case dealing with the coding descriptor 'cultural
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attitude to regulations' from the HyperRESEARCH data set- item 61 in the Commission Report on
the Westralia case.
6 ELABORATION OF THEORY

The researcher's construction of the conceptual possibilities established in the literature and
the data analysis. It attempts to show how the core competency being examined might be relevant
to high reliability organisations and then suggests a theoretical proposition based on the evidence.
7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH

The data analysis of the five cases triangulated by evidence taken from other relevant cases
(chapter 3, s3.4.l) not part of the HyperRESEARCH data set.
8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS

A final statement construed from the evidence to suggest ways the particular competency
could be considered in high reliability organisations, particularly in relation to practical
possibilities, for example in training.

4.1.2 Intersection of Management Responsibility and the Case Studies

The accident reports examined in the following data analysis chapters attempt to bring some
light to the shadowy antinomies of management's responsibilities for safety set against its
adherence

to

assumptions of managerial orthodoxy. For example, the literature reviewed in

chapter two suggested that we must ask, 'is the captain ultimately to blame for the ship running
aground', or is the real cause located elsewhere and foreseen by management? The causal
mechanisms and key variables influencing choice of cases are boundary proscribing in that
examples were sought that are illustrative of a range of relatively recent Australian incidents that
resulted in loss of life, could have been prevented if signals from the system had been attended to
by managers, and which occurred in otherwise high reliability organisations espousing safety as
critical to their operations.
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4.2 Research Questions
4.2.1 Principal Research Question

What significant underpinning capacities, organisational factors, and perfomzance capacities
are revealed in accident reports, and what competencies flow from these to enable dominant
coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively engage in accident prevention?
4.2.2 Subsidiary Research Question

What significant factors are revealed in accident reports and key literature as being required
by dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively enable compliance with
accident prevention regulations and appropriate intervention strategies in unfolding accident
scenarios?

4.3 Case Choice
The data comes from five recent accidents in Australian high reliability organisations. The
cases chosen provide a multi-layered, nuanced, and adequate understanding of the problem of
management competencies in relation to failures of safety in high reliability organisations
according to the principles set out in chapter 3 under sections 3.2 and 3.3. There is a reasonable
level of confidence in this process since the data from the case reports were both reinforced and
informed by the literature and reached a satisfactory level of saturation clustered around the ten
core competencies and compliance.
While Weick (1979) states that case studies have at least four drawbacks: (1) situation
specific, (2) ahistorical, (3) tacitly prescriptive, and (4) one-sided, this research is a legitimate small
n investigation as described in the chapter on Methodology in section 3.3.2, and in this chapter
under section 4.4 where the five major incidents are summarised. Each case is a study of an actual
incident recorded as coroner's reports, boards and commission's of inquiry, and published reports
and analyses in book and report form, supplemented by examination of other cases to provide
perspective within the framework of a proscribed literature. Yin (1994) describes the method as
'multiple case'; Creswell (1998) as 'cross case comparison'. The following Australian cases and a
range of overseas cases (Zeebrugge, Bhopal, and others that appear in the literature, ie Mitroff and
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Linstone, 1993) were examined. Table 4.3.1 itemises the Australian cases that were selected to
include a variety of incident and organisational types to allow for examination of different
management styles and organisational cultures (Creswell, 1998).
Table 4.3.1 Cross Case Comparison
Event Type
Case
Site
Lake
lllawarra,1975

Tasman Bridge
Hobart

Mauro,1994

Coal Mine
Queensland
At sea between
Newcastle and
Lord Howe Is
RAN ship

Seaview,
Oct,1994
Westralia,
1998
Longford,
1998

2

Esso's Power
Generating Plant
at Longford in
Victoria

Lives Lost

Tasman
Bridge
Collapse
Underground
Explosion
Crash of
commuter
aircraft
Fire in engine
room - off
Fremantle
Explosion

12

HRO area of
Operations
Shipping

11

Mining

9

Aviation

4

Military/Navy

2,8
injuries

Documents
Available

�

�

Power
generation

Accessible reportage and documentation on the central issues was critical in the choice of
these examples. The Mauro Mine inquiry, for example, yielded more than 5000 pages of transcript,
thousands of pages submitted as exhibits, a 70 page report (Windridge, 1996), a separate Coroner's
report (Windridge, 1969a); and a book (Hopkins, 1999).
4.3.1 Case Summaries
The naive arguments that accidents are either 'acts of god' or that the 'operator is entirely to
blame' are holding less and less sway as legislation and knowledge of accident attribution develops
over time. The analysis of accidents is becoming more focused on causes that lie behind the
'supernatural event' and 'operator-accident interface' and tend to focus on the chain of decisions
and events, which if they had been better controlled, may have prevented the accident. These
'causes' are adequately revealed in the Australian cases chosen for this study. Disconfirming cases
seem to rely on the 'act of god' or the 'operator interface' options as causes and occurred prior to
the emergence of the later understanding that accidents are primarily systemic, rendering these
older cases irrelevant to the emergence of later 'systemic' approaches.
The research data collected and its analysis can only be inferred to specifics and
generalisations that apply to cases that are similar in the values of their variables to the types of
cases under study (George and Smoke, 1989: 171; Bennett and George, 1997:12). The lessons
drawn from these studies may, however, be generalised, with reasonable confidence, to other
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potential accidents. Many of the principles may also be inferred to the decisions made by boards
and senior managers in other potential 'risk' situations such as those surrounding investment
decisions.
The cases (small 'n' study) in the list below in bold type were chosen for analysis for the
reasons outlined above and because they further proscribe the incidents as they are related to
accident and industry type, the limitations imposed by access to coronial and board of inquiry
documents, the mode of reporting of the accident, relationship to legislation, congruence with the
literature and generalisability of the findings. In each case the accidents occurred in high reliability
organisations, and were foreseeable and preventable. Turner's (1978, 1997) core disaster theory,
which states that all accidents occur in the presence of prior knowledge, proved to be the essential
theoretical factor common to all the cases reviewed. His theory goes to the heart of this research in
its concern for setting out the lessons learned as competencies that can be acquired by managers in
straightforward training programs. Hence, the cases chosen are 'confirming' cases and seek to
elaborate, for theoretical and practical purposes, the central premise of 'prior knowledge' and to
establish its contingency on competencies and compliance.
4.3.2 Australian Cases Examined
The cases in bold type and italicised were selected from a broad selection of the Australian
cases examined from 1912 to 1998. These cases are sourced from the Australian records of
industrial accidents generally available from WorkCover Australia11 and the National Archives held
in the Australian National Library in Canberra. Reasons for the selection of cases for this research
included availability of documentation, diversity of case type, variation of industry type, and
evolution over time of insights from the commissions of inquiry and the emergence, over time, in
the literature, of an incrementally more sophisticated understanding of accidents, and related fields
of understanding such as psychology, linguistics, management, philosophy and sociology. The
following cases were chosen for analysis: Lake Illawa"a, 1975; Moura, 1994; Seaview, 1994;

Westralia, 1998; andlongford, 1998.
1912 · North Lyell (Tasmania) Copper Mine: 42 miners suffocated
1921- Mt Mulligan coalmine (QLD): 75 died in gas explosion
11 The Internet now carries comprehensive work related accident information on the web sites of each
Australian State. For example the south Australian site carries a complete list of web links:
http://www.workcover.com/ learning/ Iinks/LinksWorkCovers.asp
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1923 - Bellbird Park coal mine (NSW): 21 deaths
1947 7 Aug - Fire/Explosion in ship at Melbourne dock: 10 men killed
1950s/1960s · Snowy Mountains Project (NSW): 121 deaths
1970 15 Oct - Westgate Bridge Collapse (Melbourne): 35 killed
1972· Box Flat coal mine (QLD): 17 deaths
1974 - Cyclone Tracy hits Darwin: 3 killed
1975 5Jan · Tasman Bridge struck byfreighter: 12 lives lost
1975 - Kianga Coal Mine (QLD) Explosion: 13 miners killed
1977 18 Jan - Granville Australia's worst rail disaster (NSW): 83 deaths
1979 · Appin Colliery (NSW): 14 deaths
1986 · Moura No 4 coal mine (QLD): 12 miners killed
1987 8 Dec - Australia Post gunman (Melbourne): 8 workers killed
1988 4 Aug - Queen St Construction accident (Brisbane): 3 pedestrians killed
1989 20 Oct - Cowper Bus crash (between Taree and Macksville, NSW): 21 killed
1989 22 Dec - Kempsey 2 Bus collision (NSW): 36 fatalities
1989 28 Dec - Newcastle Earthquake (NSW): 13 deaths
1991 21 Aug - Coode Island Chemical Fire and Explosion (VIC)
1994 2 Mar· Letter bomb at NCA Adelaide: 1 killed
1994 7 Aug -Moura No 2 Coal Mine explosion (QLD): 11 miners killed
1994 2 Oct · Seaview Air crash (Newcastle to Lord Howe Island): 9 killed
1987· Cairns Bleve 1 killed
1980 - Sydney Bleve O killed
1987 - CSR/ICI Chemical Explosion Rhodes Sydney: 5 contractors killed
1995 24 Feb - Cyclone Bobby (WA): 7 fisherman killed
1996 27 Sept - Cliff Collapse (WA): 9 killed
1996 8 April· Kew Cottages Fire at Melbourne: 9 killed
1996 28 April· Port Arthur massacre (TAS): 35 killed
1996 12 June - Blackhawk helicopter crash at Townsville (QLD): 18 soldiers killed
1996 - Peanut Butter Food Poisoning: 1 death, 51 poisoned
1996 14 Nov - Gretley Coal Mine (NSW): 4 miners killed
1998 HMA Ship Westralia (WA),fuelftre: 4 sallors killed
1998 Longford gas plant (Vic), explosions andfire: 2 killed

4.3.3 Selected Case Summaries
4.3.3.1

Shipping - Lake Illawarra (1975)

The case of the ship that brought down the bridge at Hobart (the ss Lake Illawarra) is
relevant because it illustrates the factors observed in the other cases but at a time before it was
understood that accidents are mostly systemic in nature, even those that seem to be attributable to
front line workers (in this case the Captain). On 5 January 1975 at about 9.25 pm the steam turbine
bulk carrier, 'Lake Illawarra' while steaming up the Derwent River to Risdon on a voyage from Port
Pirie, South Australia, collided with the Tasman Bridge and subsequently sank. Part of the bridge
collapsed and several members of the ship's crew, as well as persons crossing the bridge, lost their
lives or are missing as a result of the collision.
Hobart Harbour is under the jurisdiction of the Marine Board of Hobart. Vessels entering
Hobart Harbour do so from Storm Bay or D'Entrecasteaux Channel. Vessels exceeding 50 metres

125

(164 ft.) in length must pass through the main navigational span. This rule applied to 'Lake
Illawarra'. Regulation 3 of Part N of the Rules and Regulations of the Port of Hobart 1974 required:
( 1)
The Master or person i n charge of a vessel which i s approaching an
apertu re for the purpose of passing under the Bridge shall have such way u pon
his vessel that the vessel is under control in all res pects and s hall navigate with
all possible care and only at such m i n i mum speed as i s requi red safely to pass
under the Bridge.
(2)
No Master or person in charge of a vessel proceedi ng under power shall
attempt to pass under any part of the Bridge unless to his knowledge such vessel
i s in a fit and proper condition in all respects to pass under the Bridge."

Until 1971 pilotage was not compulsory in the Port of Hobart. Captain Pelc obtained a
Pilotage Exemption Certificate on 3 July 1967, when he held a First Mate's rank after completing
three qualifying voyages.
In 1971 the Marine Board of Hobart amended the Rules and Regulations relating to pilotage.
Pilotage Exemption Certificates issued prior to the coming into force of this bylaw had the same
force as Certificates issued under this bylaw .
Before departing Port Pirie on 2 January 1975, Captain Pelc forwarded the following
telegraph message to the Marine Board of Hobart:
"Vessel bound for Risdon. I am exempt for Hobart. Please advise if I have to take
a pi lot com ing in l ast ti me as a Master of s h i p in Risdon 1 1 . 3. 72 and Port Huon
7 . 1 2 . 7 3 . Pilotage Exemption Certificate No.848 issued 3. 7.67. B.J. PELC."

The Harbour Master advised the agents of 'Lake Illawarra' that Captain Pelc would not be
required to take a pilot for his voyage to Risdon. The Inquiry observed that, ' . . . in light of what has
occurred, that it is unfortunate that when the Marine Board in 1971 introduced the two-year
pilotage rule for the Zones of the Port of Hobart it did not act consistently with its altered policy by
making that rule applicable, not only to future Exemption Certificates, but also to those issued
before the division of the Port into Zones.'
On 22 December 1974, 'Lake Illawarra' left Port Kembla, and arrived in Port Pirie on 26
December 1974. An incident involving the telemotor equipment occurred shortly after leaving Port
Kembla. A helmsman observed the brass helm indicator was showing hard to starboard, while the
electric rudder indicator was showing amidships, thus indicating a steering malfunction. Inspection
by engineers revealed that oil in the telemotor system required replenishing and this was rectified
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by opening a bypass valve and correcting the oil level. Several hours later, the ship was put on
manual steering when the gyro compass developed a fault. This fault was rectified and no further
incident involving the steering equipment, telemotor or gyro occurred ( apparently) before the ship
arrived in Port Pirie.
The evidence shows that 'Lake Illawarra' handled well and responded readily to the helm,
though a little sluggishly when deep laden. When the vessel failed to respond to the helm on hard
aport being ordered and executed, it occurred to the Master that there was a steering gear failure.
He had no specific idea what kind of failure it might be, and agreed in evidence it would probably
not be of the same kind as that which occurred out of Port Kembla. When giving evidence, he at
first said that he still thought that there had been such a failure, but at length he admitted that on
full consideration he had abandoned the idea, and was now inclined to think that the vessel had
lost steerage way. Some prominence was given during the inquiry to the fact that the steering tiller
in the sunken ship was found by divers to be hard over to starboard; from which it may be assumed
that the rudder is in the hard-aport position.
The inquiry found that the reason the vessel failed to respond when hard-aport was ordered
was that she had lost steerage way (it was going too slowly for the rudder to gain purchase).
When 'Lake Illawarra' sank, crewmen in the water experienced a current carrying them
northwards towards the Tasman Bridge and beyond it. Most of the debris, the lifeboat and an
inflatable life-raft were found to the north of the Bridge. The consensus of their evidence is that it
was quite a strong current. Water Police arrived at the scene of the casualty in the police launch at
about 2150. They picked up survivors, and noticed much debris north of the Tasman Bridge. At
2150 hours the surface water was running upstream, and this seemed to him unusual. The
upstream flow had carried a slick of oil and flotsam and debris up the river nearly to Geilston Bay,
approximately a mile north of the Bridge. The Harbour Master and experienced pilots said that the
existence of a flood tide of 2 to 3 knots in the river was well known and occurs a few times each
year. However, the Inquiry concluded that the current flow was of no material consequence before
the ship lost steerage way. Tides, in Hobart as elsewhere, are variable, and tide predictions like
most other predictions are often inaccurate. Further, the Marine Board pamphlet, "Tides for the
Port of Hobart 1975", carried on 'Lake Illawarra', warned of variability. Even if the Captain was to
rest his judgment as to point of alignment on an assumed tidal state, the inquiry suggested that he
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ought to have made enquiries from the harbour authorities as to the actual state of the tide; but he
did not.
The inquiry found that the effective cause of the casualty was poor seamanship on the part
of the Master. It also found that the collision could probably have been avoided had the Master
chosen to abort the exercise of passing under the Bridge when he found the vessel overshooting
the navigation aids on shore. But he then compounded his previous errors of navigation by
stopping the engines, which caused the ship to lose steerage way, an event which he ought to have
anticipated, should have recognised when it happened, and should then have reacted to more
quickly.
This case is critical because no formal charge of incompetence or misconduct was made by
the Departmental Representative against Captain Pelc, but the Minister's asking of the question
whether incompetence or misconduct had been established in substance and effect becomes a
charge. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 364 to make inquiries was invoked.
This transforms the nature of the proceedings and they become "penal if not criminal" rather than
proceedings to establish the facts. The proceedings seek to 'blame' an individual. Captain Pelc was
found guilty of misconduct in the form of careless navigation. These proceedings were carried out
before the notion of systemic management failure had entered the thinking of such commissions of
inquiry. It contrasts significantly with more recent cases, such as Longford where a more
enlightened understanding of accident causation informs proceedings.
4.3.3.2

Underground Mine - Moura (1994)

The Moura inquiry produced more than 5000 pages of transcript, and thousands more pages
of documents were submitted as exhibits. It also produced a 70 page report (Windridge 1996) and
a separate coroner's report (Windridge 1996a). Hopkins' book, Managing Major Disasters, is based
on the Moura Accident.
The Moura case examines an explosion in a BHP coal mine at Moura in central Queensland
in 1994 in which eleven men lost their lives. It is of significance if only because in a 22-year period,
from 1972 to 1994, there were five methane gas explosions causing major loss of life. A total of 67
men died in these explosions. The impact on the town of Moura has been particularly devastating.
Three explosions have occurred in mines in the immediate vicinity of Moura, population 3000,
over a 19-year period, killing a total of 36 miners.
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The mechanisms that led to these explosion are well understood. Coal heats up slowly when
exposed to air. Unless it is well ventilated its temperature will rise, leading to what is called a
'heating' or 'spontaneous combustion'. If there is a significant concentration of methane in the area
it will explode. This is what happened at Moura in 1994. The very same circumstances-a
spontaneous combustion and a methane gas build-up-were responsible for the explosions at
Kianga, near Moura, in 1975, in which thirteen men died, and at Box Flat in southern Queensland
in 1972, when seventeen miners were killed.
There are plenty of warning signs as a heating develops: it gives off both a tarry smell and
abnormal amounts of CO (carbon monoxide). Both these signs were observed in the weeks prior
to the explosion at Moura but they were ignored or dismissed. The principal source for this case is
Andrew Hopkins (1999), Managing Major Hazards, in which he identifies seven perspectives on
disaster. These perspectives could be related the competencies identified in this research to enable
better understanding and further triangulation by others who might work with this material:
[INEVITABILilY] The accident was far from inevitable. In the words of the inquiry report it
was a result of ' management neglect and non-decision, which must never be repeated'. It was
reasonably foreseeable and practically preventable. It could and should have been avoided.
[THE PRIORITY OF PRODUCTION] Moura was a mine whose economic viability was in
doubt and there was pressure to maximise production. As counsel for the miners put it in his final
submission, ' BHP ran a dangerous race against time to extract all of the coal from 512 [panel] in
accordance with the plan'. But, to be fair, it was not a race the company was consciously running.
There was a whole culture of denial at Moura that served to nullify warnings of impending disaster.
Production was routinely given a higher priority than safety at Moura. Mine inspectorates are
located in government departments whose primary function is the promotion of the mining
industry. This undermines the ability of inspectorates to impose safety standards on mines. This
same structural problem is inherent in the regulatory regime for offshore petroleum production in
Australia: safety is the responsibility of a government department whose primary concern is to
facilitate production. This situation also characterised the Longford accident.
[NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY]
Hopkins (1999: 135) points out that,
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'A normal or system accident, as Perrow defi nes it, i nvolves the u nantici pated
i n teraction of mu lti ple fai l u res of vari ous of the system components. Where a
system is complex that i s , where its components can in teract i n u nex pected
ways-and where it is tig htly cou pled that i s , where multi ple fai l u res can occur so
q u ickly that there is not sufficient t i me to analyse and react to what is happe n i ng
then system accidents, he says, are virtually i nevitable.'
' It is clear that the Moura explosion can not be analysed i n these terms. The
system was not com plex i n the above sense. On the contrary, there was nothing
at al l s u rpri s i ng or unexpected about the sequence of events; the process was
q u ite foreseeable and had g ive n rise to d i saste r on two occasions i n Quee n s l and
i n t he recent past. Moreover, the system was not tightly cou pled. Events unfolded
s l owly and resol ute i n terve ntion at any poi nt cou l d have averted d i s aster and
saved the mine. Perrow himself acknowledged that coal m i n e d i s asters cou l d not
be explai ned by h i s theory and the analys i s here confi rms h i s concl u s i on . '

[MISINFORMATION] Hopkins suggests that Turner's theory that 'disaster equals energy plus
misinformation' turns out to have been a particularly fruitful approach to understanding the Moura
disaster. According to Turner (1978, 1997), disasters often occur because crucial information
available at lower levels of the organisation is not assembled in a coherent way and is not passed
on up the hierarchy to a point where it can be responsibly acted upon. The Moura inquiry
indicated that there were various reports of smells and of abnormally high CO readings. But there
was no system for collating this information, or retrieving it for review, and so these isolated
reports were rapidly lost. This indicator of the need for vigilance systems also points to high
reliability organisation theory that suggests that organisations that are good at disaster avoidance
mobilise as many pairs of eyes as possible to scrutinise critical information (vigilance). A hierarchy
of knowledge operated at Moura that gave most weighting to information acquired by personal
experience. Information acquired as the result of oral communication was next, while written
communication was considered least effective. Hopkins suggests that these beliefs systematically
undermined the value of the written safety reports. The Moura disaster occurred because vital
information was rendered ineffective, both by an inadequate information processing system and by
a culture that neutralised it (Hopkins, 1999:136).
[LATENT ERRORS] Reason (199) suggests that major accidents occur when latent failures,
arising mainly in the managerial and organisational spheres, combine adversely with local
triggering events and with the active failures of individuals at the sharp end. The latent failures at
Moura were the deficiencies in the system of communication. The local triggering event was the
heating, and the active failures were the failures of individual managers to apply their minds
conscientiously to the possibility that a heating might be occurring, particularly on the night of the
explosion. This explains from a theoretical perspective the refusal of the Moura inquiry to dwell on
the role of individuals in its account of what happened. Again, these factors are similar to these
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found in the Longford case. The operator was BHP and again it proved to have a defective memory
in spite of previous experiences.
[THE FAILURE OF ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY] Hopkins makes an important point here
that the mine that exploded in 1994 had not previously experienced an explosion, although two
adjacent mines had. This particular mine had no direct experience or specific memory to draw on.
This is salient because the mine operator, BHP, did have experience of other mine disasters, the
most recent being the explosions at Moura No. 4 in 1986 and at Appin in NSW in 1979. This was
because BHP had decentralised responsibility for disaster prevention to mine sites and had no
central capacity or expertise with respect to disaster prevention. It is important to draw parallels
with the Longford accident where safety was centralised at head office.
[MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FAILURE] Management system failure highlights management's
role in planning for disaster prevention. Management system failure incorporates Turners
misinformation, Reason's latent errors and Kletz's organisational memory failure since these make
it clear how management systems fail.
Hopkins (1999: 140) concludes that, 'The whole problem can be summed up as one of
organisational inattention-the attention of the organisation was simply not focused on the control
of catastrophic risk'.

4.3.3.3

Passenger Air - Seaview (1994)

On 25 July 1994, Seaview Air was given the status of an airline (a Regular Public Transport
Operator). On 2nd of October 1994 the flagship of the Seaview Air fleet, VH-SVQ/ crashed while on
a journey from Williamtown to Lord Howe Island. Nine lives were lost. Seaview Air emerged as a
slipshod and often wilfully non-compliant organisation in which breaches of regulations, and
unacceptable practices, were commonplace.
The Seaview crash heightened media scrutiny of the CAA. The response of management was
quickly contradicted by documents leaked to the Press. The documents appeared to demonstrate,
first, a poor safety record on the part of Seaview, and secondly, prior knowledge of that record at
the highest levels in the CAA. The CAA ignored warning after warning. It failed to act on
intelligence communicated repeatedly to it.
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The CAA's competence and integrity were already in doubt as a result of a crash fifteen
months earlier, on 11 June 1993, when an aircraft operated by Monarch Airlines, another small
airline, crashed near Young, with the loss of seven lives.
The Commission of Inquiry Terms of Reference were to inquire into:
(a) the operation of the Civil Aviation Authority i n connection with:
(i) the appropriateness of deci sions and ad m i n i strative actions (competence) of officers of
the Authority relati ng to the operations of Seaview Air d u ri ng 1 994 (and earl ier if necessary)
i ncluding its upgrad i ng to a Reg ular Public Transport (RPT) operator; and
(ii) the d i l igence (vi g i l ance, foresight and j udge ment) and propriety (ethi cs) with which
officers of the Authority and Seaview Air di scharged their res pective responsibi l ities relating to
the safety of Seaview Ai r operations; and
(iii)

the

effective ness

of the

manage ment

systems

within

the

Authority,

and

com m u n ication betwee n its various levels, as they related to Seaview Air; and
(b) the i m pl ications of these fi ndings for the CAA particu larly as to
(i) the meas u res necessary to e n s u re total propriety i n ai r safety ad m i n i stration; or
(ii) the most appropriate and effective method for the Govern ment to consider those
fi ndings for the pu rpose of determi ning the meas u res neces sary to e n s u re total propriety in ai r
safety ad m i n i stration.

The case should be set against the espoused corporate mission statement of the CAA (now
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority) as a high reliability organisation, which is taken from the Civil
Aviation Authority Industry Development Plan (1994) Q 354. 79094 AUS:
Servi ng Au stral ia and i nternational aviation, by p u rs u i n g high standards of
aviation safety, through effective and efficient safety regulation and p rovision of
world class aviation t raffic services.

This 'stakeholder' (Federal Government) imposed economic imperative for efficiency and
greater dependency on technology resulted in downsizing of the CAA (7,500 to 3,500 employees
later followed by division into two separate bodies 12) . Taylor (1995) observed that this resulted in
radical and poorly targeted restructuring, which then led to a breakdown in the essential values so
necessary for a coherent workforce.
The most relevant outcomes of the Seaview accident were those which focused on
managerial 'competencies' and 'values' at the most senior levels of both Seaview and the CAA. The
Commission of Inquiry and various reports pointed to a CAA bureaucracy out of touch with its
12 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has been abolished and replaced by two separate organisations
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (the Authority) and Airservices Australia.
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prime responsibility as the 'regulator' required to ensure aviation safety and observed that it failed
repeatedly to enforce 'compliance' with aviation safety regulations. This failure was characterised as
systemic and proved critical to its failure to prevent the Seaview accident that cost nine lives. This
case also raises 'management' issues of 'groupthink', restructuring, resistance to change, and
systemic failure. Senior executives of the CAA were prone to mistake the systemic world of the CAA
for the real world.
New compliance and enforcement procedures were introduced by the Authority in January
1996. All staff in the Authority are now required to complete a conflict of interest declaration,
designed to strengthen the Authority's accountability and integrity and reinforce the code of
conduct.
4.3.3.4

Defence Shipping - Westralia (1998)

At 0900 on 5 May 98, HMAS WESTRALIA disembarked Fleet Base West for the Western
Australia Exercise Area to rendezvous with HMA Ships SUCCESS, DARWIN and ADEWDE. At about
1030 a significant fuel leak was noticed near the port main engine, with fuel emerging under
pressure in a manner similar to a garden hose. The ensuing fire killed four sailors.
HMAS WESTRALIA13 had undergone a maintenance period for about 6 weeks prior to the
ship sailing from Fleet Base West on 5 May 98. The work included the fitting of new flexible fuel
hoses to the ship's main engines by a subcontractor under the direction of Australian Defence
Industries Limited (ADI). Trials were conducted with the ship alongside the wharf, whilst under
way and at anchor. The sequence of events signals responses that point to competency issues,
therefore the times at which these events occurred are underlined.
Personnel saw the fire start on the outboard side of the starboard main engine at about
1035. The fire was intense, causing rapid smoke build up and extreme heat. The port main engine
was shut down to enable repairs to be carried out. The atmosphere in the main machinery space
soon became inadequate to support life. The Engineering Officer recommended to the
13 This is a sum mary of points 1-40 of the Executive Summary of the Board of Enquiry. It uses the
language and tone of the formal Executive Sum mary and to some extent captures the semi-legal discourse
of most accident enquiries. This dispassionate discourse is constructed to convey a sense of the sequence
of an accident and the 'facts' pertaining to it. The effect of this is to minimise the significance of the human
lives lost and to reduce the emotional effects of their suffering. A 'body' is discovered at such and such a
time in such and such a location and this i nformation is treated in the same way as the discovery of other
'facts'. This problem of 'discourse' is also consi dered in Chapter 4.
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Commanding Officer that the main machinery space be drenched with carbon dioxide (CO2). One
person was thought to still be in the machinery space and the recommendation was not accepted
at that time. The ship's situation was communicated to Fleet Base West via a mobile telephone at
1045. Maritime Headquarters West notified RAN ships in the Western Australian exercise (but
significantly did not notify the Fremantle Port Authority, which had the expertise and equipment to
fight a ship fire, nor did it notify other civilian vessels in the area, which could have provided
emergency assistance. It is reasonable to conjecture, based on the evidence, that this oversight was
an act of hubris and reflects the 'closed nature' of the culture of the 'senior service'.)
The CO2 drench was activated at 1101. At 1232 the fire was extinguished almost exactly two
hours after it had begun. At 1220 the Fleet Base West tug TAMMAR passed a line to the Westralia.
The tow commenced with the ship about 150 metres from a shoal. The towline parted at about
1250. The civilian tug WAMBIRI which operates out of the Port of Fremantle, had been standing by
WESTRALIA since about 1220. She connected up at 1314, the tow then resumed.
At 1250, a medical team in breathing apparatus entered the main machinery space to
formally assess and identify the four bodies. All were declared deceased by the medical officer from
SUCCESS. Five injured personnel were medivaced to St John of God Hospital in the Perth suburb
of Murdoch at 1350. One additional person was treated on board for smoke inhalation and there
were a number of personnel similarly affected who did not seek treatment.
The four deceased personnel were extricated from the main machinery space over the
period from about 1515 to 1730. This task was undertaken by ship's staff, the two medical officers,
medical personnel from SYDNEY, DARWIN, STIRLING and the Sea Training Group.
Considered from the stance of the Navy as a high reliability organisation, several salient
factors were revealed by the Inquiry. Ventilation control was not well understood. The ship had
developed a standard operational procedure that involved closing both the supply and exhaust
ventilation to the main machinery space in the event of a fire that prevented heat and hot gases
from escaping, thus increasing the dangers and difficulties faced by personnel re-entering the main
machinery space to conduct search and rescue and fire fighting. Ship knowledge, particularly of
emergency systems, displayed by some officers and senior sailors when giving evidence, was less
than satisfactory. On board a ship this echelon of officers must be considered to be senior
134

management and their competencies were clearly short of that which was needed to properly
address the fire once it had begun.
Documentary evidence received by the Board of Inquiry indicated that 20-25% of the crew
had not received all the required pre-joining training for their billets (assigned tasks). Additionally ,
approximately 10% of the crew were not 'in-date' for damage control training. Some important
damage control training serials (procedures) had not been practiced regularly. Escape drills ,
particularly using emergency life support respiratory devices, had not been regularly practiced.
These latter oversights in training are also related to compliance since these drills are considered
essential and are practised frequently on most armed vessels.
Subsequently, CORONER Alistair Hope considered a submission by the families of HMAS
Westralia fire victims that he should probe the tragedy because the navy inquiry allegedly missed
vital evidence. At the time of writing this is still under consideration. The submission centres on
four key areas of concern. It alleges procedural and safety issues were missed by the inquiry. The
naval board of inquiry found the fire started after newly installed flexible fuel hoses burst and
sprayed diesel fuel over hot engine components. The inquiry found the hoses were not fit for their
intended purpose and naval engineering procedures that could have prevented the hoses being
installed were bypassed. (This factor relates directly to Turner's theory of 'prior knowledge',
Turner, 1978). The Navy and Westralia maintenance contractor Australian Defence Industries were
both found responsible for the fire.
4.3.3.5

Power Infrastructure - Longford (1998)

Successful prosecution of Esso followed a Royal Commission that had found fault on the
part of Esso for an explosion and fire at its Longford gas plant in September, 1998. Longford
workers Peter Wilson and John Lowery were killed when a 12-metre-long vessel ruptured in the
oldest of three gas processing plants near Sale, on September 25, 1998. The explosion cut gas
supplies to about one million homes and businesses in Victoria for almost two weeks.
WorkCover charged Esso with eleven indictable offences under the Occupational Health and
Safety Act of Victoria. Ten charges concerned Esso's failure to maintain a safe workplace and one
related to endangering people other than employees. Esso did not have properly trained staff or
skilled engineers on site. The judgement also found that it had not established the procedures to
deal with the emergency as it arose.
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This particular prosecution is significant in terms of its focus on managerial and corporate
competencies, managerial and corporate ethics, and managerial and corporate accountability
because the outcome of the case depended on a jury understanding technical, scientific and
engineering evidence. The jury had to understand evidence from the prosecution and defence on
topics such as chemical and process engineering, complex mathematical calculations and physics
along with sophisticated arguments concerning aspects of corporate and managerial responsibility.
The Longford gas plant was state-of-the-art when it was built in 1969, and it operated for
about 30 years without major incident. However, on September 25, 1998, events culminated in the
rupture of a pressure vessel and subsequent explosions and fire.
Critical to the principal argument proposed in this thesis is that the information needed to
prevent the accident was available and had simply not been uncovered. It was established in the
Royal Commission and the later prosecution that Esso had not undertaken adequate hazard and
risk assessments. Expert evidence suggested that if it had, it would have discovered the potential
hazards and avoided the accident. This laxity also has 'ethical' implications.
The incident also points to a 'competency' lesson for managers and Boards and that is that
no matter how sophisticated an espoused high reliability plant may be and no matter how up-to
date the systems, when those that operate and maintain those systems are not properly trained in
their operation and are unable to deal with emergencies then the employer is at risk of a successful
prosecution when the systems fail and an accident occurs.
It is salient to the 'accountability' argument in this thesis that the Esso prosecution also
sends a cautionary signal to directors of companies. While the company may technically be the
employer, its directors ultimately bear the responsibility of ensuring that the workplace is safe and
that adequate procedures and risk assessments have been implemented. Directors can no longer
concern themselves only with fiscal, business and production considerations. Increasingly, requests
by regulators for greater sanctions through amendments to the legislation mean directors face the
ultimate sanction of criminal penalties. This also forms a central recommendation of the Laing
Report into Occupational Safety and Health, WA (2002).
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The result also has implications for regulators such as WorkCover. The new "safety case"
regime places increased responsibility on employers. They are required to demonstrate that their
workplaces are safe. But a necessary corollary is that the regulator must be able to demonstrate it is
capable of enforcing this regime.

4.4 Cell Reduction and Coding Compression
This section briefly restates and summarises section 3.2.7 in chapter 3, Methodology. This
study examines eleven key variables. Some 260 codes, or descriptors, were elicited from the cases
up to the point of reasonable saturation. They were then compressed into eleven key codes. The
case text data may have revealed smaller and smaller grain-size descriptors, however reasonable
saturation was reached at 260 such descriptors (codes). Figure 4.3.1 shows how these codes were
then fitted to the patterns, or key codes (core competencies).
CASES

EJ EJ

Moura #2

[ WestrMra

J[

Longford

J

CODING in HyperRESEARCH

260 coding descriptors at saturation, determined from the HyperRESEARCH analysis of the text data from
the cases and grouped into eleven categories, or Key Codes, from patterns suggested internally in the
coding process and from the literature sources identified in the Literature Review.

I I I I I I I I I I /�
KEY CODES

Figure 4.3.1 Model of the Methodology applied to Data Analysis

4.4.1 Significant Variables and Research Boundaries
The 260 variables and eleven key variables set boundary proscribing limits relevant to the
goals of the research and its contribution to the field. The case studies in this thesis are chosen to
make qualitative use of the sources as opposed to quantitative statistical methods of establishing
causal effects through covariation.
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In summary, the coding process in HyperRESEARCH identified the concerns of the Boards of
Inquiry and also provided research 'triangulation' value. Coding compression was applied to the
260 codes to address the two research questions set out in chapter one in sections 1.7.2 and 1.7.3.
The process of making 'meaning' of the codes was further developed through textual analysis as
was explained in detail in chapter three in section 3.4.2.
Although many of the individual codes can be placed under several competencies, for
example, 'ceo lying' could also be properly placed in ethics, organisational ethos, constructing a
culture of safety (truth telling), foresight, vigilance, judgement and compliance issues, the integrity
of the research method as outlined above is not compromised. The choice for final allocation of a
code to a competency is again based on the methodological sources cited above and in chapter 3
and restated in the next paragraph. Another example using this method is that codes such as failure
of responsibility, duplicitous conduct, and ethics are also essentially all 'ethical' competency issues.
The reason this is important is that failure of a single competency subset can have a multifactorial
effect and effect other competencies. These competency categories can not be mastered in
isolation, nor do they exist in isolation in practice. University or TAFE courses attempting to
develop the competencies should be cognisant of this multifaceted phenomena. If the failure is a
serious one at a senior level the gravity of the effect is made more significant than if it occurs at
lower levels.
The selection method involves recognition in the data (by the researcher) of 'meanings'
(Richards and Richards, 1985; and the other authors cited in chapter 3 in section 3.4.2.2, who
support this method). The final choice was therefore methodologically properly based on the
researcher's best perception of the claim the descriptor made in support of the analysis and the
extent to which each descriptor enabled theory building. It is salient to note, therefore, that part of
the reason some failures of these competencies have such an insidious effect is that failure of one
competency can have significant cascading, if not byzantine, consequences on several
competencies at the same time.

4.5 Brief synopsis of the methodology
Haig (1995) suggests that the general goal of grounded theory research is to construct
theories in order to understand phenomena. A good grounded theory is one that is: (1) inductively
derived from data, (2) subjected to theoretical elaboration, and (3) judged adequate to its domain
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with respect to a number of evaluative criteria. This results in an approach that is relevant to the
sources and the need to understand the phenomena described in the next paragraph.
Deriving its theoretical u nderpin ni ngs from the related movements of American
pragmatism and symbolic i nteractionism, grounded theory i nquiry is portrayed as
a problem-solving endeavour concerned with understan d i ng action from the
perspective of the h u man agent. G rounded theory is typically presented as an
approach to doing qualitative research, i n that its procedures are neither
statistical , nor quantitative in some other way. Grounded theory research begins
by focusing on an area of study and gathers data from a variety of sources. Once
g athered, the data are analyzed u sing coding and theoretical sampling
procedures. When this i s done, theories are generated, with the help of
i nterpretive procedures, before being finally written up and presented. (Hai g ,
1995)

4.6 Research Competencies Translated into Courses
The coding descriptors (behaviours or performance criteria), the competencies they are
allocated to (units of competence), and the four categories signified in the two research questions,
are set out in Table 4.7.2. 'Perfomzance criteria' and 'units of competence' are National Training
Board terms which are equivalent to the 'coding descriptors' and 'core competencies' used in this
research. This is salient, since the aim of the research is to set out the competencies so that they
can be translated into training programs, such as TAFE delivered Certificate N level training
packages for managers, or developed into units in appropriate degree programs at Universities. An
example of this translation from competencies to courses has been developed in the Appendix. The
format is an adaptation of NTB Unit Descriptors, and is used to demonstrate how the process
might be embarked upon, rather than to specify exact unit content.

4. 7 Competencies and Competency Descriptors
Each of the competencies is examined separately in the chapters that follow. The
Competency is named and the panel containing the coding descriptors is then included. This
pattern of placing the salient examples of the descriptor (HyperRESEARCH code) being examined
into a panel is followed for each of the ten competencies described. For example in Chapter 5,
Ethics, the descriptor codes (Table 4.7.1) from the HyperRESEARCH analysis are identified and
interpreted in light of the case data, which is summarised as "(organisational and individual
manager's values and behaviour as they influence the determination of right from wrong in
decisions concerning safety). A representative sample of these behaviours is then examined in the
analysis that follows. For example,
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Table 4.7.1 Ethical descriptors:

ambiguous behaviour modelling, blaming, ceo lying, corruption, duplicitous conduct, espoused values,
failure of responsibility, false representation, pressure to break rules, relationship between regulator and
ref!Ulated

All of the competencies and descriptors to be examined in the following chapters are
included below in Table 4.7.2.
Table 4.7.2 Compression of the 260 HyperRESEARCH codes into competency clusters [units] (The
core com petencies are congruent with National Training Board criteria for Units of Competence).

Core Competencies
Coding Descriptors
(Summaries of Units
Behaviours or 'Performance Criteria
of Comoetence)
Chapter 5. Underp i n n i ng Capacities

1. Ethics (organisational and
individual manager's values
and behaviour as they
influence the determination of
right from wrong in decisions
concerning safety)
2. Foresight (attitudinal
'stance' and 'intelligent looking
ahead' as factors in decisions
concerning safety)
3. Vigilance (hazard
perception and awareness and
an alert 'way of seeing' are
necessary to signal detection)
4. Judgement (weighing up,
trading off, and deciding . often
in circumstances that make
little sense or meaning, are
factors in all competencies)
5. Balance (psychological
tenor, courage and persistence
are essential in safety versus
financial decisions)

ambiguous behaviour modelling, blaming, ceo lying, corruption, duplicitous conduct,
espoused values, failure of responsibilif)1, false representation, pressure to break rules,
relationship between regulator and regulated,

change related risk, corporate memory,, critical safef)1 indicators, failing to keep or
suppl)' records, failure to perform prospective and retrospective HAZOP (hazard and
operabilif)� stud)', incentives, prior knowledge, role ofgovernment, role of regulator,
attention to risk, auditing system, debriefing, discrepancies in reporting, equipment
defects, error detection, failure of materiels (not materials), failure of safety SJ'Stems,
failure to discriminate signals, failure to monitor operating conditions, feedback,
habituation to warning signals, hazard identification, high reliability • many eyes,
if(nored warnin1<s inattention
cascading effects, conflicting evidence, decision making, doubt about capabilif)•,
economic factors, ethical implications, external agencies, failure to conform to
guidelines, misplaced trust, practically preventable, speculation,
conflict of interest, defect reporting, diligence and proprief)•, dispassionate discourse,
institutional timidif)', integrif)1,

Chapter 6. Organ isational Factors

6. Organisational ethos

(open or closed [autopoietic]
organisational cultures shape
hazard management
capabilities)

7. Constructing a culture of
safety ('intention' to establish

a culture of safety, 'ways of
seeing', and persistent
personal or organisational
ideas · 'memes' influence the
systemic capacities for
managing safety)

administrative politics, autopoietic behaviour, corrupt management, culturalfactors,
culture of denial, dominance of CEO, dominant coalition, erroneous management
paradigm, failure to notify safef), concerns, favoured treatment, ignore legislation,
improvised safety standards, legislative framework, management interference,
managerial dysfunction, misplaced reliance on SSM, management neglect, management
speak, decision making, priorif)I of production, regulator arrogance, regulator
incompetence, safef)1 as a cost, sacrifice of safety for economic reasons, standards
sacrificed, systemic managementfailure, wages and conditions, written reports ignored,
action plan, administrative procedures, communication, complex management
SJ'Stem, compliance, contempt for regulations, cultural attitude to regulation, failure of
organisational memory,, failure to provide safe environment, failure to utilise
information, first order attribution of cause, hierarch)' of knowledge, incident reporting
system, knowledge management, lessons from previous accidents, maintenance
documentation, post hoc forensic recording, motivation, pseudopsychology, resolute
intervention, self congratulatory discourse, shared beliefs • memes, under-utilised
expertise, upward communication

Chapter 7. Capacity to Perform
8. Understanding the
salience of the particular
situation and its context

(awareness of organisational
and incident factors peculiar to

accident conditions, active failures, cause and response, cause immediate, cause of
accident, detailed guidelines, diagnostic failure, failure to enforce regulations, falsifying
maintenance reports, falsifying records, information verification, information gathering,
insufficient information, perfunctory, inspection, auditing, reliance on personal
eXf}erience, reliance on oral communication, situational risk factors,
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particular haz.ardous
environments)
9, Performance in a
particular setting (managerial
capacity to deal with stress,
conflict, and unfolding disaster
in particular hazardous
environments)
10. Multidisciplinary
performance (bringing
together skills from different
and complementary domains
to mana2e a particular hazard)

activefailures of individuals, careless navigation, communication downwards, escape
routes, failure of procedures, failure to grasp whole of system picture, inadequate
supervision, inappropriate response, inadequate response, information overload,
irrational reasoning, limited operator knowledge, operating outside limits, specification
fallure, unanticipated interaction of multiplefallures,
computerised information, critical performance indicators, currency of competence,
failure of training, failure to exercise competencies, unanticipatedfactors,

If the ten competencies above fail and result in death, injury, or serious damage to property,
then it follows that issues of regulation and compliance must be considered. Those compliance
issues identified and coded using HyperRESEARCH from the case reports follow.

Chapter 8. Regulatory Compliance and Intervention
11. Compliance
Issues (compliance and
regulatory factors, legal
and other punitive
responses to managerial
failure)

accountability, breach of law, bypassing safety requirements, cause real,
certificate of competency withdrawn, collateral casualties, collusion, compliance
with national standards, contamination of evidence, criminal offence, dominance of
CEO, dominant coalition, economic factors, enforcement, failure of regulator,
misconduct, regulator unable to enforce compliance, regulatory independence
regulator dominated by regulated, relationship between regulator and regulated,
role ofl(overnment, role of reJZUlator,

4.7.1 Continuum of Concern and Coding Method
In many cases, managerial influence is found to be the major cause of accidents. For
example, the Coronial Inquiry's ultimate explanation for what had caused the fatal accident at
Moura No. 2 Underground Mine on Sunday, 7 August 1994, was 'management neglect'. Examples
of matters of behavioural and organisational concern in the Moura case follow (Windridge,
1996:13; Hopkins, 1999:139).The behaviour descriptor is in normal type and the competency and
level of concern nominated by the researcher are in bold type
There was a norm at the mine that unless warn ing signs were verified and
confi rmed they could be ignored. ( Vigilance - high concern)
The m i ne was using the wrong safety indi cato r-the lost ti me i njury frequency
rate . This p rovided no indication of how well catastrophic risk was be i ng
managed. ( Organisational ethos - high concern)
There was a series of be l i efs at the m i ne , amounting to a culture of denial. One
belief, i n particular, 'normali sed' the evidence-that is, it rei nterpreted the
indications of abnormality as lyi ng with i n the bounds of normal ity. (Constructing
a culture of safety - high concern)
There were no specified actions that were mandatory when warn ing signs were
detected. Uudgement - high concern)
The system for re porting prod uction figures was more deve loped than the system
for communi cati ng safety i nformati on. (Balance - medium concern)
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No one was identified as responsible for critical, safety-relevant decisions.

(Multidisciplinary Performance - high concern)

The system of auditing by the company was thoroughly inadequate.
( Understanding the salience of the particular situation and its context - high
concern)
' There were no incentives for mine managers to concern themselves with disaster
prevention. (Foresight - high concern)
BHP had decentralised responsibility for the control of catastrophic risk, along
with all other aspects of safety, to the mine level. It had no corporate expertise in
disaster prevention, despite its history of mine explosions. (Performance in a
particular setting - high concern)
The law does not in practice hold the company or its senior management legally
accountable for disaster prevention in the mine, it therefore ignored its
responsibility. (Ethics - hig h concern)
Coal mines inspectorates are hamstrung in their enforcement efforts by their
position in mining departments. (Compliance - high concern)

Boards of Inquiry investigating different accidents appear to deal with these issues
differently. There is, for example, a continuum of emphasis of concern influenced by dimensions
such as time, information, and case dependence. Over time there has been a shift from a relatively
low concern to a much higher concern for ethics, for example. As previous cases reveal more
cumulative information about the causes of accidents, the emphasis has shifted to focus on the
ethical 'influence' role of management as well as the 'technical' role of front line operators. Later
reports, as well as the literature, suggest that understanding the nature and extent of managerial
influence can be very significant in diagnosing the cause of accidents. The issues of concern can be
summarised in the following table (Table 4.7.3)
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Table 4.7.3 Summary of failures of competencies low concern to high concern to Boards of
InI CI U l ry :
Lake Illawarra
Mauro
Seaview
Inquiry
Westralia
Longford
Competency
1. Ethics (organisational and
individual manager's values
and behaviour as they
influence the determination of
right from wrong in decisions
concerning safety)
2. Foresight (attitudinal
'stance' and 'intelligent looking
ahead' as factors in decisions
concerning safety)
3. Vigilance (hazard
perception and awareness and
an alert 'way of seeing' are
necessary to signal detection)
4. Judgement (weighing up,
trading off, and deciding · often
in circumstances that make
little sense or meaning, are
factors in all competencies)
5. Balance (psychological
tenor, courage and persistence
are essential in safety versus
financial decisions)
6. Organisational ethos
(open or closed [autopoietic]
organisational cultures shape
hazard management
capabilities)
7. Constructing a culture of
safety ('intention' t o establish
a culture of safety, 'ways of
seeing', and persistent
personal or organisational
ideas · 'memes' influence the
systemic capacities for
managing safety)
8. Understanding the
salience of the particular
situation and its context
(awareness of organisational
and incident factors peculiar to
particular hazardous
environments)
9. Performance in a
particular setting (managerial
capacity to deal with stress,
conflict, and unfolding disaster
in particular hazardous
environments)
10. Multidisciplinary
performance (bringing
together skills from different
and complementary domains
to manage a particular hazard)
11. Compliance Issues
(compliance and regulatory
factors, legal and other
punitive responses to
managerial failure)

low

high

high

med i u m

med i u m

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

med i u m

med i u m

high

med i u m

med i u m

l ow

high

high

high

m ed i u m

l ow

high

high

med i u m

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

med i u m

high

high

high

high

high
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These dimensions of concern are subjectively assessed by the researcher based on a reading
of the expressions of concern by the various boards of inquiry. They provide a further triangulation
across the cases, over a period of time, of the validity of the competencies.
4.7 .2 Case Analysis in HyperRESEARCH
Although the cases are treated chronologically they were analysed using HyperRESEARCH in
the following order: Moura (1994), Westralia (1999), Illawarra (1975), Seaview (1994), Longford
(1999), this choice was determined by the availability of data as the research developed. For
example, even though the Lake Illawarra case occurred in 1975, the only documentation available
at the beginning of the research was an illegible photocopy of the proceedings and it required
travelling to both the National Library in Canberra and to Hobart to discover appropriate
documents. Hence the input to the research from the Lake Illawarra case was not available until
after the early Moura and Westralia documents became available. Both the Westralia and the
Longford cases relied initially on Commission of Inquiry documents, but were later enriched by
data from ensuing Coronial Enquiries. The cases continued to reveal new information as
subsequent material became available, or useful commentary appeared in journals, articles, books
and newspaper reports. Each case examined then informed and provided more precision and a
tendency to saturation for the cases that followed.

4.8 Research Triangulation
The researcher worked as a consultant to the CAA as a member of the ATC (Air Traffic
Control) Training Review Project Team and preliminary research for this thesis (Sutherland, Keech,
Donato, and Maher, 1992, and Maher, 1994) confirms the research done by Whiteley (1999), in
which she identifies eight characteristic markers of autopoietic organisations. In that sense, the
eight Whiteley propositions have research triangulation value for the data analysis. The
HyperRESEARCH case data and the preliminary research mentioned above suggest that Whitely's
propositions profile indicators of 'unsafe' organisations. The CAA, for example, demonstrated each
of these autopoietic-memetic factors identified by Whitely. Autopoiesis and memes are developed
as relevant theoretical constructs in chapter 2, sections 9 and 10. The researcher has interpreted
Whitley's eight diagnostic factors to illustrate the congruence of her findings with the data in this
research.
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Whitley's propositions apply to each case and competency, however, they are particularly
relevant to the organisational factors examined in competencies 6 and 7, in which the interplay
between autopoiesis and memes are examined. These principles can also be employed

in

diagnosing and reconstructing dysfunctional safety cultures. Whiteley's triangulating 'autopoietic'
propositions state:

1. Conflict between organisational reality and the espoused organisational
environment.

Whitely suggests that there is dissonance between the organisation's drive to preserve the
status quo while at the same time espousing new values. Inevitably these new values should be, but
are not, modelled at the level of the dominant coalition. This produces conflicting memetic and
autopoietic drivers. For example, the drive to attain operational efficiency and improved customer
relationships at the same time can lead to elitist relationships which tend to 'push' product to
satisfy production outputs when, at the same time, the organisation is espousing better
collaboration with customers to respond to their needs. It wants to be more flexible but does not
want to change. As is seen in the CAA case data. This disconjunction between reality and what is
espoused 'spins', in a public relations sense, orthodox management principles by using
'management speak' to create the impression that it is progressive and dynamic. It often redesigns
its organisational structures, usually with top down organisational hierarchy charts, and calls this a
'change management program', but merely regroups. This 'change' program often happens in
response to serious incidents, again as seen in the CAA and in Longford.
2. Predisposed to stability and stable structures

Whiteley's second proposition suggests that autopoietic organisations, such as the CAA, will
try to preserve very stable structures and implement 'quality systems' which don't fundamentally
change the way it does things that in tum results in making the organisation more rigid and less
flexible. Its structure is layered and inappropriate to its purpose with rigid staff classifications. It
seeks a return to equilibrium - preserves structures and behaviours such as selection processes. It
has systems and processes that are institutionalised with systems, rules and regulations constructed
to suit all employees. There is a belief in long term service as a basis for recruitment; for example,
Air Traffic Controllers tended to move into management in the CAA in response to mandatory age
limits on working as an ATC (air traffic controller). This was often a salary and classification 'right'
rather than a consequence of managerial competencies, training or experience. Paradoxically, the
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organisation does not see that it is orthodox, inflexible, bureaucratic, traditional, and controlled by
benevolence and tradition. Even when bringing in consultants, the knowledge is internally focused,
rejecting any insight or recommendations that do not fit. It is autopoietically inwardly focused and
inward looking.
3. Rules and Pol icies l i n ked to stabil ity

Such an organisation, according to Whitely, is inclined to introduce systems, rules and
procedures to enhance predictability, thereby moving towards autopoiesis from a chaos
environment or a strong push to 'standardise procedures' . often seen in Government regulators
such as the CAA and the Public Sector Standards Commission. Rules and procedures which govern
rewards tend to be based on years of service rather than performance or innovation. This aspect of
autopoietic organisations is diagnostically obvious in that there are too many rules and an equally
obvious inability for management to work without them. It has functional groups which implement
new strategies and then immediately institutionalise the practices (morphogenically transform) to
be congruent with and use the language and structures of the rest of the organisation. Promotion is
governed by espoused rules and regulations but is actually shaped by unwritten rules. For
example, selection for promotion can be either male or female, depending on management gender
balance [for example male in the CAA and Navy, and female in the Equal Opportunity Commission
and the Public Sector Standards Commission]. When threatened by exposure such organisations
protect themselves by quoting its espoused rules and regulations.
4. H ierarchical structure and deci sion-maki ng

Whiteley's fourth autopoietic proposition can also be considered diagnostic. She observes
that an autopoietic organisation does not see that it is hierarchical, however its decision making is
hierarchical. It favours internal promotions only. There is rarely lateral recruitment allowed and
then the jobs go to 'acquaintances'. There is a reluctance to delegate but managers declare they are
good at delegating to members of their 'team' (management speak'), when in fact this 'team'
simply follows orders. Communication tends to be top-down and is rarely bottom up. This
communication pattern encourages dangerous memes, a failure to examine unsafe assumptions
and an inability to utilise prior knowledge (as seen in the Moura case). A diagnostician would be
able to observe an autocratic management style which is interventionist and paternalistic. Higher
level decision makers demonstrate real unwillingness to let go of decisions, even dangerous ones,
as was seen in the actions of Mr. Paull and Mr. Marcionis in the CAA case.
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5 . Tends to view the environment as stable and unchanging

Paradoxically, an autopoietic organisation wants guidance by 'the rules', and does not want
change. It has a deep system of values grounded in 'old' world practices. The Royal Australian Navy
and the CAA, for example, cling to their wartime roots where their 'heroes' seem to be located.
Both cling to past successes and glorify 'tradition'. Organisations with clear 'heroic' pasts can
become habituated to gaining and sustaining a sense of superiority and permanence from their
unique access to particular or specialist knowledge. A diagnostician would observe a propensity for
acronyms; for example, in the CAA communication is enabled for 'insiders' and rendered
impossible for 'outsiders' through a rich language of 'alphabetese'. For example, TAAATS (for The
Australian Advanced Air Traffic System), NOTAM (for Notices to Airmen), ICAO (for the
International Civil Aviation Organisation), and AMATS (for Airspace Management and air Traffic
Services).
6. Lack of openness to change

An autopoietic organisation, suggests Whitely, does not recognise when there are problems
and persists with bad decisions. It does not see the variety of cultures within it. The CAA was not
aware of its many subcultures (Sutherland, Keech, Donato, and Maher, 1992; Maher, 1994). It
highlights the barriers to change rather than possible adaptation to the future. It resists new
learning and the rigour that must accompany it, paying lip service to training and retraining. Such
an organisation espouses that it can change and accept significant and radical change, but in
practice this is only if there is no risk to its underlying power base. Changes tend to be small and
incremental, such as a leadership program restructuring around customer needs or a new
performance management system. It won't push boundaries or allow the silo walls to come down
(McNair, 1992). Vision and attempts at leadership generally fall on deaf ears because of this. It
seeks to rationalise past behaviours and to 'blame' people rather than focus on the future. It blocks
negative criticism - it blames the messenger. The CAA's core values were often developed and
enforced in a predominantly male workforce and it has difficulty now due to different values
entering the organisation as females are employed under EEO and equity guidelines at the lower
levels. This gender identifier is reversed in organisations where women began as senior
management and males later enter the organisation (as in some government departments).
7. I neffective focus of change

Poor assumptions and memes govern practices in relation to hanging on to old benefits
perceptions of roles in relation to clients and customers, and the organisation's reputation, as was
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seen in the Navy after the Westralia accident, and consistently in the CAA. Often an autopoietic
organisation tries to change its core products and methods of doing business without taking
account of these assumptions and 'ways of seeing'. It may change systems and install new ones but
they are essentially more of the same. There is a clear failure to establish the new espoused core
values and ensure they are transmitted through the whole organisation (they are often not
communicated and understood well enough even at the senior management level).
8. Staff, Knowledge and Comm u nication

Whitely argues that an autopoietic organisation does not perceive its impact on staff,
customers and other stakeholders. This is particularly evident during a change process. Some
groups are disempowered. Some are change-ready and others are change-resistant. Collegiality can
act as a dampener on responding to the demands of key stakeholders and proactive management
practices. There is an aura of privilege, satisfaction, and smugness among many staff who are
insular. There is evidence of cynicism and lack of trust, group think, stereotyping, subversive
subcultures and an overall culture in which employee lack morale and motivation - all evident in
the CAA. Managers do not have the expertise to do effective mentoring. There is a lack of
communication and knowledge of the work of others and feedback of performance.
Whiteley's eight factors are important because they provide strong triangulation support for
the observations deduced in this research, which used a different research methodology.

4.9 Conclusion
The data analysis described in this chapter took account of key issues normally identified in
the analysis of text-based small 'n' case studies. It described a model for cell reduction and coding
compression and also a method of research triangulation for data verification purposes. It
established the reasons for the selection of the cases, summarised the grounded theory approach
as a practical way to construct theories in order to understand phenomena, particularly those
concerned with understanding action from the perspective of the human agent. This is relevant to
the research focus on managerial capabilities and its interest in the psychological and
organisational factors central to the phenomena of interest.
The following data analysis chapters seek to examine the issues under the categories set out
in the principal and subsidiary research questions by considering actual experiences (real
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accidents). Chapter 5 examines the capacities which underpin safety management. Chapter 6
examines critical organisational competencies. Chapter 7 examines individual capacities to
perform. Chapter 8 examines regulatory compliance and intervention. The data is examined
according to the Modified Grounded Theory model set out in chapter three using the following
analytical criteria: interpretation, literature, case text - data, elaboration of theory, asking

generative and concept relating questions, statement of relationships between concepts,
grounding the theory through interplay with other data from the research, verification, and
elaboration to hypothesis. This conceptual set of analytical tools was described in chapter 3 in
section 3.4.2. These analytical tools are based mainly on the work of Strauss and Corbin (1990) and
Strauss and Corbin in Denzin and Lincoln (1994:273-285).
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5 U nderpinning Capacities
'The psychol ogy of the mature hu man being is an u nfol d i n g , emergent,
oscil lati n g , s p i ral l i n g p roce s s marked by p rogress ive s u bordi nation of older,
lower-order behaviour syste m s to newer, hig her-order syste m s as man's
exi stential problems change . '
Professor Cl are W . G rave s , U n i o n College, New York

5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the set of competencies considered most essential as foundation
'building blocks'. It analyses ethics, foresight, vigilance, judgement, and balance in the framework
of the modified grounded theory approach developed in chapters 3 and 4: interpretation of the
concept as it is used in this research followed by a consideration of the relationships between the
competency under consideration and the other key competencies. The chapter then poses a set of
generative questions and a review of the literature salient to the concept and complementary to the
main literature review in chapter 2. An elaboration of the insights is attempted and other data from
the research is then used to ground the theory. Finally a hypothesis based on the issues revealed by
the research is suggested.

5.2 Competency 1: Ethics (organisational and individual
manager's values and behaviour as they influence the
determination of right from wrong in decisions concerning
safety)
5.2.1 INTERPRETATION
'Ethics', as applied in this research, is concerned with reasoning through, deciding and
acting upon what is right and wrong. Definitions of ethics that are relevant to this research, can be
grouped into several ethical systems that test for ethical principles. For example, Table 5.2.1
summarises four ethical systems and their key proponents and includes a definition of each.
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Table 5.2.1 Relevant Ethical Definitions

Proponent

Eth ical System

Definition

End-result ethics

John Stuart Mill ( 1 806- 1 873)

The moral rightness of an action i s
determined b y considering i t s consequences.
We test for results.

Rule ethics

lmmanuel Kant
( 1 724- 1 8 04)

The moral rightness of an action is
determined by laws and standards. We test
for policies and procedures.

Social contract ethics

Jean Jacques Rousseau
( 1 7 1 2- 1 778)

The moral rightness of an action i s
determined by the customs and norms of a
particular community. We test for
organisational values.

Personal ethics

Martin Buber
( 1 878-1 965)

The moral rightness of an action i s
determined by one's conscience. We test for
personal conviction.

Ethics, as a philosophical concept, is considerably broader than these definitions indicate.
However, they are useful in the sense that they direct the mind of the researcher to deontological
moral 'rules' (deontological derives from deon, the Greek word for duty), such as specification and
performance standards to ensure 'duty holders' exercise 'duty of care' and comply with
organisational and professional codes of conduct and regulatory regimes. Each of the cases
examined reveals that commissions of inquiry into fatal accidents place considerable emphasis on
ethical values in their analysis of an accident, which lends weight to identifying ethics as a core
competency in this research. Ethics is perhaps the most overlooked managerial competency since it
generally competes directly with the demands of 'the bottom line'. The organisational and
managerial dimensions of ethics become important as organisational and individual values and
behaviours influence unfolding accident scenarios by potentiating or mitigating accident dynamics.
HyperRESEARCH computer analysis of the case data revealed descriptors of ethical concern.
This data derives from the text sources for each of the five cases based on the methods described in
chapters 3 and 4. Several of these descriptors are expanded into the source text they describe (in
the Case Text Data section 5.2.5) in salient examples of 'ethical' concerns raised by the
commissions of inquiry. This pattern of placing the salient examples of the descriptor
(HyperRESEARCH code) being examined into a panel is followed in each of the ten competencies
described in the following chapters.
A representative sample of these behaviours is examined in the analysis that follows. The
research suggests that managers who can, but fail to exercise initiatives to protect life in hazardous
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situations, are behaving unethically and that this behaviour can also have profound accident
potentiating systemic consequences. For example, ignoring hazards to make profits is a deliberate
decision. It is an abrogation of managerial ethics and is, therefore, criminal. It is not uncommon in
recent cases in Coroner's courts to hear the phrase, "It was a case of 'systemic failure.' This implies
that systemic failure was generated separately from the people who run the organisation.

5.2.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
Turnbull (2002) asks, why should people trust corporations when chairmen act in an
unethical manner? He comments that fish rot from the head. He also asserts that Company
chairmen routinely provide evidence of rot being universal. However, in high reliability
organisations, it is critical that good ethical conduct becomes part of the ethos (a memetic force) of
an organisation if the drive to profits is to be sufficiently mitigated to ensure safety. Within the
problem of unethical behaviour lies the ethical solution. By understanding the pathogenic nature
and the memetic robustness of persistent and dangerous communications senior managers can
model integrity and ethics. Ethical behaviour in organisations rests entirely on ethical behaviour by
each and every individual in that organisation. Ethics bears a close relationship with each of the
competencies, and in particular, organisational ethos. This broader organisational influence of
ethical conduct is also important when considering ethical reasoning (deontological reasoning)
and its role in 'judgement' (competency four). Ethical reasoning is clearly different to ordinary
decision making, even though a decision may well follow the reasoning process.

5.2.3 ASKING G ENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Generative questions attempt to generate issues of relevance related to, or which might be
construed from the research concepts (Becker, 1993). For example, the following two questions:
'Are personal and organisational ethics emergent cultural phenomena that arise over time or can
they be acquired and sustained through training and development?' and 'Can organisational
cultures be provided with conceptual tools to detect and limit the effects of unethical behaviours?'
are both derived from the research and other data and point to the issue of training managers in
ethics.
Solomon (1994) raises several behavioural questions in his social-responsibility audit.
Given any planned activity:
Who is affected? How?
Who might be affected?
What criticism might be expected? By whom? Is it justified? How can it be
avoided?

152

Who could be helped by the plan? Who could be helped by a slight change i n the
plan?
How m uch would that cost?
Is the plan ned activity one wh ich you would be will i ng (even happy) to publicise
and make known to the com m u nity? Are there social aspects of the plan that
would be wel l worth you r publicising?
If not, why not?
Does the activity involve (or encou rage) any i m moral activity?
If so, how could this be avoided?
Are the net effects of the activity just and fai r? Will anyone be cheated out of
someth ing rightfu l ly his or hers (land or its val ue, royalties, credit, dignity,
health)?
Are there any laws l i kely to be violated in carryi ng out the plan?
Are anyone's fights l i kely to be violated?
Are there valuable social i nstitutions that could be served by the action?
Are other people's customs or ways of l iving likely to be violated?

Such questions are directed to actual day to day ethical concerns of managers. The
difference between each type of question is apparent in the sense that the ethical audit style of
question asked by Solomon is different from the generative and concept relating questions about
ethical behaviour. This pattern of formulating generative and concept relating questions about the
competency is generally followed in this section in each of the following chapters.
5.2.4 LITERATURE
The Philosophical underpinnings of ethics are substantive. A way of positioning any
particular view of ethics (for example, relevant to this research is Ross's "ethics as 'duty' view",
which is located in deontologism in figure 5.2.1) is to place it within an ethical taxonomy in which
the consequences of our behaviours and the duties we have to others are considered.

ETHICAL
DEONfOLOCISM

CONSEQUENTIALISM

�

I

Utilitariani sm

/"'-

Eg oism

A

Family

�
Pure
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Divine
Command

Exi stential

A

Mixed

Ross Others

Agency

Figure 5.2.1 Ethical Taxonomies (Boatright, 1 993)
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WD Ross (in Boatright, 1993) and also in Beauchamp and Childress (1994) says we have duties of:
1. Fidel ity - to keep promises and tel l the truth.
2. Reparation - to compensate people for i nj u ry we have i nflicted .
3 . G ratitude - to return favou rs that others do for us.
4. Justice - to ensure that goods are di stri buted according to needs and merits.
5. Beneficence - to do whatever we can to improve the cond itions of others.
6. Self-improvement - to i mprove our own virtue and i ntel l i gence.
7. Non-Maleficence - to avoid i nj u ry to others.

The deontological theories argue for the nature of 'relationships' (French and Granrose,
1995). The commissions of inquiry attached considerable importance to the ethical obligations
between employers and employees and between high reliability organisations and their
stakeholders. Deontological (duty) theories also account for motives. For example, when two
people give money to charity and we know that one did it for genuine reasons of compassion and
the other to impress. The consequences are the same but our deontological view is that we value
the motives differently.
Immanuel Kant14 (1724-1804) in The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Foundations of

the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) argued that the ordinary person knows perfectly well which
actions are right and which are wrong. Kant argues that intention describes the moral worth of an
act more than consequences. If a person is motivated by the intention to do the right thing then
that person is motivated by a sense of duty. His moral law requires that one should do an act only
if one would will that others in similar circumstances would do the same thing. This goes to the
heart of the notion that senior managers should perhaps place themselves in the same hazardous
situations in which they place their employees and other stakeholders. Immorality is when we
make an exception to the moral law in our own case. Kant specifically draws the conclusion that
we must always act as belonging to a community and treat others with respect, since we all have
intrinsic worth. Kant said that achieving real outcomes required 'categoric' action. Kant said that,
"If you want to ...... , then do ....... " He saw it as imperative that if you wanted to, for example,
improve your organisation's safety then you would intervene in hazard potentiating situations. Not
to do so could be considered unethical and dysfunctional. Kant said that achieving real outcomes
required categoric action. He saw it as imperative that if you wanted, for example in the modem
14

Immanuel Kant ( 1 724- 1804). His two most important works are The Critique of Pure Reason and
the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant believed that the ordinary person knows perfectly well
which actions are right and which are wrong. Kant argues that intention describes the moral worth of an act
more than consequences. If a person is motivated by the intention to do the right thing then that person is
motivated by a sense of duty. His moral law requires that one should do an act only if one would will that
anyone in similar circumstances would do the same thing. Immorality is when we make an exception to the
moral law in our own case.
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world, to improve your driving skills then it was imperative you would take proper lessons from a
professional instructor. Kant then, took the premise further and said that one should, "act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law." Therefore, Kant would call the statement, "Tell the Truth " a 'categorical imperative'.
Ethically dysfunctional managers were identified by each commission of inquiry as being
central to the accidents they studied. This notion of dysfunctional management extends to a
broader base than ethics alone and is central to this thesis. Dysfunctional management behaviour is
congruent with high reliability organisational theory in the sense that incompetence in the form of
inattention or inadvertence, greed or neurotic behaviour, or worse, is not acceptable as an excuse
for a fatal accident. A manager's ethical constructs seem to be an indicator of a propensity for
functional and dysfunctional behaviour and point to primary managerial perceptions held by any
particular manager. Hitt (1990), for example, suggests we can identify organisational leaders in
terms of how they might 'ethically' view their primary management function. He suggests that end
result ethics leads to manipulation; rule ethics bring about bureaucratic administration; social
contract ethics promote professional management; and personal ethics can result in transforming
leadership:
Manipulator. The pri mary function of leadership is to use deception and cunning
to further one's own ends. (the end justifies the mean s.)
Bureaucratic ad ministrator. The pri mary function of leadershi p i s to communicate
and enforce rules (structure is preserved through rules.)
Professional manager. The pri mary function of l eadership i s to g et things done
through people for the purpose of achieving organ isational objectives.
(manage ment is g rounded in the responsibil ity for achievi ng resu lts through the
effective and efficient u se of hu man and material resources.)
Transforming leader. The pri mary function of leadership i s to lift fol lowers to
their better selves. (the most effective way to motivate i s to bring out the best i n
others .)

This theoretical perspective and philosophical insight is helpful in understanding the ethical
concerns of this thesis. For example, consider managerial concern for the financial bottom line in
decisions that require a trade-off between investing in safety or profit. The economic dimension
encompasses good and bad decisions in a business sense, whereas the ethical dimension
encompasses right and wrong decisions in a moral sense. Research suggests that safety centred
decisions in high reliability organisations must be both good from an economic standpoint and
right from an ethical standpoint.
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In The Neurotic Organization ' (1984) Kets de Vries and Miller examine how top executives'
personal neurotic styles of behaviour effect overall organisational functioning. They identify five
neurotic styles - more fully developed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, DSM-N (1995). These help shape and influence at least five types of dysfunctional
corporations and suggest that organisational problems seem to reflect the neurotic styles of their
top managers. They suggest that each of these styles is shown to give rise to particular problems of
strategy, structure, decision making, and managerial culture. They claim that the organisational
configuration seems to broadly mirror the psychodynamic neurotic configuration of the top
executives. Because of the relationships between the decision making outcomes of individual
managers, and their cognitive and decision making styles, particularly in novel and complex
environments, clearly it is unethical to allow personal neurotic dysfunctional aberrations to subvert
or preclude proper safety management, particularly in organisations that require high levels of
reliability to function safely, such as in mining, oil and gas exploration and refining, shipping,
aviation and military operations. Simple common sense suggests that perhaps states such as lack of
knowledge may not constitute dysfunctional behaviour. However, in high reliability organisations
managers who should have particular knowledge but do not and insist their decisions on
hazardous situations, may bring about loss of life and property. In this sense their lack of
knowledge is lethal and therefore the consequence of ignorance is dysfunctional. It is important to
understand that high reliability organisations are the setting for this research. A university, for
example, is not generally considered a high reliability organisation and the claims made here in a
general sense do not apply to such organisations.
The following list of examples of unethical behaviours offered by Nash (1990) resonates
strongly with the findings of the various Commissions of Inquiry that follow (Case Text Data in
section 5.2.5). She identified 30 ethical concerns that result in dysfunctional behaviour or are
examples of dysfunctional behaviour in themselves. This is highly suggestive of a strong
equivalence between dysfunctional and unethical behaviours when the deontological equation is
applied to high reliability organisations.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1 1.

Greed
Cover-ups and misrepresentation i n reporting and control procedures
M i slead i ng product or service clai ms
Reneging or cheating on negotiated terms
Establ i s h i ng policy that i s likely to cause others to l ie to get the job done
Overconfidence i n o ne's own judg ment to the risk of the corporate e ntity
Disloyalty to the company as soon as times get rough
Poor q uality
H u m i l iating people at work or by stereotypes i n advertis i ng
Lockstep obedience to authority, however u nethical and u nfair it may be
Self-aggrandi sement over corporate obligations (conflict of i nterest)
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12.
1 3.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Favouritism
Price-fixing
Sacrificing the innocent and helpless in order to get things done
Suppression of basic rights: freedom of speech, choice, and personal
relationships
Failing to speak up when unethical practices occur
Neglect of one's family, or neglect of one's personal needs
Making a product decision that perpetrates a questionable safety issue
Not putting back what you take out of the environment, employees,
and/or corporate assets
Knowingly exaggerating the advantages of a plan in order to get needed
support
Failing to address probable areas of bigotry, sexism, or racism
Courting the business hierarchy versus doing the job well
Climbing the corporate ladder b y stepping on others
Promoting the destructive go-getter who outruns his or her mistakes
Failing to cooperate with other areas of the company - the enemy
mentality
Lying by omission to employees for the sake of the business
Making an alliance with a questionable partner, albeit for a good cause
Not taking responsibility for injurious practices - intentional or not
Abusing or just going along with corporate perks that waste money and
time
Corrupting the public political process through legal means

David Godsell (1993) suggests that the legitimacy of the duties and standards adopted by
any profession can never be isolated from the expectations of the various groups within society,
who pay for, and rely upon, that profession's services. Godsell is pointing to a general propensity
to ethical malaise in the auditing profession. His remarks can be generalised to those who purport
to manage high reliability organisations.
Cunningham and Johnstone (1999) develop a legal socio-technical argument that both
specification standards (that tell duty holders how to meet a goal by requiring compliance with
detailed technical requirements) and performance standards (that define the duty in terms of
problems to be solved or goals to be achieved) are needed to ensure 'duty holders' comply with
regulatory regimes. They observe a trend towards replacing specification standards with both
performance standards [ duty] and principle-based standards [ ethical values] (for example, very
general 'duty of care' provisions) while complementing these latter with greater reliance on codes
of practice rather than regulations. This move to reliance on ethical values in compliance regimes
lends emphasis to the critical importance of the weight given to ethics as a core competency in this
research.
One of the more relevant elucidations _of ethical judgement is found in the deliberation
process posited by Hosmer (1996), who identifies five major ethical systems each providing clear
benchmarks for reasoning. Hosmer argues that the major implication for managers is that there is
no single system of belief, with rationally derived standards of moral behaviour or methods of
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moral reasoning, that can guide executives fully in making 'proper' judgements when confronting
difficult moral problems, such as reasoning through the consequences of whether to invest in
safety or not. For example, in the Pinto case, Ford valued a human life at $11. Hosmer, would
argue that immoral acts can be rationalised by persons who are prone to self-deception or self importance (clearly evidenced in the CAA case findings), and there is no scale to judge between
'wills'. Because of these implications it is the contention of this thesis that, if day to day managerial
(ethical) judgement fails, then legal compliance imposts must be sufficient to save lives and ensure
adequate vigilance in high reliability organisations.
5.2.5 CASE TEXT DATA
The case text data makes it clear that senior management is required to exercise competent
responsibility for the welfare of others (the deontological ethic). For example, Windridge (1996)
observes in examination of the Moura evidence:
M i neworkers place their trust i n management and have the ri g ht to expect
management to take responsible deci sions in respect to the i r safety. They also
have the right to expect management to kee p them i nformed on any matter l i kely
to affect their safety and welfare (p 4 12).

Windridge is suggesting that managerial decision making should prioritise safety before
other considerations, such as the priority of production. He is also suggesting that management has
a responsibility to proactively communicate safety concerns to those who might be effected by
them. To deliberately withhold critical safety information from those who might die as a result of
not having that information is also unethical.
All of the case reports point to a cluster of ethical failures characterised by dysfunctional or
ambiguous behaviour modelling by 'duty holders' [the legal term for those with responsibility derived from 'deontology'] such as managers and directors. These ethical descriptors are grouped
together in the panel below (Table 5.2.2).
Table 5.2.2 H

erRESEARCH Ethical Descri tors

This pattern is followed in each chapter of the following analysis. For example, the
descriptors above include: managers shifting blame to front line workers for accidents that plainly
arise from managerial greed or incompetence, CEO and other members of the dominant coalition
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lying, individual and systemic corruption, duplicitous conduct, espoused values that bear no
resemblance to actual practice, failure of responsibility through inadvertence or incompetence,
false representation, managers applying pressure on workers to break rules, and cultivating a
dubious and opportunistic relationship between the regulator and regulated. The direct
relationship between managerial competencies and ethical behaviour is established in the literature
section above (Windridge/Moura) and demonstrated in the case example (Westralia) below where
one example showing 'failure of responsibility' is selected from the text of the five cases:
TEXT DATA SOURCE - WESTRALIA CASE: [CODE: failure of responsibility} Diesel
engi nes with jerk pu m ps are known to be prone to pressure pul ses in the fuel
system . . . . The presence of these pulses is wel l known by the eng i ne
manufacturer and the I nternational Maritime Organisation. There was no
con sultation with relevant experts by the contractor, su bcontractor or s h i p's
staff. Lloyd's Register of Shipping approval of the intended arrangements was not
obtai ned as requ i red i n order to mai ntai n the ship's certification, and as
requested by the ship. (Item 60: Report of the Board of Inquiry i nto the fire i n
HMAS WESTRALIA o n 5 May 1998 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

This model of naming the text data source from now on will be done simply by naming the
case source in bold with underline at the beginning of the paragraph ie, WESTRALIA. [The
HyperRESEARCH cod e i s italicised i n the s q u are brackets in each example that fol l ows]

In the Westralia case the fuel hoses did not comply with specifications. In effect, the ship
sailed without certification. The Navy inquiry tended not to engage in the kind of higher order
analysis suggested by this research and furthermore, it leaned toward exoneration of its own
personnel by suggesting that 'systemic failure' had caused the accident. However, such 'systemic
failure' can and will happen again unless a forensic examination reveals the competencies,
motivations and thinking of the individuals involved and that is factored into future practices. A
forensic analysis would require asking uncomfortable questions such as, 'Who benefited from the
contract?' The active exercise of such candour needs to be in place in all high reliability
organisations.
In the following extract from the Longford Commission of Inquiry text data, several sections
dealing with ethical concerns are identified. Sections 13.1, 13.2 and 13.3 point to lessons from
prior accidents that were identified and detailed in operational manuals but largely ignored in
practice, resulting in the loss of critical hazard related competencies. The Eleven guidelines
included the organisation's statement of its responsibility for managerial accountability, risk
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assessment, facilities design, training, management of change, incident analysis, community
preparedness for accidents, and the integrity of the plant's operations.
LONGFORD: 1 3 . l[espoused values]
Fol l owing an oil spi l l from the oil tanker
Exxon Valdez in 1989 and again st the backg round of a n u mber of other disasters
ari sing from the hazardous activities of companies other than the Exxon
Corporation and its affi l i ates, Exxon developed a framework for the safe and
environ mental ly sound operation of its various undertaki ngs. The framework was
cal led Operations I ntegrity Management Framework (OI M F). Within this
framework, Exxon Com pany I nternational (ECI) developed a series of
expectations and guidel i nes (the ECI G uide l i nes) that included the ECT Upstream
OIMS G u idelines (the ECI Upstream Guidelines). The ECI Upstream G u idelines
contai ned eleven pri mary elements with associated expectations, and a series of
guidelines for the achievement of these expectations . . . .
1 3 . 2 The eleven elements referred to I n the G uidelines were:
Ele ment 1 - Management leadership, com mitment and accountability;
Element 2 - Risk assess ment and management;
Ele ment 3 - Facilities design and con struction;
Ele ment 4 - I nformation /docu mentation;
Element 5 - Personnel and trai n i ng;
Element 6 - Operations and mai ntenance;
Ele ment 7 - Management of change;
Ele ment 8 - Th i rd party services;
Ele ment 9 - I n cident i nvestigation and analysis;
Element 10 - Com m u n ity awareness and e mergency preparedne s s ;
Element 1 1 - Operations i ntegrity assessment and i mprovement.

1 3 . 3 [ systems manual that espoused safety accountability procedures] Uti l i s i ng
O I M F and the ECI Guidel i nes, Essa developed its Operations I ntegrity
Manage ment System (OI MS). Th is management system was outl i ned within a
manual known as the OIMS System s Manual and was detailed i n a series of
s upplementary manuals , charts and other "control led" docu ments. A controlled
docu ment was one s u bject to regulation by document management guidelines.
The OIMS Systems Manual was the centrepiece of OI MS. It set out the scope and
objectives of each of the 1 1 ele ments and identified each syste m owner, as wel l
a s the manual s and other docu ments fal l i ng within each syste m o r s u b-system.
The owner of a syste m was the person responsible and accou ntable to e n s u re
that the overall system was worki ng and achievi ng its objectives i n an efficient
manner. (Dawson, 1 999)

This failure to properly implement these espoused guidelines is tantamount to unethical
behaviour by management. The Royal Commission makes the point directly in paragraph 13.5 of
the Report (Dawson, 1999).
However,
in
many
1 3 . S [espoused procedures were not implemented]
respects, there were shortcomings in the way in which Essa i mple mented its
OIMS system at Longford and thus, in the way in which it i m plemented the ECI
Upstream G uidelines.

It stated that the failure to implement the espoused "process that measures the degree to
which expectations are met", and regarded that managerial requirement as essential "to improve
operations integrity and maintain accountability". The Longford findings were also suggestive that
these deontological ethical factors need to be specifically addressed and identified so that
organisational learning can occur. For example, the Commission emphasises management's
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responsibility for competency based training and organisational learning possibilities that flow
from identification of unethical behaviours in paragraphs 13.6 and 13.7 below.
13.6 [ espoused values emphasised training]
The ECI U pstream G uidelines
called for the careful selection, placement, ongoing assessment and p roper
trai ning of employees. They also req uired Esso to maintain a management
system that ensured that the necessary levels of i ndividual and collective
experience and knowledge were maintai ned. Further, they required Esso to
provide for ongoi ng refresher training and also to understand and apply the
proper protective meas ures to deal with safety, health and envi ron mental
hazards .
1 3 . 7 [ failure o f training resulted in failure of safetY'J
The system o f trai ning
at Longford changed in 1993 from a "supervisor based" format to a "competency
based" format. The evid ence was that a competency based trai ning programme
req u i red trai nees to demonstrate a knowledge of plant operations, to apply
acqu i red skills and to have an appropriate attitude to safety issues in respect of
fellow employees, equi pment and the environment. It was unnecessary for the
Commission to undertake a detailed investigation of Esso's trai ning p rogram me
or its particular training techniques. Thi s was because the accident on 2 5
September itself demonstrated the p ri mary deficiency i n Esso's trai ning. That
deficiency lay i n the fail u re of its trai ning programmes, however i m plemented, to
i mpart or refresh the knowledge required to operate GPl safely i n the conditions
that existed on the day. (The Esso Gas Plant Accident, Report of the Longford
Royal Com mission. 1999)

This direct connection between ethics and competencies is particularly salient since it occurs
in all of the cases in one form or another and illustrates the gap between espoused values (often in
the form of 'mission statements') and actual practice. For example, an analysis of the Seaview case
from an 'ethics' perspective should be set against the espoused corporate mission statement of the
CAA (now the Civil Aviation Safety Authority) as a high reliability organisation and as the regulator
responsible for the administration of the Act governing the conduct of Seaview Airlines. The
Seaview case was as much an examination of the CAA, as regulator, as it was an examination of
Seaview Airlines. Both failed to act ethically. Both were instrumental in the accident. The
Commission of Inquiry and various other reports pointed to the CAA as a bureaucracy out of touch
with its prime responsibility as the 'regulator'. It had a 'duty' to ensure aviation safety and it failed
repeatedly to enforce 'compliance' with aviation safety regulations. This failure was characterised as
systemic and proved critical to its inability to prevent the Seaview accident, which cost nine lives. It
failed to act in accordance with its own espoused guidelines. The following espoused undertaking
by the CAA is taken from the Civil Aviation Authority Industry Development Plan (1994) Q
354.79094 AUS:
CAA: [espoused values] Serving Australia and i nternational aviation, by purs uing
high standards of aviation safety, through effective and efficient safety regulation
and provision of world class aviation traffic services.
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With this regulatory 'duty' clearly spelled out, Mr. Paull, the CAA's regulatory officer
responsible for policing the Seaview operation, failed in his ethical duty in the following significant
ways, which resulted in compromising the critical relationship between regulator and regulated.
The Commission makes the following findings: (Staunton, J.H. (1996) Report of the Commissioner
/ Commission of Inquiry into the Relations Between the CAA and Seaview Air, Executive Summary:
40-41) { from now on referred to as Seaview Report, Executive Summary}
[diligence and vigilance were compromised by the unethical relationship between
the regulator and the regulated]
First, the Commission uncovered no

evidence of the corrupt receipt of benefits by Mr Paull as an inducement to act in
a particular way. (Researcher's note: However, the particular technical definition
of 'corruption' applied here does not entirely exonerate Mr Paull's lack of
integrity and his resultant failure to ensure safety. There can be no doubt his
judgement and impartiality were compromised by accepting benefits.)
[individual manager's values and behaviourj Secondly, Mr Paull allowed himself to
be compromised by the receipt of significant benefits from CareFlight, and, in the
case of the fax machine and the CB Radio, specifically requested those benefits.
He must have appreciated that this was wrong. He knew of no other CAA officer
who had received such benefits. He did not disclose these matters to his
superiors. He was aware of the Code of Conduct. There was no evidence that he
behaved differently toward CareFlight than he otherwise might have done, or that
his conduct towards CareFlight was inappropriate. However, no detailed
investigation was undertaken into his supervision of that organisation.
[relationship between regulator and regulated] Thirdly, Mr Paull appeared not to
have appreciated the need for some distance between the regulator and the
regulated. His dealings with Heliscene and Solitary Island Helicopter Service
demonstrated an insensitivity to the possibility of a conflict of interest. The
closeness of his relationship with each operator inevitably compromised his
ability to act as a regulator.
[duplicitous conduct] Fourthly, Mr Paull's use of training allowances to have the
CAA pay for what were unquestionably private excursions reflected no credit
upon him. He exploited his position. The evidence demonstrated a lack of
integrity.
[failure of responsibility] Fifthly, the same lack of integrity was apparent in the
evidence relating to outside employment. Mr Paull knew that permission was
required. He knew he would not be given permission if it were a paid position. He
surely knew he was compromising himself by accepting a paid position with an
operator he supervised. Yet he went ahead with such employment, and did so
repeatedly.
[false representation] Finally, in the midst of all of this, Mr Paull, on a significant
number of occasions, lied to the Commission to cover up or explain his actions.
[relationship between regulator and regulated] Mr Paull presented as an
opportunist who enjoyed, too much, the company of operators, and saw matters
too readily from their viewpoint, rather than the viewpoint of public safety.
[corruption] The crash came at a bad time for the CAA. Its competence and
integrity were already being questioned as a result of a crash some fifteen
months earlier, on 1 1 June 1993. On that day an aircraft operated by Monarch
Airlines, another small airline, crashed near Young, with the loss of seven lives.
(Seaview Report, Executive Summary)

The Seaview crash gave fresh focus to the media scrutiny of the CAA. A number of criticisms
were made. The response of management was quickly contradicted by documents leaked to the
Press. The documents appeared to demonstrate, first, a poor safety record on the part of Seaview,
and secondly, prior knowledge of that record in the CAA. There was speculation that there may be
corruption. The CAA had ample opportunity to deal with the issues at Seaview that eventually
resulted in the fatal accident, but consistently failed to do so.
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The Seaview case indicates the critical relationship that exists between managerial ethics and
managerial success or failure in high reliability organisations. It could become an exemplar case
study for management training in defining and dealing with most of the issues revealed by this
research. The most relevant outcomes of the Seaview accident were those that focused on
managerial 'competencies' and 'values' at the most senior levels.
The Commission of Inquiry (Staunton, J.H. (1996) examined Seaview's activities over a
period of approximately three years. In that time Seaview Air had three chief pilots: before August
1993, Mr John Green, the CEO and operator; between August 1993 and March 1994, Mr Gregory
Matthews; and between March 1994 and October 1994, Mr Clive Mclver.
The task Mr Mclver inherited as chief pilot required pilots to change bad habits that had
been formed over many years. Such a task was formidable. The Commission stated that Mr Mclver's
only hope of succeeding was if he were to demonstrate implacable opposition to overloading, and
to demand integrity in the completion of documents. Regrettably, he seems to have done neither.
The Commission observed that he did not set a good example of ethical conduct to his pilots:
[ambiguous behaviour] it seems that on occasions he flew overloaded and
tolerated a degree of misstatement ("fudging") in documents recording the
weight of passengers and freight; and though he urged pilots to record defects in
maintenance releases (in accordance with CAR S O), he appears not to have done
so himself.
[duplicitous conduct] On 2 October 1994, the day of the Seaview Air crash, Mr
Mciver recorded Mr Green's weight on the manifest of VH-IBF as 7 7kg (the
standard weight), when it was obvious that Mr Green was considerably more
(92kg).
[pressure to break rules]
After the crash, the CAA suspended Mr Mciver,
referring, among other things, to the following:
"As a result the company would appear to have a culture wherein the regard for
rules, regulations and general best practice is not appropriate to the class of
operation proposed to be conducted - i.e. RPT."

Mr John Green, was the CEO and airline operator and its chief pilot prior to 1993. Mr Green
denied that Mr Paull had ever disclosed to him the fact that Mr Matthews (chief pilot between
August 1993 and March 1994) had complained. That denial was furnished to the Commission
before Mr Green became aware of Mr Paull's position. Mr Green was lying. The disclosures were
certainly made. The Commission found that:
[CEO lying]
Mr Green denied having knowingly flown an overloaded aircraft.
He also denied having put pressure on hi s pilots to fly overloaded. The
Commission has found that Mr Green is lying in both respects. The evidence that
he flew overloaded, and that he put pressure on pilots, was overwhelming.

Mr Green gave evidence that he had not destroyed or concealed any document, having
simply discarded correspondence with Fastbook Travel because it was unimportant. This evidence
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was rejected. The Commission found that the agreements and correspondence with Fastbook
Travel were deliberately concealed from the inquiry.
[instance of collusion by dominant coalition in lying to the Commission]

According to M r Green it was not until VH-SVQ had fai l ed to arrive at Lord Howe
Island (after the elapse of another hour) that he recogni sed the possibility that
the aircraft might have crashed. Mr Mciver g ave simi lar evidence.

The Commission found that Mr Green and Mr Mclver were both lying. It stated that, 'It is
impossible to believe that two experienced pilots, both mature men, would not have appreciated at
once that VH-SVQ was in grave and imminent danger.'
The Seaview crash was one of many serious events that resulted in the Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) being abolished and replaced by two separate organisations: the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (the Authority) and Airservices Australia. New compliance and enforcement
procedures were introduced by the Authority in January 1996 after the Seaview crash and other
disasters.
5.2.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
Deontological ethics is a primary competency needed by managers and organisations in
which responsibility for the lives and welfare of others is essential. Seeding of unethical values into
organisations occurs where managers are themselves prepared to act unethically. This is supported
by the evidence from the Seaview case in which the CEO was found to be lying. His influence
reached deep into the into the organisation itself and into the regulatory authority, the CAA. These
unethical propensities take on memetic (message survival) force so they become part of every
communication. This was clearly evidenced in the Longford observations of ignoring critical
espoused values. This is perfectly congruent with Maurino, Reason, Johnston, and Lee's (1995)
theory that, 'organisational pathogens . . . are transported along two principal pathways to the
various workplaces, where they act upon the defences, barriers and safeguards to create latent
failures and upon local working conditions to promote active failures (errors, violations and
component failures). Subsequently these active and latent failures may act to create an event'
(Maurino, Reason, Johnston, and Lee, 1995:28). Unethical behaviour by managers both models and
gives permission for unethical behaviour in other employees such as the evidence shows in the
case of the chief pilots involved in the Seaview incident. Theoretically, the evidence is strongly
suggestive that univariate dysfunctional managerial ethics can lead to multivariate dysfunctional
ethics in employees.
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5.2.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH I NTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
This view of univariate dysfunctional ethics leading to multivariate dysfunctional ethics in
employees is strongly seen in the Seaview case where the CEOs dysfunctional behaviour entered
the organisation and infected his senior pilots. The ethical failure of corporate responsibility can be
very high. For instance Ford could have installed an $11 shield for the petrol tank of the PINTO,
but senior management did a cost benefit analysis and decided not to. Hundreds of people were
incinerated in Pinto crashes. Employees knew of this aberration but did nothing to stop the deaths.
In another example of the failure of corporate responsibility, safety queries about
Concorde's engines surfaced in 1998. New Scientist magazine, 12 August 2000 reported,
British Airways commissioned a risk analysis of Concorde's Olympus 5 9 3 engines
because it wanted to keep the 30-year-old supersonic plane flying until 2 0 1 2 .
The study . . . divided the conseq uences into five classes--ranging from trivial to
"catastrophic". The latter included "non-containment of high-energy debris,
engine separation, uncontrolled fire [and] multiple engine failures". The analysis
identified 152 separate risks, but it showed that Concorde's engines did not fall
short of the safety standards req uired by the Civil Aviation Authority in Britain
and its counterparts in France and the US.

Nevertheless, a blazing Air France Concorde smashed into a hotel two minutes after taking
off from Charles de Gaulle airport, killing 113 people. It seems prior knowledge of 'significant risk'
was not significant enough to cancel flights. British Airways was quick to emphasise that in spite of
the CAA knowing of the potential dangers the regulator in its role of safety policeman had not
required it to improve the plane's engines. This is another example of costs driving risk rather than
safety. The Pinto and Concorde crashes were preventable accidents. There was a corporate ethical
responsibility to act on clear hazard information. Furthermore it seems that not only were the
organisations failing in their due diligence, so were the industry regulators.

5.2.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the Commissions of Inquiry found that behaviour such as ambiguous
behaviour modelling, corruption, lying, and duplicitous conduct could have prevented each of the
accidents studied. As demonstrated in the case analyses the various Commissions of Inquiry all
came to somewhat similar conclusions concerning poor ethical conduct at senior level. But
Australian corporate laws and practices are based on the opposite assumption, that when directors
gather together they will always be good fiduciary agents putting the interest of others above their
own. However, this espousal of 'corporate responsibility' often rings ethically hollow. This is no
surprise. Adam Smith in 1776 stated that business people "seldom gather together except to
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conspire against the public interest". Coincidentally, Australian directors have a number of powers
that create conflicts of interest and the opportunity to serve their own interest ahead of the
company, its shareholders and stakeholders and to entrench their position, status and influence to
serve their own interests (Turnbull, 2002). Corporations governed by a single (unitary) board have
absolute power to manage their own conflicts of interest (Turnbull, 2000). Recent high profile
corporate failures and the preventable accidents revealed by this research confirm the adage that
absolute power leads to absolute corruption.
It is reasonable to assert, hypothetically, that competencies that systemically ensure the
seeding of responsible managerial modelling of ethical behaviour throughout high reliability
organisations are essential to safety. Practical methods are available to managers that they can use
to instil ethical behaviour in organisations (Ross, 1993; Kets de Vries and Miller, 1984; Nash, 1990)
and include: ethics committees, an internal ombudsman's office, judicial boards, ethics-training
programs, and social audits.

5.3 Competency
'intelligent

2:

Foresight

looking

(attitudinal

ahead, as factors

'stance,

and

in decisions

concerning safety)
5.3.1 I NTERPRETATION
No one can predict the future. However, we can adopt a stance congruent with our interests
and look ahead and think about what might happen so that we can begin to prepare for it. This
looking ahead is termed 'foresight'. Managerial foresight ('managerial stance' and 'looking ahead'),
as it is used in this research, means an ability senior executives need to have to see ahead based on
their awareness of how organisational systems in hazardous operations can be developed and
deployed. Scott (1991), suggests that 'stance' means the affective or emotional dimensions of
appreciating a situation. The competency demands considerable insight into systemic breadth and
complexity and moves well beyond the realm of individual ability, and simple skills of instrumental,
mechanistic learning. At the same time, foresight demands an attitudinal stance informed by
detailed knowledge of past events. Therefore, systemic mechanisms to retain corporate memory
are critical.
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The exercise of foresight requires that specific records are kept, such as Safety Systems
Management [SSM) (Petersen, 1996) or prospective and retrospective HAZOP (hazard and
operability) studies (performed in hazardous operations - often used with equivalence to SSM).
Such records include information about alerts and hazard signals, identification of critical
indicators and operational manual updating as well as ensuring necessary inspections and forensic
investigations of previous incidents. It also requires shaping a culture in which these factors are
meaningful and can be applied. Further, these tasks should be reinforced in a high reliability SSM
or enabling HAZOP organisation by cyclical refresher training and incentives to ensure the
competency is not extinguished. A proactive 'attitude' or mental stance by senior management is
essential to lead the practice of foresight into an organisation end ensure it operates properly.
The need for foresight is an enduring requirement in high reliability organisations both in
macro and micro focus. For example, if the organisation is in a period of change (macro) or its
systems and processes are dynamically changing in vivo (micro) then systems need to be in place to
ensure there are no surprises. Nevertheless, it makes no sense to claim to know already the facts
you will learn in the future. Yet, paradoxically, information overload has become a well-known
problem in high reliability and technology based organisations: pieces of knowledge pile up too
fast for people to sort and make sense of them (Spezia, 1979). The need for intelligent prospective
and retrospective HAZOP or Safety Systems Management (SSM) analysis to deal with this
information, taking account of the known and making room for the unknown, is put into relief
when we consider that the most rational of ideas may appear to be true, but in fact may not
actually be true. Commonsense, which mostly relies on memetic filters and frameworks, can be a
dangerous ally in managing risk. Stars do not sit on a dome above the earth. The sun does not
revolve around the earth. Big objects do not fall faster than small objects. Leaving safety control
systems to individuals to manage by exercising even the most rational of memetic hunches,
assumptions or intuitions is about as effective as relying on the evil-spirit theory of disease and is
not an adequate managerial response to hazard.
After ethics, the managerial capacity to exercise foresight is the next most important core
competency. Good record keeping and prospective and retrospective HAZOP or SSM studies
should be informed by reliable corporate memory and incentives to ensure prior knowledge is
captured and utilised. The research suggests that high reliability organisations undergoing change,
which in today's changing corporate and business world probably includes all organisations, most
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of the time, must be required by the regulator to initiate forensic prospective and retrospective
HAZOP or SSM studies to enable the foresight necessary to create useful and usable prior
knowledge. The regulator should ensure that the dominant coalition should not be allowed to
compromise safety in the pursuit of 'production', since Australian Corporate law allows directors to
manage their own conflicts of interest. The CAA and the Longford cases, which reveal the
dangerous play of uncertain contingencies in hazardous conditions, illustrate the tight relationship
between managerial competencies and the need for a strong compliance regime in HROs.
The research was sensitive to identifying descriptors in the reports that addressed these
phenomena. Table 5.3.1 itemises the critical indicators and descriptors of 'foresight' that were
revealed by the HyperRESEARCH analysis of case reports:

change related risk, corporate memory, critical safety indicators, failing to keep or supply
records, failure to perform prospective and retrospective HAZOP study, incentives, prior knowledge, role
o overnment, role o re ulator.

5.3.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
There is a striking overlap of core competencies throughout the research, as is to be
expected in Grounded Theory analysis (Bennett and George, 1997; Richards and Richards, 1995).
For example, the relationship between foresight and competency 7, 'constructing a culture of
safety', is anchored by competency subsets in competency 7 such as 'failure to utilise information'
and 'failure of corporate memory', which are strong echoes of the need for 'foresight'. Foresight
and the other competencies, such as 'judgement', competency 4, are also strongly connected
because of the memetic principle that ideas that have evolved to seem true (at least to uncritical
minds) can in fact be quite false (Drexler, 1986). Facts and real skills are important to the exercise
of foresight and the other competencies rather than the simple aleatory exercise of alert intuition
or hunches.
5.3.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATI NG QUESTIONS
Prospective and retrospective HAZOP studies both inform and are informed by reliable
systems of capturing corporate information. This observation would suggest that management
should put such systems in place at the outset to ensure critical systems and safety knowledge is
captured and properly applied when needed. The research raises such basic questions as:
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•

Should high reliability organisations initiate forensic prospective and retrospective
HAZOP studies to enable the foresight necessary to create decision usable prior

•

knowledge?
Then, because Australian Corporate law allows directors to manage their own
conflicts of interest, one should ask if regulatory bodies ought to anticipate high
level disinterest in safety, particularly where safety is mostly seen as a cost.

•

It is unrealistic in the present corporate climate to expect boards of directors to
possess well developed safety based competencies such as foresight without
regulatory pressure to do so. Therefore, is there a need for a strong compliance

•

regime in HROs if preventable accidents are to be avoided?
This concern for a strengthened regulatory role raises the question, where wilfully
non-compliant organisations that fail to utilise prior information regarding potential
accidents are allowed to operate high reliability services, or are known to be
otherwise at risk, to what extent is the regulator ultimately responsible for fatal
accidents?

•

This perspective on foresight as a regulatory failing also raises the further question,
what systems or techniques could a regulator insist on to ensure critical safety
information is captured and utilised in HROs?

1

i

These questions direct the researcher to the scenario building foresight theories of De Vries
(2001), Heinrich (1959), Harman (1976), Schultz (1993), Schwartz (1996), and Turner's (1976)
theory that underpins all of these, that prior knowledge of an accident exists somewhere in an
organisation before an the accident occurs.

5.3.4 LITERATURE
HG Wells (1932), put a strong case for what he called 'professors of foresight'. The
theoretical base concerning 'foresight' is adequate to the task but probably does not warrant a
university chair. There are several systems available to organisations who might wish to apply the
skills of foresight. Schultz (1993) suggests the Manoa approach to scenario building as a technique
for exercising practical foresight capabilities. She states that scenario building begins with the
recognition of change occurring in the environment (environmental scanning), and an
identification of specific changes critical to the specific activities and goals (issues identification).
The benefits of scenario building, according to Schultz, rest not in the completed scenarios but in
the process of development itself, and in the subsequent common language participants in the
process share. They can use this common language as a tool to explore the benefits, costs, and
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trade-offs of any potential decision, initiative, or plan. More specifically, she says, they can consider
the short-term trade-offs in comparison to long-term trade-offs as the scenario building process
creates a language to facilitate that comparison.
Scenario building also clarifies priorities in considering trade-offs under very different
possible future conditions. Schultz's approach is particularly amenable to the foresight technique
called 'incasting' - thinking up the specific details of a possible future based on a more general
scenario description. Incasting begins with an array of possible futures: several different scenarios,
all based on observed trends and emerging issues. The presumption essential to incasting the
future is that you have awakened to find yourself living in it.
Schwartz (1996) focuses on eight steps in a formulaic foresight method by 'focussing' on
future events and constructing possible scenarios: identify focal issue or decision; identify the key
factors in the local environment that influence the success or failure of the key issue or decision;
identify macro environment driving forces; rank these forces by most important and most
uncertain; select possible scenario logics by location of crucial uncertainties on an axes of
importance v uncertainty; flesh out the possible scenarios in term of connections and implications;
select leading indicators and signposts needed for the scenarios.
Joop de Vries (2001) also argues for Schultz's 'sociovision' approach to foresight
construction. 'Scenario Building', according to both de Vries and Schultz is best characterised by
Royal Dutch Shell, whose scenario building meant "thinking the unthinkable" - harnessing and
mobilising ideas that are not obvious to all. Shell generally uses only two - at the most, three scenarios at a time. This is because people must be able to keep all the scenarios in mind
constantly as a context for discussion and decision-making. The de Vries process is an organic,
evolutionary scenario building process, built on a dialogue focussed by Schultz's eight basic
questions.
1)
What is the significant i ssue, p rogram, product, or event for which we
wish to explore alternative outcomes and the i r implications? Write down the focal
issue.
2)
Map the present: what structu res , feelings, reactions, val ues are on
participants' mental maps right n ow with regard to the issue?
3)
Ask, "what next?" What could be potential outcomes of this i ssue,
program, product, or event? State the possible outcomes in a few words: a s hort,
vivid phrase. Let partici pants spend some time explori ng alternative possible
outcomes, bearing i n mind that those alternatives will i n many cases contradict
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or excl ude others on the l i st. This is the s pace i n which to con s ider n ot o n ly l i kely
outcomes, but also unth i n kable ones.
4)
Let partici pants sit back and consider the l i st for a few moments. I dentify
those outcomes that i nd i cate o ppos ite possi bilities, or a branch i ng point in the
evol ution of i m pacts and outcomes. Focus o n the branc h in g poi nts of particu l ar
i nterest strategi cal ly, or that the group feels represents a critical pattern worth
exploring.
5)
C l u ste r elements on the l i st of pote ntial outcomes that are logically
con s i stent with the main "branches" you have identified.
6)
For each "branch," l ook for a ph rase that sums u p or ide ntifies the
dee pest, most pervasive structure defi n i ng that branch of outcomes; that phrase
is your scenario title.
7)
Ask, with regard to each of you r "branches" or scenarios, "what does this
mean for the main players i nvolved i n this story?"
8)
Final ly, ask what you r organi zation or com pany, and the peo ple i n it,
wou l d do in the e nvi ron m ent descri bed by each sce nario: how would your
com pany deal with the conditions i n that pos s i ble future? Uoop d e Vries, 2 0 0 1)

Harman (1976) discusses the necessity for thinking through the multiple causalities that
produce an infinite array of alternative possible futures and his work is particularly relevant to the
task of exercising foresight in high reliability organisations. He describes how to mimic that pattern
of development in scenario building. In its simplest form, this technique is based on group
brainstorming, but could also be expanded to include phases of background research such as SSM
or prospective and retrospective HAZOP studies. Participants brainstorm evocative titles for twenty
two "snapshots" of alternative futures: not fully described scenarios, just quick images of
possibilities. Post-it note jottings are arrayed so that they are clearly visible to everyone (Figure
5.3.1) . The group then discusses which of the "snapshots" seems closer to present conditions, and
which seem to require longer-term, transformational changes. The post-it's are rearranged to form
rough groups of "near-future," "medium-term future," "long-term future," and "far future." Actual
dates, or as in this example, sooner or later, are options. On a mural-sized sheet of paper, the
group has prepared a fan diagram:
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Figure 5.3.1 Harman Fan Foresight Template (Harman, 1976).

Participants then di cuss where in tbe chronology represented by the fan template different
"snapshot" images of the future fall, and whether neighbouring " napshots" rely upon related
trend and emerging issues of change. As the group discusses timelines and related lines of
causality, the post·its are mapped onto the twenty·two different triangles on the fan . When the fan
is complete it may be used to tell different stories of bow changes and situations emerge, blend,

and bounce off each other when intersecting. The different triangles are like stepping stones into
the future, and different paths create scenarios that unfold in different pattern .

Harman's approach is close in concept to standard crisis management techniques (Myers,
and Holusba 1986), which identify a critical envelope of executive concern in which time available
to act, options available, dimension of the crisis and the extent of control over the factors are all
considered in matrix form. SM or prospective and retrospective HAZOP studies use a somewhat
similar array of techniques borrowed from the 'quality' chool of management theory, such as
fishbone diagrams and fault trees, designed to capture critical information and identify issues.

In considering potential accident scenarios Heinrich (1959) indicates that there is a Chain of

Multiple Events Model or Domino Theory of accident causation. His theory suggests a chain of
events or factors that lead up to an accident, with each factor acting on the next over a period of
time, implying that if any factor is removed from the chain, then the accident is unlikely to occur.
This thesis sugge ts that management has prime responsibility to foresee and remove such factors,
which might be achieved through immersion in the areas of concern by applying some of the
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foresight scenario techniques set out in this section. Such techniques require engagement at the
highest levels of an organisation. Because there are many techniques and tools that can be used
there can be no valid excuse for not applying them.
Most MBA programs in universities introduce future managers to the principles of strategic
thinking through acquaintance with techniques such as SWOT analysis (analysing strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and threats). However, these are useful but often inadequate models to
apply to SSM in high reliability organisations. Their focus is on markets, profits and production
rather than hazard prevention. So no matter how competent a senior manager may be in their own
estimation, foresight can be an area where one's earlier training in management may not be up to
the task. Predictions based on competent managerial skill can be quite inaccurate. Even the
comparatively steady advance of technology often eludes prediction by the most competent. For
example, though the space shuttle was clearly possible, predictions of its cost and initial launch
date were wrong by several years and billions of dollars.
Development always involves uncertainties. Drexler (1986) argues that possibilities are quite
distinct from predictions.
We look ahead with minds and cu ltures rooted i n the ideas of more sluggish
times, when both science and tech nolog ical competition lacked their present
strength and speed. We have only recently begun to evolve a tradition of
technolog ical foresight. (Drexler, 1986: 5 4)

This mix of uncertainty and technological development is a potent combination in
potentially hazardous situations and makes mastery of managerial foresight critical, particularly in
periods of change (both organisational and socio-technical). Foresight is enabled by the knowledge
base of SSM and prospective and retrospective HAZOP studies, particularly during periods of
change. In principle, if these were applied they should go some way to mitigating preventable
accidents. For example, during a change from one air traffic control system to another system the
likelihood of accidents is increased, therefore suggesting that heightened, rather than routine,
foresight and vigilance are needed. Such a scenario is amenable to elucidation and development
using any of the techniques listed above.

5.3.5 CASE TEXT DATA
If proper organisational learning does not take place after an accident and foresight
capabilities have not been deployed, then the conditions are probably still in place for the
occurrence of similar accidents (as is demonstrated in the Mauro case examined in this research).
173

The Commissions of Inquiry data suggested that prospective and retrospective HAZOP
studies would have revealed over time that systems, not individuals, were where the main locus of
most accidents in HROs and also where information to head off future accidents could be
examined. Unfortunately the 'human element' approach creates a climate where blame is levelled
at the front line operators rather than managers (as in the Longford, Seaview, and Lake Illawarra
cases). To his credit, Viner (1991) and points out that consideration of management's role has
been a notable omission from the factors considered in accidents where rapid and dynamic change
and uncertainty occur. He argues there has been a strong emphasis on a 'human factors'
interpretation of accidents where an operator experiences 'overload'. The operator must continue
to perform his usual tasks while correcting for the unusual additional system condition.
This issue of operator overload is thrown into relief in the Longford case where Esso - BHP
had a philosophy about how it should manage the change process and also recognised the hazards
that went with change but still pushed the envelope of safety for the sake of production. It failed to
carry out its own recommended risk assessment analysis and consequently failed to foresee the
impact of the proposed changes on the safe operation of the facility. Had it done so the problem of
operator overload would have become obvious.
LONGFORD: 1 3 . 6 5 [ risk resulting from change - prior knowledge - prediction of
Attached to and form i ng part of Element 7 was
consequence of change]
Essa's Management of Change Philosophy dated August 1993 (the philosophy). I n
the philosophy, Esso recognised that change was "necessary and desirable" as
part of the operation of a facil ity but also recogn i sed that "changes potentially
i nval idate prior risk assessments and can create new risks, if not managed
d i l igently".
1 3 . 66 [HAZOP requirements specified prior to accident] The
philosophy
contai ned management of change procedu res to be followed i n undertaking,
amongst other things, any modification or addition to an existing facility. These
proced u res req u i red any permanent change to an existi ng facil ity to be
accompanied by a risk assessment of the change, consistent with the procedu res
in OIMS Element 2, "Risk assessment and management". The primary purpose of
such an assessment was to determine the i mpact of the proposed change on the
safe operation of the facility.

Esso was in a process of organisational change at the time of the Longford accident. Taken
together, paragraphs 13.65-68 illustrate that the organisation specifically identified the need for risk
assessments as part of the responsibilities it has to manage change related risk. At the same time it
occludes the actual tasks required by items 2 and 7 of its own 'Integrity' management system
(OIMS) in managerial gibberish such as, "Production Technology operate(s) within a management
of change procedure that is consistent with the EAL management of change philosophy" (quoted in
13.67). Clarke (1999) describes this as, 'the moral risks of risky systems are trumped by the
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bureaucratic standards demanded of fantasy documents and the administrative rationality they
signal.' In spite of its awareness of the risk such change would bring, it failed to pay attention to
information already in the system, hence it failed to connect prior knowledge to the potential
accident conditions and the change process in train at the Longford plant. It overlooked or ignored
the need to exercise relatively straightforward foresight techniques.
13.67 [prior knowledge and change-related HAZOP requirements not converted
into operational procedures and also masked by 'management speak ) However,

OIMS Element 2 did not identify any procedures for risk assessment associated
with management of change. The only reference to this topic was in the following
terms: "Production Technology operates within a management of change
procedure that is consistent with the EAL management of change philosophy."
1 3 .68 [change related risk and failure to perform HAZOP study combine to
subvert corporate memory and compliance requirements)
Moreover,
neither OIMS Element 7 (Management of change) nor OIMS Element 2 (Risk
assessment and management) made any attempt to define the breadth or scope
of any risk assessment study to be undertaken to comply with management of
change procedures.

There is ample evidence that prior knowledge of the consequences of change existed at
senior corporate levels. Failure to perform the necessary prospective and retrospective HAZOP
studies indicate a failure of corporate memory since this requirement arose from the organisation's
prior experience of change related accidents and should have enabled adequate foresight. The
following excepts from the Commission Report indicates that if the overload Gob enrichment)
margin becomes too large, or occurs at a critical time, a person may begin to make errors in his
usual task performance or in the handling of the unusual additional system condition.
1 3.84 [ change related complexity associated with Job enrichment masked critical
safety indicators)
In mid- 1993, changes were made to the respective roles

and responsibilities of operators and supervisors at Longford. Further changes
were made in 1996 and 1 997 with the consequence that operators assumed a
greater responsibility for the day to day operation of the plant, including
troubleshooting to overcome process irregularities. There was also a reduction in
the number of plant supervisors and a reduction in the number of plant operating
areas.
13.85 [ risk assessments were required but these were not carried out) These
structural changes were clearl y intended to alter operating and supervisory
practices at the plant and thus req uired management of change risk assessment
and evaluation pursuant to Essa's management of change philosophy. Again, no
such assessment was carried out. (The Esso Gas Plant Accident, Report of the
Longford Royal Commission. (Dawson, 1999))

Paragraphs 13.84-85 of the Report (Dawson, 1999), observe that risk assessments resulting
from management initiated efficiency changes were not carried out in spite of managerial policy
alerts such as, "changes potentially invalidate prior risk assessments and can create new risks, if not
managed diligently". This combined with the overload Gob enrichment) problem, masked critical
safety indicators - such as audible alerts.
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Central to the exercise of foresight is the attention given to the capture and application of
'prior knowledge' by Turner (1976, 1978) and Turner and Pidgeon, (1997). He suggests that prior
knowledge of potential accidents already exists in organisations, however, this knowledge base of
serious risk has often been ignored. For example, in the past, aircraft accident investigations were
considered complete if 'human error' could be established as the cause. Aviation companies such
as Boeing, for example, found that 73.9% of aviation accidents involving commercial jet aircraft
could be attributed to failure of the 'human element' (survey from 1959 · 1985). Analyses such as
these failed to gamer knowledge of failing systems and little or no effort was then made to
determine what other factors had resulted in accidents. This notion of winding up an investigation
prematurely has some dubious support in the literature. For example, Viner's (1982:101) human
factors approach suggests that human error results from man's psychological and physiological
limitations and the demanding role he has been given in the aviation system.
The idea has memetic force as an assumption that appears to be true but which may not
actually be true. For example, if an investigation finds that 'human error' is the principal cause of
an accident, it has no reason to look further for 'cause' and will overlook all or most other factors
necessary to feed into HAZOP studies or scenario building exercises. Hence the need for analysing
accidents in terms of systemic factors (social and technical).
The literature points unequivocally to the need to engage in techniques of looking ahead by
keeping critical prospective and retrospective HAZOP records and applying them to the task of
scenario building. The problem of collecting and using prior information to feed into accident
prevention often flows from an attitudinal stance by senior management and was strikingly
observed in the following extract from the Seaview case. It shows the failure of both the company
to keep records and the regulator to insist on such records being kept, as is required under the Act.
If records had been kept they might have enabled the collection of already existing information
sufficient to foresee the accident under study. The case also demonstrates the connection between
such failures and how the attitudinal readiness to behave unethically and to breach compliance
requirements limits the capacity for foresight. In this CAA-Seaview case the regulator failed to stop
the airline, Seaview, from conducting unauthorised regular passenger flights.
CAA [ failure to keep or supply records as unethical behaviour, duplicitous

conduct and breach of compliance requirements showing contempt for the
regulator] Seaview Air was obliged (as was the CAA) to produce to the

Commission documents relevant to the Terms of Reference. It failed to produce
agreements and correspondence with Fastbook Travel (a travel agency that
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arranged most nights). That material was made available to the Commission by
the travel agency itself. It revealed the truth of Seaview Ai r's relationship with the
agency, namely, the purchase of seats, not the charter of ai rcraft.
M r G reen gave evidence that he had not destroyed or concealed any document,
having s i m ply di scarded correspondence with Fastbook Travel because it was
u n i mportant. This evidence is rejected. The agreements and correspondence with
Fastbook Travel were deliberately concealed from the Com mission. (p l S ,
Executive Summary)

Seaview was registered only to conduct charter operations but it was running a six-day a
week passenger operation in direct breach of its license. The core issue of ethics emerges as
seminal to a competency such as foresight. Seaview's management, who failed to exercise foresight,
simply broke the law in plain sight of the regulator, who also failed to exercise foresight, and
against the specific advice of its chief pilot, who appeared to have exercised adequate foresight
(and who was sacked), and consequently a fatal accident occurred. The Commission Report makes
it clear that the Chief Pilot provided the regulator and the company management with sufficient
prior knowledge of a potential accident. This prior knowledge should have enabled all who were
involved to foresee the accident. Ethics, compliance and foresight are inextricably linked in the
following extract.
[prior knowledge and the role of the regulator] On 7 March 1 994 the chief pilot of
Seaview Air, M r Matthews, was d i smissed by M r Green. He was replaced by M r
Mciver, with the approval of the CM. On 10 March 1 994, M r Matthews wrote to
Mr Paull. H i s letter began with these words :
"SEAVI EW AVIATION operated by John G reen i s a disaster waiting t o happen.
Uohn's) attitude is extremely negative and dangerous. He does not know enough
about Safety, Regulations, Orders, Ai rcraft l i mitations, and Pi lot Management to
run a safe and efficient operation. (His) opinion of the CAA i s that "if they could
get a decent job they would (not) be bothering hi m"; he also says "that if pushed
he would sell all his ai rcraft and retire to the (beach), d ri n king beer". It maybe
better for the travelling public that he does this?"
The accuracy of that statement has been demonstrated to the Com m i ssion.
Seaview Air, while under the effective control of M r G reen (that included the
period d u ring which Mr Matthews was Chief Pi lot), remained a poorly managed,
and often wilfu l ly non-compliant, organi sation. Mr G reen's attitude to many
aspects of the operation was dangerous , for example, overloadi ng, cheating on
mai ntenance releases, fai ling to docu ment defects, fail i ng to restrain loads.
Moreover, he manifested an attitude towards the CM of contem pt, which was
not altogether unjustified.
M r Matthews's letter catalog ued the problems of Seaview Air. It i s now known
that Seaview Air was affl icted by each one of the problems he identified. He
described an operation with which no sensible person would wish to fly. He
identified the fol lowing:
• the fail u re of M r Green to allow the chief pi lot to control the operation;
• cheating on mai ntenance releases;
• overloadi ng and the absence of a system of load i ng;
• the absence of documentation for each flight;
• fai l ure to restrain loads;
• fai l ure to maintai n flight and duty times in accordance with CAO 48.0;
• fai l u re to mai ntain adequate safety equipment (life jackets and life rafts); and
• the fact that the operations were in truth an unauthorised RPT operation.

This illustration of the dominance of the CEO and his capacity to treat safety with contempt
emphasises the critical theoretical insight offered by Turner and Pidgeon (1997) that prior
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knowledge of an impending accident is available within the organisation before the accident
occurs, and in high reliability organisations such accidents should be foreseen. However, in this
case, the information that identified the serious risk contained in Mr. Matthews letter was ignored.
I nstead of bei ng the trigger for an i nvestigation, Mr Matthews letter met with
inertia. It was enough for the CAA that Seaview Air had appointed a new chief
pilot, Mr Mciver. It was left to Mr Mciver to address the problems raised by M r
Matthews. With a new ch ief pilot, Seaview A i r was to b e regarded a s havi ng a
"clean slate". The CAA did not even take the trouble to i nterview M r Matthews to
determine what evidence he could provide.
The alleged deficiencies of Seaview Ai r were so many, so serious, and reported so
often (many being corroborated by information al ready avai lable), that an
i nvestigation by the CAA, rather than by Mr Mciver, ought to have been
u ndertaken at once. It was absurdly ben i gn , and dangerous, to regard Seaview Air
as havi ng "a clean slate" s i m ply because there was a new chief pilot. (Staunton,
J.H. (1996) Report of the Commi ssioner / Com mission of Inquiry i nto the
Relations Between the CAA and Seaview Air: 18, Executive Sum mary)

Coincidentally, Mr Matthews letter pointed to concerns later raised by the Commission and
the CAA's failure to examine his evidence amounted to an extraordinary failure of foresight on the
part of the regulator.
5.3.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
Job enrichment (a managerial euphemism for job overload) can be dangerous in high
reliability settings if appropriate training and cyclical retraining is not a change-related
requirement. High reliability organisations that demonstrate increasing complexity should
automatically become candidates for regulatory and board level scrutiny, particularly if operational
processes and systems are being managed by untrained personnel. Scrutiny of this type is
predicated on the research observations that job enrichment or job overload can reduce a system's
capacity to utilise or even capture accident relevant information. The high probability of accidents
under such conditions (almost always involving ongoing change) should be foreseen both by the
senior organisational managers and by government regulators. These predisposing factors can be
predicted whenever organisational or process change is put in place. If previous experience has
been ignored prior to an accident, then such conduct goes beyond loss of corporate memory to
individual negligence and culpable, if not criminal, behaviour.
It is relevant to observe that most system and process change is ordered by the dominant
coalition to effect cost reductions, increase production, and so increase profits. Consequently, the
dominant coalition is entirely responsible for change related accidents since it is their responsibility
to foresee such accidents, because the information they need to identify accident potentiating
factors is always present somewhere in the organisation (Turner and Pidgeon, 1977).
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5.3.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Grimaldi and Simons (1989:114-115) observe that, "The qualifications for a safety
practitioner should include (1) knowledge of hazards, safety principles and techniques; (2)
knowledge of engineering; and (3) knowledge of business administration". It is salient that while
chief executive officers and managers may have some knowledge of item three, business
administration, it is rare that they have skills in items one and two. If this is the case it might be
argued that priorities set by management interests may take precedence over those where
knowledge of hazards, safety principles and techniques or even knowledge of engineering
dynamics at play in the particular safety milieu are non-existent or poorly understood. Grimaldi's
observation then, amplifies the need for these skills to be required of managers in high reliability
organisations or for the regulator to ensure that, if they are not then safety will not be
compromised through the inability to foresee a potential accident.
Managers lacking these skills would find it difficult to convince an Inquiry that they had the
competencies necessary to exercise foresight. For example, the Seaview Air case discussed in this
thesis reveals core failures of foresight amplified by serious duplicitous behaviour. The CEO of
Seaview could perhaps claim he had adequate knowledge of hazards, safety principles and
techniques, knowledge of engineering, and knowledge of business administration, and yet these
competencies still did not prevent a foreseeable and therefore preventable accident. Both the CEO
and the regulator failed to exercise core competencies, particularly foresight. Many indicators and
behavioural descriptors relating to lack of foresight on the part of Seaview Air, and its regulator,
were identified in the research.
Problems within Seaview Air included:
The company was not licensed to operate Regular Public Transport (RPT) services
on the route in question
There was little evidence of compliance with the recording and processing of
defects
Evasion of regulations was common-as admitted by several previous Chief Pilots.

Deficiencies on the part of the Civil Aviation Authority included:
Lack of effective procedures to review the issue of Air Operator Certificates
Poor operator surveillance
Inadequate follow-up of safety hazards identified in Seaview Air's operation.

Bureau of Air Safety Investigation. (1996) 9402804
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A crash in the previous year on 11 June 1993 (ATSB Occ# 199301743, and the BASI (1994)
Report, 9301743) should have rendered the Seaview crash foreseeable. VH-NDU, a Piper PA31-350
Navajo Chieftain operated by Monarch Airlines, was on a landing approach to Young Aerodrome,
NSW, in conditions of low cloud and darkness. It struck trees, crashed, and was destroyed by
impact forces and post-crash fire. All seven occupants were fatally injured. A combination of local
and organisational failures led to the accident.
Local factors included:
The weather conditions were poor, and there were i n adequate vis ual cues
ava i l able to the hand l i ng pi lot.
The pi l ot had a h i g h workload, m ade worse by aircraft eq u i pm e nt deficiencies
and i n adequate proced u res.
Deficiencies were identified wit h i n the reg u l ator and the o perator.

Organisational failures on the part of the operator included:
Poor trai n i ng of fl i g ht crew
Poor control of the safety of fl i g ht o perations
I nadequate s u pervi s i o n of maintenance
I nadequate res o u rces a l located to s afety.

(ATSB ( 1 993), 19930 1 74 3)

All of the above factors in both cases were foreseeable. These failures were made worse
because operational staff in both companies felt unable to discuss their safety concerns with
management. Management refused to see what the front line operators could see.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau web site15 details 486 aviation accidents between 22
December 1990 and 13 January 2003. Most of the fatal and serious category accidents reveal
dangerous failures of foresight. Many of the accidents reported on the ATSB site contain data
similar to the Monarch accident at Young and the Seaview accident, en route to Lord Howe Island,
cited above. There is also a disheartening similarity of event data in the marine accident
investigation section of the ATSB site. It would be possible to list the details of several hundred
accidents using the format of the accident of the Seaview Air Aero Commander and the Navajo
Chieftain crash outlined above. All of them demonstrate deficiency indicators and organisational
failures that point to break downs of the critical managerial competencies, such as foresight,
discussed in this research.

15 Australian Transport Safety Bureau web site (http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/index.cfm)
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5.3.8 ELABORATI ON TO HYPOTHESIS

Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that adequate prior
knowledge was at hand to render each accident foreseeable. This capacity to intelligently look
ahead for strange artefacts and possible anomalies to head off accidents should doubtless be a
major concern for CEOs and the dominant coalition. It is clear from the warnings and signals
received and ignored in the examples above that routine managerial competencies, such as
assessing critical safety indicators and carrying out HAZOP studies, are essential in managing safety
in the change process. The examples also illustrate that corporate memory can not be counted on
and the Corporate regulator must play a significant role, particularly when high reliability
organisations are going through change. Regulators should place themselves in a position to insist
on the necessary capabilities required to the dominant coalition. Adequate responses to the
knowledge that already existed or to the records that should have been kept and to the HAZOP
procedures that should have been performed could have provided sufficient foresight to prevent
each of the accidents studied. The various Commissions of Inquiry all came to somewhat similar
conclusions.
Foresight is a trainable competency as demonstrated in the techniques and tools revealed in
the work of De Vries (2001), Schwartz (1996), Harman (1976), Schultz (1993), and Heinrich
(1950), and in straightforward works that deal with the effectiveness of managing safety systems,
such as Petersen (1996). The competency can be acquired with moderate effort by most managers
and ought to be required of managers of HROs. It grows out of clearly understanding the sorts of
hazardous exigencies that can arise in high reliability organisations during normal operations and
particularly during organisational or operational change. Both positive and punitive consequences
for compliance and non-compliance with safety requirements are needed to ensure that the
instruments and competencies essential to ensure foresight are in place and operating properly.
Both organisational and regulatory interventions may be necessary.
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5.4 Competency

3:

Vigilance

(hazard

perception

and

awareness and an alert 'way of seeing' are necessary to
signal detection)

5.4.1 I NTERPRETATION
Williamson (1975:21) observed that humans have limitations and that these 'physical limits
take the form of rate and storage limits on the powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve and
process information without error'. Subsequently Spezia (1979), developed the 'task overload'
concept to examine how system components and the pilot's limitations combine in the causation
of the human error accident. Downs (1967:116-8) showed how information is typically subjected
to increasing biases, errors and missing content as the number of levels in a hierarchy increases.
Individuals and the systems they engage with need to constantly attend to risk. Vigilance is
conceptualised as the capacity to attend to events that carry information significant to safety, and
because they have different thresholds of significance they all must be above the vigilance
threshold.
The psychobiological concept of 'threshold' is particularly useful in distinguishing vigilance
from other competencies. For example, we all have a pain threshold that can be mitigated through
drugs or habituation resulting in an altered perception of pain. The vigilance threshold must be
held very low through attitudinal and systemic foresight initiatives such as involving and valuing
'people', signal detection, and reporting skills. In consideration of Down's findings, this is
particularly critical in bureaucracies where supporting foresight systems may not be adequate.
Therefore, Table 5.4.1 suggests that the competency also requires practical organisational systems
to be in place to continually monitor and detect danger signals that move above the vigilance
threshold, such as signal discriminating methods, feedback systems, attendance to records,
monitoring of processes and flows, and attention to warnings and methods of calling attention to
hazard signals that continually repeat and to which human operators can become habituated.
Vigilance is necessary for the effective practice of 'foresight', competency 2, but should not be
confused with it. The following 'vigilance' descriptors, which are significantly different from those
for foresight, were identified in the HyperRESEARCH analysis of the text data.
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Table 5.4.1 HyperRESEARCH Vigilance Descriptors

attention to risk, auditing system, debriefing, discrepancies in reporting, equipment defects, error
detection, failure of materiels, failure of safety systems, failure to discriminate signals, failure to
monitor operating conditions, failure to utilise records, habituation to warning signals, failure to engage
in or provide feedback, hazard identification, high reliability - many eyes, ignored warnings,
inattention.

5.4.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
This competency requires the information gathering and deployment capacities identified in
competency two, foresight, and it is also closely linked to competency six, organisational ethos,
and seven, constructing a culture of safety. If the culture is supportive and healthy, vigilance
concerns will be expressed in healthy ways. Equally, if the culture is repressive these capabilities
will be subverted and thresholds will be raised to protect the individual, particularly where the
culture supports individuals with agendas of their own. Senior management should encourage and
reward expressions of human vigilance capabilities and be aware of their strong cultural
connections.
Understanding the issues surrounding vigilance also informs organisational development
and training concerns, which goes to the heart of issues raised in both competencies eight and
nine that are concerned with performance in particular settings. Training may need to be site
specific. This psychological perspective addresses the skills someone must acquire to operate a
system safely and efficiently and how to select and train those operators whose abilities will match
the competencies required by the job.

5.4.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Human performance and human competencies are intimately related. For example, this
perspective helps us consider the importance of conceptual training and deep understanding
through practice versus rote memorisation in learning the procedures needed to construct a
'working memory' to enable operation of a complex piece of equipment. Furthermore, it helps us
interrogate issues in competency acquisition such as whether it may be better to learn a complex
task through mastery of its components or by practicing the whole task together from the
beginning.
This perspective on vigilance raises such questions as:
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•

If skills tend to be forgotten when they are not used (salient working memory fades)
then what sort of refresher training might be the most useful?

•

How site specific and situation specific should training be?

•

It also raises the problem of the nature of individual differences in verbal and spatial
abilities and raises the question, should these differences be taken into account
when training?

Finally, is it likely that packaged non-site specific, off -the-shelf, training packages can be
sufficiently salient to ensure low vigilance thresholds? These questions should direct the reader to
theories of organisational and adult learning such as those of Argyris and Schon (1996, 1974,
1985); theories of organisational development and change such as those of Cummings and Worley
(1993); and the compelling theories of education concerned with individual differences and
human intelligence such as Gardiner (1985).

5.4.4 LITERATURE
This competency is well covered in the literature, particularly in fields such as human
performance psychology, experimental psychology and engineering psychology. These fields of
psychology are concerned with how the brain perceives and decides what to do with the sensory
messages that are relayed from the environment by the eyes, ears, and other senses (perception) in
the sensory register; then how the operator decides what to do with this information (decision) in
the working memory and executive control centres of the brain; and then how the actions that are
decided on are carried out (action) by the response generator (Wickens, 1992).
The human performance perspective also requires us to consider the rich interplay of
variables among training, individual differences, and system design. This approach is very
important because it accounts for several human-centred performance factors such as operator
work load and performance, training, and selection (Spezia, 1979). This is congruent with the
observations in the case data. However, while it is important to be aware of the role of these
human performance factors it is vital not to be seduced by plausible psychological explanations of
them to the point they capture a whole incident.
Of particular relevance to this study is Reason's (1987:463-470) observation that 'human
fallibility in one form or another is the major contributor to catastrophic failures in complex and
hazardous process environments.' Heinrich (1959:13-16) asserts that only 10% of accidents are
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caused by unsafe mechanical and physical conditions, whereas 88% of accidents are caused by
unsafe acts of persons. (The other 2%, he suggests, are classed as unpreventable, or acts of God).
The psychobiological approach to vigilance in HROs is very useful. For example, Reason
(1987), shows us how an incident is planted as a virus very deep within the body of an
organisation. The expression of that virus (the actual accident or incident) is often far removed in
time and responsibility from the site of infection. Reason calls these causative factors resident

pathogens. These viruses have memetic (survival and dispersion) force. They promote unsafe
actions and also lower the system's defences against disastrous consequences. They reside at the
human and systemic communication nodes of an organisation's communication channels. These
nodes are easily located. They occur at the interfaces between one part of the process and the next.
Vigilance needs to occur at low signal detection thresholds with high sensitivity to ensure it
is detecting the early event phenomena required to offset the cumulative effects of simple human
induced error influenced by fatigue, uncertainty, background phenomena, and salience of signals
(Wickens, 1992). Examples of poor vigilance can be seen in the simple errors in ordinary
experience, such as turning on a car's headlights instead of the windscreen wipers because the
controls are placed side by side. Other simple errors that are made because the process exceeds
human capabilities (Spezia's 'task overload' concept) are making a mistake in using a set of
controls because of ambiguous or poorly worded instructions or having to remember a ten digit
number and not remembering it long enough to complete entering it.
Because vigilance is a competency requiring the capacity to signify and attend to events that
carry information significant to safety it is characterised by perception, stimulus detection,

recognition, identification or categorisation, absolute judgment and pattern recognition
(Wickens, 1992). It is a competency to be highly valued by management in front line operators in
high reliability organisations. Each of these factors is complex and can lead to competent
performance or impediments to performance. For example, training for 'perception' in Air Traffic
Controllers requires that we distinguish between several levels of complexity in categorising a task
brought about by the nature of the stimulus and the task confronting the operator. At a basic level,
the competency may call for the simple human performance judgment of whether a stimulus is
present or not, such as determining the presence of a blip on a radar screen. Only two perceptual
categories are used, 'yes', and 'no', and the human performance operation is one of detection but
still involves sensory processing, perception, attention resources and response execution. At levels
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of greater complexity, the competency may call for not just detection but also recognition,

identification or categorisation of the stimulus into one of several possible groups, such as 'light
aircraft converging with military or civilian jet traffic'. This level of complexity requires the use of
the memory capabilities acquired through experience or training or both. The competency is
learned and embedded in memory through repetition and use.
The process is made more or less complex depending on whether one physical dimension
alone is to be used in perceptual categorisation of the stimulus, or whether instead several
dimensions are to be considered in concert. As one example of the simpler, first case-the absolute

judgment task--an operator may be asked to judge the velocity of several converging 'blips', the
separation between them, and the aircraft characteristics they represent, and assign the stimulus to
a particular categorical level. In more complex tasks, several dimensions need to be considered to
match a stimulus category. Such multidimensional vigilance factors are typical of pattern

recognition. Each pattern is specified by a combination of levels (called features) along the several
dimensions. For instance, recognition of a particular malfunction of a complex system will occur
when an operator can associate a unique combination (pattern) of dial readings (features) on
several different instruments (dimensions) to the perceptual category associated with a particular
malfunctioning state. For example, a particular collection of thermometer and barometer readings,
satellite cloud cover photographs, and wind speeds may signal "storm coming" to a trained
meteorologist.
Some aspects of perception do not involve any categorisation into discrete states but rather
judgment of continuous events in which we do not consciously assign error into either 'large' or
'small' categories. This analogue perception, (in contrast to categorical perception), describes
much of our perceptual experience with space and its perception in three dimensions - critical to
both pilots and Air Traffic Controllers, ships captains and navigators, and the spatial mental
modelling required in visualising complex plant processes while watching control room displays.
This last item proved to be very important in the Longford explosion when critical stimuli were
habituated to and the vigilance threshold was raised to the point where alarms were ignored.

5.4.5 CASE TEXT DATA
Whereas the competency 'foresight' is mostly located in an organisation's systems, the
problem of vigilance is largely located in an organisation's human component (giving rise to the
term, 'human factors' and the fields of study identified above, such as 'human performance
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psychology'). The allocation of HyperRESEARCH-defined behavioural descriptors in the cases was
based on this discrimination between predicting systems and psychobiological signal phenomena
which, as in foresight, also includes relevant auditing and record keeping since these both enable
signification of factors such as signal awareness and discrimination and most of the behaviours
identified in the cases as vigilance related. The behaviours identified were:

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•

attention to risk,
debriefing,
discrepancies in reporting,
equipment defects,
error detection,
failure of materiels (not 'material),
failure of safety systems,
failure to discriminate signals,
failure to monitor operating conditions,
failure to utilise records,
habituation to warning signals,
failure to engage in or provide feedback,
hazard identification,
high reliability - many eyes,
ignored warnings,
inattention.

The following cases provide salient examples of failure in these capabilities and, in some
cases, paradoxical findings. For example, it is stated in the Court of Marine Inquiry (1975), Report

Number 57: ss Lake Jllawarra, (ON 1 78472), that the Minister required several questions to be
answered during the inquiry into the case. The Commission revealed in answer to question 11,
'What caused the ss Lake Illawarra to collide with the Tasman Bridge and subsequently founder?'
and to the related questions, 12 and 13, that 'The loss of the s.s. Lake Illawarra, the resulting
damage to the Tasman Bridge and the subsequent loss of life . . . was due to the failure of Master,
Captain Boleslaw Pelc to navigate with seamanlike care, skill and vigilance.' The Commission found
that he failed to maintain a low threshold for discriminating signals, attention to risk, hazard
identification, ignored warnings, and displayed inattention in the lead-up to the accident, and he
failed to monitor ongoing operating conditions. His failings met several of the performance criteria
for failure of the competence, 'vigilance'. The Commission's findings went on to confirm a direct
relationship between the concept 'vigilance', as described in these terms, and the claim that it is a
competency. The Commission cited several legal sources for its interpretation. However, it was
found that Captain Pele's conduct amounted to misconduct rather than incompetence within s.6C
of the Navigation Act (1912-1973). This section of the Act relates to careless navigation.
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For the purposes of Section 372 of the Navigation Act, "incompetence" i s defi ned
in the following manner by Section 6C(a): "An officer is incompetent if he i s
i nefficient in the pe rformance o f any o f his duties a s a n officer".

That view is supported by the definition of a shipmaster's duty of care given by Isaacs and
Rich JJ. in Spain v. Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand Ltd. (1923) 33 C.L.R. 555, at p. 569: " . . .
the legal standard of the Captain's duty was that he should take whatever precautions a
hypothetical prudent and skilled navigator would reasonably be expected to take in the actual
circumstances." (Australian Department of Transport (1975), Court of Marine Inquiry: ss Lake
Illawarra)
The Illawarra case illustrates a compelling phenomena; there is no single precipitating
behaviour. The failure of vigilance is collection of separate behaviours by individuals, which
themselves are failed by poor systemic 'foresight' tools. The Longford case identifies in somewhat
more detail how several critical behaviours which must occur together to maintain a low threshold
of vigilance. The threshold for discriminating stimuli from the environment on the night of the
accident had eventuated over a period of time, all the while becoming more and more elevated.
This elevated threshold means that stimuli, necessary to sense hazard information, does not
activate a safety system management response. In Paragraph 13.87, the Commission16 identified a
problem in which necessary information did not get the attention of the operators in spite of the
fact that there was a formal handover procedure. The foresight capability failed and consequently
the vigilance capability also failed.
LONGFORD 1 3 . 8 7
The safe and efficient operation of a processing facility
depends to a significant extent upon the di ssemination of information and
knowledge amongst those i nvolved in the operation of the plant. OI MS, as
appl ied at Lon gford, required certai n channels of commun ication in order to
facilitate the exchange of i nformation. For exam ple, it was a requirement that
operators use the handover at the end of each shift for this purpose. Apart from
OI MS, there were other protective systems, such as alarms, to ensure that
essential information about the process came to the attention of plant ope rato rs.
(Longford Royal Com mission (Dawson, 19 99)).

The following paragraphs from the Longford report are summarised to identify significant
failures of vigilance. Taken together, they illustrate the way in which several poor vigilance
behaviours are collectively amplified by poor 'foresight' tools and together are able to precipitate a
hazardous situation. Shift handover problems are amplified by inadequate log books. The Longford
Royal Commission (Dawson, 1999), in paragraphs 13.87, 13.88, 13.104 and 13.107, makes a
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pointed accusation about the responsibility management has to ensure these 'foresight' tools (log
books and shift handover procedures) are effectively deployed.
1 3.88 There was no evidence that any system existed at Longford to eliminate
unsafe or inefficient operations for the regular monitoring of operating
conditions or operator practices.
1 3.104 Correct GPl Control Room Log and Shift Handovers would certainly have
referred to abnormal conditions in Absorber B and to the fact that the level of
condensate in that absorber was still out of control.
1 3 . 1 0 7 Shift handovers and log book entries were used ineffectively In the lead
up to the accident on 2 5 September 1998. Moreover, laxity in the implementation
of the handover requirements seems to have escaped scrutiny by management
(Longford Royal Commission, 1999).

The core factor in this thesis, that prior knowledge of an impending accident exists in an
organisation and if utilised, could prevent the accident from occurring, was forcefully made by the
Longford Royal Commission in paragraphs 13.05, 13.08, and 13.09 (again, these are summarised).
13.105 The process difficulties experienced during the night shift were also
known to the night shift supervisor, Wijgers. However, at the change of shift
Wijgers made no mention of the abnormal conditions of Absorber B to the
relieving supervisor, Visser.
13.108 Log book entries were not subjected to any examination either by
Longford plant management or by management in Melbourne. They do not
appear to have been used by management as a means of monitoring process
conditions at the plant nor were they passed on to any person or group in
Melbourne for plant surveillance purposes.
13. 109 The shift supervisors' log was available to management personnel both at
Longford and in Melbourne. However, process upsets were construed narrowly
both by Esso management and by operations personnel unless they were
accompanied by injury to persons or damage to property and were not generally
included. This meant that the shift supervisors' log was not a substitute for a
properly maintained control room log, (Longford Royal Commission, 1999).

This prior information specifically concerned key vigilance factors, such as warnings, which
were ignored; error detection noted but not passed on; the need to attend to the increased risk not
signified; and the operator habituation to hazard warning signals was not detected. There appeared
to be a failure to engage in or provide appropriate 'foresight' feedback on all of these critical pieces
of 'vigilance' information. The key rule applying to high reliability organisations to use 'many eyes'
in hazardous conditions was ignored.
There is significant resonance here (paragraph 13.145) between 'foresight' tools, 'vigilance'
factors and 'organisational ethos', Competency 6, because they inform the lead-up to the Longford
accident by telling us about the state of mind of the organisation and its management. Paragraph
13.146 of the Longford Royal Commission Report, (Dawson, 1999) demonstrates the connection
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between this failure of capability and 'prior knowledge'; information lost to the 'foresight' system
and then lost as a necessary factor in the vigilance of the operators to signify the defective
equipment, inappropriate operating conditions and the unsafe operating practices leading up to
the accident.
1 3 . 14 5 The conseq uence of thi s practice was that p rocess upsets that may wel l
have signified to qualified and experienced personnel, defective equipment, or
i nappropriate operating conditions or un safe operating practices, were not
brought to thei r attention. Th us, val uable opportu nities to learn from process
u psets were l ost.
1 3 . 146 A pertinent example of such a lost opportunity was the fai l u re of
operations personnel to report the cold temperature incident that occu rred on 2 8
August 1998, (Longford Royal Commission, 1 999).

Competency 7: Constructing a culture of safety is also implicated because it demonstrates a
failure to actualise any real 'intention' to establish a culture of safety and demonstrates how 'ways
of seeing' about critical vigilance factors such as allowing defective equipment, inappropriate
operating conditions and unsafe operating practices to become persistent personal or
organisational ideas. Over time this 'way of seeing' develops the characteristic of a virus of the
organisational mind, or meme, that can then influence the systemic capacities for managing safety.
(A parenthetical note regarding the many failures of opportunity BHP has demonstrated to master
this facet of their management of safety is salient here, because even more recent catastrophic fatal
accidents involving almost similar 'memes' have occurred since the Longford explosion.) Like each
of the organisations studied in this research, BHP set itself up for catastrophic failure by not
understanding the powerful memes at work. The Longford Royal Commission (Dawson, 1999),
made this clear in relation to the 'state of mind' regarding reporting of the previous incident on the
28 of August ('prior knowledge') in paragraph 13.148 of its report.
1 3 . 148 Had the i ncident on 2 8 Au gust 1998 been reported as it should have
been, the danger of equi pment becoming subject to dangerously low
temperatures u pon the loss of lean oil flow for any length of ti me would, i n all
probability, have become known as would the steps available to avert the danger.
The fai l u re to report this incident thus stands as another example of a fai l u re in
Esso's implementation of its management systems. In the case of the i ncident on
28 August, s uch fail ure deprived operations personnel of process i nformation
vital to the p revention of the incident on 2 5 Septe mber 1998, (Longford Royal
Commission, 1 999).

The real causes of the accident are identified in the paragraphs under 15.6 of the Longford
Royal Commission Report (Dawson, 1999), and are essentially all centred on the failure of the core
competency, 'vigilance' and its role as a safety system management competency.
1 5 . 6 [debriefing, attention to risk, failure of materiels, failure of safety
systems, error detection, failure to discriminate signals, failure to monitor
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operating conditions, failure to utilise records, habituation to warning signals,
failure to engage in or provide feedback]

Notwithstanding the matters mentioned above, the concl usion i s i nevitable that
the accident that occu rred on 2 5 September 1998 would not have occu rred had
appropriate steps been taken fol lowing the tri pping of the GP1201 pumps.

[attention to risk, debriefing, failure o f materiels, failure o f safety systems, error
detection]

When efforts to restart those pumps proved uns uccessful, it should have been
reali sed i m mediately that cold temperatures would ensue downstream from the
absorbers and render vessels not designed to operate at l ow tem peratu res
dangerous. Had this been real i sed, steps could and should have been taken to
i solate the outlets of both rich oil and condensate from the absorbers in o rder to
prevent those cold temperatu res from developing in the ROD/ ROF area.
[habituation to warning signals, failure to engage in or provide feedback]

Those who were operating G Pl on 2 5 September 1998 did not have knowledge of
the dangers associated with loss of lean oil flow and did not take the steps
necessary to avert those dange rs. Nor did those charged with the supervis ion of
the operations have the necessary knowledge and the steps taken by them were
inappropriate. [failure of safety systems, error detection, failure to discriminate
signals, failure to monitor operating conditions, failure to utilise records]

The lack of knowledge on the part of both operators and supe rvi sors was d irectly
attributable to a deficiency in the i r i nitial or subsequent training. [overall
competency failure]

Not only was the i r trai ning i n adequate, but there were no current operati ng
procedu res to guide them in dealing with the problem that they enco untered on
25 September 1998] [failure of safety systems] , (Longford Royal Commission,
1 999).

Examples reinforcing the 'prior knowledge' message from the Longford case appear in each
of the other cases. For example in the mining case, the Moura17 inquiry (1966), revealed failures of
vigilance when peculiar smells and high Carbon Monoxide readings were lost because there was no
'foresight' system in place to record them and deploy them to the people involved even though
these were 'signified' locally. The hazard detection threshold shifted upward and these critical
factors failed to register as stimuli and failed to produce a vigilance response.
MOURA [ignored warnings, habituation to signals, hazard identification] At

Moura, there were various reports of smells and of abnormally high CO readings.
But there was no system for col l ating this information, or retrieving it for review,
and so these i solated reports were rapidly lost (Queensland Warden 's Court,
c1996)

In the Seaview-CAA18 example, an engineering report of a suspected cracked cylinder
(equipment defect) was detected, reported and then there was a culpable 'duty of care' breach
made by the CEO of Seaview and this passed unnoticed because the engineer did not report the
Queensland Warden's Court (c1996). Report on an accident at Moura No 2 Underground Mine on
Sunday, 7 August 1 994: Wardens inquiry conducted pursuant to Section of The Coal Mining Act, 1 925,
17

[ Brisbane)
18
Staunton , J. H. (1996). Report of the Commissioner / Commission of Inquiry into the Relations
between the CAA and Seaview Air. Canberra. 2v.
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matter to the regulator. This meant that the pilot was unable to exercise the necessary vigilance. He
simply did not know he needed to do so.
CAA [failure to utilise records, equipment defects, error detection, prior
knowledge] There was an additional aspect. It significantly aggravated the

tran sgression by Mr Green. After he had taken del ivery of the aircraft he spoke to
the previous owner. As a result of that d i scussion the aircraft was taken to the
Monarch mai nte nance facil ity at Bankstown . The engi neer at Monarch began an
i nspection. He noticed oil leaking from a cyli nder and therefore suspected a
cracked cyli nder. Mr Green was i nformed. He elected to termi nate the inspection
i n order to make his own arrangements for the repai r of the cyl i nder. The
engineer who had released the ai rcraft to Mr Green said this:
"My understanding i s that the aircraft flew directly from Bankstown to Coffs
Harbour. However if I had believed that the plane would be u sed to carry
passengers I would have taken steps to stop it flying." p8 Executive Summary
(Staunton, ). H., 1 996).

In the Westralia19 case the debriefing process after the accident was characterised by the
Coroner as a 'contamination' of evidence that can occur through witnesses discussing matters
among themselves. This process not only presents the compliance problem of possible
contamination of evidence, but also shows how an in house post-hoc forensic review can introduce
an element of pseudopsychology and a self-congratulatory discourse in which the possibility of
gathering useful prior knowledge about safety system management to feed into future potential
accidents is mitigated. The Westralia inquiry (1999) did not miss this fact in paragraphs 51 and 52.
An accident debriefing should be directed by senior management to gaining useful information to
prevent other possible accidents. It should not be used to rationalise failure and exonerate senior
managers.
WESTRALIA [debriefing] 5 1. An i nformal 'de-fu s i ng' was undertaken through the

CO add ressing the ship's company on retu rn to Fleet Base West on the evening of
the i ncident. An information session was conducted for the whole ship's company
at STIRLI NG on 6 May, and g roup 'de-briefi ng' was conducted at STIRLI NG on 7
and 8 May. This de-briefing focused on each individual's recounting of their
activities and was done in g roups of about 30 personnel who had s hared si milar
experiences on the day. The feedback from ship's company was mostly
favourable, although some felt it was of l ittle use and others attended agai n st
thei r wi ll.
52. There was some s uggestion that de-briefing conducted before personnel had
had the opportunity to record their recollection of events, may have exacerbated
the process of 'contami nation' of evidence that can occur through witnesses
d i scussing matters among themselves (Departmen t of Defence, 1 999).

This is another example of how several factors can work together to subvert vigilance. What
should have been a vigilance - foresight building opportunity was contaminated by Navy ethos

19

Department of Defence (1999). Report of the Board of Inquiry into the fire in HMAS Westralia on

5 May 1 998.
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issues. The process of group debriefing is highly prone to the effects of 'groupthink' where there is
a strong tendency to conformity to

group

values and ethics. The Navy ethos ensured that the

' group' would overtly value loyalty and keeping issues 'in-house' above forensic detailing of events.
To that extent it was inevitable that the ' group' would colour and shade the facts, if not clearly
distort them. Certain individuals could well go on to hide the truth from the Commission and
ignore their ethical responsibilities to reveal everything of relevance in some ill-conceived notion of
loyalty to senior personnel and the Navy (organisation) itself. This ethos of loyalty is further
reinforced by the broader Australian cultural ethos of not '<lobbing' on ones mates. Issues of duty
of care, compliance, ethics, organisational ethos and organisational culture become overlaid on the
core issues of foresight and vigilance and subvert their delineation.
The Westralia (1999) case also illustrates more concrete examples of failure of vigilance in
paragraphs 56, 57 of the Commission report. Paragraph 56 identifies fire fighting safety equipment
deficiencies and error detection, while paragraph 57 identifies error detection and shortcomings in
the materiel state of the ship. Paragraph 18 identifies critical failure of fire extinguisher. These all
speak to the failure to engage vigilantly with possible hazards in the lead up to the fire.
56. [safety equipment deficiencies, error detection, equipment defects] Although
the fire fighting effort was successfu l , the report detai ls equi pment problems
with breathing apparatus, protective clothing and safety equi pment. The Board
has made a number of observations and detailed recommendations of a fleet
wide nature on these i ssues.
5 7 . [ error detection, materiel conditions, diagnostic failure] When WESTRALIA
sai led there were a number of deficiencies in the materiel state of the ship. The
two serious deficiencies, the flexi ble s upply and return fuel hoses and the CO2
system, were not readi ly apparent. At that time, the flexi ble fuel l ines gave no
sign of any inherent flaw. The condition of the CO2 system, and particu larly the
tension of the operating wires, would only have been apparent to an expert on
close i nspection.
[ failure of safety systems] 18. The d rench was remotely i nitiated but some of the
CO2 bottles fai led to d i scharge and were d i scharged manually seven m i nutes
later.

5.4.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
There appears to be an attitudinal component modifying vigilance that determines how high
or low an individual's vigilance threshold is. Each Commission of Inquiry found that 'alertness' and
'signal detection' were either weak or compromised by a poor organisational ethos and by a focus
on priorities other than safety (such as concern with the bottom line). In such an environment it
proved impossible to incorporate the experiences and insights available to people at the interface
of an impending accident. In the cases examined in detail and in the other cases cited, staff who
raised safety concerns were often seen by management as annoyances or 'out of order'. Such staff
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often paid a price in terms of career advancement. These people are often classed as
'whistleblowers'. However, both human performance and systems factors are characterised by
strengths and weaknesses. Both require low vigilance thresholds to provide early detection of
phenomena that may be predictive of an accident. The information from both sources must be
valued by management and must also be incorporated into organisational learning.
5.4.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH I NTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH

Turner's (1976 and 1978) theory that disasters result from energy plus misinformation is
highly relevant here. The Moura disaster occurred because vital prior information was rendered
ineffective, both by an inadequate information processing system and by a culture that neutralised
it. According to Turner and Pidgeon (1997), disasters often occur because crucial information
available at lower levels of the organisation is not assembled in a coherent way and is not passed
on up the hierarchy to a point where it can be responsibly acted upon. The insights of high
reliability organisation theory are also relevant here (Chapter 2, sections, 2.6.5 and 2.6.6).
Organisations that are good at disaster avoidance mobilise as many pairs of eyes as possible to
scrutinise critical information. This maximises the likelihood that the organisation will respond
effectively to signs that things are going wrong.
5.4.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS

Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that adequate vigilance,
the capacity to maintain low event thresholds and intelligently use many inputs, 'many eyes', to
examine processes and practices for breakdowns and possible anomalies should be a major
concern for CEOs and the dominant coalition. This requires both a human and systems approach
to vigilance. The data makes it clear that vigilance is a matter of maintaining low phenomena and

event thresholds in a culture that values both human and systemic feedback. The case data is
strongly persuasive that senior management consistently fails to understand the psychological
dimensions of human performance. Humans can bring intuition, creativity, insight, flexibility and
common sense to safety issues, even if they have good and bad days. Furthermore, managers need
to establish systemic protocols such as an independent auditing or prospective and retrospective
HAZOP systems to identify and respond to failure of materiels, failure of safety systems, failure to
discriminate signals, failure to monitor operating conditions, failure to utilise records, habituation
to warning signals, failure to engage in or provide feedback, hazard identification, failure to employ
many eyes, ignored warnings, and inattention.

194

Both human and systemic factors generate infonnation significant to safety. This requires
that people across the organisation (all staff) understand the importance of maintaining a low
vigilance threshold and of paying attention to risk signals. It is essential that dominant coalitions
realise that they can not rely on their own error detection capabilities alone. Therefore, it is a
competency to be highly valued by management in front line operators working in high reliability
organisations. The research suggests that information collected should be incorporated into a
continuous organisational learning process that becomes the basis of training and cyclical refresher
training programs both in management and safety. Such programs should be structured to ensure
the lowest possible vigilance thresholds are maintained across the organisation.
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5.5 Competency 4: Judgement (weighing up, trading off, and
deciding - often in circumstances that make little sense or
meaning, are factors in all competencies)
5.5.1 I NTERPRETATION
Judgement, in this research, focuses on weighing up, trading off, prioritising and deciding bounded by circumstances that make little sense or meaning (Fischoff et al, 1978; Hayek, 1945).
Orthodox decision models often only indicate steps to follow or eliminate, or ask the decision
maker to focus on decision variables and select between them (Browne, 1993; Cooke and Slack,
1984; De Michaelis, 1996, Gilligan, 1983).
Rowe and Boulgarides (1992) observe that in the context of organisations, a decision can be
described as an answer to a question or a choice between two alternatives. This simplification
anchors the differences between judgement and decision making since it raises the problem of
dichotomy, where not only two acceptable alternatives can exist but also mutually exclusive
concepts at the same time.
Browne (1993:5) addresses this issue when he notes that, 'A decision is the end point in a
series of activities which are primarily of a cognitive nature. On the whole, the tendency is to think
of decisions as the outcome of a choice between a number of alternatives although sometimes
writers do not distinguish between a decision and a decision process.' This clearly describes the
difference between the decision and the process (identified as 'judgement' in this research).
Browne sees the decision as a final step in a sequence of events. One might characterise it in terms
of: X + Y x a = > Z; where X, Y, and a are variables, which via an intentional cognitive judgement
process, synthesise to Z, a final decision.
Judgement, as applied in this research, takes account of normal logical decision variables but
also goes further to consider finer grain variables such as discretion, the scale and scope of an
action and its consequences, the frame-work and context, the best interests of the parties, intent,
trade-offs, impact on the organisation and its people and the environment. Other factors having an
impact on judgement include variables that often appear in codes of conduct and social system
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audits (i.e., under the Public Sector Standards Act, 1984), such as rights, values, duties, codes of
conduct, moral rules, human relationships, keeping promises and being able to rely on people
doing what they say, non-malevolence, mutuality, and respect for property belonging to others.
Because the mental ability to perceive and distinguish relationships, to act with discernment,
is central to this research (fatigue may affect a pilot's judgment or discernment of distances), it is
essential that this competency is considered as an underpinning capacity of safety systems
management. The concept 'judgement' is more complex than first appears. This thesis does not
construct an argument for the logic (ie syllogistic analysis) of judgement. Nor does it engage the
decision styles of managers (Rowe and Boulgarides, 1992). However, the thesis does take account
of the view that decision-making processes differ from one situation to another and from one
person to another. Directors make decisions utilizing different processes (Nutt, 1990). For
example, as Mech (1993) suggests, some directors are:
• Results-oriented and impersonal, relying on facts and figures to make decisions;
• Sensitive and responsive to the needs and feelings of others and make decisions
cognizant of their impact on people;
• Planners who rely on careful analysis before making decisions;
• Creative, innovative, and take risks, depending more on intuition than on fact.
In that sense judgement emphasises individual cognitive competencies such as weighing up,
trading off, prioritising, and deciding, using many of the mental skills outlined in the dictionary
definition, such as: acumen, adjudication, appraisal, assessment, belief, censure, common sense,
conclusion, condemnation, criticism, decision, decree, determination, disapproval, discernment,
discretion, discrimination, estimation, evaluation, finding, good sense, intelligence, judiciousness,
level-headedness, mind, opinion, order, outcome, perception, percipience, perspicacity,
perspicuousness, prudence, reproof,

result,

ruling,

sagacity,

sentiment,

shrewdness,

understanding, upshot, valuation, verdict, view, way of thinking, wisdom, and wit.
In high reliability organisations, safety related 'judgement' is a managerial competency that
involves intentionally weighing up more or less equally weighted, but uncertain, alternatives
Qudging) and selecting the alternative that would be considered to result in a right or good
decision (deciding). It is the capacity to assess situations or circumstances and draw sound
conclusions. This is different from 'satisficing' in which one sets lower bounds for the various
objectives that, if attained, will be 'good enough'. The satisficer's philosophy is that in real-world
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problems there are too many uncertainties and conflicts in values for there to be any hope of
obtaining a true optimisation and that it is far more sensible to set out to do 'well enough'. In
considering the concept 'judgment', the 'decision' is the 'outcome' of the deliberation or
'judgement process' (weighing up, trading off and prioritising). In this research then, 'high
reliability safety system judgement' infers intentional reasoning about uncertainty - seeking to
discern the best outcome as opposed to the 'good enough' outcome of the satificer. Table 5.5.1
lists the HyperRESEARCH analysis of the case reports and identifies the following judgement
variables that inform safety system judgement and characterise its limitations in hazardous
situations.
Table 5.5.1 H

erRESEARCH Jud ement Descri tors

cascading effects, conflicting evidence, decision making, doubt about capability, economic
factors, ethical implications, external agencies, failure to conform to guidelines, misplaced trust,
racticall reventable, s eculation

5.5.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
The literature (Chapter 2, section 2.5.3) and the case reports suggest that good managerial
judgement (weighing up, trading off, and deciding - often in circumstances that make little sense or
meaning) results from using a range of management competencies plus experience. Hippocrates
spoke of the role of experience in judgement in about 400BC in his writing on medical ethics. The
notion is not startling or new. The core competency most closely related to 'judgement' is 'ethics',
because of its deontological impost on decisions.
In essence one of the best and most succinct tests of a judgement is 'The Golden Rule" (do
unto others as you would have them do to you) 2°. This also resonates with Gunningham and
20 The Golden Rule integrates j udgement. For example, in the first century pious Jews attempted to
live up to 6 13 commandments-365 negative, 248 positive. It was impossible for the average person to
remember all those laws, let alone obey them. Hillel summed up all of the commandments in a single
succinct guideline: "Do not unto thy neighbour what is hateful unto thee; that is the whole law. All the rest is
commentary." The Golden Rule occurs in most of the worlds moral teachings. :
Buddhism: Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful. (Udana-Varga, 5 , 1 8).
Brahmanism: This is the sum of duty: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to
you. (Mahabharata, 5, 1 5 17).
Christianity: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for
this is the Law and the Prophets. (Matthew 7 : 12 and Luke 6:3 1).
Confucianism: Surely it is the maxim of loving-kindness: Do not unto others that you would not
have them do unto you. (Analects, 1 5 , 23).
Islam: No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for
himself.(Sunnah).
Taoism: Regard your neighbor's gain as your own gain, and your neighbor's loss as your own loss.
(T'ai Shang Kan Ying P'ien)
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Johnstone's (1999) observations regarding 'principle-based' compliance (competency eleven).
Judgement also has an important memetic connection with each of the other competencies
because the way an organisation judges safety issues conveys the organisation's attitude and that of
its senior management into its mission and activities, no matter what it may have espoused as its
mission.
Kant's (1797) views of judgement amplify the Golden Rule and reflect the observation made
by David Godsell (1993) in the first competency (ethics) that organisations have a deontological
responsibility to society. Kant specifically draws the conclusion that we must always act as
belonging to a community and treat others with respect, since we all have intrinsic worth. This
principle can be seen in the efforts made by some professional bodies to fulfil their deontological
role in society. For example, the Institution of Engineers Australia 'Code of Ethics' describes
engineering as a: 'creative process of synthesising and implementing the knowledge and
experience of humanity to enhance the welfare, health and safety of all members of the
community.' This definition places particular emphasis on the implications of engineering
technology on the community it services. The engineering profession, therefore, has an implied
responsibility to address the social implications of the technology it provides
Gunn (1986) describes the nature of an engineering practice that does not have any regard
for ethical conduct:
'Engineers harness technology to achieve their (own) goals , Yet the hi story of
recent technology i s a h istory of the wasteful use of mostly non-renewable
resources, ai med at satisfyi ng s hort term human wants without regard either to
future h u man needs or the rest of nature. • 21

If ethical engineering practice, therefore, implies an assessment of values, one must ask
whether high reliability managers might not be required to adopt such codes. If an engineer is
faced with conflicting values in the decision making process, ethical guidelines give a systematic
approach to providing resolutions to such conflicts. It is for this reason that various engineering
institutions, such as The Institute of Engineers Australia, have developed a 'Code of Ethics'.
A code of ethics that is put in place to govern any profession is a documented recognition of
the responsibilities of all members of that profession to the general community. In addition, a code
Zoroastrianism: That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is not
good for itself. (Dadistan-i-dinik, 94, 5).
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of ethics provides guidelines for the conduct of those members, should a situation arise which
requires judgement. Generally, a code of ethics covers obligations to society, the profession and
colleagues. In the 1994 publication Engineering Ethics and the Spirit of Community Service, Mair
writes, in reference to an institutional code of ethics: 'Ultimately, it is used as an instrument of the
profession to shape the conduct of its individual members.'
This confirms the relationship between judgement and ethics and also suggests a strong
connection to competency five, 'Balance', which emphasises psychological tenor, persistence and
courage. Both Judgement and Balance require the ability to act with discernment. A discerning
judgment should detect and consider both causes and consequences. Sound, discerning
judgements should 'first do no harm' (Hippocrates, c400BC).

5.5.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Research (Reason, 1991) suggests that human judgement is susceptible to predictable errors.
People make mistakes when they encounter complex problems. Therefore, it might provide
managers with necessary insights to discover what factors that can influence making error prone
judgments and better decisions in safety critical situations. For example, several questions arise
directly from the issues identified in the HyperRESEARCH analysis of the case data based on
Reason's view that human judgement is susceptible to predictable errors, such as:

•
•
•

Do these identified issues adequately frame the issue or issues?
What mental metaphors do managers use to conceptualise safety system
management issues?
Can managers be taught skills that enable sound, discerning judgement under
uncertainty?

• To what extent do missing data, conflicting information, limited time and long-term
trade-offs influence judgement in matters of safety?

•

Do factors such as cascading effects in operational systems become amplified by
poor decision making skills?

Managers might also examine how they frame or put boundaries on a problem. In other
words, what aspects of the situation do managers leave out of consideration? If salient material is
left out of consideration then what implications might flow from issues the research identified,
such as doubt about one's capabilities and poor ethical decisions and how is success measured?
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Accountability issues which relate to regulatory frameworks are also important and raise
questions such as, what is the exact role of regulatory agencies and, do other people in the
industry think about this question differently from the way we do? Consideration of related
questions also needs to be considered, such as the consequences of failure to conform to
guidelines, particularly in relation to economic factors and the pressure of production. Finally, any
consideration of judgement should raise issues of responsibility to intentionally consider the
deontological issue of duty of care, since principles and codes and regulatory policies do not
provide precise or specific guidelines for every conceivable set of circumstances. Principles require
judgment, which in tum depends on character, moral discernment, and a person's sense of
responsibility and accountability.

5.5.4 LITERATURE
This section engages the following issues in cognitive psychology, since it is the basic science
that explores how people reason, formulate judgments and make decisions. Cognitive psychology
suggests that people make mistakes when they encounter complex problems. The distinctive
finding is that everyday situations are often sufficiently complex to elicit mistakes. The fundamental
assumption is that these mistakes are not random.
Knowing and thinking, or epistemology and logic, rely on a conception of 'judgement'
(Brentano, 1911). However, knowledge and logic are not always reliable, for example, ideas that
have evolved to seem true (at least to untrained minds) can in fact be quite false (Drexler, 1986).
Naive human judgment compared to judgment aided by scientific and statistical techniques, is very
often erroneous and, just as we suffer from optical illusions and blind spots, so we suffer from
cognitive illusions and blind spots (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Other experiments show that
untutored people share systematic misunderstandings of such elementary facts as the direction a
ball will move when whirled in a circle and then released, believing it will continue to travel in an
arc rather than a tangent. This error is easily understood if one observes an Olympic 'hammer
thrower' in action. The hammer travels in a straight line out from the point of release, not in a
curve or arc. Learned medieval philosophers (who neglected to test their ideas against reality)
evolved whole systems of 'science' based on identical misunderstandings (Mcclosky 1983). The
implication of these insights for this research is that competencies underpinning safety system
management, such as 'judgement', require specific training, because they are often counterintuitive
and if they are left to ordinary humans to exercise in extraordinary circumstances they may evoke
dangerous memetic, rather than educated, responses.
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In 1999, the Centre for the Study of Intelligence, at the Central Intelligence Agency,
published research that was strongly suggestive that once an experienced analyst has the minimum
information necessary to make an informed judgment, obtaining additional information generally
does not improve the accuracy of his or her estimates. Additional information does, however, lead
the analyst to become more confident in the judgment, to the point of overconfidence. From a
HRO perspective, the CIA observation that experienced analysts have an imperfect understanding
of what information they actually use in making judgments is identical to the way prior information
is used by safety system managers in the accident reports in this thesis. They are unaware of the
extent to which their judgments are determined by a few dominant factors, rather than by the
systematic integration of all available information. Analysts actually use much less of the available
information than they think they do.
Also of relevance to this research is the finding by the CIA that if analysts have good insight
into their own mental model, they should be able to identify and describe the variables they have
considered most important in making judgments. However, there is strong experimental evidence
that such self-insight is usually faulty.
These experimental findings by the CIA should not necessarily be accepted at face value. For
example, circumstances exist in which additional information does contribute to more accurate
analysis (Slovic, 1973). However, there also are circumstances in which additional information-
particularly contradictory information--decreases rather than increases an analyst's confidence.
Research suggests that human reasoning is susceptible to predictable errors; that is, some
mistakes are made repeatedly by most people. Hence, cognitive psychology is a scientific discipline
that might inform managerial judgement. For example, Bemer, Webster, Shugerman, Jackson,
Algina, and Baker (1994:1792-6), observe that the diagnostic ability of an astute clinician is still
much better than the performance of a sophisticated computer programmed with an encyclopedic
knowledge of medicine. However, in contrast, Dawes (1989:1668-74) claims the judgments of
psychologists that are intended to predict parole violations or those of university admissions
committees that are intended to predict student performance are not much better than simple
statistical models. The core problem relevant to managers in high reliability organisations is that
people are often poor at judging their own performance, even in the most ideal conditions. For
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example, studies done by McCarthy, Beshansky, D'Agostino, and Selker (1993:579-82) show that
85% of people believe that they are better-than-average drivers, contrary to the laws of probability.
Cognitive psychology holds that the human brain is a finite organ with bounded capacity. We
could all gain by having more memory or intellect, but this is not possible. Leape (1994:1851-7)
suggests that although some weaknesses may be offset by technology such as computers, the core
exercise of decision-making remains fallible because of human limitations and other pressures.
Therefore, failures in judgement can confront any manager. A paradox also arises because
managerial judgement is so valued that it verges on being incorrigible. Duma, Bebe, Leader,
Steigrad and Garrett (1995:248-51) make the striking and useful analogy that grandparents often
consider their own grandchildren to be distinctly attractive, even when no genetic link is present.
In consequence, the grandparents' adoration makes it hard for them to compare their
grandchildren fairly with other children, to hear negative feedback about their grandchildren and
to discipline

their grandchildren. It is fair to say that the same failures may occur when managers

consider their own judgement.
This paradox, unfortunately, can make research on managerial judgement seem pretentious
or something to be avoided, especially by those who might most benefit from it. The wisdom
needed to produce good judgement may be the same wisdom that is needed to recognise good
judgement (Wu, Folkman, McPhee, and Lo, 1991:2089-94). Conversely, confidence in one's
judgement may merely indicate an unawareness of repeated mistakes and faulty judgement can
lead to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Redelmeier, Ferris, Tu, Hux, and Schull (2001:164) make the usefully analogous observation
that most physicians are highly dependent on the work of others. Their clinical judgement can be
seriously faulty if based on erroneous charting of vital signs, reports of radiology studies, messages
about biopsy specimens or other misinformation from a range of diagnostic testing sources. In an
organisational setting reliance by management on information generated by other people and
systems should commit managers to ensure that such sources are valued and valid. A final concern
is that judgement is a complement to, but not a substitute for, knowledge. An experienced CEO or
manager who trusts only his or her judgement and never engages in retraining, for example, might
be brilliant at diagnosing a recurrent safety problem but may never realise that it could have been
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prevented by computer sensors. Such a manager may not appreciate the limits of his or her
judgement and may be unaware of a superior approach offered by new technology.
5.5.5 CASE TEXT DATA

The notion of judgement is well supported by the intellectual discipline of Philosophy,
particularly epistemology and deontology (the philosophy of duty). Bretano's theory of judgement
(in Chisholm, 1982:17-36), for example, tried to achieve a systematic analysis of the mental
phenomena involved in attaining knowledge and in drawing inferences. The practical processes
involved in judgement leading to an outcome is explored in the work of Sheeran (1992: 16-17) who
suggests that practical philosophy provides knowledge to be used or applied in concrete actions or
situations. It leads to action after knowledge has been acquired. It is this practical competency that
is of concern to this research. For example, the issue of cascading effects applies in a practical way
to accidents both before an accident where small events can cause consequential events, and after
an accident where the accident itself can cause other accidents or have other serious
consequences. The Longford Gas plant accident came about after a series of events which cascaded
into an explosion, and after the accident the state of Victoria experienced consequential loss of
electrical power. The organisation responsible was found to have failed in its practical exercise of
its duty of care on several fronts. The judgement required to weigh up the cascading and increasing
signals and information from the locus of a possible accident is critical to effective and timely
intervention. The phenomena was also seen in the Westralia22 case, as seen in paragraph 12 of the
report (Department of Defence, 1999), where smoke preceded the fire and the fire itself caused
critical electrical cabling to fail (paragraph 13), which then caused emergency power circuits to
fluctuate, resulting in loss of compass and communications (paragraph 15).
Westralia [cascading effects] 12. A fire report was made to the bridge and
emergency stations was sounded. A brief inspection of the main machinery space
through the door of the machinery control room revealed thick black smoke and
flames. Visibility was severely limited. Four people escaped from the main
machinery space into the machinery control room. Three of the personnel were
injured and were initially treated by the ship's emergency medical organisation
and later assisted by medical staff from SUCCESS, STIRLING, and the Sea Training
Group.

1 3. The fire was intense, causing rapid smoke build up and extreme heat.
Despite some heroic but unsuccessful fire fighting efforts, the atmosphere in the
main machinery space soon became inadequate to support life. Electrical cabling

22 Department of Defence (1999). Report of the Board of Inquiry into the fire in HMAS Westralia on 5
May 1998.
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on the deckhead over the fire was quickly damaged with a consequent loss of
services, including some communications.
1 5 . After the machinery control room evacuation, the emergency power circuits
were subject to severe voltage fluctuations, probably as a result of fire damage in
the main machinery s pace. Power to the gyro compass and the com m u n i cations
centre was lost.

This cascading series of failures in which each hazard caused another compounding hazard
had followed from poor judgement in the commissioning of flexible fuel hoses which did not meet
specifications. Considerable trust had been placed in an external agency, ADI Limited, to fit fuel
hoses that met specifications. This trust was misplaced and demonstrated poor judgement and
decision making on the part of the Navy Fleet Intermediate Maintenance Authority (paragraph 6 of
the Board of Inquiry report).
6. [decision making, external agencies, misplaced trust] Prior to the ship sai li ng
from Fleet Base West on 5 May 98, WESTRALIA had undergone an ass i sted
mai ntenance period for about 6 weeks. During this period, members of the ship's
company of WESTRALIA in conjunction with Fleet I ntermediate Maintenance
Authority and the ship's contractor, ADI Li mited, carried out mai ntenance work.
The work i ncluded the fitting of new flexible fuel hoses to the shi p's mai n
engines by a s ubcontractor under the direction of ADI Limited.

Finally, when a judgement was made to extinguish the fire using CO2 gas it was a significant
failure of judgement because it failed to utilise prior knowledge about the flood of oxygen that
enter the fire space when the engine room was opened to the air.
3 3. The Board cannot say whether the CO2 extinguished the fire or not. The
decision to re-enter the mai n machinery s pace to fight the fi re, after only fifteen
mi nutes was, however, premature and s howed a lack of understanding of the way
in which a fire extinguishing system using oxygen depletion works. Thi s lack of
understanding increased the risk to the shi p and the hose teams . (EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (1999:4)

This series of poor judgements could have been avoided if the competencies necessary to
judgement had been in place. 'Lack of understanding' is a euphemism for poor judgement. This
critical competency failed in each of the cases studied. For example in the loss of the Lake
Illawarra, the Captain's judgement was impaired by a series of cascading events that confused him.
The following paragraphs from the Inquiry23 demonstrate failure of judgement, the effects of
conflicting evidence subverting competence, and the passage of hazardous cascading events. The
paragraphs have been slightly condensed to show these essential factors.

23 Australian Department of Transport (197 5), Court of Marine Inquiry Report N umber 5 7 : ss Lake
lllawarra, (ON 178472). AGP.
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I LLAWARRA Uudgement, conflicting evidence, doubt about capability, cascading
effects] The evidence leads very strongly to the conclusion that this increase to

sea speed, so that the vessel arrived i n the vici nity of Rosny Poi nt, some 7 cables
(approxi mately 1300 metres) from the Bridge, at a speed . . . of 8 knots, (Pelc
1 0 7 5 , Bon nitcha 644- 5), set the stage for the d isaster that followed .
Asked why he stopped t h e engines, Captain Pelc said i t was because h i s vessel
was movi ng over the ground with greater speed than he had anticipated (1082).

The order "hard aport" was g iven, according to Captai n Pe lc, i n order to bring
the ship back on to the lead l i ne (1083) . . . .At that stage he was sti l l confident he
could "enter the mai n channel leads", and had g iven no consideration to aborting
the exerci se (1083, 1 1 4 3), nor d i d he ever con sider the possibil ity of going under
any of the other spans (1208).

The following paragraph illustrates the capacity of cascading events to produce confusion,
rendering the vessel out of control.
After orderi ng "hard aport", the Master saw the ship was not responding at al l . He
asked the helmsman twice if the rudder has hard to port, and the helms man said
it was. He looked at the electric rudder i nd icator and noted that it indicated hard
to port (1085). The ship was movi ng but he could not estimate for the Court what
its speed was at that time (1085). It d i d not occur to h i m that the ship had lost
steerage way. He thought it may have suddenly developed a steering malfunction
( 1085). He asked the hel msman "Is she an swering?", and the reply was, it was
not. At and from this poi nt, our concl usion is that the vessel was, in the
circumstances, out of control (see Question 1 3A (a) ).

As the result of further poor judgement, the captain then caused a further hazardous
cascading effect.
Bei ng then about two shi ps' lengths from the Bridge (about 300 metres), or even
less (1085-6), he ordered "fu l l astern", then gave a double ring fu l l astern. With
that order executed, the bow of the ship began to swi ng to starboard and the
stern to port (1088), u nder the combined i nfl uence of the astern motion of the
propeller and the 'hard aport' position of the rudder; whi lst the ship sti ll moved
forward at an i ncreasing angle to the Bridge. The Master ordered the shipwright
on the forecastle to d rop both anchors. He saw the shipwright standing on the
port side of the forecastle, and thought that he d ropped the port anchor ( 1 088).
The ship struck. The Master's i m pression was that the port side of the ship struck
a glancing blow on one pylon on ly. The roadway col l apsed in the centre and fel l
on the s h i p, and the pylon fel l . The bow of the s h i p had struck o n a n angle of
about 30 or 40 degrees. The col lapse of the roadway and the pylon occurred
with i n seconds afterwards (1090), and the ship started to s i n k fai rly quickly
(1090).

The inquiry found that Captain Pelc was confused and exercised poor judgement resulting
in poor seamanship, resulting in the setting in motion of the chain of events that resulted in the
accident. The Inquiry suggested that he could have avoided the accident if had judged the
overshooting vessel to warrant aborting the manoeuvre. Rather than do this he proceeded to make
the situation unrecoverable by deciding to stop the engines, leaving he vessel without steerage.
Poor seaman ship on the part of Captain Pelc consi sted pri marily i n approaching
too close to the Bridge at too fast a speed before attem pting to align the lead
l ig hts. It was a combination of those two factors that set off the d i sastrou s chain
of events ; although the col l i sion could probably have been avoided had the
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Master chosen to abort the exercise of passing under the Bridge when he found
the vessel overshooting the leads for the second time - that is, to the east. But he
then compounded his previous errors of navigation by stopping the engines,
which caused the ship to lose steerage way: an event that he ought to have
anticipated, should have recognised when it happened, and should then have
reacted to more quickly.

The Lake Illawarra accident was practically preventable had the captain's judgement been
exercised at a higher level.
Many factors can impair judgement, for example, inadequate training (paragraph 13.30 of
the Longford Royal Commission Report, Dawson, 1999) causing failure of prior knowledge and an
unsafe working environment amplified by lack of appropriate operating procedures and failure of
responsibility by senior staff (paragraph 14.12), as is shown in the following examples from the
Longford24 case. Both paragraphs show poor judgement on the part of ESSO.
Esso also relied upon the
LONGFORD Uudgement and training] 1 3.30
evidence of Luke Musgrave, the Longford gas restoration project manager, to
support its contention that operators were adequately trained in appropriate
responses to the loss of lean oil circulation. . . . He gave evidence that he had
knowledge of the consequences of the loss of lean oil flow and said that he
acquired that knowledge from discussions with operators, reading the Red Book
and from some courses that he attended. (Ch 1 3 Longford Report: 197)
14.12
. . . However, the failure of
Esso to provide a safe working environment on 2 5 September 1998 was the
result of its having failed to take measures that were plainly practicable. In order
to provide a safe working environment there could and should have been
appropriate operating procedures to deal with the loss of lean oil circulation, cold
temperatures and the shutdown and start up of the plant. Furthermore, the
operators and supervisors could and should have known of and understood the
real hazards confronting them on the day. (Ch 14 Longford Report:225)
[practically preventable, ethical implications]

Judgement can be seriously impaired by the priority of production and by judging safety to
be a cost in economic terms as is seen in the following example from the Moura case.
MOURA [economic factors] The view that the Moura explosion stems from the
priority given to production has much more to recommend it. Moura was a mine
whose economic viability was in doubt and there was pressure to maximise
production. As counsel for the miners put it in his final submission, ' BHP ran a
dangerous race against time to extract all of the coal from 5 12 [panel] in
accordance with the plan'.

24 Parliament of Victoria (1999). The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident: Report of the Longford Royal
Commission. Victoria.
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5.5.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
The evidence from the cases suggests that mistakes are frequently made in managerial
judgement. Flawless intellectual reasoning, constant vigilance, diligent checking for errors and
fool-proof environmental safeguards would require superhuman skills. This observation suggests
that, theoretically, it is important to the mastery of this competency that recognition of the tight
correlation between foresight tools, personal vigilance, discerning judgement, and deontological
ethics is made to offset the range of factors which can impair judgement and decision making
under uncertainty. Because judgement in matters of safety is deontological in nature and the
responsibility of senior management, it has a higher priority than production and it can not be
passed off to the regulator.
The most salient attributes of judgement reported in the data appear to exactly mirror the
findings of Eraut and du Boulay (2001) concerning making holistic and balanced decisions in
situations of uncertainty and complexity.
Descriptors of bad judgement in both findings included:
* not integrating all the data
* attending to fine detail, 'the small print'', but missing the big picture
* choosing an inappropriate management plan
* overvigorous intervention
* not taking into account conflict between people and systemic information and feedback
* being competent in all the important aspects of the job, but failing to make a sensible
decision on a particular site specific case as a whole
* making decisions on current evidence alone and disregarding prior knowledge.
Good judgement descriptors included:
* incorporating lessons from prior learning
* discerning the key features and deeper layers of a problem in a more complex way
* going beyond the guidelines
* actively examining assumptions
* intuitive but rationally assessing expertise
* making small responsive approximate decisions and readjusting (fuzzy logic)
* being prepared to do nothing.
Situations where judgement was called for included:
* decisions based on fuzzy logic and partial information in situations too complex to fully
understand
* ill-defined situations that are complex diffuse and muddled
* high risk situations
* situations combining technical - systemic and human - psychological aspects
* deciding what to tell key staff and how to put it
* diagnosing phenomena and adjusting safety thresholds
* deciding between maximum interventions and minimum interventions (or doing neither)
* balancing cost and safety
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Other aspects ofjudgement described in the literature concern:
* ethical issues
* the effect of a practitioner's feelings and emotions about a particular case-these could
concern the event situation, their own behaviour, the actions of other professionals or the
organisation (Fish and Coles, 1998)
5.5.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH I NTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Hopkins (1999) identified other factors that can compromise decision making and the ability
to make sound judgements regarding safety, such as the structural problem inherent in the dual
role of some regulators to both promote and police an industry at the same time. This was also a
weakness revealed in the Seaview case where the CEO had a level of control over the regulator.
Hopkins points to a solution adopted in Britain when this phenomena became known:
There i s also a sense in wh ich the very structure of government i mplicitly g ives
priority to production. I refer to the l ocation of mine inspectorates in govern ment
departments whose pri mary function i s the promotion of the mini ng i ndustry. As
we saw, this undermines the abil ity of inspectorates to i m pose safety standards
on mines. This problem was identified in the Piper Al pha report and led to a
recommendation to relocate the offshore inspectorate withi n the general
occu pational health and safety organisation i n Britai n, to ensure its i n dependence
from the industry it was supposed to regulate. Th i s same structural problem i s
inherent i n the regulatory reg ime for offshore petroleum production in Austral ia:
safety i s the responsibi lity of a govern ment department whose pri mary concern i s
t o facil itate production. Safety inspectorates i n Australia's extractive i n dustries
need to be relocated to reduce the risk that safety wi l l take second place to
prod uction (Hopki n s : 1 3 3)

5.5.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that sound judgement
was needed and lacking in early accident scenarios when accidents could have been prevented.
'Judgement' requires intentional effort and the highest level(s) of expertise by CEOs and managers.
Accordingly courts and commissions of inquiry should give guidance by defining judgement either
as an advanced level of a necessary competence or as managerial expertise that goes beyond
competence, because the hardest problems to solve in high reliability organisations are the ones
where no one recognises that anything is wrong. Consequently, managerial judgement deserves
just as much scrutiny as any other component of a manager's responsibilities. Managerial
judgement should be framed by an organisation's deontological responsibilities to society as well
as its more immediate stakeholders. Therefore, management decisions should be ethical and
discerning.
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Because judgements concerning safety are often made in circumstances that make little
sense or meaning, the capacity to weigh, trade off, prioritise and decide constitute a more complex
skill set than at first appears. This competency, in particular, demands cyclical refresher training
and furthermore it must be set against the quality of information other people and systems
provide. Finally, if managerial judgement fails then legal compliance imposts must be sufficient to
save lives and ensure adequate vigilance and deployment of 'foresight systems' in high reliability
organisations.

2 10

5.6 Competency

5:

Balance

(psychological

tenor,

and

psychological consonance, emotional intelligence and
maturity, and courage and persistence)
5.6.1 I NTERPRETATION
Psychological balance (loss of centering on organisational and individual purpose and
values), courage (acting morally in the face of coercion and fear) and integrity (educated moral
judgement) in making decisions about safety are not possible in dysfunctional organisations
focused on the financial bottom line or where personal or group power is exercised
inappropriately.
Balance is a competence anchored in Australian National Training Authority (ANTA)
guidelines. The ANTA Elements of Competency and Performance Criteria include analogous
concepts to those used in this research. Balance appears as a specific unit of Competence in several
competency requirements, in much the same way it is used in this research. For example, in the
Public Sector competency unit, PSPETHC60W02, it is constructed as a competency in which the
participant will demonstrate they can, Balance competing public interests. Its performance criteria
include: Consideration of relevant facts is comprehensive, and weightings given to competing

interests are unbiased and defensible (implying fairness and honesty devoid of self interest and
focusing on the 'consideration' process). Decision making processes are transparent and

accountable and reasoning I grounds for decisions are documented in accordance with policy
and procedures (implying that the decision making or judgement 'process' steps can be
scrutinised). Advice to government regarding policy decisions relating to the public interest, is

objective and impartial (implying equity). Where staff indicate conflicts of interest, action is
taken to resolve the situation in accordance with policy and procedures (implying concern with
codes of conduct).
Balance infers a sound mental or psychological tenor or state of mind of someone with good
judgement. Mental soundness is often equated with mental health. Balance, as used in this
research, is associated with cognitive consistency or consonance, and imbalance with cognitive
dissonance. It has close resonance with the work on emotional intelligence and leadership by
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Goleman (1995), Boyatzis, Goleman and Rhee (1999), Boyatzis (2000), Cherniss and Adler, (2000),
Sala and McBer (2000), Sala and McBer (2001), Boyatzis, Murphy and Wheeler (2000), Mclelland
(1973). Hien, (1999) defines emotional intelligence as a form of intelligence relating to the
emotional side of life, such as the ability to recognise and manage one's own and others' emotions,
to motivate oneself and restrain impulses, and to handle interpersonal relationships effectively.
As a synonym for emotional intelligence, it is important not to confuse the meaning given to
'balance' in this research with the organisational management term meaning 'work-life balance'.
However, one might argue that in this case balance is also concerned with reconciling conflicting
demands or pressures. The 'process' of resolving these can result in cognitive consistency or
cognitive dissonance, as described in chapter 2, sections 2.6.5, 2.6.6, 2.6.7 and 2.7.
Goleman (1998) suggests that emotional competence, or balance, is a learned capability
based on emotional intelligence that results in outstanding performance at work. Goleman
suggests that our emotional intelligence determines our potential for learning the practical skills
based on the five elements: self-awareness, motivation, self-regulation, empathy, and adeptness in
relationships. Our emotional competence, he claims, shows how much of that potential we have
translated into on-the-job capabilities.
Goleman's dimensions of emotional competence are:
•

•
•
•

Independent (each contributes to job performance); Interdependent (each draws to
some extent on certain others with strong interactions);
Hierarchical (the emotional intelligence capabilities build upon one another);
Necessary, but not sufficient (having an emotional intelligence doesn't guarantee
the competencies will be demonstrated);
Generic (different jobs make differing competence demands.

These are significant, both conceptually and in practice, to understanding the concept of
'balance' as it is used in this research. 'Balance' embraces these variables.
The HyperRESEARCH data analysis (Table 5.6.1) revealed the following examples of how
the concept of 'balance', cognitive consonance, or emotional intelligence, is congruent with the
sources cited above, and as it is used in this research.
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Table 5.6.1 H

erRESEARCH Balance Descri tors

conflict of interest, defect reporting, diligence and propriety, dispassionate discourse,
institutional timidit , inte rtt

5.6.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
This competency relates directly to competencies eight (salience of the particular situation.
understanding relevant task, particular and site specific incident factors) and nine (particular
performance, managerial actions in a high reliability setting, stress, conflict, disaster management,
risk management. Bordieu's (1972, 1977, 1980/1990, 2004) theory of 'habitus' (outlined in s5.5.4
and in chapter 2, s2.6.5) is a particularly resonant concept when considered in relation to
competencies one, ethics; and six, organisational ethos, which examine the data from the research
from the perspective of values and how they influence decisions and judgement (competency
four). Foresight (competency two), is also compromised under a dysfunctional habitus since it
particularly relates to the 'attitudinal stance' and balance of managers and the organisations they
shape. Cognitive consistency and balance resonate through each of the competencies and connect
the major theoretical concepts underpinning this research, such as 'prior knowledge', 'habitus',
'autopoiesis', 'memes', and 'high reliability theory'.

5.6.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
For managers to reflect on factors that engage with safety and factors that subvert safety at
the same time, raises the proposition that if this is not feasible then managers who think they can
perform this mental task must be delusional. Then the questions arise concerning the support that
should be available for decisional support from enabling systems in organisations, such as human
resources and information systems. For example:
•

•

Can a manager make informed, courageous, balanced decisions regarding safety in
dysfunctional or information poor situations?
Furthermore, can managers who are dysfunctional themselves or have other
priorities, make balanced decisions about safety?

5.6.4 LITERATURE
Socrates made reference to the negative impact that organisations had on the individual.
Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) in their discussion of Model I and Model II learning (theories in
use), suggested we organise in ways that endanger individuals' psychological balance. As was seen
in section 5.1.8, Adam Smith in 1776 stated that business people "seldom gather together except to
conspire against the public interest". The idea is also echoed in the concept of 'habitus'. Habitus
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plays a central role in Bourdieu's (1972/1977, 1980/1990, 2000;2004) "generalized economy of
practices", which specified both the social conditions of emergence of economic actors and systems
of exchange and the concrete manner in which they encounter, propel, or thwart each other.
It also salient to recall, in the context of 'balance', that Australian directors have a number of
potent and purposeful powers that create conflicts of interest and the opportunity to serve their
own interest ahead of the company, its shareholders and stakeholders and to entrench their
position, status and influence to serve their own interests (Turnbull, 2002). Corporations governed
by a single (unitary) board have absolute power to manage their own conflicts of interest
(Turnbull, 2000). If such Boards govern high reliability organisations then potent and purposeful
psychological balance can be expected to be at risk.
The Literature Review, Chapter 2, (sections 2.6.5, 2.6.6, 2.6.7 and 2.7) comprehensively
addresses this competency.

5.6.5 CASE TEXT DATA
The five cases offer examples of all of the 'balance' variables; conflict of interest, defect
reporting, diligence and propriety, dispassionate discourse, institutional timidity, integrity.
However, the Seaview-CAA case has been selected to illustrate how these variables appear in an
accident sequence because the Commission of Inquiry25 report provides both a logical sequence
and a clear understanding of the issues as part of an unfolding accident scenario, making them
accessible to the reader.
It is important to frame the examination of the following data by an understanding that both
the operator and the regulator failed to correctly prioritise safety because their principal driving
force was to keep aircraft flying for profit by ensuring certification, not primarily to address the
safety issues. Hence, this loss of critical balance confirms the links between organisational and
human pathology as described in section 2.6.6 of the Literature Review (Chapter 2). For example,
since the Commission was able to examine other cases, its perspective on the role of the regulator
extended beyond Seaview Air. The Commission was, therefore, in a position to observe the
regulatory system in operation with CAA officers unconnected with Seaview Air. There was a
25 Staunton, J. H. (1996). Report of the Commissioner / Commission of Inquiry into the Relations
between the CAA and Seaview Air. Canberra. 2v.
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considerable gap between the rhetoric and the reality. Serious breaches in the past that reinforce
Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) premise of prior knowledge, including fraud in the renewal of an
instrument rating, were never referred to prosecution. The Commission found that the CAA was
afflicted by an institutional timidity against taking strong action for transgressions by the aviation
industry, reinforcing Goleman's (1998) view of psychological competence.
CAA [institutional timidity] The institutional timidity of the CAA
The CAA in its submissions, accepted the validity of that observation. It said this:
"To the extent that outside pressures (legal, political, industry and managerial)
affected the ability or resolve of officers to take decisive and forceful action may
be termed as "institutional timidity", then that expression is probably an accurate
description of an environment that existed at that time in which officers may
have been wary of making particular decisions." (Executive Summary:3)

The loss of balance on the part of the CAA was a direct consequence of a conflict of interest
and a loss of integrity because the government required the CAA to both act as an enabler of the
aviation industry and its policeman. The Commission suggested that Mr Pauli's lack of diligence
was due to systemic failure in the regulator and it compromised his ability to carry out his duty as
an agent of the regulator. Goleman (1998) would characterise this as an example of emotional
incompetence; La Porte and Consolini (1991:19-47) would suggest that as a high-reliability
organisation, CAA management failed to prioritise both performance and safety as organisational
goals, and failed to gain consensus among its staff and relevant organisations that these goals are
unequivocal.
[loss of integrity, conflict of interest] Evident throughout was an approach by the
CAA to unsafe practices or breaches of the law by operators. It is a problem that
arises through the application of the policy of "graduated response".
[loss of integrity, conflict of interest] Mr Paull presented as an opportunist who
enjoyed too much the company of operators, and saw matters too readily from
their viewpoint, rather than the viewpoint of public safety. Mr Paull appeared not
to have appreciated the need for some distance between (himself as) the
regulator and the regulated. His dealings with Heliscene and Solitary Island
Helicopter Service demonstrated an insensitivity to the possibility of a conflict of
interest. The closeness of his relationship with each operator inevitably
compromised his ability to act as a regulator.

Loss of integrity and conflict of interest resulting from the dissonance caused by the
Government's requirements resulted in failure of due diligence and acts of impropriety. In terms of
the core premise of this thesis (Turner, 1976 and 1978) that prior information can not be captured
and utilised and is lost is again seen to be salient (ie 'the CAA ignored warning after warning').
[diligence and propriety] The CAA was under an obligation to conduct
surveillance of Seaview Air to determine its health or otherwise. In three years it
did very little and discovered almost nothing. Worse, the CAA ignored warning
after warning. It failed to act on intelligence communicated repeatedly to it. The
upgrading process to RPT suffered as a result. Moreover, the CAA processed the
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upgrading with only minimal attention to its own guidelines. The absence of
surveillance, for instance, was consistent with a lack of diligence on the part of
Mr Paull, or his having accepted, quite unreasonably, what were worthless
assurances, and glib explanations given by the operator. Mr Pauli's lenient
treatment of Seaview Air was, in part, the product of a systemic problem in the
CAA arising out of the policy of graduated response.
Mr Paull failed to charge Seaview Air for the chief pilot interview, and he lied
about his reasons, though ultimately it was not for the purpose of benefiting
Seaview Air in a corrupt way. It was a lack of diligence which so characterised Mr
Pauli's performance of his duties. He knew the rules and he pushed them to their
boundaries, and in some instances was in breach, but always ready with an
excuse. Thus, when he came to supervise Seaview Air, such were his own
personal standards that he lived so close to the edge of "legality" that he was
ready to accept that standard in Seaview Air, and willingly accepted their excuses
and assurances for their deficiencies without question and without adequate
investigation. (Executive Summary p43)
Mr Paull allowed himself to be compromised by the receipt of significant benefits
from CareFlight, and, in the case of the fax machine and the CB Radio,
specifically requested those benefits. He must have appreciated that this was
wrong. He knew of no other CAA officer who had received such benefits. He did
not disclose these matters to his superiors. He was aware of the Code of
Conduct. (Executive Summary p41)

The Commission alleged many serious deficiencies in Seaview Air and observed that these
defects had been reported so often (many being corroborated by information already available to
the CAA), that an investigation by the CAA, rather than by Mr Mciver, ought to have been
undertaken at once. Specific guidance was available in the form of operational and breach manuals,
however, vital information was rendered ineffective, both by an inadequate information processing
system (technical) and by a culture (social) that neutralised it.
A number of manuals were in use within the CM providing guidance to officers
as to how they should respond to a breach. Reading these manuals, one would
expect officers of the CAA earnestly to consider prosecution or suspension when
a serious breach was uncovered. Indeed, if action were not taken in such
circumstances one would expect questions to arise about either the diligence of
the officer, or his or her relationship with the operator. (Executive Summary:3)

Central to Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) thesis is the premise that the information needed to
prevent an accident is already known within the organisation and is not heeded - as a result people
die or are injured - this failure can therefore be considered to be pathological. Organisations and
their safety systems seem to reflect the personalities (balance) of their top executives, a premise
that also finds support in the literature suggested in chapter 2, s2.7 (Kets de Vries and Miller,
1984). The research would also suggest that the CAA failed as high reliability organisation by
placing the entire weight of the regulatory role on Mr. Paull, since the theory suggests that that
organisations that are good at disaster avoidance, systemically mobilise as many pairs of eyes as
possible to scrutinise critical information. This maximises the likelihood that the organisation will
respond effectively to signs that things are going wrong. It was an absurdly benign and dangerous
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failure of diligence and propriety to regard Seaview Air as suddenly becoming competent simply
because there was a new chief pilot. For example;
[defect reporting, diligence and propriety) It was not until September 1994, for
instance, that Seaview Air ultimately corrected the problems associated with the
absence of a system in respect of life jackets and life rafts.
[defect reporting - courage, multiple factors compromising integrity] The
shortcomings were:
• overloading;
• cheating on maintenance releases;
• failure to record defects;
• operating an unauthorised RPT service; and
• a "culture" of pilots and their attitude to regulation.
The areas in which Mr Mciver did not set a good example to his pilots, were:
• it seems that on occasions he flew overloaded and tolerated a degree of
misstatement ("fudging") in documents recording the weight of passengers and
freight; and
• though he urged pilots to record defects in maintenance releases (in
accordance with CAR 50), he appears not to have done so himself.
On 2 October 1994, the day of the Seaview Air crash, Mr Mciver recorded Mr
Green's weight on the manifest of VH-IBF as 77kg (the standard weight), when it
was obvious that Mr Green was considerably more (92kg).
The task Mr Mciver inherited as chief pilot required pilots to change habits that
had been formed over many years. Such a task was formidable. Mr Mclver's only
hope of succeeding was if he were to demonstrate implacable opposition to
overloading, and to demand integrity in the completion of documents.
Regrettably, he seems to have done neither. (Executive Summary:24)
Both aircraft had numerous defects (16 Class B items), none of which was noted
on the maintenance releases, as they ought to have been. (Executive Summary
p37)

5.6.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY

Managers do not randomly construct or reconstruct their personalities, emotions, needs,
perceptions, and ways of reasoning. They do so in order to devise and maintain practical
organisational activities or habitus. Much of the concern about balance then must lie with the
unconstructed and less than competent managerial personality. The work of Bordieu (1997, 2000,
2004) and Kets de Vries and Miller (1984), outlined in chapter 2, is salient here because the
Seaview/CAA case text data identifies serious concerns about specific dysfunctional behaviour such
as institutional timidity at an organisational level of analysis, and integrity and courage at an
individual level of analysis. The literature confirms this, particularly in relation to cognitive
consistency and cognitive dissonance and habitus, as described in chapter 2, sections 2.6.5, 2.6.5,
2.5.6 and 2.7, and points to the complexity behind these characteristics. In the organisations
studied (and demonstrated with the CAA case example), there was little success in integrating
individual human beings, with all their varied abilities, interests and needs, into organisations, and
require them to both reflect on an incident and reflect in an incident, while demanding that they
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focus on economic performance at the same time (see chapter 2, s2.8). This points to either a need
for separation of these tasks or training to better prepare managers to achieve this delicate balance.
5.6.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Bourdieu (1975, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2004), states that a socially constituted set of
understandings guide perception, thinking, emotions, motives, needs, imagination, and behaviour.
The socially constituted set of understandings that form the core of our cultural psychology is
called a habitus, a term that Bourdieu borrowed from Marcel Mauss (1934), who also considered
the concept of 'capacity' (or competence) as the self-reflexive and knowing aspect of habitus,
showing how this is an essential feature of the agential self. As stated in chapter 2, s2.6.5, the roots
of habitus are found in Aristotle's notion of hexis, elaborated in his doctrine of virtue, meaning an
acquired yet entrenched state of moral character that orients our feelings and desires in a situation,
and thence our conduct.
In Bourdieu's words, the habitus is a socially structured, and structuring structure. It is a
structure of understandings about the nature of things that structure psychological phenomena
and which is itself structured by social practices. The habitus is a social product in that its
'dispositions are durably inculcated by the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and
necessities, opportunities and prohibitions inscribed in the objective conditions' (Bourdieu, 1975,
chap. 2; 1990a:76-86; 1990b, chap. 3). Therefore, if the organisational habitus is unbalanced it will
have a dysfunctional 'disposition', as has been seen in the text data for each of the underpinning
competencies (as described in chapter 2, sections 2.6.5, 2.6.5, 2.5.6 and 2.7), and an accident
potentiating dysfunctional behaviour results. As is seen in the next chapter, the dysfunctional effect
also influences organisational factors.
Bordieu's theory strongly grounds the research data when applied to reported data from
other incidents. For example, The New Scientist (12 August 2000) described concerns about
Concorde's tyres breaking up, which could lead to catastrophic problems including uncontrolled
fire and multiple engine failure. Both figured in the crash outside Paris when an Air France
Concorde smashed into a hotel two minutes after taking off from Charles de Gaulle airport, killing
113 people. These 'engineering' concerns were reported to the Confederation of European
Aerospace Societies in Cambridge in 1999. From a 'contextual' perspective we can say that the
factors that could produce an incident were known to the organisation before the incident
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occurred, as Turner (1976, 1997) determined. The data required to exercise foresight was available
to management prior to the accident but failed to evoke managerial decision support because

judgement was framed by a habitus of commercial priorities over safety.
A study26 commissioned by British Airways was very detailed and should have triggered a
system response. It looked at problems that could arise with the engines and examined the history
of previous failures to calculate the odds of each event occurring in the future. It divided the
consequences into five classes ranging from 'trivial' to 'catastrophic'. The latter included 'non
containment of high-energy debris, engine separation, uncontrolled fire [and] multiple engine
failures'. The analysis identified 152 separate risks, including 55 'significant' risks inherent in the
design of the Rolls Royce Olympus engines, but it showed that Concorde's engines did not fall
short of the safety standards required for airworthiness certification by the Civil Aviation Authority
in Britain and its counterparts in France and the US. British Airways emphasised that the CAA had
not required it to improve the plane's engines so it decided not to do so. The factors needed to
trigger a response were clearly below the threshold of concern. It is unquestionably dysfunctional
when managerial cognitive consistency prevails in clearly hazardous situations and renders them
paradoxically 'normal', as suggested by Perrow (1984), to satisfy commercial needs over safety
requirements.
British Airways gave the appearance it intended to exercise consonance when it
commissioned the risk analysis of Concorde's Olympus 593 engines. However, the motive for
doing so is in no way altruistic or related to customer safety. The dissonance revealed by New
Scientist was that it wanted certification to keep the 30-year-old supersonic plane flying until 2012
for commercial advantage. Concorde's engines had remained relatively reliable over the previous
10 years, with each engine being shut down about once in every 600 transatlantic flights due to
mechanical faults. It can be confidently claimed that habitus (the culture of the organisation and

managerial intent) was directed toward profit rather than safety priorities and that such priorities
shaped management's agenda or capacity for 'balance'. New Scientist reports that a quarter of the
'significant' risks identified in the risk analysis required design changes to engine parts and half of

26 British Airways commissioned the risk analysis of Concorde's Olympus 593 engines because it
wanted to keep the 30-year-old supersonic plane flying until 2012. The risk analysis was done by the airline
in conjunction with Rolls-Royce, which built Concorde's engines, and BMT Reliability Consultants of
Fareham, Hampshire.
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the risks were said to require 'further analysis'. However, the principal driving force was to keep
the planes flying for profit by ensuring certification, not primarily to address the safety issues27 •
5.6.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that managers failed to
exercise sound judgement, often in the lead-up, during, and after an accident. Managers failed to
heed warnings from human and organisational sources prior to accidents, ignoring prior
knowledge. They often acted with in a state of confusion and with less than the required level of
integrity and courage needed to effectively deal with an incident as it unfolded; and they often
sought to blame others, such as front line staff after the accident. In other words, they did not
demonstrate psychological balance at each critical stage of an incident. The inference is clear that if
a manager making possible life or death decisions is not able to do so in a state of psychological
balance (for whatever reason) then that manager will influence and be influenced by the culture of
the organisation. If the organisation has been rendered dysfunctional then dysfunctional decisions
can be expected to follow.
The problem of balance becomes amplified when one considers that managers are not
automatons or computers. They have particular motives, values, fears, experiences and
expectations that also come into play in the decision process. More importantly they function in
organisations that are cultural or social settings that also frame cognitive consistency and hence
balance. Therefore, when critical decisions need to be made managers look for some consistency
among their own experiences and memories. But what if there is some inconsistency? The Asch
study (1956)28 showed what happened when there is a serious inconsistency between one's own
experiences (and the beliefs based on them) and those reported by others, and that people under
pressure are inclined to perform badly. But suppose the inconsistency is among the manager's own
experiences, beliefs or actions? Many social psychologists believe that this will trigger some general
trend to restore cognitive consistency - to reinterpret the situation so as to minimise whatever
inconsistency may be there.

27

The risk analysis was done by the airline in conjunction with Rolls-Royce, which built Concorde's
engines, and BMT Reliability Consultants of Fareham, Hampshire.
28
Asch wanted to investigate whether people could be influenced by what other people did. He did
this in a very simple way by having a single subject make a very simple decision. Normally, this would be a
very simple task, but the single subject found him/ herself outnumbered by seven other people who
deliberately make the incorrect choice. Asch demonstrated that people could easily be made to follow
others despite overwelming evidence that what they were doing or saying was wrong.
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According to Festinger (1957), this is because any perceived inconsistency among various
aspects of knowledge, feelings and behaviour sets up an unpleasant internal state - cognitive
dissonance - which people try to reduce to restore balance whenever possible. Decisions made in a
state of cognitive dissonance can not be 'safe' decisions because of the complex cognitive and
emotional influences at play, such as:
•

anxiety (apprehension in response to perceived threat),

•

incident cognition (perception, knowledge, memory and judgment about oneself and the
problem at hand),

•

conflict (antagonistic pressures forcing the manager to make a decision in the presence of
simultaneous mutually exclusive priorities, such as 'safety versus cost'),

•

consonance (congruence with personal and organisational values),

•

dissonance (when two cognitions are inconsistent with each other such as, to close the
hatch to snuff out the fire and kill the four seamen or fight the fire with the hatch open

•

and put the entire vessel and all the crew at certain risk),
recognising and managing personal and organisational defence mechanisms (coping
behaviours that come into play such as media spin to protect organisational reputations
versus honesty and candid reporting),

•

forced compliance (balancing rewards an punishments and regulatory requirements) and
other issues such as the relevance of information coming from the systems involved and
how to manage the motivational factors.
Then again, once a decision is made it is the beginning, not the end of conflict (Festinger,

1957). Depending on the magnitude of the dissonance it is not difficult to visualise intense
incident scenarios in which reality and perceptions are distorted to make rapid adjustments to try
to restore cognitive consistency and balance between all the inconsistent factors, which itself
further compounds the situation, making sound decisions impossible.

5. 7 Conclusion
This chapter suggests that if the underpinning competencies are absent or compromised by
other factors, such as the primacy of production, then they can confidently be characterised as
dysfunctional. Dysfunctional high reliability organisations exhibit impaired balance (loss of
centering on organisational and individual purpose and values), failure of courage (acting morally
in the face of coercion and fear) and compromised integrity (educated moral judgement). For
221

example, where organisations focus on the commercial drivers or where personal or group power
is exercised inappropriately the role of the regulator and legal sanctions becomes critical to safety
by forcing organisational change in organisations that have a record of accidents, particularly where
dysfunctional habitus (culture) has been shown to be a factor. Dysfunctional organisational
cultures are created by dysfunctional managers, not staff, and they lead to dysfunctional managerial
decisions that potentiate accidents. They tend to close themselves off from their stakeholders and it
becomes difficult to establish a culture of safety.
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6 Organisational Factors
'All men dream: but not equal ly. Those who d ream by night wake in the day to
find that it was vanity; but the d reamers of the day are dangerous men, for they
may act their d ream with open eyes, to make it possible.' (T. E. Lawrence)

6. 1 Introduction
This chapter examines the set of competencies considered most relevant to creating and
managing the ethos and culture of an organisation. It adopts the framework of the modified
grounded theory approach set out in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Data Analysis chapter:
interpretation of the concept as it is used in this research followed by a consideration of the
relationships between the competency under consideration and the other key competencies. The
chapter then poses a set of generative questions and a review of the literature salient to the
concept and complementary to the main literature review in chapter 2. An elaboration of the
insights revealed to theory is attempted and other data from the research is then used to ground
the theory. Finally a hypothesis based on the issues revealed by the research is suggested.

6.2 Competency 6: Organisational ethos (open or closed
[autopoietic]

organisational

cultures

shape

hazard

management capabilities)
6.2.1 INTERPRETATION
Morphogenesis29

-

literally, the "coming into being" (genesis) of "form" (morpbe) is

important to understanding the ethos in high reliability organisations in that it engages the concept
that organisations are more than the sum of their parts; there is something within them that is
holistic and purposive, directing their development toward certain goals. Aristotle argued that a
29 Morphogenesis asks, How do complex living organisms arise from much simpler structures such as
seeds or eggs? How does an acorn manage to grow into an oak tree, or a fertilized human egg into an adult
human being? A striking characteristic of living organisms is the capacity to regenerate, ranging from the
healing of wounds to the replacement of lost limbs or tails. Organisms are clearly more than just complex
machines: no machine has ever been known to grow spontaneously from a machine egg or to regenerate
after damage.
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tree had the organising power of a tree. The matter of a tree would be organised as a tree. The
scientific world recognises the tendency of things to follow patterns we call laws of nature.
Sheldrake's (1981, 1991) dubious, but intriguing, theosophical view of organising fields, he calls
'morphic resonance' enables visualisation of an organising process governed by an ethos.
According to Rupert Sheldrake's theory, a radio would tune into events from outside it. If the radio
is turned off the events are not turned off, the events keep on happening. The voices do not come
from the radio itself. By analogy, neither functional nor dysfunctional values can be turned off if
they exist in the atmosphere (ethos) of an organisation, they have organising force.
In analysing organisational ethos, its most obvious dysfunctional manifestation is a tendency
to 'autopoiesis', which is defined as a process whereby a system becomes self-referential and closes
itself off from the outside world. An autopoietic system is operationally closed and structurally
static with no apparent inputs and outputs. The CAA (described in the data analysis s6. l.5) is
perhaps the most obvious example. It mishandled issue after issue and consequently came under
attack in parliament, the aviation industry and the media and closed itself off as best it could with
obfuscation, denials and refusal to cooperate along with individual hubris among managers as they
tried to put a positive bureaucratic 'spin' on events as did BHP after the Longford explosion.
The HyperRESEARCH analysis of the cases revealed descriptors of organisational ethos
congruent with the morphogenic organising power of the collective mind of the dominant
coalition and a tendency for dysfunctional organisations to shift to autopoietic behaviours. These
descriptors are listed in Table 6.2.1 below.
Table 6.2.1 H

erRESEARCH Or anisational Ethos Descri tors:

administrative politics, autopoietic behaviour, corrupt management, cultural factors, culture of
denial, dominance of CEO, dominant coalition, erroneous management paradigm, failure to notify
safety concerns, favoured treatment, ignore legislation, improvised safety standards, legislative
framework, management interference, managerial dysfunction, misplaced reliance on SSM, management
neglect, management speak, decision making, priority of production, regulator arrogance, regulator
incompetence, safety as a cost, sacrifice of safety for economic reasons, standards sacrificed, systemic
mana ement ailure, wa es and conditions, written re orts i ored

6.2.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
The nature of the ethos (competency 6) is a determinant of the capacity to construct a
culture of safety (competency 7) that in tum is dependent on psychological balance (competency
5), judgement (competency 4), vigilance (competency 3), capacity for foresight (competency 2),
and the ethics of its dominant coalition (competency 1). The direct connection to each of these
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high reliability competencies is through the previously developed conceptual interplay of the
theories of habitus, memes, autopoiesis, reflective practice, and prior knowledge.
6.2.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
This research raises many questions concerning the role played by organisational
management and the regulator in building an ethos of safety. For example,
• If assumption surfacing and verification are essential to test for dangerous mental
models and persistent memes in management and operations, what role should the
regulator play in enforcing this process?
•

How can organisational cultures in HROs be responsive to stakeholder concerns
and inputs to avoid autopoietic responses to a crisis?

•

What role should the regulator play in driving fear and bullying, and direct and
indirect discrimination, from HROs to overcome barriers to safety, quality,
productivity and innovation?

•

ls this task solely the responsibility of management?

•

What if management themselves are the source and cause of these problems?

The state of mind of the organisation and the way it sees itself at any particular time is
framed and constructed against the views employees believe the organisation values. For example,
• How can management place value on safety as an investment rather than a cost,
espouse positive beliefs about safety, and demonstrate they behave according to a
set of cognitively consistent underlying assumptions if these values are at odds with
their real agenda and behaviour?
•

If 'prior knowledge' of accident conditions tends to be ignored when there is a
conflict between commercial priorities and a commitment to safety how can
managers deal with these financial pressures?

Other questions that might indicate autpoietic tendencies include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Is there a hierarchical structure and top-down decision-making?
Does the organisation see that it is hierarchical?
Does it favour internal promotions only?
Does the organisation tend to view the environment as stable and unchanging?
ls its system of values grounded in 'old' world practices?
Does the organisation demonstrate a lack of openness to change?
225

•
•

Is it aware of the variety of cultures within it?

•

Is it inclined to highlight the barriers to change rather than possible adaptation to

Does it not recognise when there are problems or does it persist with bad decisions?

future?

•

Is the focus for change blurred and ineffective?

•

Is it possible to name and bring to the surface the faulty and subversive assumptions
and memes which govern practices in relation to hanging on to old benefits,
perceptions of roles in relation to clients and customers, and the organisation's
reputation?

6.2.4 LITERATURE
Having the capacity to diagnose and manage the ethos of the organisation has been shown
in this research to be one of the core failings of the dominant coalition, as was seen in several
perspectives considered earlier, notably Turner's (1978, 1997) 'misinformation' or theory of 'prior
knowledge'; Reason's (1990) 'latent errors' and Kletz's (1994) 'organisational memory failure';
Perrow's (1984, 1999) theories of 'normal accidents'; and Bordieu's (2004) theories of 'habitus';
and particularly Roberts and Gargano's (1990) view that failure-tolerant managers create hazardous
conditions in their pursuit of downward pressure on costs and increasing shareholder dividends.
Theories of autopoiesis and enactive cognitive science claim that certain self-organising
biological systems can close themselves off from their environments and abandon symbolic
representations and instructional interactions to polarize an altered reality (Maturana and Varela,
1980; Varela, 1979; and Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). These theories can provide useful
inferential insights into how accidents might happen in high-reliability organisations. 'Autopoiesis'
(chapter 2, s2.9) suggests that certain organisations might close themselves off from their
stakeholders to protect the internal 'actors', particularly management. Under such conditions key
players ignore warnings, deny events, and lie to cover up errors. These two theories amplify
Bourdieu's (1975, 1977, 2004) theory of 'habitus' (described in chapter 2, s2.6.5) which states that
a socially constituted set of understandings guide perception, thinking, emotions, motives, needs,
imagination, and behaviour.
Morgan discusses the morphogenic dimension of autopoiesis while considering the form,
function, and character of enterprises suggesting that 'autopoietic systems are closed loops: self
referential systems that strive to shape themselves in their own image' (Morgan, 1986: 242). Von
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Krogh and Roos (1995) apply principles from autopoietic theory in laying out a schema for
corporate knowledge building. Mingers (1994) points to similarities between autopoietic theory,
and sociologist Anthony Giddens' (1984) to structuration theory. Giddens' theory of structuration
(Gauntlett, 2002) notes that social life is more than random individual acts, but is not merely
determined by social forces. Giddens suggests that human agency and social structure are in a
relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of the acts of individual agents which
reproduces the structure. This means that there is a social structure - traditions, institutions, moral
codes, and established ways of doing things - but it also means that these can be changed when
people start to ignore them, replace them, or reproduce them differently. Put simply, management
determines structure and all structural values. If management becomes dysfunctional so does the
organisation. These two theories also resonate with Bourdieu's (1975, 1977, 2004) theory of
'habitus'.
Whitely (1999) sees the usefulness of autopoiesis as a metaphor for reflective thinking about
organisations contemplating change. The issue of how autopoiesis can or should be applied to
social systems is an ongoing topic of debate (Zeleny, 1980; Benseler, Hejl and Kock, 1980; Zeleny,
1981; Ulrich, Gilbert and Probst, 1984; Mingers, 1994). These authors tend to indicate that there
are two primary approaches in applying autopoiesis to social systems. The first applies the formal
aspects of autopoietic theory to the social system itself ( e.g., organisation; autopoiesis). The second
derives an explanation of the social system from the phenomenological aspects of the theory (e.g.,
the observer; communication, hence memes). In the context of this research the theory is best
understood when both the organisational and communication factors are considered together:
autopoiesis

+

memes = explanation for many of the issues the various Commissions of Inquiry

discovered that lead to failures which resulted in fatal accidents. For example, the issue of the
failure of prior knowledge is explainable in light of a purposive, dysfunctional system that devalues
and subverts information that might point to an impending accident.
Von Bertalanffy (1980) claims that an autopoietic or 'closed system' is one where behaviour
is entirely explainable from within, essentially a system without input. Systems may be variously
closed to new ideas, to information, and/or to organisation. Systems closed to energy or new ideas
are 'autark', systems closed to information are independent, and systems closed to organisation are
'autonomous'. The output has nothing to do with whether a system is closed. Systems without
output are non-knowable through observation from the outside. Organisations such as the Navy
and the CAA are almost unknowable from the outside and therefore meet this criteria.
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Evidence in the research makes it clear that autopoietic organisations such as the CAA
attempt to organise the environment to enable the organisation's self focus. Morgan (1986: 244)
calls organisations like this 'egocentric', suggesting they often do not understand their own
complexity as '[they] draw boundaries of narrow definitions around themselves and proceed to
advance the self interest of this narrow domain.' To such autopoietic organisations, the future is a
projection of the present. Changes are only welcomed when needed to retain the status quo.
Change is seen as imposed, something that upsets the equilibrium, and often this change must
come from outside. This indicates the critical and often interventionist role required of the
regulator where safety is put at stake by an organisationally egocentric predisposition.
The change literature comments on the challenges and difficulties of implementing change,
and confirms this reaction by both management and workers (Kanter (1984); Dunphy and Stace
(1990); Ulrich, Losey and Lake, (1997). Therefore, it is unlikely that concerns of outsiders, such as
for safety, will cause a self-referential, autopoietic organisation to voluntarily change. Intervention,
rather than concern, is required to bring about change. Maturana (1981) suggests that invariance in
an organisation is the essence of an autopoietic system and such a system cannot undergo an
evolutionary change. Therefore, this research suggests that it is the ultimate responsibility of the
regulator to understand the culture of the organisations under its purview where such
characteristics have become institutionalised and intervene where appropriate.

6.2.5 CASE TEXT DATA
Each of the organisations discussed in this thesis had a distinct, purposive organising ethos,
which was shown by the Commissions of Inquiry, to have contributed to each fatal accident. It
existed much as background dissonance in each of these dysfunctional organisations and was
amplified (tuned into) by the accident scenarios as they unfolded. Some of these failings were
subtly autopoietic. For example, there is evidence that disconnected managers used deception and
cunning to further their own ends (creating an organisational ethos where the end justified the
means).
The HyperRESEARCH analysis revealed considerable disconnection between an
organisation's espoused position in regard to its organisational obligations and the reality revealed
by tuning in to its actual behaviour (as suggested in Whitely, 1999 · chapter 4, s4.8), particularly
with the clarity brought to bear by a Royal Commission. For example, paragraphs 13.38, 39, and 40
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of the Longford Commission revealed that while the Longford operation held world class manuals
of best practice, the actual practice was not congruent with their own espoused operational safety
systems guidelines written into those manuals. One might go so far as to say the evidence suggests
that the manuals were a cynical exercise in obfuscation to 'appear to be in compliance' with safety
requirements.
LONGFORD [dangers of disconnection between espoused values and actual
practice and need for simplification]
13.38. Evidence was given that OIMS was

a world class system and complied with world's best practice. Whilst this may be
true of the expectations and guidelines upon which the system was based, the
same cannot be said of the operation of the system in practice. Even the best
management system is defective if it is not effectively implemented. The system
must be capable of being understood by those expected to implement it.
13.39 Esso's OIMS, together with all the s upporting manuals, comprised a
complex management system. It was repetitive, circular, and contained
unnecessary cross referencing. Much of its lang uage was impenetrable. These
characteristics made the system difficult to comprehend both by management
and by operations personnel.
13.40 The Commission gained the distinct impression that there was a tendency
for the administration of OIMS to take on a life of its own, divorced from
operations in the field. Indeed, it seemed that in some respects, concentration
upon the development and maintenance of the system diverted attention from
what was actually happening in the practical functioning of the plants at
Longford. (The Esso Gas Plant Accident, Report of the Longford Royal
Commission. Dawson, 1999)

Paragraphs 13.38-40 indicate that the OIMS system (operations integrity management
system) took on life of its own, using management speak such as, 'world's best practice', while at
the same time failing to implement these 'best practice' guidelines. The inference can be
reasonably drawn that this was a way 'management' could impress and mislead both the parent
company, Exxon, and the regulator.
The recurring problem with 'management speak' is its dangerous propensity to take on
memetic force and become a mantra endowed with sufficient power to create an autopoetic entity,
an organisational ethos serving its own ends. Such an entity can be as small as a management
group or as large as an organisation. It also has ethical implications in the sense that while
espousing a high moral tone to engage in necessary action, management both fails to carry out
these actions and obscures its own inaction in a language that requires forensic unravelling to
understand. This is of particular concern when this obfuscatory language finds its way into glossy
manuals governing the safety operations of high reliability organisations. Not only does it hinder
actual operations, it also makes training virtually impossible. This creates a propensity whereby
dissonance is set up, which then results in dysfunctional paradigms (mental models of an
organisational world) governing actual behaviours by the organisation.
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Erroneous management paradigms can guide a person to unsafe behaviours in hazardous,
stressful conditions where reflex rather than reason takes over. Often, the edge of the rut can be
mistaken for the horizon in such constrained, autopoietic paradigms. Perrow (1999:9) points out
that 'mariners had quite reasonable explanations for their actions; it is just that the interaction of
small failures led them to construct quite erroneous worlds in their minds, . . . and these conflicting
images led to collision.' The paradigmatic force can be subtle and framed by erroneous perceptions
and expectations, as in the Court of Marine Inquiry: ss Lake Illawarra (1975:8) example that
follows.
ILLAWARRA [erroneous management paradigm] The Master's reason for charting

a course i n stead of steering by land marks , he said, was that he expected bad
weather and poor vi s i b i l ity. Normally he would have stee red by land marks i n
these pilotage wate rs, starting at about the place where a pi lot would be picked
up, between White Rock Point and Crayfi s h Poi nt. As it happe ned, weather and
v i s i bi l ity i m proved i nstead of gett i n g worse, but the Master did not revert to h i s
u s ual practice i n regard t o stee ring by landmarks. (Com m is s ion Report p8)

This perfectly sensible but entirely erroneous mental model in the mind of the Master is not
dissimilar to the erroneous mental paradigms used by senior decision makers in each of the cases.
For example, in the Longford Royal Commission (Dawson, 1999: 13.71), a more serious mental
model is described. It ignored the effects of hot condensate transferred down the line:
LONGFORD [erroneous management paradigm] 1 3 . 7 1 I m portantly, i n
considering the i m pact of the modification o n the transfer p i pe l i n e , the 1 9 9 2
study ide ntified cond en sate carryove r i nto the absorption o i l system a s a
potential outcome of high l evel s of conden sate i n the absorbe rs. It did not,
however, exam i n e the effect of conde n s ate carryover on ve ssels downstream
from the absorbers in GPL This was because of a concl usion reached by those
i nvolved in the study, that conde n sate carryover was "not a new phenomenon"
and that it should " ... be hand led in the same way as it is handled now". The study
n oted that no fol l ow- u p action was req u i red .

These assumptions can have the effect of creating altered realities in dominant coalitions of
sufficient force that they can lead to the thwarting of safety system tests to identify latent systemic
problems. For example, in the Executive Summary of the Seaview Report, Staunton,

J. H.,

(1996:22), the Commissioners observed that administrative politics played a role in subverting
safety.
CAA [administrative politics] Mr Roser d i rected the Head of the D i rectorate of
Avi ation Safety Reg u l ation, Mr Maci o n i s , in these forthright term s :
"Please h ave t h e h i story, t h e cu rrent ope rations a n d t h e above i s sues o f Seaview
i ndependently audited and revi ewed as a matte r of absol ute priority and provide
a report to me on the fi ndings, pl us any actions you propose to have taken as a
re sult of the i nve stigation."
M r Macionis referred the i s s u e to M r Abberto n, Acting Reg ional Manager, North
East Region. M r Abbe rton was fu rious at not h aving been con s u lted. He was
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determined to thwart the inquiry. Neither Mr Macionis nor Mr Abberton examined
the Seaview Air files to determine the position. Neither asked that someone
independent, with technical expertise, do so. Mr Abberton simply solicited a
response from Mr Paull, the person who was the subject of the accusations. Mr
Paull, predictably, denied the allegations. Soliciting his denial was hardly a
substitute for an independent audit.
Mr Macionis thereafter assured Mr Roser that an independent audit was not
necessary. Mr Roser accepted that assurance. An opportunity therefore, was lost.
It was lost, moreover, for reasons connected with administration politics, and
unrelated to the merits of Mr Roser's direction. (Executive Summary p22)

The report goes on to identify further evidence of the regulator's internal failure to carry out
its role because of a failure in the organisational ethos that the CAA previously purported was one
of safety. It bears highlighting that each of the people identified in the Commission report are CAA
employees.
CAA [managerial dysfunction] Twice Mr Roser had asked Mr Macionis to
investigate allegations against Seaview Air (18 April and 9 May 1994). On both
occasions Mr Macionis had failed to investigate. He had simply referred the
issues to Mr Paull, who had provided a rebuttal. The rebuttal had been accepted
without an independent check, and passed on to Mr Roser. That was clearly not
good enough. (Executive Summary p2 7)
The processing of the Operations Manual demonstrated, first, the dysfunctional
nature of the Coffs Harbour Office, where the Flying Operations Manager and the
Airworthiness Manager plainly could not agree. (Executive Summary p29)

Hence, the play of organisational politics and the exercise of organisational and personal
power was sufficient to create an ethos in which precedence was given to the interests of the
dominant coalition, and the systemic traps and tests needed to overcome this powerful force were
not in place.
The internal problems revealed by the Seaview and other fatal crashes pointed to a
dysfunctional ethos and demonstrated how a dysfunctional ethos can permeate into every comer
of an organisation and diminish many critical competencies related to safety or critical mission. For
example, the damaging effect on vigilance in the CAA as the result of dysfunctional systems
operating in the dysfunctional habitus described above can be seen in the following sequence of
accident precursors:
CAA [managerial dysfunction, systemic management failure] Officers and Flight
Service Officers. Many other errors were brought about by a distinct lack of
concentration or inattention by both, including:
• Failure to notice for some minutes that VH-SVQ had disappeared from the
radar screen.
• Failure to recognise that VH-SVQ was in controlled airspace when the pilot
announced a significant descent.
• Failure to ask the pilot whether his operations were normal.
• Failure to carry out a communications check for an unacceptably long time after
the position report of VH-SVQ was due.
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Management problems were also evident. Shift supervisors manipulated shifts or
were late. Airspace positions were closed when they ought to have been open, it
being the weekend of the Bathurst Motor Races. There were local "Sydney
practices", which were not the best practices, in what needs to be a highly
disciplined environment. Pilot breaches were not reported; non-procedural
expressions were tolerated; and departures from procedural requirements were
almost commonplace. What was most extraordinary was a television set being
present in the flight service area, broadcasting the Bathurst races. Its presence
had been permitted earlier by a manager. It was con nected to a permanent aerial
wall jack and was tolerated by later shift managers. One officer, near the
television, denied that his many and serious errors had been caused by the
presence of the television. If it was not the cause, then his lack of concentration,
and that of other officers had no apparent cause other than a lack of diligence.
(Executive Summary p47)

One dimension of an unhealthy organisational ethos, or habitus, in the CAA is the evidence
put forward by the Commission of regulator arrogance. The characteristics of autopoietic
behaviour are many and often quite subtle. The propensity for paranoia and the memetic
reinforcement gained from evidence from the environment can alter perceptions of responsibility
and drive the organisation inwards on itself in a self-protective mode. Behaviours that manifest this
inclination include the likelihood that anyone from inside bearing 'bad news', or more particularly
'whistle blowing', will be severely punished, either by losing their jobs or career path
opportunities. Therefore, people at the safety interface are often disinclined to be the 'bearer of
bad tidings' since there is often a tendency to 'execute the messenger'. For example,
CAA [regulator arrogance] In its submissions, the Authority has failed to extend
to Mr Hoy the apology for his treatment that he deserved. Indeed, the
submissions disclosed the same irritation with Mr Hoy that was the root cause for
his warnings having been ignored. That attitude, in the Commission's belief,
signifies that the lesson of these events has not been learned, notwithstanding
the acknowledgment of timidity. [Executive Summary p22]

The durability and expression of the core high reliability competencies identified in this
research are reliant on a sound organisational ethos. However, since the source of a healthy
organisational ethos derives mostly from the influence of the dominant coalition and, in particular,
the CEO. If the CEO is dysfunctional the core competencies cannot be expressed. For example,
persisting with the CAA case, the lapses identified above can be traced back to the dominance and
exercise of power by Mr Green and his innate propensity for dysfunctional and unethical behaviour
(ie the pressure he applied to others to break rules and put productivity ahead of safety).
CAA [dominance of the CEO, wages and conditions, pressure to break rules,
priority of production] Mr Green, as the proprietor of Seaview Air, was a dominant
figure. His pilots were all young men. They had entered general aviation in the
hope that one day they would fly for one of the major airlines. That ambition
required the accumulation of experience and flying hours. Jobs were in short
supply. Mr Green regarded his pilots as being lucky to have a job. They so
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regarded themselves. He was, therefore, in a position of significant dominance so
far as the pilots were concerned.

That dominance manifested itself in two distinct ways:
• First, Mr Green offered wages and conditions considerably less advantageous
than those provided by the Pilots (General Aviation) Award. That award was, for
Seaview Air, the law. Mr Green was bound by it. Yet he regarded it as irrelevant to
his company. His pilots were prepared nonetheless, to accept his conditions.
Indeed, they were eager to do so, because they were anxious to keep their jobs.
• Secondly, Mr Green was in a position (as he acknowledged) to put pressure
upon pilots to break or bend the rules, to his financial benefit. It was plain that
he applied such pressure. (Executive Summary p4)

The evidence is strong that Mr Green did not exercise a level of responsibility congruent
with the power he exercised. Somewhat similar dysfunctional relationships also played a role in the
accidents discussed in the other cases, particularly in the Longford and Moura cases. In the
Longford case, Management in Melbourne, at head office, ordered a cost cutting reduction of
supervision at Longford, which included the transfer of its engineers to Melbourne. This reduction
of supervision at Longford, described in the Longford Royal Commission Report (Dawson,
1999:13.36), including the transfer of engineers to Melbourne, necessarily meant a reduction in the
amount and quality of the supervision of operations there. There was a correspondingly greater
reliance by Esso on the skill and knowledge of its on-site operators.
LONGFORD 13.136 [priority of production) Had there been surveillance by
qualified engineers, there would have been an opportunity to detect and correct
the operating practices which led to the accident on 2 5 September 1998. The
failure to conduct the HAZOP study for GPl and the reduction of supervision at
Longford, including the transfer of engineers to Melbourne, were a result of
Essa's desire to control its operating costs.

This reduction in supervision to achieve cost cutting goals related to production was
compounded by the dysfunctional behaviour of senior staff left on site at Longford, which directly
resulted in failure of critical hazard related 'prior information', as suggested by Turner, (1976 and
1978), and Turner and Pidgeon, (1997).
13:30 If Musgrave acquired the knowledge, which he said he did, he did nothing
as plant manager to ensure that the written operating procedures contained
instructions to be followed in the event of loss of lean oil circulation.

The change in supervisor responsibilities left operators without properly structured
operational procedures to follow in the event of specific hazardous events. This amplification of
contributing factors was behaviourally endorsed in the framing of the Longford ethos during
regular on-site visits by senior management whose actions provided clear memetic cues to the sort
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of behaviour head office expected (paragraph 13.33 demonstrates low managerial concern for
hazard identification).
1 3 : 3 3 Month ly visits to Longford by senior management fai led to detect these
shortcomings and were therefore no su bstitute for essential on-site supervis ion.

This consistently poor hazard identification was compounded even further by the actions of .
an external assessment team, who appear to have provided a 'management speak' assessment of
hazard at the Longford plant. The management speak 'power words' that are used in such
compliance reports to convey dynamic organisational processes to managers, whom the report
writers believe want to hear such hyperbole, are underlined in paragraph 13.36 below. Generally
these words can be taken out without changing the meaning. This propensity for memetic
falsehoods is extant

in

most organisations and generally covers the incompetence of poorly

qualified audit or human resource staff who feel the need to 'Harvardise' their language. Everything
must be 'dynamic' or 'powerful', or 'extensive'. Not only are these clues to potential hazards, they
are also dangerous 'belief system' memes that can shape the ethos or habitus of high reliability
organisations. It is relevant to note that this audit report would not have been called for except that
it was required for compliance purposes.
13.34 Element 1 1 of the ECI Guideli nes, which were translated i nto Essa's OIMS
Systems Manual , req u i red a "process that measures the degree to which
expectations are met" and regarded that req uire ment as essential "to i mprove
operations i ntegrity and mai ntai n accou ntabil ity". That meant that Essa's OIMS
were required to i nclude a system to ensure that these guidelines were met and,
i n particu lar, that Essa's operations were assessed at predetermi ned freque ncies
to establ i s h the degree of compl iance.
1 3 . 3 5 An external as sessment was carried out by a team under the leadership of
Wayne Achee in March and Apri l 1998. A report of the assessment was prepared
and sent to Sikke l . The report acknowledged that the assess ment was required by
element 1 1 of the ECI G u idelines to dete rmine the extent to wh ich Essa was
meeti ng the gu idel i nes and the requirements of its i ndivid ual management
systems. The report noted that the assessment team had concl uded that Essa
had successfu l ly applied OIMS and had a high level of management involvement
and participation, presumably in that process.
1 3. 36 The report fu rther noted the fol lowi ng achievements:
There was a com mon set of operati ng manuals, references and records wh ich
were identified and i n place at al l sites.
There was an extensive set of operations and mai nte nance procedures which
were updated at s pecified i ntervals as changes occu rred.
There was a good understandi ng of and high discipl i ne in safe work routines and
procedures.
There was a structured and di scipl i ned process in place for shift handover for
offshore and onshore operating sites.
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There was a comprehensive i ncident reporting, i nvestigation and analysis system
which was wel l understood throughout the organi sation. Esso personnel were
well di scipl ined in following their procedures.
Near miss reporting was actively encouraged by management and supported by
Esso personnel.

The Longford Royal Commission (Dawson, 1999:13.37) observed that these (and other)
observations of the assessment team appear inconsistent with the Commission's findings
concerning the failure of Esso to implement its own systems, particularly in relation to risk
identification, analysis and management, training, operating procedures, documentation, data and
communications. Paragraphs 13. 107, 13. 108, and 13.67 of the Report point to similar failings in
critical aspects of hazard prevention (log book entries and handover procedures, and management
speak).
13. 107 Shift handovers and log book entries were used ineffectively In the lead
up to the accident on 2 5 September 1998. Moreover, laxity i n the i mplementation
of the handover req uirements seems to have escaped scrutiny by management.
1 3 . 108 Log book entries were not subjected to any exami n ation either by
Longford plant management or by management i n Melbourne. They do not
appear to have been used by management as a means of monitoring process
conditions at the plant nor were they passed on to any person or group in
Melbourne for plant surveil lance purposes.
1 3.67 However, OIMS Element 2 did not identify any proced ures for ri sk
assessment associated with management of change. The only reference to this
topic was in the fol lowing terms: "Production Technology operate within a
management of change procedure which is consi stent with the EAL management
of change philosophy."

The Commission also observed (paragraph 13.18) that the collective experience of those
present at GP922 on 25 September 1998 was more than 200 years at Longford, and yet no one
recognised the hazards associated with the plant conditions which culminated in the explosion and
fire.
Appropriate supervision of operators to ensure adherence to basic operating practices was a
responsibility of Esso management. The investigation of the events leading up to the accident
revealed a number of occasions when operators failed to adhere to rudimentary operating
practices. These included failures to monitor plant conditions, respond appropriately to alarms,
report process upsets to supervisors and undertake appropriate checks before adjusting process
variables. Had there been an ethos in place where operating practices been more closely
monitored and supervised by Esso management, these departures from appropriate operating
practices would have been detected and remedied.
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Finally, the problem of ethos is inherent in the regulatory regime for offshore petroleum
production in Australia, where safety is the responsibility of a government department whose
primary concern is to facilitate production. This situation is similar to that pertaining to aviation.
In discussing the Moura case Hopkins (1999) observed that the mine operator, BHP, had
experience of previous mine disasters, the most recent being the explosions at Moura No. 4 in
1986 and at Appin in NSW in 1979. It is BHP as an organisation whose memory was defective.
However, at the time of the Moura accident the economic viability of the mine was in doubt and
there was pressure to maximise production. Counsel for the miners put it in his final submission,
'BHP ran a dangerous race against time to extract all of the coal from 512 [panel] in accordance
with the (management) plan' (Hopkins, 1999:134).
There was a habitus and ethos of denial at Moura which served to nullify warnings of
impending disaster. Compliance requirements demanded that production could continue at top
speed only if the mine was understood to be safe. This requirement consequently generated an
elaborate set of dysfunctional beliefs that provided this reassurance. For example, the routine
practice of allowing men underground when a sealed panel was going through the explosive range
involved a sacrifice of safety. Shift production reports were prepared at a higher level in the
management structure than shift safety reports. Substantial financial incentives were paid for
production but none for the diligent management of catastrophic risk. This led to a situation where
safety did not pay for relevant decision makers (Hopkins (1999).
6.2.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
This capacity for an organisational ethos to morphogenically shape purposive dysfunctional
management behaviours and systems highlights the critical ability needed by management to
engage in assumption surfacing and verification to test for dangerous but entirely plausible mental
paradigms and persistent memes, both in management and operations. Such assumptions are often
the source of cycles of mistrust and subsequent autopoietic tendencies. Organisational cultures in
HROs need to be responsive to stakeholder concerns and inputs to avoid autopoietic responses to
a crisis. Power relationships, such as that engendered by fear and bullying, and direct and indirect
discrimination, need to be proactively and unambiguously driven from the workplace by the
dominant coalition to overcome tendencies to autopoiesis and to engender lower barriers to safety,
quality, productivity and innovation.
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6.2.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
In the early 1980s, only two years after joining the company, the CEO of Beech-Nut
Nutrition Corporation found evidence suggesting that the apple juice concentrate, supplied by the
company's vendors for use in Beech-Nut's "100% pure" apple juice, contained nothing more than
sugar water and chemicals. The CEO was under extraordinary pressure to tum the ailing company
around. Eliminating the inventory would have killed any hope of turning the $700,000 profit
promised to Beech-Nut's parent, Nestle.
A number of people in the corporation, it turned out, had doubted the purity of the juice for
several years before the CEO arrived. But the ethos created by the 25% price advantage offered by
the supplier of the bogus concentrate allowed operations to meet cost-control goals. When a
member of the research department voiced concerns about the juice to operating management, he
was accused of not being a team player and of acting like "Chicken Little." His judgment, his
supervisor wrote in an annual performance review, was "coloured by naivete and impractical
ideals."
This propensity to ignore the advice of front line operators and to label them as
'whistleblowers' or 'troublemakers' is present in every case examined in this research. It confirms
the premise of 'prior knowledge' developed by Turner (1976 and 1978) and more fully in Turner
and Pidgeon, (1997). No one else at Beech-Nut seemed to have considered the company's
obligations to its customers or to have thought about the potential harm of disclosure. No one
considered the fact that the sale of adulterated or misbranded juice is a legal offence, putting the
company and its top management at risk of criminal liability. In 1987, the company pleaded guilty
to selling adulterated and misbranded juice. Two years and two criminal trials later, the CEO
pleaded guilty to ten counts of mislabelling. The total cost to the company - including fines, legal
expenses, and lost sales - was an estimated $25 million.
Such errors reveal a culture that is insensitive or indifferent to ethical considerations, or one
that lacks effective organisational systems or is plainly focused on the 'bottom line'. The media
followed the somewhat similar cases examined in this research. For example, The Canberra Times
(Sat. Oct. 7, 1995) carried an article by Mike Taylor in which he states: 'The Seaview tragedy
claimed a dozen lives, the Monarch crash claimed seven lives. Based on evidence given to the
Commission of Inquiry into Seaview's relationship with the CAA and on the submissions of the
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Counsel assisting the Coronial Inquest into the Monarch crash, which occurred two years earlier,
the CAA had little to be proud of. What has become clear in the evidence given to both forums is
that a culture of distrust had evolved within the organisation - a culture borne of radical and poorly
targeted restructuring; a culture borne of jealousies and internecine warfare.'
The same phenomenon was evident in the Challenger disaster where a belief evolved that 0ring malfunction was normal and acceptable. This belief served to disguise the fact that safety was
being sacrificed so that launch schedules could be met. Safety did not pay in the Moura accident
data. Moura was not unusual in this respect: Bhopal and the Herald of Free Enterprise were two
other disasters where it seemed that safety did not pay for the integrity of relevant decision makers.
Whiteley (1999), identified eight markers of autopoietic organisations. Her eight factors are
important because they provide strong triangulation support for the observations deduced in this
research using a different research methodology (chapter 4, s4.8).
1. Conflict between organisational reality and the espoused organisational
environment.
2. Predisposed to stability and stable structures
3. Rules and Policies linked to stability
4. Hierarchical structure and decision-making
5. Tends to view the environment as stable and unchanging
6. Lack of openness to change
7. Ineffective focus of change
8. Staff, Knowledge and Communication

6.2.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS

Deficiencies within the culture of the CAA led to serious problems in airlines operating
regular public transport services not being addressed. For example CAA officers had known for
months that both Seaview and Monarch Airlines were cutting comers on aircraft maintenance and
it was also well known that each was in breach of regulations. The factors identified in the Seaview
crash as accident contributors were previously identified in the Monarch crash from which the CAA
appeared to have learned nothing. Its response after Monarch was to close itself off from scrutiny
as best it could. It behaved autopoietically and failed to incorporate the lessons of the Monarch
crash. The situation was so bad that the Minister split the organisation into two. The Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) was formed to handle safety, and Airservices Australia was formed to
handle commercial operations.
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The Longford and Lake Illawarra cases also demonstrated the dangers of disconnection
between espoused values and actual practice, particularly where priority of production constructs
dangerous paradigms.
The state of mind of the organisation and the way it sees itself at any particular time is
framed and constructed against the views its stakeholders believe the organisation values. This
ethos tends to percolate from the dominant coalition downwards. These coalitions place value on
certain artefacts, espouse certain beliefs, and behave according to a set of underlying assumptions
(mostly related to the priority of production). This drives their behaviour, which then acts as a
driver of organisational ethos. 'Prior knowledge' of accident conditions tends to be ignored when
there is a conflict between commercial priorities and a commitment to safety. It is imperative that
an organisational ethos must never be allowed to develop where safety is seen by the dominant
coalition as a cost item rather than an investment. Systems should be in place to manage crises so
that an incident becomes a learning experience, not a reason to withdraw. An accident is not a
reason to 'circle the wagons'; it is an opportunity to learn.
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6.3 Competency 7: Constructing a culture of safety ('intention '
to establish a culture of safety, &ways of seeing', and
persistent personal or organisational ideas - &memes'
influence the systemic capacities for managing safety)
6.3.1 I NTERPRETATION
Persistent ideas and ways of seeing can be readily understood if one grasps the concept of
the 'meme' (chapter 2, the literature review, section 2.10). The concept of a 'meme' is simply a
cultural equivalent to the biological entity called the 'gene'. In this cultural context it is applied to
persistent ideas which seem to survive in a particular communications niche, such as an
organisation (echoing 'the survival of the fittest'). Organisations can take on characteristics all their
own, and a relationship with the organisation develops which is 'parasocial' because it takes place
between constructed personalities - organisations and humans. We tend to seek out elements of
identity in the organisations we belong to and in which we work. The nature of parasocial
communications is always captured and understood through its ethos and through its memes.
'Meme' is a term coined by the Darwinian biologist Richard Dawkins (1976 and 1989) to describe
self-replicating cultural elements. Each of the organisations studied in this research failed in its
intention to value safety as a persistent way of seeing and consequently set itself up for catastrophic
failure by not understanding the powerful memes at work that subvert safety.
Turner and Pidgeon (1997:49) point out that, 'A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing.' A
problem defined may well mask an unseen problem. The clarifying factor is the extent to which
assumptions about the 'way of seeing' are embedded in the psyche of the organisation and
reinforced by the language and values used to transmit them, which in tum points to the distinctive
relationship that exists between autopoiesis and memes. For example, where a culture is
attempting to preserve the status quo based on patterns of shared assumptions that are based on
the need for feelings of security and internal equilibrium, these 'ways of seeing' can be conveyed,
in covert and overt communications and mantras that act as instructions embedded in human
brains (Blackmore, 1999; Brodie, 1996) Examples of these 'ways of seeing' include:

• "That's just a matter of opinion." - devaluing others views reinforces the idea that
'we know best. So we will not entertain perturbating 'ways of seeing'.
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•

"What would they know anyway." - diminishes the experience of others.

•

"We do it this way for the sake of consistency." - it saves confrontations and
thinking.

The following descriptors all share a common thread. They point to aspects of the state of
mind, mental stance, or habitus, of the organisation and the way it sees itself at any particular time.
They are memetic constructions/instructions, and they are suggestive that an individual in an
organisation is parasocially influenced by others, who are themselves influenced parasocially by the
organisation and its perceived values (not its espoused values). Every new idea coming into an
organisation is weighed against the views the organisation is perceived to value and is embraced or
rejected accordingly. For example, action plans and administrative procedures; modes and quality
of communication and constraints on upward communication; attitudes such as contempt for
regulations, the disinterest and failure to train and retrain that causes failure of organisational
memory; the failure to provide a safe environment and the failure to capture and utilise critical
hazard related information; the malaise that under-utilises expertise, are all organisation specific
and come about because of the carriage and influence of memes. The descriptors that follow in
Table 6.3.1 are related to the construction of a culture of safety and its failure.

action plan, administrative procedures, communication, complex management system,
compliance, contempt for regulations, cultural attitude to regulation, failure of organisational memory,
failure to provide safe environment, failure to utilise information, first order attribution of cause,
hierarchy of knowledge, incident reporting system, knowledge management, lessons from previous
accidents, maintenance documentation, post hoc forensic recording, motivation, pseudopsychology,
resolute intervention, self congratulatory discourse, shared beliefs - memes, under-utilised expertise,
u ward communication

This organisational 'state of mind' or 'attitudinal stance' tends to percolate from the
dominant coalition downwards. This process is usually in the form of a self-propagating idea,
phrase, 'meme', or manner of thinking that circulates from person to person, so that all
perceptions and cognitive processes are to some extent shaped and filtered by this way of thinking
or 'ethos'. It is unlikely that dysfunctional management will result in a well balanced, sound ethos.

6.3.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
The factors revealed in examining this competency are diagnostic of the state of mind of the
organisation and the way it sees itself. Ideas are weighed against the perceptions people believe the
organisation values. This organisational cognitive consistency or 'state of mind' is shaped by the
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dominant coalition. These values take on the force of self-propagating ideas, phrases, 'memes', or
manner of thinking that spiral outward and downward from person to person and all perceptions
and cognitive processes are to some extent shaped and filtered by this way of thinking or 'ethos'.
The collection of images, ideas, examples and actions that managers draw upon becomes the
substance of their managerial repertoire. Organisations having an ethos with poor ethics
(competency one) , poor judgement (competency four) and dysfunctional cognitive capabilities
(competency five) are unlikely to construct and maintain a culture of safety.
Competency 6, ethos, is a necessary antecedent to the capacity to construct a culture of
safety (competency 7), which in tum is dependent on psychological balance (competency 5),
judgement (competency 4) , vigilance (competency 3), capacity for foresight (competency 2), and
the ethics of the organisation's dominant coalition (competency 1). Each of these high reliability
competencies is connected in practical terms in that they build on one another, and by the
interplay of the theories of habitus, memes, autopoiesis, reflective practice, and prior knowledge.
The salient thread connecting all of these core competencies is 'communication and
messaging in an organisational setting', which can frame assumptions that then guide actions and
decisions regarding constructing a habitus of safety. Certain messages persist and take on and make
sense of assumption sets. For example, 'the cultural attitude to regulation' is an echo of the
problems we saw in the competency dealing with ethos, (competency 6), and with the need for
foresight, (competency two) , and with vigilance, (competency three). The following data also
illustrates the strong relationship of this competency with ethics, competency one.

6.3.3 ASKI NG GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
To examine and tum around an organisation's 'ways of seeing' in regard to safety one needs
to ask diagnostic questions, particularly those that point to relationships with other competencies.
For example :
1. Is there conflict between organisational reality and the espoused organisational
environment? Does the organisation preserve the status quo whilst espousing new values? Are the
new values, such as putting safety first, modelled at the level of the dominant coalition? Is there
evidence that management values provoke conflicting drivers such as operational efficiency and
customer relationships which tend to be elitist, when the dominant coalition espouses
collaboration?
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2. Is the organisation predisposed to stability and stable structures? Has it constructed stable
structures and implemented quality systems which don't fundamentally change the way it does
things, which then results in making the organisation more rigid and less flexible? Is its structure
layered and inappropriate to its purpose with rigid staff classifications?
3. Are its rules and policies linked to stability or the flexibility needed to 'detect safety
signals'? Is the organisation inclined to introduce systems, rules and procedures to enhance
predictability? Has it gone too far by moving towards autopoiesis from a chaos environment or is
there, perhaps, a strong push to 'standardise procedures'?
4. What is the relationship and impact of the organisation on its staff, acquired knowledge
and communication? For example, if it is an autopoietic organisation is there evidence that makes it
clear that it does not perceive its impact on staff, customers and other stakeholders.

6.3.4 LITERATURE
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research reveals that there was a conflict
between commercial priorities and a commitment to safety. This resulted in an organisational
culture where safety was seen by the dominant coalitions as a cost item rather than an investment.
Perhaps one of the clearest examples was the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Directorate of Aviation
Safety Regulation (DASR) head, George Macionis, who was quoted in the media reacting to events
(the Monarch, MiG-15, and Nomad crashes, and the new air traffic control configurations that
lowered possible intersect conflicts between light and commercial aircraft, known as TAAATS [The
Australian Advanced Air Traffic System] and AMATS [Airspace Management and Air Traffic
Services]). He said that the CAA would compartmentalise the safety-related compartments into one
compartment. His language, strategies and assumptions all subverted the construction of an
organisational ethos needed to ensure safety. Organisational culture can not be deliberately
compartmentalised at a CEO's whim or directive. Marcionis' solution is no solution since it would
guarantee

to bury the problems under even deeper layers of bureaucracy. The press claimed at the

time that the CAA demonstrated how some of these 'compartments' were failing safety (monitoring
and surveillance), even to the point of describing the CAA as 'out of control'.
Several orthodox writers in organisational and management theory are concerned about its
language (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Griffin, Shaw and Stacey, 1998; Zohar and Marshall, 1994),
which has been characterised as mechanistic, rational, transactional, if-then, controlling, and also
that the language used plays an active part in shaping a world in its own image (Morgan, 1986;
Hayles, 1994; Black, 1962). This is significant because the language of an organisation can amplify
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or mitigate memes. It requires little imagination to visualise the effect on an organisation of the
meme for 'priority of production' amplified, for example, by the organisational and management
theories suggested by Sun Tzu in the 'Art of War' (Clavell, 1910, 1981; Hou, Sheang, and Hidajat,
1991). Meme theory suggests that dangerous pathogenic messages can survive in certain conditions
(organisations) and alter meanings sufficiently to reconstruct human behaviour compliant with
these robust messages. Under such conditions ethical behaviour can be severely compromised.
This view is congruent with that of Schein (1993) who says we can simplify the notion of
organisational culture by looking at three levels - firstly its artefacts, the visible behaviours and
processes such as language, socialisation rules, documents and office layouts - the things you first
notice when you first enter an organisation. Secondly, its espoused beliefs, the stated strategies, the
purpose, and its philosophies - often traceable back to the founder or CEO of the organisation.
Thirdly, the underlying assumptions which drive behaviour, the unconscious, taken-for-granted
values and perceptions which are always there but rarely considered because 'that's the way it's
always done around here'. Each of these were found to be dysfunctional in the cases that follow.

6.3.5 CASE TEXT DATA
Examples of memetic dysfunction (dysfunctional instructions embedded in the
organisational brain) are evident in the case data that follows, (Blackmore, 1999). One organisation
saw itself as immune from accidents (as in the Longford case). Another set about confusing
individual memory of an accident by evoking memes and demonstrating that organisational
cultures mirror the neurotic state of mind of the organisation's top executives (in the Westralia
case).
Paradoxically, orthodox management and administrative procedures often contribute to the
dangerous meme set in an organisation's communications network because they do not adequately
explain and illuminate critical high reliability communications issues such as assumption surfacing
and the consequential organisational 'state of mind'. They do not recognise unexamined
assumptions because they are memetic (virus-like) and largely invisible. Procedures that place
administrative reliance on manuals, for example, can lead to a sequence of misinformation where
prior knowledge is not utilised because it does not appear in the manual, or it is in the manual and
not implemented. This was seen in the Esso Gas Plant accident at Longford. The Commission
(Dawson, 1999) points to the problems of management working from a set of seriously deficient
and erroneous orthodox assumptions which proved be pathogenic. The Commission observed
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that: 'Reliance placed by Esso on its OIMS for the safe operation of the plant was misplaced.' The
Commission observed that the accident on 25 September 1998 demonstrated that important
components of Esso's orthodox system of management were either defective or not implemented.
Paragraph 13.42 of the Longford Royal Commission Report (Dawson, 1999) goes on to say:
[communication,
knowledge
management,
adm i n istrative
LONGFORD
procedures, documentation, fai l ure to utilise i nformation, fai l ure to uti lise
i nformation learned from previous accidents] 13.42. If the i mplementation of
OIMS by Esso was to be measured by the adequacy of its operating procedures,
they were deficient and fai led to conform with the ECI U pstream Guidelines or
with the OIMS Systems Man ual . If it was to be measured by reference to the
actions and decisions of those persons who were attem pting to resolve the
process upsets on 2 5 September 1 998, they were also deficient. The deficiencies
were in the manner i n which Esso dealt with the acquisition and retention of
knowledge. This i nvolved its trai ning system, its operating procedures, its
documentation and data system , and its com m u n ication system. (Report of the
Longford Royal Comm ission. 1999 p200)

Esso management had clearly identified what sort of orthodox risk assessment management
needed to be done at Longford. As the Commission points out, they were either not implemented
or were defective.
It ought to have been obvious through the Longford plant's knowledge management system
that separate procedures were required under normal circumstances and in a period of change.
For example, paragraphs 13.46-48 of the Longford Royal Commission report show that 'planned
hazard prevention' was addressed in a range of orthodox operating procedural manuals and
knowledge management requirements. However, many of these were simply not implemented or
were defective if they were:
LONGFORD [knowledge management, hazard identification] 13.46

The
highest level requi red planned hazard identification and risk assess ment to take
place in various circumstances . These assessments embraced Periodic Risk
Assess ments (PRAs) which were to take place at i ntervals specified by RAMS;
Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) which were detai led risk studies carried
out as needed to assess specific major hazard risks; and triggered risk
assessments which were scenario-based assess ments prompted by the
happening of particular events.
13.47 At the next level there were hazard identification techniques to be used
by employees and management in the course of operations. These i ncluded the
use of check l i sts, analyses based upon the q uestion "what if?" and hazard and
operability (HAZOP) studies, either prospective or retrospective, cond ucted when
the need appeared to identify particular hazards i nvolved in the operation of the
plants.
13.48 At the lowest level there were hazard identification "tools" to be used by
operators to identify hazards and m itigate risk on a daily basis. These tools, or
tech niques, pri mari ly comprised "step back 5 x 5' (stepping back 5 paces and
pausing for five minutes to reflect upon l i kely hazards) and task analysis. (Report
of the Longford Royal Com mission. 1999:201-202)
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The orthodox knowledge management system failed. The issue is not one of the existence of
the tools needed to ensure safety but an enduring mental model that subverted the use of these
tools.
This theme echoes the primary premise of this thesis suggested by Turner (1976 and 1978)
and Turner and Pidgeon, (1997) that prior knowledge exists within and organisation and if heeded
could prevent accidents, for disasters are eminently preventable. For example, the Moura accident
was found by the Commission of Inquiry to be a 'carbon copy' of previous accidents (Braithwaite
1985:34-8). Curiously the organisation concerned was also BHP. For example, the Moura No.2
underground coal mine explosion occurred because vital information was rendered ineffective,
both by an inadequate information processing system (failure of prior knowledge in particular) and
by a culture that neutralised it. The culture systematically discredited indicators that something
might be wrong (Hopkins, 1999).
The Commission found that if BHP had learnt and applied the lessons of those earlier
disasters the most recent in the series would not have occurred. If BHP had attended to the lessons
of earlier coal mine explosions, eleven men would not have lost their lives at Moura in 1994. The
lessons of Moura must be learnt once and for all, so that this totally avoidable industrial carnage
stops.
Clearly there was no enduring intention to manage safety at Moura and in the Longford
example, and here lies the central focus of this competency. Critical HAZOP exercises would have
been diligently carried out if the organisation took safety seriously. BHP has a long record of such
accidents. One of the four workers seriously burnt in a gas explosion, at BHP Billiton's iron plant in
Port Hedland on 19 May, 2004, died in Royal Perth Hospital with bums to his lungs and 95 per
cent of his body. Hours after the gas explosion, a 19-year-old Westrac apprentice died from head
injuries at the company's mine site near Newman when he was struck by heavy equipment. Another
worker was killed earlier in May at the company's Nelson Point facility. Earlier, the Iron Baron had
foundered off the Tasmanian coast, spilling hundreds of tons of oil and threatening wildlife.
This disconjunction between espoused values and actual practice is always diagnostic of
underlying persistent ideas (memes) about how things should be done in an organisation. Hopkins
(1999) suggests the whole problem can be summed up as one of organisational inattention. The
attention of the organisation was simply not focused on the control of catastrophic risk. It is not
difficult to detect these latent pathogens during a rigorous audit. What presents to the
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organisational consultant or psychologist is evidence of actual hazard management practices. These
can be examined for memes. It is also possible to make a clear connection between organisation
attitudes, actual practice and the role of the regulator. The regulator (even an internal one) should
have resolutely intervened and insisted on these prospective HAZOP procedures being carried out.
Hopkins (1999) observes that such organisations:
. . . must be rigorously audited to ensure that they are working as intended.
Auditors must find ways of pulling the triggers to see if what is intended to
happen really does happen. Moreover, someone must audit the auditors to
ensure that they are doing their job thoroughly. There is an important role here
for the inspectorate. Inspectorates must also be willing to enforce the
requirements of safety management plans and be prepared to prosecute when
they find serious cases of non-compliance with plans that are supposed to be in
operation.

The problem is confounded by administrative procedures set up to deal with change that
simultaneously focus on the 'bottom line'. There is an echo here of Turner's (1976 and 1978) and
Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) premise that risk is increased in an atmosphere where the 'priority of
production' supersedes concern for safety. Soucek (1993) makes the point that different
circumstances require different competencies. The following paragraphs from the Longford Royal
Commission Report (1999: 13.65-68) suggest that risk assessment procedures based on orthodox
management principles do not prevent accidents. They make the point that change (both long
term and short term) requires a risk assessment of the change and it is management's responsibility
to ensure that such a risk assessment encompasses change itself and the consequences of change.
It should be diagnostic of potential hazards that organisational memory does not inform situational
risk accompanied by change.
LONGFORD (administrative procedures, change can result in invalidation of prior

risk assessments] 13.65. Attached to and forming part of Element 7 was Essa's
Management of Change Philosophy dated August 1993 (the philosophy). In the
philosophy, Esso recognised that change was "necessary and desirable" as part of
the operation of a facility but also recognised that "changes potentially invalidate
prior risk assessments and can create new risks, if not managed diligently".
[ risk assessment requirements specified] 13.66. The philosophy contained
management of change procedures to be followed in undertaking, amongst other
things, any modification or addition to an existing facility. These procedures
required any permanent change to an existing facility to be accompanied by a
risk assessment of the change, consistent with the procedures in OIMS Element 2,
"Risk assessment and management". The primary purpose of such an assessment
was to determine the impact of the proposed change on the safe operation of the
facility.
[ risk factors not converted into operational procedures and also masked by
'management speak'] 13.67. However, OIMS Element 2 did not identify any
procedures for risk assessment associated with management of change. The only
reference to this topic was in the following terms: "Production Technology
operates within a management of change procedure which is consistent with the
EAL management of change philosophy."
[espoused values subverted by poor compliance, contempt for regulations,
cultural attitude to regulation, failure of organisational memory, failure to
provide safe environment, failure to utilise information,] 13.68. Moreover, Esso
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management neither made any attempt to define the breadth or scope of any risk
assessment study to be undertaken to comply with management of change
procedures - OIMS Element 7 (Management of change) nor OIMS Element 2 (Risk
assessment and management) (Report of the Longford Royal Commission. 1999)

The critical organisational change process occurring at the time of the accidents did not
seem to be taken into account in relation to safety. Slavic (1973) cautions against overconfidence.
It seems that BHP-Essa's management were otherwise preoccupied. BHP understood the paradox
that change increases risk and at the same time invalidates any prior risk assessment. In spite of all
the lessons learned, risk is situation specific. Reason (1991) made this clear in Human Error when
he observed that managers should not ignore the situation-related factors. This is discussed in
more detail in the next competency, which examines how we might better understand the salience
of the particular situation and its context (awareness of organisational and incident factors peculiar
to particular hazardous environments)
Manipulation of memes is all too easily accomplished by the dominant coalition in an
organisation, particularly in the immediate aftermath of an accident. Paragraphs 51 and 52 of the
Westralia inquiry point to the capacity for behaviour after a catastrophe to be both autopoietic and
have the ability to shape witness and employee behaviour through very subtle meme-based
manipulation. All that is needed is the ability to confuse or cloud individual memory by evoking
resonating appeals to prior meme-based triggers such as 'loyalty' to the service. The level of
psychological skill needed to do this is minimal. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) suggests that
organisational configurations (cultures) seem to broadly mirror the psychodynamic neurotic
configuration of the top executives. So if top executives feel the need to mask their own errors or
role in causing or contributing to a preventable accident, this is one tool at their disposal. It is
subtle and can be seen at work in the Westralia case ((Department of Defence, 1999) in the
debriefings that occurred after the accident where evidence was possibly contaminated.
WESTRALIA [pseudopsychology, motivation, self-congratulatory discourse,
shared beliefs post-hoc forensic recording] 5 1. An informal 'de-fusing' was
undertaken through the CO addressing the ship's company on return to Fleet
Base West on the evening of the incident. An information session was conducted
for the whole ship's company at STI RLING on 6 May, and group 'de-briefing' was
conducted at STIRLING on 7 and 8 May. This de-briefing focused on each
individual's recounting of their activities and was done in groups of about 30
personnel who had shared similar experiences on the day. The feedback from
ship's company was mostly favourable, although some felt it was of little use and
others attended against their will.
52. There was some suggestion that de-briefing conducted before personnel had
had the opportunity to record their recollection of events, may have exacerbated
the process of 'contamination' of evidence that can occur through witnesses
discussing matters among themselves. (Westralia Executive Summary plO)
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There is a strong attitudinal element running through much of the material coded from the
various commissions of inquiry. These extracts continually point to a cultural attitude to
regulations, as is evident in the Westralia data in paragraph 61 of the inquiry. The 'errors' referred
to in paragraphs 51 and 52 above involve an attitude to regulations that had been subverted by a
'she'll be right' meme. Whatever brought about the acceptance of inventory acquisition outside
regulations had evolved with implicit permission from higher up in the chain of command or it
would not have occurred.
WESTRALIA [cultural attitude to regulations] 61. The new flexible fuel hoses were
fitted by a subcontractor to ADI Limited during March and April 98. The flexible
fuel hose change to the main engines was a configuration change which
bypassed the prescribed processes. It was not approved by appropriate
authorities and did not comply with Lloyd's Register of Shipping requirements.
(Westralia Executive Summary p11)

The RAN later placed the blame for the faulty hose with the contractor. It seems to have
escaped their notice that if ordinary Naval regulations had been complied with the accident would
not have happened, because the contractor would have supplied to specifications.
Memetic dysfunction evident in the case data illustrates that organisational cultures mirror
the neurotic state of mind of the organisation's top executives and that orthodox management and
administrative procedures often contribute to the dangerous meme set. Critical assumptions can be
ignored and unexamined when invisible, virus like, memes shape an organisation's 'way of seeing'.
Commission reports into fatal accidents point to the problems of management working from a set
of seriously deficient and erroneous orthodox assumptions, which proved be pathogenic, resulting
in a range of dysfunctional behaviours such as, prior knowledge not being utilised, and implicit
permission from dominant coalitions that it is acceptable to bypass safety regulations. People and
evidence can also be manipulated by dominant coalitions who have the authority and influence to
evoke memes, such as the 'loyalty meme', so top executives can mask their own errors or role in
causing or contributing to a preventable accident, and pass the accident off as 'systemic failure'.
6.3.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
An

organisation's 'way of seeing' determines its capacity to construct a culture of safety. A

range of limiting factors related to an organisation's propensity to autopoiesis can be detected in
its values and behaviour. These subversive factors can be diagnosed by analysing the organisation's
meme content along with its espoused and actual behaviour along several specific dimensions.
Once diagnosed these factors can be turned around to enable the organisation to construct a
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culture of safety. It is an error of interpretation of orthodox management principles to attempt to
construct a 'culture of safety' simply by imposing change. It becomes apparent in analysing the case
reports above that accidents were associated with organisations in a 'process of change'. Blackmore
(1999) pointed out that dysfunctional instructions can be embedded in the organisational brain,
and that the configuration, or way of seeing', an organisation adopts is largely a mirror of its
dominant coalition. Therefore, the key to high reliability and safety appears to be to purposively
configure an appropriately focused 'safety' culture, rather than simply change organisational
structures (which most organisations call 'change'). Changing structure amplifies complexity as
problem elements of an organisation simply change their geography, and do so under pressure which itself tends to further complicate factors related to safety; signalling the need for
management to be even more vigilant and focused on safety, and

guard

against unexamined

assumptions entering the organisation as memes that may mirror their own neuroses.

6.3.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Organisational failure extends into the most sophisticated of high reliability organisations.
For example, it was reported on the internet on June 8, 2004, that such were the worries about the
Beagle mission to Mars, ahead of its launch, that one leading member of the European Space
Agency (ESA) said that he had wondered whether it might have been better cancelled. Professor
David Southwood, Director of Space Science at ESA, said the inquiry had found that "no single
event led to failure and no single individual made a bad decision. However, failure was institutional
(systemic). We were working in a system which wasn't right, where the organisational structures
weren't right, and people didn't have the right level of empowerment, authority or resource."
Professor Southwood30 had absorbed the dominant coalition's meme of the priority of a
launch deadline. When he started his job in the summer of 2001, he examined the Beagle 2 project
and initially decided that it should not take place at all. "By the autumn I had accepted (the meme)
that Beagle was going to go," he said. "Maybe I should never have accepted that. But frankly I
would have had to have been a different person for me to take that final decision."

30
http: / /science. newsfactor.com/ story.xhtm l?story_title=Organizational-Fa i l u res-To-Blame-forLoss-of- Beagle---- l nq ui ry&story_id = 2 4 1 9 l&category= in nv
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As in the NASA example above, other examples serve to confirm the case data findings. In
the Westralia case the Coroner found that the accident was preventable. The Kursk accident was
found to be the result of a failure to construct a culture of safety. The Russian Navy conducted its
affairs with complete disregard to prior knowledge and ethics in an environment that mirrored the
values of its dominant coalition.
6.3.7.1

Westralia Coronial Inquiry

When Western Australian Coroner Alistair Hope released the findings from the WA
CORONERS INQUEST - HMAS WESTRALIA FIRE, in December 2003.3 1 he severely censured the
Navy for ignoring expert advice, using wrong procedures which bypassed safety checks, and not
adequately monitoring work carried out by defence firm ADI (Australian Defence Industries). ADI
later faced charges that it contravened section 19(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety
(Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991. 32 Coroner Hope said the tragedy could have been
avoided.
These behaviours are all characteristic of 'ways of seeing' and point to a culture where
'safety' is espoused at the 'senior officer' level but needs to be reconstructed at this level so that the
necessary values are transmitted as positive memes to the workface rather than the ambiguous
ones seen in the research data. Safety can not be consistently constructed through issuing orders. It
has to be a 'top-down' value set.
The Naval Board inquiry gave the impression that Midshipman Megan Pelly, 22, had
disobeyed a lawful command when she ran into the engine room at the time of the blaze, had
panicked and "contributed to her own demise". However, Coroner Alistair Hope ruled that Pelly
and the three other sailors were ordered into the engine room and died in circumstances where
they faced great danger while trying to save the ship and their fellow navy personnel. One can only
construe that the Naval Board was more intent on reducing damage and embarrassment to the
Navy than in providing an accurate assessment of what happened on the ship.

31
The WA Coroner convened an inquest at the West Australian Coroners' Court on April 28, 2003 to
enquire into new evidence which was alleged to have emerged following the Board of Inquiry. This coronial
inquest was separate from the Board of I nquiry (BOI) conducted in 1998 by the Navy. Several legal matters
arose in connection with the fire on HMAS Westralia on 5 May 1998, including Commonwealth v ADI Limited,
a claim in tort, contract and under the provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974.
32 WA Court Of Petty Sessions, Friday, 27 February, 2004. (Comcare, Australian Government, Feb.
2004)
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The Bulletin, (Bell, 2003), reported that 'there were concerted attempts by Navy personnel
to deliberately withhold key information from the BOI, sufficient to suggest that the inquiry itself
was little more than a sham.' He reports that a four-year investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the fire, and the inquiry into it, uncovered the following developments:
* A second former crew member of the Westralia has clai med she was
encouraged to with hold i nformation from the BOI if asked about the nature of her
work on flexible fuel l i nes the night before the ship sai led. This work had
i nvolved bending the hoses back and forth.
* A retired former warrant officer has claimed that in order to reassure crew
members that their bending of the hoses had not caused the fire, the navy
secretly made a video showing a length of flexible hose being bent back and
forth and then passing a pressure test.

Bell (2003) points out that although flexible hoses should never have been fitted to the
Westralia, no mention was made in any BOI evidence that crew members had been bending the
hoses back and forth or in half in an attempt to fix the Westralia's fuel leaks the night before it
sailed. The Coronial inquiry found that former RAN marine technician Melissa Munday claimed she
was told by a senior officer to lie to the BOI if she was asked about attempting to fix the leaking
fuel lines or using shifting spanners to carry out that work. When asked if she had told the truth to
the board of inquiry, she replied: "No I did not. We were told if the ADI lawyers ask you if you
worked on the fuel line, to say no because we were unqualified. If you are asked if you used
shifting spanners to repair the leaks, say no. I was told to keep my mouth shut about [the fact that]
the fuel lines that burst were the ones that we all had a go at bending backwards and forwards. 'Be
careful what you say', we were told both individually and as a group. We were told not to say too
much about the fuel lines, or anything that wouldn't look good. ''We were told that we had to keep
in mind that the RAN was who we were working for and we were told the Navy had to be looked
after" (Bulletin, Vol 121 :20).
Curiously, in spite of this and other witness testimony, the Coroner found no evidence that
the Navy had misled a board of inquiry (BOI) or pressured witnesses to lie. However, such witness
statements and other revelations made at the Coronial Inquiry tends to confirm the research
finding that the meme responsible for acceptance of inventory acquisition outside regulations had
pathogenically evolved with implicit permission from higher up in the chain of command or it
would not have occurred. The Navy pleaded 'systemic failure', however, implicit permission from
individual senior officers created the attitude that it was acceptable to bypass safety regulations. It
also confirms theoretical views, such as Kets de Vries and Miller (1984), who suggests that
organisational configurations (cultures) broadly mirror the psychodynamic neurotic configuration
of the top executives. So if top executives feel the need to mask their own errors or role in causing
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or contributing to a preventable accident, they have the authority, influence and motivation to do
so.
Severe consequences followed this accident. One of the people giving evidence to the
Coronial Inquiry was the mother of Matthew Liddell, aged 29, a survivor of the Westralia fire who
committed suicide. Dulcie Liddell said her son, a marine technician who suffered smoke inhalation
in the fire, later suffered severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. This death and
others prompted a Senate inquiry into military justice and mistreatment of Australian Defence
Force personnel after The Australian published a series of stories on military suicides last year
(Meade, 2004).

6.3.7.2 The Kursk
Another salient example of failure to construct a culture of safety where the subsequent 'way
of seeing' resulted in an organisation's safety culture being subverted by its dominant coalition is
the sinking of the Russian submarine, the Kursk which sank in the Barents Sea on the 12 of August
2000 as the result of two explosions. 118 men were lost. Christine Middap (2000) reported that the
context of the accident is set against a long history of cultural malaise in the Russian Navy. The
ability of the crew to deal with emergencies was questioned after evidence of drug use among
sailors, lack of navy training and theft of military equipment. In November 1999 an admiral and
several senior officers were charged with selling warships for personal profit. Others had sold
warships for scrap metal. In one incident conscripts on an island in the Far East starved to death
when their rations failed to arrive. It is reported that conditions on Russian ships are so bad that it
is common for seamen to sell vital operating equipment to survive. The issue of compliance and
other competencies, such as prior knowledge and ethics are also clearly at play in this in this
incident.
Middap also suggested that rescue submersibles rely on second-hand batteries. Her
important claim in terms of this research is that authorities were aware of this when they steadfastly
refused the offer of high-tech Western equipment for rescue of the sailors. Russian Navy officials
admitted that batteries on one of the unmanned rescue vessels, the Priz, last for only two hours
even though a single rescue operation takes four or five hours. The rescue submersibles were fitted
with old batteries for reasons of economy. The Priz almost succeeded in locking on but had to
return immediately to the surface because its batteries were flat.'
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This mishap further demonstrates the central tenets (managerial failure to address prior
knowledge, competencies, compliance) of the thesis' argument. It also signals the critical nature of

ethical practices in hazard situations. Navy officials were prone to unethical behaviour in which
they exercised scant concern for the welfare of their sailors and lied about the time that the
accident occurred and then spent the next week offering conflicting accounts, half truths and long
silences (McMahon, 2000). The Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, denied responsibility, would not
accept outside help, blamed a collision with another vessel for the accident, and persisted with a
line of secrecy and misinformation while men died at the bottom of the ocean (tapping was heard
from inside the hull for two days - Monday 12 and Tuesday 14).
These examples triangulate well with the research findings indicating the characteristics of
such cultures (for example, the Royal Australian Navy, and BHP and its subsidiaries) that exhibit a
dysfunctional 'way of seeing', discussed in the Literature and Case Text Data sections of this
competency. However, these factors can be turned around to create a culture of safety if properly
diagnosed early enough.

6.3.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that even in healthy
cultures there is a tendency to 'blame and shame' which ignores the fact that failures often arise
from levels of complexity that human beings cannot cope with rather than irresponsibility or
wickedness. The research revealed that many individuals and organisations simply cannot
assimilate and apply the vast amounts of technical knowledge they may need, and regulatory
demands may just add to the knowledge burden. Fox and Das (2000) suggest that this accounts for
the increasing interest in 'decision support', 'workflow' and other computer technologies to help
deliver complex services.
Another compelling perspective to emerge from the data is that the greater the pressure on
'performance' the more demotivated and likely to habituate hazards front line operational staff
become. Sennett (1998) re-iterates the critical importance of people working within an
organisation, and identifies the 'performance versus loyalty' paradox. He suggests that
organisations offering less loyalty to their workforce, while depending on their ever increasing
productivity, face managing a workforce demotivated and alienated by the environment within the
organisation.
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Relatively stable government oganisations such as the CAA and the Australian Navy are
particularly prone to the development and persistence of memes, many of which are dangerous
and destructive. It is possible to identify and replace dangerous memes, provided they are
recognised and the impetus comes from the dominant coalition. However, the literature suggests it
is just this group which is usually the source of the most dangerous memes and is most persistent
in holding on to them (Blackmore, 1999). Memes are most easily detected and audited in the
communications and corporate symbols which characterise an organisation.
Deeply entrenched memes are most clearly revealed during periods of change (Blackmore,
1999; Brodie, 1996; Dennet, 1993). Change forces an organisation to rediscover its foundations.
The elaboration to structure and form becomes more pronounced the further up the structure one
goes. The carriage of memes into daily operational usage directly subverts examination of
assumptions and therefore the capacity to examine organisational foundations. This results in
superficial change, where only the names on the doors are changed.
Organisational memes make it difficult to make the deep cultural changes to values, which
are essential to tum around unsafe organisations. To remind the reader of one of the examples of
memes discussed in the Literature Review, language such as 'that's how we do things here' is a
simple phrase but a deadly meme with a powerful cultural force acting as a direct counter to the
examination of core assumptions. Such memes signal a persistence of vision or way of seeing the
world of the organisation. The fact that such mindsets are reinforced by orthodox management
practices renders them particularly difficult to unravel. Insiders are often blind to these factors
because they are immersed in them.
While working as a management consultant the researcher became aware of many phrases
which have memetic force and signal cultural malaise in an organisation. These phrases signal
acceptance of unexamined assumptions and fear. They get in the way of thinking and learning.
They prefigure resistance to change, uncertainty about the future, dislike for fellow employees,
mistrust of authority, and distrust of outsiders, and are therefore strongly diagnostic. The CAA for
example, did not like or trust the government, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the
Airlines, or the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, nor did it welcome public scrutiny. It tended to
close itself off from these stakeholders. Examples of corrosive phrases often found in the
communications channels of organisations such as the CAA are:
"We've always done it this way."
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"It's too expensive."
"Not in the budget."
"Realistically ... "
"In principle I agree, but... "
"Too much paperwork."
"It's not our policy."
"This needs more study."
"They won't do anything about it anyway."
"They don't care."
"They don't want to know."
"We have enough complications already."
"There are no clear answers."
"That's just a matter of opinion."
" What would they know anyway."
" We do it this way for the sake of consistency."
" Redundancy is built in."

6.4 Conclusion
This chapter suggests that if dysfunctional managerial behaviour is allowed to shape the
habitus of a high reliability organisation by subverting the 'intention' or capacity to establish a
culture of safety, then the organisation will evolve dysfunctional 'ways of seeing', and allow the
introduction of dangerous persistent ideas - 'memes' - that will mitigate the organisation's systemic
capacities for managing safety. It will result in disabling an ethos of safety, if one already exists, and
it will subvert the creation of such an ethos, thereby reducing its hazard management capabilities.
Creation of such a habitus or culture, reinforced by immobilising self preservation memes, will
drive the organisation to close itself off from its stakeholders.
A culture or ethos of safety does not appear by happenstance or government legislation. It is
constructed and nurtured by the dominant coalition and shaped over time by example and deep
and enduring cultural values. Turning around a workforce lacking in trust, commitment, and
stability becomes a critical priority for managers of organisations where safety should be
paramount. The implication for meme management and the management of dysfunctional and
often autopoietic organisational configurations becomes critical in high reliability organisations.
However, it must begin with the dominant coalition because the messages and the morphology are
connected and shape the organisation's capacity to perform its core function.
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7 Capacity to Perform
'We make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon and the stars, as if we were
villains by necessity, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance.'
Shakespeare, King Lear, Actl Scene2

7. 1 Introduction
This chapter examines the set of competencies considered most relevant to managerial
capacity to perform in high reliability organisations. As in the two previous chapters it adopts the
framework of the modified grounded theory approach set out in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Data
Analysis chapter: interpretation of the concept as it is used in this research followed by a
consideration of the relationships between the competency under consideration and the other key
competencies. The chapter then poses a set of generative questions and a review of the literature
salient to the concept and complementary to the main literature review in chapter 2. An
elaboration of the insights revealed to theory is attempted and other data from the research is then
used to ground the theory. Finally a hypothesis based on the issues revealed by the research is
suggested.
This chapter emphasies the managerial need to understand the salience of a particular
situation rather than have a generic, 'off the shelf approach to hazard management. It also
identifies the need to perform in a particular setting and the capacity to bring together skills from
different areas of expertise. The capacity to adapt and adapt again, and the need to value intuition
are central to the capacity to perform. Mitroff and Linstone (1993) capture this notion when they
observe that military planners are prone to anticipating future strategies and tactics without
considering how the enemy will adapt to minimise the effectiveness of those strategies. This is the
problem-solution, one step process, that is congruent with the human tendency to simplify. It fails
to anticipate the problems that result from the original solutions.
The issue of trust in one's intuition, as well as that of others such as front line workers, is
critical to understanding the competencies outlined in this chapter. Siu (1978) said that the, 'does
it add up?, 'does it sound OK?, and 'does it feel right?' questions CEOs pose for themselves can not
be adequately addressed by rational or scientific knowledge. Only intuition can properly address
the second and third questions. Siu's proposition is more profound than first appears. This begins
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with experiential brain patterning, which then becomes an operational schemata, accessed by a
huge index established through expertise, using intuition. It is far more than a hunch because each
person with operational experience in anything has a unique set of patterns that informs his or her
intuition in a crisis (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993). It's relevance for the following three competencies
is that front line expertise in unbounded, unstructured hazardous situations that don't present as
problems that have clearly structured solutions, may be largely unconscious and should not be
discounted by managers. Operational intuition should be valued. Competencies that are salient to
the situation, appropriate to the setting, and bring together a multidisciplinary schemata of
problem solving perceptions may not be available to central office dominant coalitions.

7.2 Competency 8:

Understanding the salience

particular situation

and

its

of the

context (awareness

of

organisational and incident factors peculiar to particular
hazardous environments)
7.2.1 INTERPRETATION
Salience of a particular situation is marked by safety specific insights into that particular
situation (understanding relevant task, particular and site specific incident factors). This insight
must also necessarily precede competency nine, 'performance in a particular situation'. The
competency demands that a person in a particular situation has the technical and human skills
needed to interpret signals from the situation that may indicate real and potential hazards. Salience
is a psychological 'way of seeing' in a particular situation.
Factors identified under this competency indicated the need to both foresee, identify and
react to accident conditions, active failures in progress, and cause and effect phenomena, to be
able to understand and interpret detailed operational and procedural guidelines, and to possess
the diagnostic skills necessary to identify systems failures. The various Commission of Inquiry
determined that there was evidence of a range of shortcomings that fall within this core
competency. The following descriptors in Table 7.2.1 indicating understanding of situational
salience were derived from the HyperRESEARCH analysis of the five cases:
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Table 7 .2.1 HyperRESEARCH Salience of a Particular Situation Descriptors

accident conditions, active failures, cause and response, cause immediate, cause of accident,
detailed guidelines, diagnostic failure, failure to enforce regulations, falsifying maintenance reports,
falsifying records, poor information verification, inadequate information gathering, insufficient
information, peifunctory inspection, inconsequential and sub-standard auditing, significant reliance on
personal experience, a dangerous reliance on oral communication, and a failure to identify critical
situational risk factors

7.2.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
Understanding the salience of the particular situation is closely related to foresight,
competency two and related to organisational factors such as ethos, competency six, and
competency seven, constructing a culture of safety. If lessons have been learned from previous
accidents then future accident scenarios ought to be reasonably foreseeable, particularly at the
same site or closely related sites. This competency is necessary to competency nine because
performance in a particular situation or setting requires prior understanding of its salience. Both
are necessary to competency ten because the schemata needed for multidisciplinary performance
require a clear grasp of both salience and setting.

7.2.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Because psychological balance is critical to shaping the habitus of a high reliability
organisation to 'intentionally' establish a culture of safety, then organisational 'ways of seeing'
shape the 'memes' that will effect the organisation's systemic capacities for managing safety. Such
questions require insight gained both from the previous generic information and the particular site
specific information. Therefore, questions directed to salient information and an ethos of safety
become important. Such questions include:
•

To what extent is previous experience of a generic nature salient to decisions made
regarding a specific site? Is the necessary insight possible in an ethos of power,
hierarchic decision processes, where organisational learning is limited by
managerial hubris?

•

Are there gender related psychological factors involved in limiting the opportunity
for insight into the signification of salience in incident scenarios?

•

To what extent do task orientation, preference for hard numbers, preoccupation
with financials and short-run orientation all conspire to obscure latent errors and
make insight into potential accidents difficult?
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•

Because creating an environment for learning is a long range task, to what extent
are managers able to plan for critical people and learning processes and knowledge
systems in particular or site specific situations?

7 .2.4 LITERATURE
Each high reliability operational site and interface carries within it a large set of potential
accident factors. Reason (1990) calls these factors 'latent errors'. Maurino, Reason, Johnston, and
Lee (1995) observe that major accidents occur when latent errors, arising mainly in the managerial
and organisational spheres, combine adversely with local triggering events (weather, location etc)
and with the active failures of individuals at the sharp end (errors and procedural violations). The
latent failures at Moura, for example, were seen in the deficiencies in communications. The local
triggering event was the heating, and the active failures were the failures of individual managers to
apply their minds diligently to the possibility that a heating event might be occurring at the time of
the explosion.
These factors were almost identical to the accident conditions at Longford. The company
had apparently learned nothing from the Moura experience. Reason's analysis would suggest that
actions or inactions of individuals were a part of the chain of events that led to disaster, but would
also conclude that focusing on these active failures of individuals is not as useful from the point of
view of accident prevention as focusing on the salient latent or organisational failings involved.
This research suggests that part of the cause of accidents and the inability to make situation
salient insights into possible accident scenarios is because there is an unhealthy anxiety about the
loss of power at the highest levels of many high reliability organisations. Writing about Sagan's
(1993, 1996) perspective on High Reliability Theory and expressing his concern that power elites
impose risks on the many for the benefit of the few, Perrow (1999: 369) says, 'the issue was not
risk, but power'. Schein (1994) suggests that part of the problem is the inability of managers to
acknowledge their own vulnerability and uncertainty and hence to become learners in their
organisations. He suggests that this dangerous myth portrays the lone problem solver as hero and
that this is amplified by the additional cultural force of 'rugged individualism'. Perrow points out
that operators can not exercise initiative in a decentralised site while at the same time having to
comply with centralised rules and guidelines.
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Schein cites Karl Deutsch (1996) who said, "power is the ability not to have to learn
anything." Deutsch's observation about not learning tends to reinforce the case data that suggests
that this competency, understanding the salience of a situation, is readily obscured by those who in
fact have the power to act to mitigate accident conditions, for example, by adapting generic site
experience or centralised manuals to the present one. According to Schein the competition based
work hierarchy then ultimately becomes the main source of security and status, and higher level
managers can be expected to act in a more decisive and controlling manner to express that status.
The problem seems to be that managers either experience managerial inertia (Mitroff and
Pauchant, 1990) or ignore prior knowledge (Reason, 2000) and previous experience (Hopkins,
1999) or apply it with hubris in an ill-considered one-size-fits-all manner (Mitroff and Pauchant,
1990; Mitroff and Linstone, 1993), much as they also pull training and technical manuals off the
shelf to apply to all situations. These all act as barriers to learning (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).
Hopkins (1999:58) points out that, 'The question that management posed for itself that Sunday
afternoon was not, should the men go down (into Moura no 2), but what should be done if the
men expressed any concerns about going down.' Management saw an industrial relations issue not
a problem of safety.
This competency demands intellectual application and a certain vulnerability, since learning
is involved. The vulnerability needed to learn seems to be at odds with the dominant coalition's
reluctance to learn. Again, the data points to psychological factors as contributors to fatal accidents
where managers act with superior attitudes and often with arrogance (Kets de Vries and Miller,
1984) to dismiss safety critical information readily available from the organisation (Mitroff, 1998).
Where people are just another resource, rather than a prime factor of concern to management,
creating a learning culture from such a set of assumptions becomes very difficult. Hence insight
brought about by critical knowledge just does not find its way into decision making .
A significant problem is the dangerous attitude evident in the orthodox risk management
literature, which clearly emphasises the organisation's interests in relation to risk assessment by
reducing consequences to a frequency count. This quantisation of a disaster's impact has the effect
of making an accident nothing more than an annoyance for management. It creates the inference
that a formula contains all of the consequences, when significant effects on stakeholders and
victims are not necessarily accounted for. For example, Ridley (1999:24-25) states:
261

Once a list of risks within a company has been compiled . . . the risks may be put
in order of priority in terms of when control action is actually required, i.e.
immediate; short term; medium term; long term on the basis of a ranking of the
risks relating to their relative impact on the organisation. Such an assessment
should take account of legal, humanitarian and economic considerations. The
fundamental equation in any risk assessment exercise is:
Risk magnitude = Frequency (how often?) X Consequence (how big?)
Low frequency, low consequence risks should be retained (i.e. self
financed) within the organisation. Examples include the failure of small electric
motors plate glass breakages, and possibly motor vehicle damage accidents (via
retention of comprehensive aspects of insurance cover).
Low frequency, high consequence risks should be transferred (usually via
insurance contracts). Examples include explosions, and environmental
impairment.
High frequency, low consequence risks should be reduced via effective
loss control management. Examples include minor injury accidents; pilfering; and
damage accidents.
High frequency, high consequence risks should (ideally) be avoided by managing
them out of the organisation's risk portfolio. If this appears to be an uneconomic
(or unpalatable) solution, then adequate insurance i.e. the risk transfer option
must be arranged.

Ridley goes on to develop a risk rating equation based on the risk magnitude equation above
in which a multifatality is allocated 50 points. The inference is, 'insure or transfer the risk'. There is
little in the above quotation to suggest that prevention might be a possible alternative. This arises
from the notion that a hazard is not a risk. Hazard is the danger, risk is the likelihood or
mathematical probability that an accident will occur. This orthodox approach can induce
organisations to assess risk, not necessarily hazard. Essentially, it encourages senior coalitions to
gamble with the lives of others while at the same time purporting to account for 'humanitarian'
factors.
7.2.5 CASE TEXT DATA
The weight of the literature examined above and in chapter 2 is suggestive that not only are
notions of hazard, risk, incident, accident, and near miss clearly misunderstood, but that they are
site specific, and not likely to be resolved during a crisis by 'head office'. It is critical that learning
from prior experience and all other sources needs to be decentralised and adapted to the specific
situation where hazard resides.
Mitroff (1998:59) developed a theory that argues for a four dimensional perspective on a
problem (particularly a safety related problem) to include the scientific and technical aspects of the
problem and the factors that influence it and flow from it; the existential, taken for granted aspects
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of meaning and purpose; the interpersonal, psychological and social aspects ; and the systemic,
dynamic and consequential aspects of an accident. This analysis follows from correct identification
of the type of problem at hand, its scale and scope options, a stakeholder analysis, and the
management of paradox. Mitroff identifies what he calls the 'one fundamental flaw' to which all
serious errors of management can be traced, and that is solving the wrong problem precisely. He
blames orthodox management literature for this problem of muddled thinking based on wrong
assumptions since it implies managers already know what their most important problems are.
Therefore, orthodox management literature is itself a cause of the failure to learn.
The following HyperRESEARCH case extracts illustrate these concerns (salience and
orthodox management skills). For example, in the Longford case a range of situation specific issues
were raised by the Commission, such as the actual site specific conditions that were salient at the
time; the actual on site cause and the responses to the accident conditions; the failure to diagnose
latent conditions manifested in hazard signals; the failure to gather and correctly interpret
information; and the failure of audits and inspections to reveal situationally specific potentiating
accident conditions.
LONGFORD [accident conditions, active fail u res, cause and response, cause

i mmediate, cause of accident, detai led guidelines, diagnostic fail u re, fail u re to
enforce regulations, i nformation verification, i nformation gathering, insufficient
information, perfunctory inspection, auditing, situational risk factors] 1 3 . 1 3 9
The actual procedure for the reporting o f i ncidents was set out i n another Essa
manual cal led the Safety Management Manual (SM M). I n its i ntroductory
parag raph, the SMM stated:
"Al l incidents, no matter how m i nor, are to be reported i m mediately to the
worksite supervisor. All i ncidents are to be recorded on the hard copy Essa
I ncident Form, regardless of whether the Profs reporting system is used".

The Commission observed that these critical terms were defined in the Safety System manual
(SMM). Longford Royal Commission Report (1999:13.140) states, 'Incident' is an unplanned event
that caused, or could have caused, injury or damage to personnel, property or the environment
which, in the case of injury, involved an Essa employee or contractor, and in the case of damage to
property, occurred at a place controlled by Essa or involved Essa property. Paragraph (13.141)
states that a 'near miss' is '... an unintended or unwanted event or circumstance which under
slightly different conditions would have resulted in an incident'. Therefore, a 'near miss' would
clearly qualify as an 'incident' for the purpose of SMM incident reporting requirements.
Using a system somewhat similar to Ridley's (1999) impact assessment formula cited above
(Ri sk mag n itude = Freq uency (how often?) X Con sequence (how big?)), the SMM also
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contained a classification system for ranking incidents according to their seriousness or potential
seriousness (13.143). In theory this was to ensure that appropriate resources were directed to
investigation and follow-up. Incidents which were classified as serious had to be accompanied by a
critical evaluation of all related OIMS systems and critical equipment, to detect weaknesses in such
systems or equipment and to ensure preventative action was taken. However, in practice, the
Commission found that (13.144) 'the obligation to report incidents was construed narrowly both
by Essa management and by operations personnel.'
Process upsets were rarely, if ever, the subject of an incident report, unless they were
accompanied by injury to persons or damage to property. Consequently, process upsets that may
have signified to qualified and experienced personnel that defective equipment or inappropriate
operating conditions or unsafe operating practices were common, were not brought to their
attention. The Longford Royal Commission (1999) observed that this resulted in learning
opportunities that were lost.
1 3 . 146 A pertinent example of such a lost opportunity was the fai l u re of
operations personnel to report the cold temperature i ncident which occurred on
2 8 Aug ust 1998. (Longford Report 1 98-2 2 2)

The critical issue of misinformation and its conjoint interplay with the problem of a failure of
prior information (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997), was also identified by the Commission (1999:13.9698) in relation to log books, highlighting the following issues: information verification, information
gathering, insufficient information, perfunctory inspection, auditing, reliance on personal
experience, reliance on oral communication, and situational risk factors.
1 3 . 96 The other method of comm u n i cation u pon handover was through the
control room log. This log was kept on the control room desk. Panel operators
were required to record in it "the activities that have taken place in their
operating areas, during the shift". Those activities i ncl uded changes made during
the shift to key process parameters and the res ults of such changes, any process
or machi nery problems encou ntered, any safety systems or devices defeated
(including bypasses i n the outside areas) and any control lers that were bei ng
operated i n manual and the reason why.
1 3.97 In practice, however, operators did not keep control room logs i n
accordance with the stated req u i rements. A n examination of the G P l control
room log revealed that entries were usual ly short and often contained only
l i mited process information. There was i nconsi stency in the way entries were
made and m their subject matter. Process i ssues, if referred to, often received
only scant attention. Standing on their own, log entri es were often confusing and
i ncomplete. On frequent occasi ons, panel operators made no l og book entry at
all at the concl usion of a shift.
1 3.98 The log book entries made by the GPl panel operators leading up to the
accident on 25 September 1 998, did not contai n any reference to the abnormal
process conditions occurring m Absorber B. These conditions had been occurring
al most constantly from the afternoon of 23 September until the accident.
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Verbal communications also failed. The Commission reported (13.94) that the night shift
operator, Olsson, should at least have told Ward (the GPl operator: 13.19) about the almost
constant occurrence of the Absorber B high level alarm and the TC913 alarm and the fact that such
alarms were still active at changeover. The inference is that Ward placed reliance on Olsson's
personal experience and oral communication concerning any specific situational risk factors.
Olsson did not express concern regarding the continuous alarms.
13.101 At the commencement of the day shift on 2 5 September 1998, the
outgoing GPl panel operator had an obligation to tell the relieving operator, not
only about the cold temperatures in Absorber B, but about the off-scale levels of
condensate in that vessel. Both of these conditions had existed for some time.
Indeed, the purpose of the handover procedure as a communication tool was to
ensure that important process information was passed on. In the same way,
Olsson's log book entries at the conclusion of his shift could have been, and
should have been, more informative. They should also have made reference to
these matters.
13.103 Had Ward's attention been directed to these matters he may well have
taken steps to see that the temperature and level of condensate in Absorber B
were more appropriately managed.

The Commission made the point that Ward would not have directed Rawson to close the
TRC3B bypass, as he did at 7.30 am, if he had had proper information. On the contrary, it is likely
that he would have given Rawson (an area operator with 18 years experience: 13.21) a direction to
open rather than close it. The Commission was inclined to the view that Longford was a
preventable accident
13.104 Had the shift handover communications been in accordance with the
requirements laid out in the LWM M , reference would certainly have been made to
the abnormal conditions in Absorber B and to the fact that the level of
condensate in that absorber was still out of control. Similarly, had the control
room log book been entered in a proper way, it would have made reference to
these matters.
13.105 It may also be observed that the process difficulties experienced during
the night shift were also known to the night shift supervisor, Wijgers. He had,
during the course of the night shift, spent time with Olsson in the GPl control
room endeavouring to deal with the high levels of condensate in the slug
catchers. However, at the change of shift Wijgers made no mention of the
abnormal conditions of Absorber B to the relieving supervisor, Visser.
13.106 As shift supervisors were not primarily responsible for process matters,
their obligation to pass on at handover information regarding process upsets was
different from that of operators. However, given the degree of Wijgers' personal
involvement with the process difficulties experienced on the preceding night shift
and his knowledge of the abnormal conditions in Absorber B, he should have
passed on this information to the incoming supervisor, Visser.

The 'cause real' for the accident then seems to fall back to management. With examples of
poor log book keeping, substandard handovers, misinformation, poor verbal communications, the
Commission found that these issues all escaped scrutiny by management.
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13.107 Shift handovers and log book entries were used ineffectively In the lead
up to the accident on 2 5 September 1998. Moreover, laxity in the implementation
of the handover requirements seems to have escaped scrutiny by management.

The log books were not examined in any way by management, nor were they used to
monitor the conditions of the process.
13.108 Log book entries were not subjected to any examination either by
Longford plant management or by management in Melbourne. They do not
appear to have been used by management as a means of monitoring process
conditions at the plant nor were they passed on to any person or group in
Melbourne for plant surveillance purposes.

The issues identified in the Longford case above (misinformation and communications) of
information that should be factually captured and recorded for organisational learning purposes
reaches its ultimate deontological demise when the records are falsified for compliance purposes,
such as recording correct weights for overloaded aircraft and falsifying maintenance reports, as in
the CAA [Seaview] case.
CAA [ falsifying records] Mr Green also directed his pilots in 1992 to
certain documents. The documents were then backdated in order to
represent to the CAA that they were the documents used for various
undertaken by the company. Again Mr Green's denials have been rejected
Commission. (Seaview Executive Summary p5)

create
falsely
flights
by the

The aircraft was seriously overloaded, and the documentation associated with the
flight sought to disguise the overload. (Seaview Executive Summary p31)
[ falsifying maintenance reports] Maintenance is a significant overhead. It is
required to be undertaken periodically (usually every 100 hours). It is dependent,
therefore, upon the accurate recording by pilots of the aircraft's hours in service.
There is a temptation to cheat. Mr Green could not resist that temptation. He
himself cheated, and he encouraged his pilots to do likewise. Flight times were
either understated, or sometimes not recorded at all. (Seaview Executive
Summary p5)

7.2.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
A vigilance regime should signify previous incidents, 'near misses', and accidents as
important information from which it is possible to learn. These opportunities to learn enable
higher awareness of potential accident factors but do not necessarily deal with local triggering
events and salient, but very particular and different, factors from those previous incidents. Auditing
for potential salient factors must be deliberate and informed by previous events, but at the same
time must be situation specific and develop largely from a 'clean slate'.
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7.2.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
The mine that exploded in 1994 (Moura No. 2) had not had a previous explosion, however
two adjacent mines had. Hopkins (1999:137) reveals that the mine operator, BHP, had experience
of previous mine disasters. There was Moura No. 4 in 1986 and previously at Appin in NSW in
1979. As an organisation, BHP's memory was defective because decentralised responsibility for
disaster prevention to mine sites had no central capacity or expertise with respect to disaster
prevention. This is an example of an organisation running multiple hazardous operations
expecting each one to independently learn the lessons the organisation itself should have noted as
'significant' and disseminated.
On 19 December 2003, news.corn.au (The Australian) reported that a two-month naval
inquiry found the May 5, 1998 fire started on board the Westralia after newly-installed flexible fuel
hoses burst and sprayed diesel fuel onto hot engine parts. This inquiry was followed by a coronial
inquiry and the West Australian Coroner, Mr Hope concluded that a "series of mistakes and
systemic deficiencies" had led to the fuel hoses being changed from solid metal to a flexible type.
The mistakes were very serious mistakes, particularly as the hoses were to be installed close to the
indicator cocks that were known to be extremely hot and a possible ignition source. The use of
flexible fuel hoses to replace pipes in the close vicinity of an exposed heat source capable of
igniting diesel without any engineering assessment of their fitness for the purpose was an
outrageously bad error." Mr Hope said.
The loss of 193 lives in the Zeebrugge ferry disaster on 6 March 1987 (the Herald capsized)
identified one of the key factors in the accident was pressure to produce annual dividends for
shareholders (Crainer 1993). P&O's declared policy was to comply with the standards laid down by
current legislation. However this 'minimal' compliance failed to protect the lives of customers and
employees. It was a clear example of the failure of this competency since managerial focus was on
financials rather than people. Money was more salient than the particular conditions on the ferry.
The Zeebrugge inquiry found that simple design modifications such as the addition of simple
indicator lights would have told the captain whether the bow doors were shut and bulkheads
would have slowed the vessel's capsize. The risk was well understood by management but they
ignored it. Crainer observes that:
Ferry operators repeatedly claim that they are 'dedicated to safety'. However, this
usually means they have satisfied whatever regulations have been forced upon
them by bodies whose track record is one of belated response rather than
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foresight. I n general terms, the cap s i ze of the Herald demon strated the need for
strong and con si stent manage rial i nvolvement in all aspects of safety.
Respon s i b i l ity for safety m ust be taken (and be seen to be taken) by the board of
d i rectors .
Proced u res need to be appropriate for the hardware and written for the s pecific
appl ication. (In the case of the H erald, procedures were 'l ifted' from other fe rries
with visor bow doors, ig noring the fu ndamental difference of a ferry with clam
doors.) (Crai n er 1 9 9 3 : 1 5 8)

7.2.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that the salience of the
particular situation was not appropriately appreciated. This lead to erroneous assumptions being
made that resulted in fatal accidents. For example, the Westralia engine room fire occurred because
hoses that were neither the correct ones that were required to have been fitted in that particular
situation nor the immediate response to the actual fire and its intensity were properly understood.
The culture of the Navy allowed what should have been clear indicators that something might be
wrong in purchasing the hoses to go unremarked and unchallenged. The actual fire and its
development also showed that the Navy and its staff were not adequately prepared or trained to
deal with the events that developed in that particular situation.
Schein (1994) offers a useful insight into this kind of thinking and the operational
assumptions of such dominant coalitions.
H u man h i story h as left us with a legacy of patriarchy and h ierarchy, and a myth
of male domi nance and s upe riority based on the male as the warri o r and
protector. One can th i n k of this as almost a state of "arrested deve lopment" i n
the s e n s e that w e h ave very l i m ited m o d e l s o f how h u mans can a n d s h o u l d relate
to each other in o rgan izati o nal setti ngs. The trad itional h i erarchical model i s
virtually the only o n e we have. O n e consequ ence of t h i s set o f h i storically based
cultural ass u m ptions is that managers (wh o are mostly male) start with a self
i mage of havi ng to be co mpletely i n contro l , deci sive, certain, and domi nant.
Neither the leader, nor the fol l ower wants the leader to be u ncertain, to ad mit to
n ot knowing o r not be ing in contro l , to e m brace error rather than to defens ively
deny it.

Organisations that manage operations in different parts of the country (or globe) should
take responsibility for acquiring sound accident prevention knowledge and for disseminating it to
each site. Paradoxically, each site is different and requires appropriate adaptations of knowledge
and, hence, site specific risk auditing. This is congruent with Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) theory
that misinformation and energy cause accidents. It is also congruent with Reason's (1990) theory
that latent errors reside in the managerial spheres of organisations and combine with local
triggering events to cause accidents. It also resonates with Dawkins (1989, 1999) theory that
memes survive to effect communications and cultures in organisations.
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7.3 Competency 9: Performance in a particular setting
(managerial capacity to deal with stress, conflict, and
unfolding disaster in particular hazardous environments)
7.3.1 INTERPRETATION
This research suggests that stressful conditions test competencies where particular
managerial actions in a high reliability setting (where stress, conflict, disaster management, and risk
management are persistent factors) require skills and competencies that may be different from the
competencies required in a similar setting or at a different site within the same organisation.
Soucek (1993) suggests that different circumstances require different competencies. Performance
in specific situations is mitigated by human competency limitations or slippages such as active
failures of individuals who simply fail to perform a competency adequately. Examples listed in the
panel below include, careless navigation, irrational reasoning, limited operator knowledge,
unanticipated interaction of multiple failures and failure to prepare escape routes. Perrow (1999)
suggests that there is an 'overriding importance of the context into which the subject puts the
problem'. Other examples of descriptors of the competency include communication downwards,
which invariably results in failures of procedures. Individuals who only get the 'approved
managerial' view of critical systems and processes are unlikely to grasp the whole of system picture.
Inadequate supervision often results in inappropriate and inadequate responses to information.
Information overload inhibits performance that is amplified by specification failure resulting in
critical processes and machinery operating outside safe limits. The descriptors signifying
performance in a particular setting are included in Table 7.3.1.

active failures of individuals, careless navigation, communication downwards, escape routes,
failure of procedures, failure to grasp whole of system picture, inadequate supervision, inappropriate
response, inadequate response, information overload, irrational reasoning, limited operator knowledge,
o eratin outside limits, s eci ication ailure, unantici ated interaction o multi le ailures.
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7.3.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
Performance by managers and operational staff in particular settings is closely related to the
ethos of an organisation and all of the previous competencies. This competency indicates the need
for individuals in particular hazardous situations to deal with stress in a framework where ethics,
foresight, vigilance, judgement and balance are required. These are not possible without an
appropriate and supportive organisational ethos and an understanding of the salience of the
situation in which they find themselves.

7.3.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Questions suggested by chapter 2 and the case data point to the importance of trying to
assess communications weaknesses because dysfunctional managerial behaviour can shape the
habitus of a high reliability organisation site resulting in a disabling ethos of safety, thereby
reducing the site's hazard management capabilities. Questions need to be directed at the creation
of such a habitus or culture, and its immobilising memes that lead to questions such as:

•

What conditions outside normal operational parameters are likely to require special
skills and competencies?

• Are there existing conditions that are pointing to accidents?

•
•
•
•
•

Who is responsible for translating vigilance signals into operational defences?
Is managerial performance enhanced or constrained by regulations?
What can be done to simplify systems that are more complex than they need to be?
What attitudes frame acceptance or denial of responsibility?
To what extent can organisational learning and competency enhancement serve to
eliminate unanticipated interactions of system processes and prevent multiple

•

failures of processes and components?
Are there definable differences between operational sites in the one organisation
and how are they similar and different?

7.3.4 LITERATURE
Eraut (1994) claims that what makes people competent in a particular job depends on them
being able to meet the requirements of that job. Hence, competence in a job is defined as the
ability to perform the tasks and roles required to the expected standard. Using Eraut's definition, a
manager found to have failed in a critical capability would be considered incompetent and ought
not to hold that job. While this definition also applies to front line operators and can form the basis
of a charge of incompetence (ie against Captain Pelc in the Lake Illawarra case), it has already been
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established that human operator error is far more complex than at first appears. Almost always
'operator' error occurs for reasons that can be clearly traced back to management. This attribution
can be applied to a manager at any stage in their career, not only to the newly qualified. The actual
competency standard expected could be expected to vary with experience and responsibility and
should take into account the need to keep up to date with changes in practice. However, it also
leaves open the question of who will decide what is to count as competence when different people
have different expectations.
Reason (1990:184-185) cites Rasmussen's (1980) studies of 200 cases where the author
identified 'operational problems'. Rasmussen's range of errors of significance to this research and
this particular competency are human factors in which failure to carry out particular actions
signified a failure of critical performance in the particular situation. They are generally related to
preventative and corrective tasks such as surveillance testing, removal and restoration of
equipment, checking, supervision, post-maintenance testing and modifications. The particular
error types Rasmussen identified were all seen in the case data and can be characterised as
performance failures: absent mindedness, familiar association, low alertness, omission of essential
isolated acts, mistakes among alternatives, strong expectations, side effects not considered, latent
conditions not considered, manual variability, poor spatial orientation. Paradoxically, these are also
characteristic of a poor understanding of the particular situation, competency eight.
The evidence of poor competency sets points to poor professional development. In most
professions training results in a steadily increasing range of competence, accompanied by gradually
decreasing levels of supervision; and the process of expanding one's range of competence
continues after completion of training through a range of professional activities that may well
include cyclical refresher training. Therefore, one would conclude that throughout this period the
principle holds good of not undertaking work for which one is not competent without appropriate
supervision, whatever one's status. However, the research cases demonstrate clearly that managers
still function beyond their competencies and do so without any serious checks and balances, other
than those imposed by the regulator, which is often itself found to be seriously incompetent. In the
case of safety related situations these managers also operate with poor information while under
stress, resulting in compromised, if not dangerous, performance of their jobs. Rethans, van
Leeuwen, Drop, van der Vleuten, and Sturmans, (1990) point out that many researchers have failed
to appreciate this distinction between competence and performance. They also noted that only one
of the eight studies he reviewed was able to show that competence was a significant predictor of
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performance. It was not due to measurement deficiencies, as claimed, because it was a behavioural
problem rather than a psychometric problem.
7.3.5 CASE TEXT DATA
Autopoietic organisations and other culturally homogenous settings result in people seeing
problems the same way (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993), so maintaining cultural homogeneity in a
high reliability organisation is dangerous, and yet, paradoxically, it is important to generate shared
understandings of potential accidents. Active failure of individuals identified in the Longford Royal
Commission Report (Dawson, 1999) focus on the exchanges between individuals on the night of
the accident. Each in tum failed to perform to a high level of competence in a particular setting.
Other competency shortfalls were also indicated, such as limited operator knowledge and
inappropriate responses. However, these all point directly to poor training and failure of 'particular
site' managerial responsibilities, rather than a responsibility on the part of operators.
LONGFORD [active failures of individuals, failure of procedures, failure to grasp
whole of system picture, limited operator knowledge, inadequate response,
inappropriate response, unanticipated interactions of multiple failures] 13.94
Most significant was the content of the handover discussion at the
commencement of the critical day shift on 2 5 September. There were
shortcomings in the exchange of information that took place between the night
shift operator, Olsson, and his relieving panel operator, Ward. Olsson identified
problems which he had experienced during the night with the rate of condensate
coming into the slug catchers from offshore. He also made reference to cold
condensate temperatures which he had experienced in Absorber B and to
problems which he had experienced in controlling the temperature of this
absorber throughout the shift. He made no reference, however, to the off-scale,
high condensate levels in Absorber B, or to the frequent occurrence of TC9B
interference with level control, both of which he had experienced during the
night. Nor did he make any reference to the frequent incidence of alarm warnings
acknowledged by him during his shift. These warnings had accompanied the high
condensate levels and the TC9B override. Nor did he convey to Ward the fact that
the alarms for high Absorber B condensate levels and TC9B interference were still
active at the change of shift, indicating not only that the levels were still high, but
that level control had still not been regained by the time of the change. (Longford
Report p2 11-2 12)
[inadequate supervision, operating outside limits] 13.33 These failures were not
confined to operators or to any one shift. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
some of the failings were so prevalent as to have become almost standard
operating practice. These practices could not have developed or survived had
there been adequate supervision of day to day operations by Essa management.
(Longford Report p 199)

Justice Staunton's report on the CANSeaview case (1999), stated that wrong assumptions led
the regulator to credit Seaview with maintenance it never carried out and lied about. The ability of
Mr

Paull, the regulator's agent, to perform with competence in that role, and in that particular

setting, was profoundly diminished and because of this he entertained a mode of irrational
reasoning and made entirely inadequate responses to his direct experience.
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CAA [irrational reasoning] The limited nature of the documentation examined
was entirely consistent with a perfunctory inspection. Mr Paull did not believe, for
instance, that it was necessary to investigate whether Seaview Air was cheating
on times recorded in maintenance releases. Mr Paull believed it would have been
foolish to cheat, given that the aircraft were flying across oceans to Lord Howe
Island, and given that Mr Green had his own maintenance facility.
Mr Paull was living in a fool's paradise. Mr Green, at this time, and throughout,
was cheating on maintenance releases, even though that may have been foolish.
On the flight on 6 September 1992, when Mr Green flew Mr Paull to Lord Howe
Island for the periodic inspection, Mr Green recorded 4. 7 hours for the 6. 5 hour
flight, even though Mr Paull had been sitting beside him. (Executive Summary p6)

In relation to shipping and maritime accidents Perrow (1999) points out that unlike Aircraft,
where pilots have the backup of co-pilots, ships masters do not. This tradition of the sea is
apparently continued to enable shipping companies to pass blame and insurance risk to human
error triggered by individual masters. The IMCO (United Nations Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organisation), which governs these matters is, according to Carter (1978), described
as a forum dominated by shipowners who want to minimize their capital outlay and operating costs
despite the greater risk of chronic pollution and accidents. Costs for accidents are simply passed
along to clients and insurers. Hence the extraordinary pressure of 'turnaround' time is placed on
ships masters, almost always with punitive fines for missed deadlines, no matter the reason.
It is common (norma� for sea captains to decline tugs and pilots if they can to ensure
shorter turnaround times, because of the covert and overt pressure on them by owners to do so.
Perrow (1999) points out that the economics of the maritime system itself conspires to induce
errors. He points to evasion of costs and responsibilities by owners and shippers. According to
Lloyd's List (21 May, 1981), 2: 'the results of such regimes not infrequently lead to "a ship"
beneficially owned on one country, directly owned by a company resident

in

another country,

registered under a flag of a third country, managed by a company in a fourth country, but on long
term charter to interests in a fifth country and even sub-chartered to interests in a sixth country.'
When the Lake Illawarra accident happened there was not a deeply understood scientific
grasp of the nature of large keels in Hobart harbour. Therefore, issues such as, 'bottom effects',
'bank effects' and 'hull effects' (suctions created by water having to pass through shallow or narrow
spaces) were not well understood. The findings against Captain Pelc seem onerous if one
contemplates that his 'capacity to perform in Hobart harbour' failed him due to the pressures that
may have been on him to tum his ship around. These more likely causes were not well understood
and the Inquiry found him to be personally guilty of careless or negligent 'navigation'.
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ILLAWARRA [careless navigation] We are q u ite s ati sfi ed that it h as not been
e stabl i s hed th at Captai n Pelc is i ncompete nt" wit h i n the meaning of Section 3 7 2
o f the N avigation Act. On the contrary, al l the evi de nce i n d i cates that, apart from
the events of the even i ng of 5 January 1 9 7 5 , he i s a we l l qual i fied, com petent and
capabl e Maste r.
Howeve r (keeping in m i nd the warni ng g ive n in Spain's case s u pra, at pp. 6 5 8-9,
not to be wise after the event i n i m puti ng negli gence), we are clearly of opin ion
that Captai n Pelc was , i n relation to this cas u alty, gui lty of m i scond uct in the
form of carel es s n avigation (Lake l l l awarra I n q u i ry p l4).

LONGFORD [cause immediate, cause of accident, diagnostic failure] 1 5 . 6

N otwithstan d i n g t h e m atte rs me ntio ned above, t h e concl u s ion i s
i nevitable that t h e accident wh ich occu rred on 2 5 Septe mber 1998 would not
h ave occu rred h ad appropriate steps been taken fo l l owi ng the tri pping of the
G P 1 2 0 1 pu m ps . When efforts to restart those pumps proved u n s uccessful , it
s h o uld h ave been reali sed i m mediately that cold temperatu res wou ld en su e
d ownstream from th e absorbers a n d re nder ve s se l s n ot d e s igned to operate at
l ow tem peratures dangerous. Had t h i s been real i sed, steps could and should
h ave been taken to i solate the o utlets of both rich o i l and co ndensate from the
absorbers i n order to prevent those cold tem peratures from developing i n the
ROD / ROF area. Those who were operat i n g G P l o n 25 Septe mber 1998 did not
h ave knowledge of the dangers associated with loss of lean o i l flow and did not
take the steps necessary to avert those dangers. Nor did those charged with the
s u pervi s i o n of the operations h ave the neces sary knowledge and the steps taken
by them we re i nappropriate. The l ack of knowledge on the part of both operators
and s u pervisors was d i rectly attributabl e to a deficie ncy in the i r i n itial or
s u bseq uent trai n ing.
Not only was th ei r trai n i ng i n adeq u ate, b ut there were n o cu rre nt ope rating
proce d u res to g u ide them i n deal i ng with the prob l e m which they encounte red on
25 Septe mber 1998. (Longford Report p2 34)

7.3.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
Stressful conditions test managerial competencies. Communication downwards results in
individuals who require an overall operational view of critical systems and the ability to process the
'whole of system' picture, but often they do not have such a picture. Operational staff should take a
broad and authoritative view of their duties. Supervision should result in appropriate and adequate
responses to information. Performance can be enhanced by limiting information overload,
particularly where specification failures occur. This can often result in normal processes becoming
critical. Achieving this balance is a management responsibility, since management also have a
responsibility for overall organisational competence.
More research should focus on the conditions that influence managers' performance.
Whatever the standard of performance at the end of training, the expectation must be for
continuing improvement and this largely depends on the manager's attitude towards quality
improvement and lifelong learning. This attitudinal component is essential because cyclical
refresher training that makes performance salient in a particular setting not only includes site
specific skills but also the core values of managing in that organisation at that particular place.
These are learned largely through discussion, site specific problem-solving exercises, workshops
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and practical experience. An arrogant manager or CEO who found training 'beneath them' would
have great difficulty with this and the higher stages that involve dealing directly with these values,
which are likely to require at least some formal instruction in addition to opportunities for practice
and formal feedback. Integrative skills, or applications of the values and characteristics, are gained
by acquiring experience in realistic site specific settings.
7.3.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Hopkins (1999) observes that a normal or system accident, as Perrow defines it, involves the
unanticipated interaction of multiple failures of various of the system components. Where a system
is complex, in that its components can interact in unexpected ways and where it is tightly coupled,
such that multiple failures can occur so quickly that there is not sufficient time to analyse and react
to what is happening, then system accidents, he says, are virtually inevitable.
It is clear that the Moura explosion cannot be analysed in these terms. The system was not
complex in the above sense. On the contrary, there was nothing at all surprising or unexpected
about the sequence of events; the process was quite foreseeable and had given rise to disaster on
two occasions in Queensland in the recent past. The system was not tightly coupled, according to
Perrow's definition (Perrow, 1999:4). Events unfolded slowly and resolute intervention at any
point could have averted disaster and saved the mine. Perrow himself acknowledged that coal mine
disasters could not be explained by his theory and the analysis here confirms his conclusion.
The mine that exploded in 1994 had not previously experienced an explosion, although two
adjacent mines had. This mine therefore had no direct experience or memory to draw on. BHP
management should have learnt from the disasters in adjacent mines, which was salient to this site.
As indicated in paragraph 7.1.7, there were relatively recent explosions at Moura No. 4 in 1986 and
at Appin in NSW in 1979. BHP's management had decentralised responsibility for disaster
prevention to management at individual mine sites and retained no central capacity or expertise
with respect to disaster prevention. BHP as an organisation failed to engage in organisational
learning and therefore failed to develop a corporate memory and retain the lessons of the various
disasters.
Reason's (1990) theory of latent and active errors asserts that major accidents occur when
latent failures, arising mainly in the managerial and organisational spheres, combine adversely with
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local triggering events and active failures of individuals at the operational interface (such as human
errors and procedural violations). The latent failures at Moura identified in this research were
largely organisational, cultural and ethos failings, especially the deficiencies in communications.
The local triggering event was the heating, and the active failures were the failures of individual
managers to apply foresight, vigilance and judgement, which would have made it clear that a
critically unsafe heating could happen, particularly at the time of the explosion when the actual
failure process was in train.
The Moura and Longford cases both demonstrate the applicability of Reason's assertion that
actions or inactions of individuals are a part of the chain of events that lead to disaster. Reason
counsels caution, however, and concludes that focusing on active failures of individuals is not as
useful as focusing on the latent or organisational failings involved. It is salient that both enquiries
focused on the organisational factors and did not preoccupy themselves with the role individuals
played in the Moura and Longford accidents.
Hopkins (1999) makes a strong claim that the Moura accident demonstrated key
organisational failures - hence management failures. The Moura case showed that many of the
competencies suggested by this research were involved:
C9. There was no adequate system for communication of decisions down the
mine hierarchy.
C7. There was no adequate syste m of communicating information about warn i ng
signs up the hierarchy. I n particular, people at BHP headquarters had no access
to such i nformation.
C7. There was no feedback mechan i s m to ensure that those reporting hazards or
warn ings were notified of what action, if any, was taken.
C6. There was a hierarchy of knowledge which led to a misplaced rel iance on
personal experience and on oral com mun ication and a tendency to ignore written
reports.
C S . The system for com municating production figures was more developed than
the system for com municating safety i nformation.
C6. There was a norm at the m i ne that u nless warning signs were verified and
confi rmed they could be ignored .
C6. There was a series of bel iefs at the m i ne, amou nti ng to a cu lture of denial.
One bel ief, i n particular, ' normal ised' the evidence-that is, it reinterpreted the
i ndications of abnormal ity as lyi ng withi n the bou nds of normal ity.
Cl. There were no s pecified actions that were mandatory when warni ng signs
were detected.
C7. No one was identified as responsible for critical , safety-relevant decisions.
C6. The system of auditing by the company was thoroughly i nadequate.
CS. The m i ne was using the wron g safety indicator - the lost time i njury
frequency rate. This provided no i ndication of how wel l catastrophic risk was
being managed, it just showed time lost due to i njuries.
CB. There were no i ncentives for mine managers to concern them selves with
disaster prevention .
C6/7 BHP had decentral ised responsibility for the control of catastrophic risk,
along with all other aspects of safety, to the mine level. It had no corporate
expertise in d isaster prevention , despite its history of m ine explos ions.
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C l1. (Compliance) The law does not in practice hold the company or its senior
management legally accountable for disaster prevention in the mine.
CS. Coal mines inspectorates are hamstrung in their enforcement efforts by their
position in mining departments.

7.3.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Evidence from each of the cases examined in this research revealed that stressful conditions
test managerial competencies. Different settings demand competencies which may be different
from site to site in the same organisation. The research showed that performance in specific
situations is mitigated by human competency limitations or slippages such as active failures of
individuals who simply fail to perform a competency adequately. For example, careless navigation,
as in the case of the Lake Illawarra; irrational reasoning, limited operator knowledge, unanticipated
interaction of multiple failures as in Moura and Longford; and failure to prepare adequate escape
routes as in the Westralia case. Communication downwards invariably results in failures of
procedures, because individuals who need an overall operational view of critical systems and
processes are unlikely to grasp the whole of system picture if they are simply subject to orders, as
in the Zeebrugge case (described in chapter 2, 2.11.2).
The Moura and Longford enquiries involved the same company (BHP) and indicated the
clear need for salient performance management, which suggests overall organisational learning and
specific site learning is needed in similar situations. Achieving this balance is a management
responsibility. The Zeebrugge case confirms this. The last person to leave the car deck on the night
of the disaster didn't check that the doors were closed or close them himself. The Zeebrugge
inquiry (Sheen, 1987) found that, 'He took a narrow view of his duties and it is most unfortunate
that he took this attitude.'
There is a delicate balance between giving too much freedom and requiring people to stick
rigidly to tightly defined job descriptions. The Herald of Free Enterprise (off Zeebrugge) disaster
poignantly demonstrated the need for employees to be able to exercise their own judgement
where it is salient to safety. P&O's managers, however, ignored the earlier concerns of employees
regarding the haste to depart. The inquiry also found that P&O management's inability to collect
and communicate vital information was a telling reflection on their training, sensitivity and
knowledge of the business they purported to manage. They failed to demonstrate any significant
performance capabilities salient to the situation they were managing.
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7.4 Competency 10: Multidisciplinary performance (bringing
together skills from different and complementary domains
to manage a particular hazard)
7.4.1 INTERPRETATION
Multidisciplinary performance is anchored in Mitroff and Linstone's (1993) concept of
'expertise'. Mitroff and Linstone claim that expertise provides a set of patterns about a subject and
these in tum together construct a schemata. This schemata provides both intuition and learned
opinion. For example, it is not uncommon for trained organisational consultants to walk into an
organisation and talk to the receptionist to suspect that there may be something wrong with that
organisation. Some people are able to offer a 'learned opinion' rather than just an 'opinion'.
Judges offer 'learned opinions' based on their knowledge of the law and previous cases.
Perrow (1999) suggests a disconfirming line of reasoning when he reminds us that experts
make errors and suggests that experts are people who 'abjure intuitions'. However, he applies a
concept somewhat equivalent to Mitroff and Linstone's schemata, in considering 'heuristics', which
he suggests are 'regularised, checked out intuitions'. He suggests that heuristics prevent a paralysis
of decision making and the 'costs of search', the collection, prioritising and ranking of all possible
choices. This is salient when considered in light of Mintzberg's (1973) claim that managers'
activities are generally varied, typically of short duration - less than half an hour · and often
interrupted and little time was spent reading or reflecting or in solitary activity.
Multidisciplinary performance can be illustrated in the example given by Reason (2000) who
illustrates the point in the case of a Boeing 767 that, after a series of blunders, ran out of fuel on a
domestic flight in Canada. Without power, the plane lost use of its flaps for a controlled descent.
The captain, a skilled glider pilot, used a manoeuvre known as a sideslip. He lost height quickly
without going into a dive, then kicked the tail back into normal position for landing. The plane
landed safely, although it was certainly never included in any Boeing procedure manual. Reason
calls this phenomena, 'resilience'. Call it schemata, heuristics or resilience, it still amounts to
multidisciplinary performance and it relies on expertise in other than the prime field of concern,
such as the use of skills from diverse domains of knowledge, training and previous involvement in
life and work.
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Singer (1959) proposed that every act performed by humans was complex and had within it
a complex series of other actions, which themselves could be modified by 'ideas swept in'. This
critical concept of nonseperability and interconnectedness forms the basis of the 'systems
approach' and is the basis of this competency, which asserts that skills from different and
complementary domains must be utilised with expertise in a connected way to prevent accidents.
This competency is the one most obviously lacking in the examples of systemic failure in this
section, suggesting that there is a failure to exercise the previous nine competencies at the same
time. This is usually a consequence of the crisis at hand and a propensity for ignoring the enabling
lessons of experience to address unfamiliar and unanticipated events. This may be due to a failure
of training to translate skills into practical responses or simply because these competencies are not
current and relevant to the specific situation, even though they may be relevant in other situations.
HyperRESEARCH disclosed several descriptors closely associated with multidisciplinary
performance listed in Table 7.4.1 below. The cases revealed that the primary critical performance
indicator expressed is a failing to exercise competent responsibility for the welfare of others by
those who purport to have such responsibility (dominant management coalitions such as directors
and individual managers). Dominant coalitions have a final organisational moral responsibility for
the consequences of the impacts the organisation has on stakeholders; hence, 'the problem of
systems improvement is the problem of the 'ethics of the whole system' (Churchman 1968:4). The
implications are clear. Dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations have a clear cut
responsibility to safeguard stakeholders, particularly where unanticipated factors are in play, and
require a multidisciplinary competency set to do it effectively. The various Commissions of Inquiry
found that responsible managers failed to exercise the competencies they had and that many did
not maintain their competencies. Cases, such as Longford, also made it clear that there were
significant failures of training across many levels of management. This competency tends to capture
the capabilities developed in each of the other competencies developed in this research and its
failure can most clearly be said to be a failure of competence.

critical performance indicators, currency of competence, failure of training, failure to exercise
com etencies, unantici ated actors
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7.4.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
If oganisations learned from events, near misses and other incidents then, conceivably, such
lessons would be incorporated into an organisation's systems. Ethos based team skills such as
feedback, cooperation, team orientation, coordination, leadership, and backup behaviour influence
a team's effectiveness. The literature supports this view and the direct linkages with other
competencies discussed earlier. For example, Mitroff and Linstone (1993:91) state: 'The logic for
choosing a particular way of modelling or representing a problem is not governed by
considerations of conventional logic and rationality (orthodox management). It may also involve
considerations of justice and fairness as perceived by various social groups and by considerations
of personal ethics and morality as perceived by distinct persons.' Mitroff and Linstone's observation
establishes relationships with all of the previously described competencies.
The relationship between the competencies developed in this research is organic. An
absence of any of the first nine competencies will render the final one difficult. Ideally, each
competency would build on the next.
A stark case of a multidisciplinary failure caused by a failure of ethics, vigilance and foresight
and the other competencies were the attacks on the World Trade Centre and other US targets on
September the 11th, 2001. For at least 12 minutes after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
warned the military's air defence command that a hijacked airliner appeared to be headed toward
Washington (9:25am), the federal government failed to make any move to evacuate the White
House, Capitol, State Department or the Pentagon, which was the eventual target of the attack
Only after the 9:38 a.m. impact into the side of the Pentagon were other government buildings
evacuated, including the White House and the Capitol. CNN (16;9;2001) reported that officials at
the Pentagon said that no mechanism existed within the U.S. government to notify various
departments and agencies under such circumstances. A failure of multidisciplinary competencies in
government makes catastrophic systemic failures of judgement inevitable.

7.4.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Questions that assess mental schemata as suggested by Perrow (1999), Reason (2000), and
Mitroff (1998) should reveal an existing rigidity and inflexibility in specific situations where
diagnostic skills arising from expertise and intuitive approaches may be better suited. These
questions should also go to the heart of learning failures, and issues related acquiring expertise,
such as:
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•

To what extent do organisations learn from the lessons of accidents?

•

Does the depth (within the multidisciplinary skill set - team or individual) and
breadth (across the team and each individual's skill set) enable integration of
knowledge to support decisions?

•

Is there a measurable difference in team orientation, related to power, in
communication skills, leadership and hazard reduction between female and male
team members?

•

What consequences might flow if a team or individual responsible for safety
decisions becomes dysfunctional?

•

How might dysfunctional behaviour be mitigated?

•

What factors enable or inhibit team problem solving?

•

What is the nature and impact of successful multidisciplinary collaborations, and the
role of technology in these collaborations?

Mostly these are questions for postdoctoral research, however, this research attempts to
address some of them, particularly where expertise and integration are concerned. Finally, as
Perrow (1999) suggests, we should also ask, 'What risks should we run to promote the private
profits of a few?'

7.4.4 LITERATURE
This problem of multidisciplinary competence is addressed by Turner's theory of 'prior
knowledge' (developed in Turner, 1976, 1978, and in Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). Mitroff and
Linstone (1993:98) suggest that a 'multiple perspective' [multidisciplinary] approach enables the
use of technical, organisational and personal information to ensure that underlying assumptions
and values are considered in dealing with problems. Mitroff and Linstone identifie 'risky positions'
taken by groups and the difficulties of measuring human reaction times in systems. Dunphy
(1981:163) argues that job redesign for sociotechnical organisations must reverse the traditional
principles of job design on several key dimensions. He points to the need for multiskilling and
autonomy and participation in decision making applied to complex tasks, quality control,
inspection and work environments. This principle can be translated directly to high reliability
organisations such as those studied in this research.
Dunphy and Griffiths (1998:53) define sociotechnical systems as having certain
characteristics:
•

metaphor, organised as an organic open system;
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• diagnostic, systems combined with participant redesign and work practices;
• ideal state, representative democratic community composed of semiautonomous
work groups with the ability to continuously learn through participative action
research;

•

intervention strategies, comprised of participative action research and workplace
redesign around socio-technical principles.

Stace and Dunphy (1994: 190) demonstrate a multidisciplinary 'star' concept using these
principles that was developed at Akan, Granville, NSW. It transfers new tasks and responsibilities
to teams that are structured to bring a variety of competencies to a project and at the same time
relieve the burden of new tasks on the team leader.
The model illustrates roles allocated to team members. Each member has a primary and an
alternate role. The director stands in for the team leader and is responsible for utilisation of idle
time. The personnel and safety role carries out accident investigations, reports on safety issues and
conducts regular safety training events such as talks. Production and quality team members
represent the team at meetings and keep production records. Administration deals with orders,
supplies from store and maintains holiday and overtime schedules; while the equipment team
members sets maintenance priorities and records equipment performance. This team profile may
be adaptable with minor modification to high reliability organisations. Clearly the model is based
on orthodox management values and would need to be modified to take account of ethics, ethos
building, vigilance and foresight systems along with training and cyclical retraining and succession.
These competencies develop values and give guidance and motivation in situations where manuals
cease to be effective.
This simple model can be adapted to specific situations and provides a large measure of
multidisciplinary performance assurance. Had this system been employed at Longford and Moura it
may well have obviated the accidents at those places. Such a model also has the benefit that it
encourages job rotation, multiskilling, collaborative work practices and continuous improvement,
particularly in key areas of an organisation's activities such as safety, customer service, productivity,
quality and equipment performance and maintenance and process engineering. If properly applied
the model confers the benefits of technical, supervisory and managerial multiskilling and use of
skills from different domains.
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Mitroff and Linstone (1993: 90-110) argue that, ' . . . the widest possible array of disciplines,
professions, and branches of knowledge - capturing distinctly different paradigms of thought - must
be consciously brought to bear on our problems.' More recently Whittingham (2003) also
examined the linkage between human error and accidents and identified failures of performance
such as slips and lapses among error types. He also considered human reliability, task complexity
and the problem of expert judgement and task decomposition among other task shaping factors. If
this is framed by Eraut's (1994) perspective that people need to meet the requirements of a
particular job to be considered competent it is possible to argue that the competency mix appears
to become more complex as the literature reveals more recent and sophisticated insights.
The capacity to consistently engage in correct error modelling, or being in possession of a
relevant site-specific taxonomy of error types is being revealed over time as a managerial
competency requiring extraordinary breadth and depth of general and specific skills almost beyond
the scale and scope of abilities of a single person to master. The problem is further amplified
because as Mitroff and Linstone (1993:91) claim, 'everything interacts with everything'.
Mol (2004) also suggests a multidisciplinary strategic approach for hazardous industries that
ties safety and production together. Her contribution requires managers and multidisciplinary
teams to consider risk models, organisational decision making, systems change processes,
technologies, physical environments, human resources, risk quantification, managerial behavioural
change (suggesting leadership and management training and behavioural audits) as well as
formulating a safety management plan as a method of enhancing management performance using
an achievement cycle.
However, multidisciplinary teams bring with them their own approaches and some
problems that need to be actively managed. Kraut et al (1988) in a collaboration study in science
stressed the importance of communication and the social component of successful collaborations
and found that virtually all of the social and most of the task activities were performed informally
face-to-face and they found no case in which collaborators used formal management techniques or
technologies. Collaborators used division of labour to reduce demands on communication. Also,
institutional, disciplinary, and professional norms (that the collaborators shared in common)
resolved many problems of how to proceed.

283

High reliability organisations should understand that systems are evolving to fit with the
information sharing practices of different industries and professions (see, for instance, Lodahl and
Gordon, 1972; Hargens, 1975; Garvey, 1979; Whitley, 1984) that reflect disciplinary norms of
information ownership and communication and help collaborators to learn the norms of other
disciplines. These emerging adaptive systems themselves require special competencies to manage
them. For example, there are different issues among co-located teams and teams experiencing
geographic and functional distance between members (Krackhardt, 1992). In addition, when teams
are distributed, membership is often transitory, and representation varies over time, then new
problems in coordination arise including members' incomplete understanding of others' group
identity, questions about information ownership, secrecy, and proprietary products, and
socialization of newcomers. Compounding these problems is a "misinformation effect" (Reder,
1998) whereby interaction in a group and discussion of ideas distort the real sources of ideas,
which may obscure early warning signals.
7 .4.5 CASE TEXT DATA
Creating and evaluating systems for members of multidisciplinary groups, as for individuals,
requires managers to understand non-managerial concepts such as advice networks, professional
weak ties, and social filters (whereby certain important traits are actively selected and others are
not) and their effects on collaboration, shared knowledge and access to multidisciplinary
competencies (Hill, Stead, Rosenstein and Furnas, 1995; Resnick and Varian, 1997; Terveen and
Hill, 1997). While experts tend to solve problems faster and better than non-experts they may also
redefine problems to suit their schemata and hence solve the wrong problems. Many of these
issues are directly addressed or implied in the following data extracted from the cases using
HyperRESEARCH.
Both the Moura and the Lake Illawarra cases illustrate the process of failing to exercise
multidisciplinary competencies. The Moura Inquiry (Queensland Warden's Court, c1996) found
the explanation for the accident was management neglect and the wrong assumptions made.
[failure to exercise competencies] The complex of competencies which
must come together i n a crisis i s critical to steering a safe path through a
hazardous s ituation. For example, the Coronial Inquiry's u ltimate explanation for
what had caused the fatal accident at Moura No. 2 Underground Mine on Sunday,
7 August 1 994, was ' management neglect':
"It i s the opinion of the I nquiry that events at Moura surrounding ass umptions as
to the state of knowledge of the night shift on 7 August and the safety of those
at the m i ne represents a passage of management neglect and non-decision
which m ust never be repeated i n the coal m i ning i ndustry. Mineworkers place
thei r trust in management and have the right to expect management to take
MOURA

284

respon s i ble decisions i n res pect to th eir safety. They also h ave the right to
ex pect manag ement to keep them i nformed on any matter l i kely to affect their
safety and welfare (Wi nd ridge 1996:4 12)."

The Lake Illawarra case found that a failure to exercise several competencies contributed to
the accident. The findings against Captain Pelc seem somewhat unjust if one contemplates that his
'expertise' or mental map of Hobart harbour and all its eddies and tidal swirls around the bridge
failed him due to the production pressures that may have been on him to tum his ship around.
The word, 'precautions' in the data extract point to a failure of schemata. Had he had a higher level
of 'expertise' he may well have asked for a pilot. More to the point, the Harbour Master should
have insisted on it if he had the more recent and comprehensive 'expertise' of Hobart harbour.
ILLAWARRA Ord i nari ly, when i ncidents which happened on an i solated occas ion
are i n question, the Cou rt wi l l be co n s idering whether there was carel ess
navigation on the part of a competent Master o r Offi cer. "Careless navigation" i n
t h i s context, therefore, connotes a fai l u re t o n avigate with such care and skill' as
a compete nt Master or Officer wou l d reasonably be ex pected to exercise in the
circumstances.
There is l ittle if any difference, in our opin ion, between "carel es s navigation" and
"negl igent navigation". That view is s u pported by the defi nition of a s h i p master's
d uty of care g iven by I saacs and Rich JJ. in Spai n v. U n i o n Steams h i p Co. of New
Zealand Ltd. ( 1 9 2 3) 33 C.L.R. S S S , at p. 5 6 9 :
" . . . t h e legal standard o f the Captai n's d uty was that he s h o u l d take whatever
precautions a hypothetical prudent and s ki l led navigator wou l d reasonably be
expected to take in the actual circ u m stan ces . "

The Longford Royal Commission, (1999: 13.134-5) found that the evidence before it
indicated that critical performance indicator data that was recorded by the Bailey system and also
stored in the PIDAS database (PIDAS provided a continuous record of process information) were
not used as effectively as they might have been and that their ineffective use played a part in the
occurrence of the accident on 25 September 1998. This was mostly due to a loss of expertise when
the plant engineers were transferred to Melbourne. This effectively mitigated 'learning' because the
essential records for surveillance purposes and for accident investigation and analysis were thrown
away.
The conseq uence of the relocation of plant engi neers to
LONGFORD 1 3 . 1 34
Melbo u rne was that the i mportant task of cont i n u o u s monitoring of process
conditi ons wit h i n the Longfo rd facil ity was d i m i n i s hed. Mo reover, what was done
was no longer carried out by plant engi neers.
I n stead , it was undertake n al m ost excl us ively by operators and pl ant s u pervi sors
whose s u rve i l lance work was focused on i m mediate prod uction req u i rements
rather than trend analys i s or the analys i s of recurring process problems.
1 3 . 1 3 5 The l ack of plant s u rveil lance activity i n G P l was demonstrated by the
l ack of use made of process i nformati on. El ectron ically generated process
i n formation was automatically retai ned in the PI DAS d atabase. H owever, it wou l d
s e e m that it was rarely, if ever, l ooked at, let alone s u bjected t o a n y trend
analys i s . The remai n i n g 70% of process i nformation for GPl was to be found on
chart record i ngs and was al so n ot s u bjected to any trend analys i s . This is
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apparent because there was no system in place for preserving such records either
for surveillance purposes or for accident investigation and analysis. The evidence
was that charts, once used, were discarded by operators. They were not stored or
retained. Thus historical process information covering some 70% of GP I
operations was never reviewed by engineers for surveillance purposes, but simply
thrown away. Charts were not even date stamped at their beginning and end to
make analysis easier.

7.4.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
The loss of expertise points directly to the need for a system of developing and enriching the
available schemata of dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations. It should include a focus
of concern on each of the competencies elaborated in this research and be seen as something
needed in addition to individual expertise. A multidisciplinary competency approach such a this
should be informed by the work of authors such as Dunphy and Griffiths (1998), Stace and
Dunphy (1994), Mitroff and Linstone (1993), Whittingham (2003), and Mol (2004), discussed in
Chapter 2.
7.4.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
There is a difference between knowledge held by the system and knowledge held by the
dominant coalition (those who make decisions). It seems that in many cases the dominant coalition
makes wrong assumptions about safety and passes off its responsibility to OH&S or other
departments while it is focused on concerns other than safety, such as profit, or acts deliberately in
a straightforward criminal way and ignores safety in spite of signals warning of hazards
(Longford/Esso). Hopkins (1999:57-8) observes that the normal practice at Moura No. 2 was to go
underground to work elsewhere when a recently sealed panel was going through the explosive
stage. In contrast, at the adjacent Moura No. 4 mine, the practice had been for panels to be sealed
on a Friday and for the men to stay out of the mine over the weekend while the panel went
through the explosive stage. Both were BHP mines. However, there was no head office safety policy
and the site specific result was that the Moura No. 4 miners simply refused to go underground
while a panel was explosive. At Moura No. 2, a different workforce had not taken similar collective
action.
It appeared to be BHP policy that the miners at both mines could decide and implement
policy for themselves. Consequently, individual middle level managers imposed variants of policy
to focus on performance for their own personal ends. There seemed to be considerable bullying by
individual managers and it was a simmering industrial issue. The Commission found that one
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deputy in particular had raised the issue repeatedly with management. In response, he was told it
was a ploy by workers to get time off. The deputy had been suspended twice for arguing the safety
case with management. This is clear case of a particular site developing a different culture and set
of working conditions because of different site specific managerial values and could not have
happened if there had been multidisciplinary teams in place such as the Akan 'Star Model'.
7.4.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS

The cases and literature when considered together point to the need for critical performance
benchmarks supported by cyclical retraining for dominant coalitions to ensure currency of
competencies - if necessary required by the regulator. Multidisciplinary collaboration in business
organisations in the 1980s (Sproull and Kiesler, 1991) provided a better understanding of how
multidisciplinary groups can effectively use the new technologies available to them. These
multidisciplinary capabilities are considered essential in the more recent literature, such as that of
Whittingham (2003), who examined a range of cases and identified different types of detectable
and preventable errors confirming Turner's thesis of prior knowledge that underpins this research.
Whittingham's examples included:
• organisational and management errors (Flixborough, Herald of Free Enterprise,
railway privatisation);
•

design errors (BP Grangemouth explosion, Estonia ferry sinking, Abbeystead
explosion);

•

maintenance errors (Royal Flight engine failure, Hatfield and Potters Bar rail
crashes);

•

active errors in railway operation;

• active errors in aviation;
• violations (Chernobyl, Mulhouse A320 crash);
• incidence response errors (Swissair flight SRl l l, Channel tunnel fire);
Most, if not all of these, could have been prevented if early intervention had occurred
through these errors being signified as critical by multidisciplinary capable individuals or teams.
The prior knowledge was available in each case but was not converted into intervention by those
responsible.
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7.5 Conclusion
Evidence from the cases examined in this research revealed that prior knowledge could have
prevented the Moura and Longford accidents if it had been acted on. Moura No 2 was the third
explosion in a BHP coal mine in fifteen years. There seemed to be a loss of corporate memory. The
Esso oil platform fire in Bass strait in 1989 was found by the Victorian coroner to be almost
identical to the Piper Alpha fire in the North Sea only nine months before. Kletz (1999:21-2)
suggests that because of this loss of corporate memory managers at the highest level need to
undergo regular refresher courses on the kinds of things that can go wrong in their own
organisations. The inquiry found that Moura No. 2 was a result of 'management neglect and non
decision that must never be repeated.' It was entirely foreseeable and could have been avoided.
Dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations have a clear cut responsibility to
safeguard stakeholders (Windridge 1996:412; Lord Denning, 1975; Turnbull 2002; Gunningham
and Johnstone, 1999:308-340), especially where complex systems govern safety, and they require a
multidisciplinary competency set to do it effectively. The acquisition of such skills should be
performed voluntarily or insisted on by statutory mandate. The principle focus of concern appears
to be ethics, ethos building and competency enhancement.
A multidisciplinary competency program would enable the use of skills from diverse
domains of knowledge, training and previous involvement in life and work. to ensure that
managers understand that every act performed by humans is complex and has within it a complex
series of other actions. Critical concepts of nonseperability and interconnectedness underpin the
insights sought from such a program and is the basis of this competency which asserts that skills
from different and complementary domains must be utilised to prevent accidents. Managers need
to understand that decisions made 'on the run', outside their own areas of expertise, may be based
on faulty schemata and often relying on a mix of hubris and poor information as a consequence of
the crisis at hand, will demonstrate a propensity for ignoring the lessons of experience, particularly
in unfamiliar and unanticipated events. Of most concern to stakeholders appears to be a
willingness by managers to trade-off the welfare of others for profit. This propensity should be
curbed by a punitive regulatory and compliance regime.
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8 Regulatory Compliance and Intervention Issues
'A company may i n many ways be l i kened to a human body. It has a brain and
nervous centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the
tools and act in accordance with d i rections from the centre. Some of the people
in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands
to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or wil l . Others are
directors and managers who represent the di recting mind and wi ll of the
company. '
Lord Denning, 1975.

8. 1 Introduction
This chapter examines the competencies considered most relevant to the requirement
imposed on managers of high reliability organisations to ensure compliance with the regulatory
regimes that govern their enterprises. As in the three previous chapters it adopts the framework of
the modified grounded theory approach set out in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Data Analysis
chapter: interpretation of the concept as it is used in this research followed by a consideration of
the relationships between the competency under consideration and the other key competencies.
The chapter then poses a set of generative questions and a review of the literature salient to the
concept and complementary to the main literature review in chapter 2. An elaboration of the
insights revealed to theory is attempted and other data from the research is then used to ground
the theory. Finally a hypothesis based on the issues revealed by the research is suggested.
When the other competencies fail and an accident occurs it becomes necessary to determine
to what extent the organisation complied with safety policies, laws and guidelines. Ensuring
compliance is an ongoing managerial task or competency. Compliance failure is managerial failure.
Compliance is a competency differentiated from the other competencies in this research by its 'end
game' status. Rather than a concern with eleven key competencies the research addresses ten
competencies plus compliance to establish that this is a competency in a special relationship with
the others. It is both a process of ensuring safety on an ongoing basis and a legal requirement of
management. It is knowledge based rather than behavioural. Managers must know the compliance
requirements of their organisation's operations.
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8.2 Compliance Issues: (compliance and regulatory factors,
legal and other punitive responses to managerial failure)
8.2.1 INTERPRETATION
Compliance issues arise when an organisation fails to comply with specific laws which
govern the actions of the organisation and where that law is enforced by a regulator, rendering the
regulator a party to an accident. Compliance determinations also include consideration of
accountability issues where, for example, the regulator is unable to enforce regulations or their
regulatory independence is seriously compromised, such as where the regulator becomes
dominated by the regulated organisation or industry or where the relationship between regulator
and regulated is compromised by government intervention.
The law is based on precedents and, therefore, is backward looking. The legal system makes
judgement about accidents that have already happened in its determinations of responsibility in
such cases as are presented here. However, it also takes account of the regulations governing the
ongoing conduct and commercial practices of the organisations it examines, particularly in relation
to the Acts of Parliament that govern them through their regulatory authorities, who should
anticipate potential accidents and intervene in the potentiating stream of factors that lead to an
accident.
Tension between the law and management, particularly in relation to the managerial
responsibilities of the dominant coalition (Lord Denning, 1975), arises partly because the law looks
backwards and management looks forwards. Mintzberg (1973, 1975) said that managing involves
staying on track (managing continuity), staying in touch (managing boundaries), and keeping up to
date (managing change). The more complex the organisation and its operations are, the more
managers are duty bound to take responsibility for the complexity and safe running of it (Crainer,
1993). Managers in high reliability organisations have a legal responsibility to anticipate how each
of these might be done while at the same time ensuring they do not generate hazards.
A further complicating factor is that large organisations are legal entities in and of
themselves and under Australian corporate law, directors have absolute power to manage their
own conflicts of interest (Turnbull, 2000). This has direct compliance consequences because the
dominant coalition of large organisations can hide behind the corporate veil, even in cases where
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fatal accidents are preventable or where organisations bypass safety requirements or are not
carrying out the necessary interventions to stop accidents from occurring. Under the current
regulatory regime such accidents tend to be related to managerial systems or blamed on 'systemic
failure' and are seen as misconduct at worst.
In sentencing the train driver after his train killed five people after going through a red light
in Purley in 1989, the judge said, 'The railway passenger who gets onto a train puts himself, in a
very special way, into the hands of the driver.' Crainer (1993) observes that the railway company is
also responsible for the maintenance of the train, the systems surrounding its running, and the
training and proficiency of the its staff.
The dominant coalition, as identified in this and other research (Crainer, 1993), joins
corporate directors with senior managerial staff in a fundamental deontological premise that such
dominant coalitions have prime duties for safety above production and shareholder returns if they
are governing the affairs of high reliability organisations. For example, the dominant coalition has
both a moral and legal responsibility to intervene where prior knowledge is available or where
bypassing safety standards in favour of the priority of production may occur. This research suggests
that the exercise of these responsibilities must be supported by strong legal and financial sanctions,
particularly in high reliability organisations.
The HyperRESEARCH analysis of the text data revealed the following behavioural descriptors
supporting this view (Table 8.2.1).

accountability, breach of law, bypassing safety requirements, cause real, certificate of
competency withdrawn, collateral casualties, collusion, compliance with national standards,
contamination of evidence, criminal offence, dominance of CEO, dominant coalition, economicfactors,
enforcement, failure of regulator, misconduct, regulator unable to enforce compliance, regulatory
independence regulator dominated by regulated, relationship between regulator and regulated, role of
overnment, role o re ulator,

8.2.2 STATEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS
Compliance is a complex issue in preventing accidents. This research treats it as a core
competency that relies to a large extent on mastery of specific knowledge and its application
through the other core competencies, because senior managers have a responsibility to develop a
competent working knowledge of their legal and ethical responsibilities (compliance and ethics),
including the day-to-day running of the company (understanding the salience of the particular
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situation) while retaining sufficient independence of mind (balance) to enable them to reach
sound decisions (judgement)(Crainer, 1993). They need sufficient knowledge and mastery of the
systems as they are designed and as they will be used in practice (performance in a particular

setting). They also need the ability and detachment (foresight) not to make too rapid decisions
about changes to prevent the last disastei33) .
The problem of compliance also strongly implies that failure of the ten core competencies
can not be excused. If the necessary competencies were established and practised there would be
very few, if any, accidents which could be sheeted home to individuals (ie most accidents would be
classed then as acts of God).
Ethics is perhaps the most critical of the competencies to which compliance measures
should apply since it is clearly unethical to decide to allow unsafe conditions to persist which could
cost lives as a trade off for profits or personal power. All of the compliance issues involving the
other competencies flow from this.

8.2.3 ASKING GENERATIVE AND CONCEPT RELATING QUESTIONS
Several questions arise from consideration of sources such as Turnbull (2000), Gunningham
and Johnstone (1999), and the body of this research. these include:

•

•

In what circumstances does managerial failure and neglect become a criminal
offence?
Should incompetent, negligent and criminal behaviours in individuals,
organisations and their regulators attract legal consequences for the key individuals
involved?

•

Should these individuals be allowed to hide behind the veil of the corporate entity?

• What consequences should flow from the contamination of evidence and the failure

•

to comply with safety standards?
What is the effect on stakeholders of ensuring a high reliability entity is governed by
a statutory act while its senior managers face only misconduct charges for
preventable fatal accidents?

33 Professor A. R. Hall, of the Safety Science Group at Delft University made this observation regarding
making rapid decisions to prevent the last disaster while presenting a paper at the Disaster Prevention and
Limitation Conference, Bradford University, December, 1989.
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8.2.4 LITERATURE
Turnbull (2002) claims that shareholders, stakeholders and the public can not trust
corporations because our system of corporate governance creates at least eight reasons why they
should not be trusted:
1. Information overload that m akes i s i m p ractical for d i rectors to monitor
complex and/or dynamic busi nesses with monthly meetings.
2 . Lack of information, i ndependent of m anagement for d i rectors to dete r m i n e
t h e Stre ngths, Weakness, Opportunities a n d Th reats (SWOT) o f m anage ment or
the busi ness.
3. Lack of syste m i c proces s for d i rectors to d i scover when the i r trust in
manage ment might be m i s pl aced.
4. Expropriation by d o m i n ant s h are holder or m an age ment who can dete r m i n e the
appoi ntment of each d i rector and the auditor.
5. Absol ute corruption from abs ol ute power of d i rectors to manage thei r own
confl i cts of i nterest.
6. Non- Executive Di rectors (NEDs) l acking the w i l l to act in the best i nte rest of
the com pany.
7. NEDs l acki ng the capab i l ity to act alone in the best i nterests of the com pany.
8. Shares can be covertly traded and /or m an i p u l ated by i n s iders.

These elements are strongly congruent with the findings of this research. For example, it
became legislatively necessary for the Review of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act, 1994, in the
light of recent cases that indicated managerial failure as a factor in accidents, to set out several
recommendations related to managerial responsibility, and therefore compliance. For example:
R: 7: It is reco m m ended s. 1 2 of the Mines Safety and inspection Act 1 994 be amended
to:
• specify the d uty of employers and self-employed persons to protect non
e m p l oyees from adverse conseque nces of work so that it extends to all aspects
of work including system s of work and h azards ari s i ng afte r d i rect work activity
h as ceased. The application of the section should be restricted to workplace
i n i tiated safety and health m atters.

Recommendations 15 and 16 suggest mine managers be required to have knowledge of the
Act and certification under the Act.
R: 1 5 It i s recom me nded the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 be amended to
req u i re Reg i stered M i ne Managers to be able to demon strate a knowledge of the
Act and associated Regu l ati ons.
R: 16 It i s recommended a review be undertaken of the certification req u i reme nts
in Part 4 of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994.

The West Australian Government set up a safety review in mid June 2004 to run
concurrently with the statutory investigations under the Mines and Safety Inspection Act 1994 to
examine the underlying culture of BHP at its WA Pilbara iron ore operations mine sites and
Boodarie Iron hot briquette iron plant following three deaths (The West Australian June 19,
2004:6). The State Development Minister set the terms of the review to include an examination of
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the cultural and behavioral factors affecting safety. The review will also try (at the time of writing)
to determine the nature of issues arising from the attitude to regulations and company policies
prior to the accidents. It seems that BHP has learned little from the Longford, Moura and other
accidents described in this research.
The data examined in this research is suggestive that dominant coalitions should be held
responsible for preventable accidents. Gunningham and Johnstone (1999:308-340) offer the most
recent, elaborate and thorough exegesis of the compliance issues surrounding management
responsibility as it relates to safety in an Australian legal framework. Salient to this research is their
argument that there is a problem of identifying the responsible officer in large organisations. They
suggest that these difficulties can be overcome by: (a) presuming that the CEO is the responsible
officer; or (b) requiring the organisation to nominate a responsible officer and provide that officer
with adequate training and resources.
Gunningham and Johnstone also argue a case for redesigning OHS regulation and its
enforcement, so as to make it both more effective and efficient in addressing OHS problems. In
doing so they identify a range of 'next generation' regulatory and enforcement instruments arguing
that OHS statutes to be reformed to increase the maximum fines available (to increase the size of
the stick) along with a range of sanctions for OHS breaches. They suggest these sanctions might
include:
•
court-ordered adverse publicity, which enables a court to require the
details of the contravention and the outcome of the prosecution to be publicized
through the media to enhance general deterrence, and to affect non-financial
values of the organisation.
•

supervisory orders and corporate probation, which include:

- internal discipline orders requiring the organisation to investigate the
contravention, discipline those responsible, and return a compliance report to the
court;
- organisational reform orders, which require organisations to report regularly to
the court on its efforts to develop a compliance programme and to reform its
OHS management system; and
- punitive injunctions, where the court requires the organisation to introduce a
specific OHS management system.
•
community service orders, which require the duty holder to carry out an
OHS-related project using the organisation's resources, involving top
management, during normal business hours.
•
dissolution, where the most egregious offenders are required to cease
their activities until their OHS management systems are reformed, or wound up
permanently if the court decides that they are incorrigible.
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•
equity fines, where i nstead of being fi ned, offenders are requi red to issue
new shares to the OHS agency wh ich can be liquidated by the agency when it
chooses. This sanction might result in a di lution of the offenders shares, might
i ncrease its suscepti bil ity to a takeover, and m ight decrease the val ue of top
management's shares in the organisation.
•
disq ualification from tendering for govern ment contracts. (Cunni ngham
and Johnstone, 1999: 3 34)

The research data would support this set of sanctions for failure to comply with OHS
regulations, since the current impression is that most OHS regulations focus on management
systems rather than the consequences of them.
Gunningham and Johnstone (1999:309) also examine the issue of compliance and conclude
that there is a debate between specification standards (which tell duty holders how to meet a goal
by requiring compliance with detailed technical requirements) and performance standards (which
define the duty in terms of problems to be solved or goals to be achieved). They note a trend
towards replacing specification with both performance standards and principle-based standards
(for example, very general 'duty of care' provisions) while complementing these with greater
reliance on codes of practice rather than regulations. They claim that their approach, in most
circumstances, establishes general goals but leaves duty holders with the flexibility and discretion
of finding the most effective and efficient way to achieve them and they see this as a benefit.
This research agrees but caveats their claim in that such benefits appear to rely on the
competencies of dominant coalitions. These competencies can not be assumed, based on the data
at hand. They point out that recently, there has been a trend to complement performance
standards with process-based standards: standards which address procedures for achieving a
desired result. However, this research is suggestive that compliance with performance standards
becomes compliance with minimum performance standards in practice, and that these minimum
standards become defacto benchmarks that organisations set as the highest standards they are
prepared to meet.
In general, Gunningham and Johnstone recognise this problem and suggest that the weight
of specification standards should be substantially reduced. But where there is a high degree of risk
and there are specific controls which are applicable to all circumstances where the risk occurs and
which are essential to control the risk, then more rigid standards should be maintained. They
suggest that small employers and subcontractors, in particular, remain a problem under this
approach because they often require much more concrete direction as to what is required of them.
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They claim that this direction can be most appropriately given through technical guidance
documents, rather than through legally binding and prescriptive specification standards.
This view assumes that the regulator is competent, which the data in this research does not
support. For example, Seaview Airlines was in possession of all the technical documents it needed
to avoid accidents and the regulator knew of the regulatory breaches this airline was engaging in.
The regulator should have intervened and did not. It was the combination of regulator and
operator incompetence which resulted in the fatal Seaview accident. The CAA, however, sought to
entirely blame Seaview.
Congruent with these findings, Gunningham and Johnstone (1999:317) found that empirical
scrutiny revealed that inspectors did not use a framework for an escalating enforcement response
against individual employers and the enforcement response tended to be informal and
unstructured. Moreover, they found that there may be little consistency across the inspectorate
(regulator) about the circumstances in which the various notices are issued, or prosecutions taken.
Again, the Seaview case supports their findings.
Gunningham and Johnstone also develop an argument for a lateral approach to regulation,
taking advantage of the considerable leverage that large firms have over smaller trading partners.
This would involve using the former as surrogate regulators, who would act if not to 'police', at
least to oversee, the OHS performance of their suppliers and contractors, exercising control
through the extended application of their management systems. Had the Navy overseen the
manufacture of the fuel hoses installed in the Westralia, for example, it is unlikely there would have
been an accident.

8.2.5 CASE TEXT DATA
This research suggests that compliance should be an issue when an organisation is in breach
of common laws, such as those that consider culpable manslaughter to be a criminal act, or where
there is deliberate contamination of evidence or other criminal behaviour in fatal or serious injury
accidents. However, it becomes apparent on reading the various accident reports from this
research and others, such as Zeebrugge and Bhopal, that senior management seems to be
protected from prosecution even where culpability is established. For example, Crainer (1993)
observes that British precedents demonstrated some confusion regarding the role of managers. A
1971 House of Lords case found that Tesco was not criminally liable when one of its shop
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managers defaulted on a payment. It decided that the manager was not sufficiently senior enough
to count as the 'company'.
This decision found its way into later safety related accident cases. In reference to the
Zeebrugge case (Herald of Free Enterprise), an article in the Guardian (13 Oct, 1987) by Hugo
Young captured, albeit in journalistic rhetoric, the attitude to responsibility often found among
senior management: 'It says something about the moral climate in which we live that a ship can
sink, 188 people die, a judge report a catalogue of negligence, a coroner's jury find unlawful killing
- and yet the owners can be so bold as to contend that they, of course, are not to blame.' This is in
spite of the fact that Lord Brabazon said that 'The government fully accepts that a sloppy and
inefficient shipowner or ship's manager can make it difficult for a master to carry out his duties.'
'Sloppy' management was used to describe the actions of Townsend Thoresen's management after
the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise of Zeebrugge in the Sheen Report (1984).
Compliance is a fluid and changing legal palette on which the law is practised. Sometimes
the legal brush is broad and sometimes finely nuanced. For example, judges have differed on what
constitutes 'senior management'. Lord Denning in 1975 suggested that it is directors and managers
who represent the directing mind and will of the company. Lord Diplock restricted the definition
to directors. Lord Reid included senior officers who carry out the functions of management. Lord
Dilhorne included persons in actual control of operations who in practice are not responsible for
anyone else.
The report of the Court of Marine Inquiry: ss Lake Illawarra (1975) was interesting in that it
went beyond management and recognised the role of the regulator, and yet went to considerable
lengths to exonerate the Harbour Master. However, it seems inescapable that the conditional
paragraphs below are strongly suggestive that the role of the regulator was at best discretionary, if
not borderline, and perhaps a causative factor in this accident. The accident occurred on the cusp
of the altered navigation arrangements in the Port of Hobart and it is quite clear the Captain Pelc
should have been piloted through the port since he had not previously entered the port under the
new navigation regulations.
ILLAWARRA [role of regulatoij The evidence given by Captain Pelc makes two
matters clear:
(a)
there was no doubt in his mind about his ability to navigate his vessel
into the Port of Hobart without the aid of a pilot (1041); and,
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(b)
h i s purpose i n sending a telegram (before enteri ng the port of Hobart)
was to check whether his Pi l otage Exe m ption Certificate remained valid i n
accordance with the Regulations ( 1 040).
The Master's Pilotage Exem ption Certificate remained valid in accordance with
Reg ulation 8, and that there was no reason to exercise the discretion which the
Harbour Master bel ieved (759) he had under Regulation 10 (2) to prevent Captai n
Pelc exercising h i s right as an Exe m pt Master to enter the Port. We believe their
decision as to the val idity of Captai n Pele's Pi lotage Exem ption Certificate was
correct.
We do not stay to consider closely the nature of the Harbour Master's discretion
under Regulation 10 (2), or the circumstances in which it might be exercised.

(Court of Marine Inquiry: ss Lake Illawarra, 1975:7)

The next paragraph suggests that it was unfortunate that the Port of Hobart did not act
consistently with its altered policy. This is congruent with a propensity to exonerate the regulating
authority and to blame the frontline operator.
However, we think it appropriate to observe, in light of what has occurred, that it
i s u nfortunate that when the Mari ne Board i n 1971 i ntroduced the two-year
pilotage rule for the Zones of the Port of Hobart it did not act consi stently with its
altered pol icy by maki ng that rule applicable, not only to future Exe m ption
Certificates, but also to those i ssued before the division of the Port i nto Zones.
We desi re to recom mend that the Regu lations be altered so as to make it clear
that an Exempt Master must navigate the waters of a Zone of the Port of Hobart
within two years if h i s Exemption Certificate is to remai n val id in res pect of that
Zone. (Court of Marine Inquiry: ss Lake Illawarra, 1975:7)

The Lake Illawarra case is one of the first cases in Australian law to offer a finding which to
some extent engaged with the role of the regulator.
Later cases such as the Seaview/CAA, Westralia, and Longford cases had much better
theoretical and case precedent information to work with and were strongly critical of the role of
the regulator and used the evolving language and insights from work such as that of Reason (1982,
1987, 1994, 1995, 2000) and Turner (1976, 1978) and Turner and Pidgeon, (1997). The Longford
case also seems to have relied to some extent on the analysis of the Moura case by Hopkins (1999).
The Longford Royal Commission Report (Dawson, 1999) illustrates the relationship between prior
knowledge and responsibility for handover, or accountability - failures that directly played a part in
the cause of the accident.
LONGFORD 1 3 . 1 0 1 At the commencement of the day shift on 25 Septem ber
1998, the outgoing GPl panel operator had an obligation to tel l the rel ieving
operator, not only about the cold tem peratures in Absorber B, but about the off
scale level s of condensate i n that vessel. Both of these conditions had existed for
some time (prior knowledge). Ol sson should at least have told Ward about the
al most constant occurrence of the Absorber B h igh level alarm and the TC9 1 3
alarm and the fact that such alarms were still active at changeover
(accountability). I ndeed, the purpose of the handover procedure as a
communication tool was to ensure that i mportant process i nformation was
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passed on. In the same way, Olsson's log book entries at the conclusion of his
shift could have been, and should have been, more informative. They should also
have made reference to these matters.
13.12 8 However, the evidence before the Commission indicates that such records
were not used as effectively as they might have been in GPL Indeed it is possible
that their ineffective use played a part in the occurrence of the accident ( cause
real) on 2 5 September 1998. (The Longford Royal Commission Report,
1999: 13.101)

The Longford Royal Commission Report (Dawson, 1999) also made it clear that in order to
provide a safe working environment there was an obligation to provide appropriate operating
procedures to deal with the loss of lean oil circulation, cold temperatures and the shutdown and
start up of the plant. Furthermore, the operators and supervisors could and should have known of
and understood the real hazards confronting them on the day. Esso failed to take measures that
were plainly practicable. Bypassing safety requirements this way also affects the organisation's
capacity to learn from reported anomalies.
13.144 The SMM definitions of 'incident' and 'near miss' were clearly wide
enough to require operations personnel to report as an incident any serious
process upset that occurred during the operation of the Longford plant, In
practice, however, the obligation to report incidents was construed narrowly both
by Essa management and by operations personnel. Process upsets were rarely, if
ever, the subject of an incident report, unless they were accompanied by injury to
persons or damage to property.
13.145 The consequence of this practice was that process upsets which may well
have signified to qualified and experienced personnel, defective equipment, or
inappropriate operating conditions or unsafe operating practices, were not
brought to their attention. Thus, valuable opportunities to learn from process
upsets were lost. (The Longford Royal Commission Report, 1999 : 1 3.144-5)

The cases examined revealed many examples of a failure of accountability leading directly to
safety requirements being bypassed or overlooked. Since this can be a real cause of an accident it is
a serious breach of regulations or failure of compliance. Each commission and coronial inquiry has
placed more or less weight on these failures of accountability. In any case, they serve to point to a
human competency failing in understanding the actual cause of accidents.
Reason (1995, 2000) is right in that a tight system should have prevented the failing,
however, these are failures of individual accountability and are sufficiently important to be
considered more grievous than mere oversights, or to be excused as 'systemic failures particularly
in organisations where they have occurred time and again (such as BHP). Turner and Pidgeon's
(1997) observation that prior knowledge was ignored has more traction. This is heartening since it
more accurately points to the critical and often failed intervention role of the regulator in cases
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where management orthodoxy has not prevented and accident or where negligence or
management incompetence or criminal behaviour has been a factor.
The Longford Commission pointed out that regulations promulgated under the
Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cwlth) required the consent of the
Designated Authority to construct or install a facility and to use a facility offshore. Obtaining
consent entails the submission and acceptance of a safety case. The Gas Safety Act and the Gas
Safety (Safety Case) Regulations 1999 require a gas company to submit a safety case to the Office of
Gas Safety. The safety case must be in writing and comply with the regulations.
If managerial competencies had ensured that compliance with this process had occurred,
BHP would have submitted a safety case that, in tum, would have identified the hazards that
caused the accident
LONGFORD 1 4 . 3 3 The regulatory regi me covering Essa's operations at Longford
was less stringent than for its facil ities upstream from Longford and for the gas
transmission and distribution faci l ities downstream from Longford. Had Esso
been required to submit a safety case with respect to its faci l ities at Longford
before 2 5 September 1998, it is l i kely that it would have identified the very
hazard s which were in evidence on that day, hazards which a proper HAZOP
study of GPl would also have identified.
14.34 The Com m i ssion notes that the Dangerous Goods (Storage & Hand l i ng)
Regu lations 1989 were amended in 1997 to enabl e operators of MHFs to obtain
exemptions from certai n prescriptive provisions contai ned in the regu lations if
they could demon strate compl iance with the national standard. There is no
evidence that Esso ever sought such an exemption. Fai lure to hold such a l icense
was an offence under s.2 1(2) of the Dangerous Goods Act. The l icense held by
Esso expi red on 2 6 August 1998 - exactly one month before the accident. (The
Longford Royal Commission Report, ( 1999: 14. 34)

However, the Longford Royal Commission Report (Dawson, 1999) observed that Esso/BHP's
failure to secure a current license effective at the time of the accident was 'technical'. It sets this
observation against the legislative framework which gave rise to the Occupational Health and Safety
Act and the Dangerous Goods Act. It unequivocally stated that it is a continuous legal and social
responsibility of all those who have control over the conditions and circumstances under which
work is performed.
Longford 14. 16 Until 198 5 , the legislative scheme i n Victoria deal ing with
occupational health and safety was prescriptive. That is to say, it laid down
specific require ments, compliance with which was supervised by government
agencies. For example, there was legis lation deal ing separately with disparate
matters such as pressure vessels, hazardous substances, scaffolding and lifts and
cranes. Followi ng the 1972 Robens Report in the United Kingdom, a decision was
made to change, at least in part, from a prescri ptive system to one that was
performance based, that is to say, one which enunciated the basic and over-
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riding responsibilities of employers and employees. The report (Paragraph 130)
explained that system as follows:
"A positive declaration of the over-riding duties, carrying the stamp of
parliamentary approval, would establish clearly in the minds of all concerned that
the preservation of safety and health at work is a continuous legal and social
responsibility of all those who have control over the conditions and
circumstances under which work is performed. It would make clear that this is an
all-embracing responsibility, covering all workpeople and working circumstances
unless specifically excluded."
The Longford Royal Commission Report, (1999:14.16)

As in the BHP/Esso case, there seemed to be a persistent permissive cultural attitude to
regulations in the CAA (Staunton, J. H., 1996). The inquiry identified process steps which are in
themselves compliance audit competencies. The regulator should, as a matter of course, have these
capabilities in place. It should pursue them to prosecution if clear breaches occur.
CAA It is accepted that the aviation industry has a responsibility to comply with
regulations and that the CAA, not being able to monitor every aspect of every
operation, must place a degree of trust in operators. However, there should be
limits to the degree of trust. CAA officers should not simply assume the accuracy
of what they are told. The information should be received sceptically. It should be
tested more than occasionally for its accuracy. either by inspection or by random
ramp checks.
When inaccuracies are uncovered the CAA should become more probing. It must
do so in order to determine the truth about the level of compliance in an
operation. If that truth reveals criminal offences, consideration should be given
to prosecution or other enforcement action-just as all regulators are obliged to
consider such possibilities when a breach of the law is uncovered. (Executive
Summary p7)

This is also salient in that the CAA case observes a regulator must to some extent trust an
operator to provide proper levels of health and safety, but is still clear that the responsibility to
ensure compliance is on the regulator. 'Responsibility' also embraces its duty of care or
deontological interpretation under the Act that governs its role and responsibilities as a regulator,
to those who may suffer as a consequence of operator negligence or incompetence.
In 1985 the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Dangerous Goods Act were
enacted. Section 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act is one of the two sections (the other
being s.22) which imposed the primary obligation upon an employer to provide and maintain a
safe workplace and working environment, leaving it to the employer to identify the specific steps
required for the carrying out of that obligation.
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This does not exonerate the regulator. Both regulator and organisation are bound in law to
comply with specific Acts governing safety in Australia, each regulator under its establishment Act,
and each organisation under various Occupational Health and Safety Acts.

8.2.6 ELABORATION OF THEORY
Both the organisation and the regulator should be held accountable for fatal accidents. The
research revealed many instances of criminal behaviour, negligence and sheer incompetence which
resulted in fatal accidents. These acts and behaviours go well beyond 'systemic failure'. For
example, in the CAA case, the CEO of Seaview lied, falsified maintenance reports and records,
behaved like a schoolyard bully, engaged in a long record of duplicitous conduct and showed
continuing contempt for critical safety regulations and the regulator.
Clearly, the inquiry into the fatal Seaview crash could not contemplate allowing this
incompetent person (he appeared to possess none of the competencies suggested in this research)
to hide behind the veil of the corporate entity. Paradoxically, the regulator failed to intervene and
deal with this dangerous situation even though it was aware such a potentially hazardous situation
existed. Had the CAA at the time intervened, doubtless the fatal crash would not have occurred.
However, its senior officers also hid behind the corporate veil and received little more than
admonishment for the lives lost. One is compelled therefore to ask to what extent the lax regulator
is complicit in the crash. This suggests that prosecutions ought to be brought against individuals in
organisations, and their regulators, where criminal offences can be established.

8.2.7 GROUNDING THE THEORY THROUGH INTERPLAY WITH OTHER
DATA FROM THE RESEARCH
Gunningham and Johnston (1999:333) suggest that higher monetary fines, and the
possibility of imprisonment for culpable corporate officers, are required to provide a greater
general and specific deterrent to Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) duty holders to ensure that
the perceived costs of OHS contraventions exceed the likely benefits of ignoring or side-stepping
statutory OHS obligations. Sanctions should also signal to OHS duty holders that, where they fail to
introduce appropriate OHS management systems, courts will order them to do so. The Longford
case demonstrated this more recent trend.
The Westralia case illustrated the effect of non-compliance with Naval regulations that insists
that fuel hoses meet certain technical specifications. This non-compliance was found to be the
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direct cause of the Westralia accident. The West Australian Coroner, Alistair Hope, said that "gross
mistakes" were made in not assessing flexible fuel hoses that had been fitted prior to the fire. Mr
Hope's findings concluded that a 'series of mistakes and systemic deficiencies' had led to the fuel
hoses being changed from solid metal to a flexible type. 'The mistakes were very serious mistakes
particularly as the hoses were to be installed close to the indicator cocks which were known to be
extremely hot and a possible ignition source. The use of flexible fuel hoses to replace pipes in the
close vicinity of an exposed heat source capable of igniting diesel without any engineering
assessment of their fitness for the purpose was an outrageously bad error.'
He said the tragedy could have been avoided.
In certain cases, such as fatalities, regulatory acts may be insufficient to both render justice
and to uncover serious failure of duty of care. At best the Navy has been admonished and perhaps
the Commonwealth will have to pay fines as consequences flow from a compliance failure.
Solicitor, Bernard Collaery (West Australian Dec 20, 2003), said he intended to file civil suits on
behalf of the families of the four sailors killed in the accident, despite the expiration of the 12
month statute of limitations. Mr Collaery said, 'We are going to be filing civil processes against the
Commonwealth and we suspect that they will not oppose those writs being filed past the 12 month
limitation period.' He said the coroner's findings vindicated the family's quest for an inquest. 'The
persistent opposition by the Navy to an inquest, claiming that the Naval Board of Inquiry had
answered all the questions, has been found to have been the smokescreen it was. The system of
outsourcing used amounted to nothing short of abdication by the Commonwealth of it
responsibilities to maintain defence assets in proper operational order.'
The Beechcraft Super Twin Air 200 incident is significant because it succinctly illustrates
many of the research findings that show how compliance issues such as the failure of regulators to
act on prior knowledge often goes together with managerial hubris and failure of judgement and
demonstrates the relationship of compliance to several core competencies.
On Monday, September 4, 2000, nine people died when their flight from Perth to Leonora
overflew its destination by more than 2,300 km and crashed in northern Queensland near the
outback town of Burketown, northeast of Mt. Isa. The aircraft appeared to have lost pressurisation
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and flew at around 34,000 feet on autopilot until it crashed34 . It appears that the depressurisation
warning system failed to alert the pilot. The problem is that if depressurisation occurs slowly
people on board can lose consciousness and not be aware of what is happening. The system
installed on the Beechcraft is a small flashing light above the pilot's head. The issue here is that the
Bureau of Air Safety advised the Civil Aviation Safety Authority over a year previously that the
flashing light ought to be accompanied by an audible alarm, but CASA did not act on the advice and
no audible alarms were installed on Beechcraft Super Twin Air 200's in Australia. This particular
aircraft was normally used as flying doctor aircraft.
The strange paradox of this accident is that Tom Ballantyne's article in Tbe Bulletin of the
5th of September (the same day the accident was reported in headlines around the country)
carried a picture of the CEO of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Mick Toller, on its cover with the
lead story of that issue entitled, 'Zero Tolerance, Taking the Fear out ofFlying'. The article has the
CEO arguing that safety fears have been 'overblown'. It was a response to the premise that air
safety regulation in Australia is in turmoil and following the resignation of Dr. Rob Lee, the head of
the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) , which insiders report was due to his belief that
organisational changes (BASI being incorporated into the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB) and funding cuts undermined the work of the air accident branch's ability to do its job.
Again, Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) argument is established (that prior information was known
which could have prevented the accident but it was not heeded by the dominant coalition).
In each of these accident scenarios we see 'scientific' insights failing to prevent future
accidents and in each case the dominant coalition could have acted to prevent the accident but did
not. This failure to act on previously known information is central to this thesis. It raises concerns
about the preoccupations and state of mind of managers. As recently as March 200235 , the Western
Australian Coroner, Mr Alistair Hope reported that his attempts to conduct an inquest into the
Beechcraft accident were 'bedevilled from the start'. Counsel Assisting, Mr. Dominic Mulligan,

Daniel Clery reporting in the West Australian, Tuesday Sept 5 2000. He stated that the pilot was
heard gasping and breathing heavily before air traffic controllers lost touch with him soon after take-off. A
si milar event occurred i n the Un ited States in 1999 on October 2 5 when golfer Payne Stewart's private
Learjet 35 flew 2240 km on autopilot before crash i ng after decrom pression caused the six people on board
to lose consciousness.
35
The West Austral ian Saturday, March 16, 2 002 (p36)
34
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echoed this view when he said that a lack of cooperation between various government bodies36 did
not justify a high level of public confidence.
The accident report eventually presented revealed that ATSB investigators did not include
interviews nor did they take notes and their sources of information remained confidential. During
the hearing an ATSB investigator said he was instructed not to bring the bureau's files to court.
Similarly, a doctor called to give evidence was told that his files were not available for release. The
inquest ended in acrimony when Mr Hope ordered the ATSB to provide him with the engineers'
report on the plane. Mr Mulligan accused CASA of taking no active part in any meaningful form of
investigation. He had written to CASA on February 15 and March 1 seeking their current attitude to
the fitting of audible alarms on air craft to alert pilots of pressurisation problems. Neither letter had
been acknowledged or answered until after the start of the inquest.
Neither the ATSB nor Air Services Australia would provide the Coroner with a copy of the
final conversations between the doomed flight and ground control. Air Services' advised the
Coroner that: 'As long as Air Services receives written confirmation that there is no potential
adverse involvement for Air Services, we are more than happy to cooperate with the Coroner.' The
Queensland police finally forwarded their report to the Coroner on February 27, but only after
repeated requests and telephone calls. The evidence demonstrates the hubris of senior
management and confirms that as the pressure increases the stronger is the tendency to
autopoiesis.

8.2.8 ELABORATION TO HYPOTHESIS
Gunningham and Johnston (1999:333) hold that corporate liability should be attributed to
the acts of upper and middle management. This is congruent with the evidence from each of the
cases examined in this research which revealed that erroneous thinking by senior personnel was at
the centre of accident causes. For example, in the case of Moura No.2, considerable financial
incentives were paid for production but none for the conscientious management of catastrophic
risk (Hopkins, 1999:134). The research strongly suggests that each party should be held
36
The bodies referred to are the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, The Civil Aviation Safety
Authority, Ai r Services Australia, and the Queensland Pol ice Depart ment. The ATSB said that the Coroner
and the victim's fam ilies were not 'interested parties' and they were not made aware of a draft of the ATSB
report. When the ATSB were told that the Coroner would hand down an adverse report that the ATSB were
not competent to investigate air crashes, the report was fast tracked. Eleven counsel representing the
various parties turned up for the inquest.
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accountable for failures which could have been prevented particularly where breaches of governing
acts and criminal law occur.
The Review of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 made several recommendations
related to managerial responsibility and therefore compliance, for example,
R: 7: It is recommended s. 1 2 of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1 994 be amended
to:
• specify the duty of employers and self-employed persons to protect non
employees from adverse consequences of work so that it extends to .fill aspects
of work including systems of work and hazards arising after direct work activity
has ceased.

It then goes on to limit the effect stating, 'The application of the section should be restricted
to workplace initiated safety and health matters.'

8.3 Conclusion
If benighted managers in positions of responsibility in high reliability organisations, or
people in the appropriate regulatory authority, are found to be negligent or incompetent, or their
actions can be construed to be criminal and this results in fatal accidents, then those people ought
not to be able to hide behind the veil of the corporate entity. At the very least, if the corporate
entity is considered to be a legal entity in law for which they purport responsibility then they
should be found individually complicit in accidents in which there is a failure of responsibility of
the corporate identity.
There should be a presumption that the CEO is the responsible officer or the organisation
should be required to nominate a responsible officer. Mainstream criminal law (for example,
manslaughter and related crimes) should allow enforcement officials to initiate prosecutions for
manslaughter and causing serious injury over and above statutory OHS acts governing such
organisations. Most OHS statutes appear to be inadequate in dealing with attributing criminal
cause in fatalities and currently portray contraventions in terms of inadequate OHS management
systems. These should be rewritten to reflect criminal law or be tied to criminal law in cases of
fatalities or serious injury so that the Rule of Law applies equally to all legal subjects including
corporate entities in matters of safety.
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9 Concl usions and Recommendations
"Power is the ability not to have to learn anything."
Karl Deutsch: MIT political scientist.
"Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do"
Goethe

9. 1 Introduction
This thesis began with the research premise established by Turner (1976 and 1978), that
information needed to prevent accidents was available and known to organisational personnel and
others before an accident. The research also established that critical competencies, such as ethics,

foresight, vigilance and judgement, require specific training, because if they are left to ordinary
humans who have not incorporated them into operational schemata, then when extraordinary
circumstances arise they are unlikely to spontaneously do so, and this may well result in unreliable
and inaccurate memetic rather than educated responses to dangerous situations. The investigation
was guided by the following research questions:
9.1 .1 Principal Research Question

What significant underpinning capacities, organisational factors, and peifonnance capacities
are revealed in accident reports, and what competencies flow from these to enable dominant
coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively engage in accident prevention?
The competencies developed in this investigation in response to this question are:
Underpinning Capacities:
•

ethics (organisational and individual manager's values and behaviour as they
influence the determination of right from wrong in decisions concerning safety)

•

•

foresight (attitudinal 'stance' and 'intelligent looking ahead' as factors in decisions
concerning safety)
vigilance (hazard perception and awareness and an alert 'w ay of seeing' are
necessary to signal detection)

•

judgement (weighing up, trading off, and deciding - often in circumstances that
make little sense or meaning, are factors in all competencies)

•

balance (psychological tenor, courage and persistence are essential in safety versus
financial decisions)
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Organisational Factors
•

organisational ethos (open or closed [autopoietic] organisational cultures shape
hazard management capabilities)

•

constructing a culture of safety ('intention' to establish a culture of safety, 'ways
of seeing', and persistent personal or organisational ideas - 'memes' influence the
systemic capacities for managing safety)

Capacity to Perform
•

understanding the salience of the particular situation and its context
(awareness of organisational and incident factors peculiar to particular hazardous
environments)

•

performance in a particular setting (managerial capacity to deal with stress,
conflict, and unfolding disaster in particular hazardous environments)

•

multidisciplinary performance (bringing together skills from different and
complementary domains to manage a particular hazard)

9.1 .2 Subsidiary Research Question

What significant factors are revealed in accident reports and key literature as being required
by dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations to effectively enable compliance with
accident prevention regulations and appropriate intervention strategies in unfolding accident
scenarios?
The competency developed in this investigation in response to this question is:
Regulatory Compliance and Intervention
•

compliance (compliance and regulatory factors, legal and other punitive responses
to managerial failure)

The two research questions directed the research activity to the discovery of eleven
managerial competencies, which together constitute a core set of high reliability competencies
considered essential for the prevention of preventable accidents. They also suggested the need for
training and cyclical refresher training for dominant coalitions in high reliability organisations,
particularly in the capabilities needed to create and maintain a safety aware habitus.
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The research also indicated serious implications for corporate governance and the role of
government policy and corporate alliances in the construction of organisational capabilities needed
to attend to risk.
Finally, the two research questions suggested directions for further research.

9.2 The Case for Competency Training
Chapter 2, section 2.5.6, pointed out that values may have a variety of manifestations,
including, arrogance demonstrated by those in power, hasty propagation of unsound ideas,
inhibition of individuals' capacity for judgement, an inward and defensive outlook, work systems
that do not convey crucial information or allow accountability, masking of critical signals
concerning potential hazards, and a tendency for decisions to be based on false consensus,
assumptions or group-think, and for management to blame operational staff for accidents (Mitroff
and Pauchant, 1990; Mitroff and Linstone, 1993).
This proposition suggested the research assumption that even though the organisations
concerned espoused compliance with current safety regulations and standards, and the dominant
coalition sustained an official model of competent understanding of the responsibilities for which
they purported to be responsible, whereas, where accidents occurred that resulted in fatalities or
serious injury, it could be established that they were not competent. The research activity therefore
was to discover evidence of this failure of competence and to identify in that evidence the
competencies that were lacking. This research activity was carried out and framed by an
examination of the seminal literature and representative case evidence. The method adopted to
examine the case evidence and elicit the core competencies was a modified form of grounded
theory.
The case evidence suggested that skilled use of 'prior knowledge' and 'managerial
competencies' culminating in an operational schemata based on 'expertise' are needed to limit
fatal accidents in high reliability organisations. It emerged from the case evidence that most, if not
all, accidents occur in spite of a recognition somewhere in the organisation that just such an
accident could occur (bearing in mind, that paradoxically, an accident is an unanticipated event
and is a surprise to those involved). This supports Turner's accident foresight theory, in which he
and his co-author, Pidgeon, suggest that there is an incubation period, during which the factors
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that contribute to an accident are known to various people (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997:68). This
emphasis on 'prior knowledge' in the data is premised on the reasoning that when an accident
occurs it is too late to start planning for it, therefore focus must be placed on the managerial
competencies of members of the dominant coalition and their deontological capacity to exert
influence to eliminate or mitigate the likelihood of fatal accidents.
The problem of training is complicated by the certain knowledge that some CEOs and other
senior members of the dominant coalition may be clinically assessable as psychopathic. Such
people are not amenable to normal training techniques and some programs may actually make
them worse, or at least better-functioning psychopaths. Hare (2004) suggests that programs that
are emotion-based and appeal to one's sense of right and wrong, or depend upon the presence of
a conscience or the ability to understand emotionally what other people are going through, are not
programs for psychopaths. Professor Hare suggests that programs based on enlightened self
interest may have some effect on psychopaths. Programs for corporate psychopaths would indicate
or convince them that there are ways in which they can get what they want and need without
having to actually harm other people.

9.3 Real world implications for corporate governance in high
reliability organisations through the application of the
research findings
The concern for a pattern of dovetailing competencies highlights the key failures of
assumptions and communications made by managers. Mitroff and Linstone (1993:69-81 and 136150) identify the critical need to surface safety related assumptions. The case evidence is strongly
suggestive that members of the dominant coalition subscribe to faulty assumptions and ignore the
knowledge and advice available from those at the interface of potential accidents, especially when
the 'bottom line' is at stake. This takes us full circle to the central argument of this thesis that the
core competencies, which enhance the responsibility to manage safety and put safety before other
factors, are essential in high reliability organisations. Also critical is the motivation to employ these
competencies, either by encouragement or coercion, through managers knowing there will be a
personal 'cost' for negligence in the form of a strong compliance regime. This aspirational view
must be set firmly against real world observations such as those made by Cyert and March (1963),
who claim that goals (and therefore, decisions) are largely set by a negotiation process among
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members of dominant coalitions in the pursuit of certain interests related to production. Punitive
compliance measures are necessary because evidence shows that safety goals are inclined to be
influenced by the interests of 'managerial' individuals and groups as they engage in "horse
trading", and build self-interested alliances. These potentially dangerous activities are, in effect,
supported by Australian corporate law, which allows directors the absolute power to manage their
own conflicts of interest (Turnbull, 2000). There is strong evidentiary support for a compliance
regime because the research shows that in each case where accidents occurred there was an
amplified concern for 'the bottom line' and 'stakeholder returns' and a range of other 'production'
related pressures, rather than safety.
9.3.1 Competency Trai ning for Dominant Coalitions and Compliance
The research demonstrated that naive human judgment compared to judgment aided by
scientific and statistical techniques, is very often erroneous and compounded by cognitive illusions
and blind spots. The example of the 'hammer thrower' showed that the hammer travels in a
straight line out from the point of release, not in a curve or arc as most people report will happen.
This suggests that the competencies underpinning safety system management require specific
training, because they are often counterintuitive, and, if they are left to ordinary humans to
exercise in extraordinary circumstances, they may result in dangerous memetic, rather than
educated, responses.
The accident reports make it clear that the competencies or capabilities identified were
lacking or not employed in the accidents studied at the points of intervention required by the
circumstances. One is inclined to the view that these key managerial competencies failed or were
overwhelmed when financial or production pressures took precedence over deontological
requirements. If managers have acquired the competencies described, through experience and
training, and use them to intervene in unfolding accident sequences then accidents will be less
likely to occur. This line of reasoning is strongly suggestive of the need for mandatory training and
retraining and a powerful supporting compliance regime to ensure that such pressures do not
prevail over the competencies needed to ensure safety. Gunningham and Johnstone (1999)
suggests the need for significant sanctions against managers for managerial and organisational
lapses, particularly where fatalities occur in preventable accidents.
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9.3.1.1

Points of intervention

Clear points of intervention are revealed by the research. For example, at the operator
interface, the managerial decision that put the operator in harm's way, senior management and
boards that escalate the risk attached to managerial decisions regarding safety, and the influence of
stakeholders such as shareholders and governments that impose cost cutting and profit imposts on
boards and senior managers, have all been identified.
9.3.1.2

Government Policy and Industry Alliances

There is a continuing role for government policy directions and industry alliances to urge, if
not insist on, individual organisations to set innovative directions and capabilities in safety systems
management. As international trading alliances, treaties, conventions and agreements are
implemented it will fall to governments, through policy directions, to reconcile the private rights of
individuals and corporations and the public interest for safe goods, services and workplaces. Such
policy settings should be supported by strong regulation and compliance regimes. For example,
the common law concept of negligence, shared by Australia with its trading partners, through
international law, includes 'duty of care', 'right to know', and 'duty to warn'. In this research, the
Seaview case demonstrated negligence attributable to the CEO and the Regulator where each of
these failed. In future, governments will be compelled to ensure such acts of negligence are
mitigated through adequate compliance requirements. For example, when California enacted the
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, it combined a 'duty to warn' requirement
along with the demand to advertise the safety levels of known carcinogens. In 1992 the Australian
Prime Minister announced the establishment of a National Pollution Inventory to ensure the
Community's right to know their exposure to hazardous materials. It should prove relatively simple
to adapt this 'duty to warn' model to both Corporate law and Occupational Health and Safety Law.
If organisations fail to protect their stakeholders then the law should be up the task of
serving the public interest. Companies in Australia should not be able to treat their responsibilities
with impunity, particularly in the area of due diligence in safety matters. Their directors should not
be able to hide behind the corporate veil and escape liability for the harmful consequences of their
actions and inactions and their greed and negligence.
9.3.2 Attending to Risk
Greed, inadequate training, bypassing regulations and failure of the regulator to adequately
insist on safety standards should be unacceptable when set against a managerial schemata and
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organisational habitus that espouses a responsibility for ensuring an appropriate priority on safety.
A number of principles emerge from this research about how to get organisations to attend to risk.
Dominant coalitions must be made legally accountable for what goes wrong in their
organisations and financial incentives should reward them for attending conscientiously to the
control of catastrophic risks. Organisations that are concerned to be seen must also be seen to be
concerned. Legal accountability is also necessary because of the potential for dominant coalitions
to be populated by psychopaths (Babiak and Hare, 2002).
Decision making must be structured so that the 'do nothing' option is removed. This
involves the development of comprehensive, site specific, schemata and plans for the management
of known major hazards. These plans must specify information gathering processes, signal
recognition, possible trigger events, what must be done when these trigger events occur, and who
is responsible for carrying out these actions.
There should be rigorous ongoing auditing to ensure that the protocols are working as
intended. Within sensible boundaries, auditors must find ways of 'pulling the triggers' to see if
what is intended to happen really does happen. Moreover, someone must audit the auditors to
ensure that they are doing their job thoroughly. Regulators must also be willing to enforce the
requirements of safety management plans and be prepared to prosecute when they find serious
cases of non-compliance with plans that are supposed to be in operation.

9.4 The Significance of a Safety A ware Habitus
Differences in the way managers see a 'particular' situation and the events that pertain to it
construct their decisions and therefore outcomes. Therefore, it is essential that dominant coalitions
are able to manage the 'salient' psychological space. This leads directly to a requirement for a
capacity to then manage the 'particular' background and the 'salient' physical factors. Managing the
physical space is a different task for each operational site and depends on the capacity to manage
the psychological space. These capacities are necessary to constructing the habitus needed to
ensure high reliability.
A significant part of managing the psychological space is to manage the climate of power
relations inside the organisation so that talented individuals are able to feel confident that they can
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safely pass important insights up the chain of command. The literature that signifies the
psychopathologies also points to issues related to 'harassment', 'bullying', 'mobbing', victimisation
and 'whistle blowing'. There is a high level of congruence in the literature suggesting that
individuals who are bullied, mobbed, harassed and vitamised are subject to preventable poor
human resource management practices that often result in qualified and capable staff leaving or
being 'expelled' from their positions because they display qualities such as enthusiasm, integrity,
and commitment that challenge the status quo or dominant culture. They are easy targets for
passive aggressive and abusive behaviours, including constant criticism, faultfinding, gossip and
slander, and false accusations (Shalcross, 2003). People subject to these behaviours lose the
motivation to prioritise safety.
The following cautionary quotation from Tom Wolfe (2000), connects the suggestion that
both a 'corporate community' or habitus (ethos and culture) and competency 'training'
(particularly for understanding and schemata building, not just performance) are salient, as is the
idea of not training for failure through 'the primitive stupidities of bureaucratism' ('ways of seeing',
'stance', ideas about management [memes]) and the influence on work practices imposed by
others, such as management and unions (systemic factors).
Fairchild was rather enlightened, for an Eastern corporation, but truth was, there was
no one back East who understood how to run a corporation in the United States in the second
half of the twentieth century. Back East they had never progressed beyond the year 1940.
Consequently, they were still hobbled by all the primitive stupidities of bureaucratism and
labor-management battles. They didn't have the foggiest comprehension of the Silicon Valley
idea of a corporate community. The brightest young businessmen in the East were trained
most notably at Harvard Business school- to be little Machiavellian princes. Greed and
strategy were all that mattered. They were trained for failure.

The research went some way to establishing that if the core managerial competencies were
present and had been applied they may well have prevented preventable fatal accidents from
occurring. It also suggested that dominant coalitions both shaped and at the same time were
influenced by certain key situational factors, such as the role played in decision making about
safety by the mental schemata of managers and the heuristics they employ, by ethical practices
considered central to an organisation's operations, their compliance with regulations, and
stakeholder and stockholder pressures for profit. Training that specifically addresses issues such as
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power and responsibility, language and sense making, ethics and priorities is critical in most
organisations and essential in high reliability organisations.

9.5 Limitations and constraints
The limitations of the research are related to the constraints of methodology and issues of
scope and scale. Five cases may be too small a sample, even though the literature on small 'n' case
studies suggests it is adequate. The inability to see inside the unfolding accident process limits
accuracy, even though if that were possible, many cases would need to be studied to have any
confidence in generalising from specific cases. The fact that it is not possible to interview accident
victims, even for data triangulation purposes, limits verification of some assumptions.

9.6 Future Research
Issues emerging as important for further research include addressing questions related to
the ten competencies and compliance, and might focus on integrative aspects relating to
management and organisations, such as organisational identity (culture, memes, ethos), change
(particularly as it relates to loss of ethics and corporate and individual responsibility), and the
priority of production as it stands against responsibility for other than fiscal drivers (such as
judgement, safety, and the management of a wide range of systemic factors particular to each
organisation).
If the phenomena under study are amenable to surveying techniques it may be useful to
'quantify' each of the key codes and its dimensions (perhaps using a Likert scale). This is
particularly revealing if done in selected and related groupings and for each case.
Table 9 .6 . 1 Categories: Kev Codes

Key Code

Com petencies
Vigi lance
Ethics
Fores iqht
Compl iance
Judgement

Dimensions of the Key Code

Advanced <----> Naive
Active intelligence capturing <----> Ignores signals
Permeates organisation <----> Absent
Scenario and contingency planning <----> SCP not done
Self imposed <----> Statutory imposition
Jurisprudential <----> Impetuous
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9.6.1 Post doctoral research :
It would be feasible, using survey and questionnaire techniques, to establish baseline level
competency assessments among experts along the following lines. The application of such
information may be to apply baseline studies to particular high reliability settings in a range of
industries. For example,
Competencies for high reliability managers questionnaire:
Please rate the baseline level of competency (ie., before placement) you would expect of
graduating managers from a Certificate N of PG1 Diploma Degree on placement in your
organisation in a role where responsibility for safety is a requirement; where:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

= not necessary for the position
= somewhat necessary
= moderately necessary
= highly necessary
= essential

Competencies

Codes Rating (1·5)

Ethics (organisational influence is a factor as well
as individual maruwer's values and behaviour)
Foresight ('stance' is a factor here as well as
'intelligent looking ahead')
Vigilance ('way of seeing' is necessary to
'alertness', signal detection)
Judgement (weighing up, trading off, and deciding
• often in circumstances that make little sense or
meaning)
Balance (psychological tenor, courage, persistence)
Organisational

ethos

(open

or

closed

rautopoiesisl)
Constructing a culture of safety ('ways of seeing'

and persistent personal or organisational ideas
'memes', enduring 'intention' to establish a culture
of safety)
Understanding the salience of the particular
situation and its context (insight into the real and

potential or2anisation and incident factors)
Performance in a particular setting (stress,

conflict, unfolding disaster, capacity for action)
Multidisciplinary performance (using skills from

different and complementary domains)

The investigation of correlational coefficients between key variables such as prior knowledge
and systemic failure, vigilance and judgement, accident rates and compliance, ethics and foresight,
autopoiesis and meme frequency may also be a worthwhile postdoctoral research project.
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9.6.2 Papers in development
At the time of submission of this thesis the following papers are in development:

• Riskjudgements versus Corporate Knowledge Retrieval: Efficient Strategies for judging the
risk of serious hazards.

• Designing Interactive High Reliability Management Tutorials for Senior Coalitions: In
house Certificate JV Level Cyclical Retraining/or High Level Managers.

• Metacognitive aspects of habituating a High Reliability Habitus in an Organisation.
• Memetic Theory as a tool for understanding Safety Critical failure and Reactive Crisis
Management.

9. 7 In Conclusion
• The thesis hypothesises that incidents of organisational failure frequently happen with the
information needed to prevent them actually available in the organisation before the incident
occurs.
• This thesis suggests that incidents are scenarios of a rapidly converging confluence of
events, none of which would individually cause an accident, and in which management does not
seem to understand the forces it makes decisions about.
• This research suggests that if the managers who make cost cutting decisions could foresee
their consequences then they may reverse those decisions or not make them at all, in effect, they
would make ethical decistons.
• This thesis found that managers who misuse 'power and control' resources in favour of
production interfere with the capacity for vigilance for critical accident avoiding information.
• This thesis showed that cultures favour satisficing, and that satisficing may compromise
foresight and judgement and mitigate against a habitus of safety.
• This thesis considered the 'memetic' perspective and found that dysfunctional memes
subverted critical communications, promoted autopoiesis and a dysfunctional habitus, which then
became the cultural background to information, vigilance and decision making.
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• This research contends that managers use selective and often unreliable heuristics,
patterns, ways of seeing and mental schemata to make models of reality, models they socially
construct among themselves and share with each other.
• The research shows that a confluence of factors incubating in the organisation along with a
limited managerial stochastic attention span for essential information results in critical information
not being discovered
• The research suggests that it could be argued, if the manager failed to foresee an incident
and did not exercise a level of judgement needed to organise the resources needed to avoid a
disaster, then the regulatory regime governing that industry and the appropriate criminal law
should be considered. Senior executives ought not to expect to hide behind the corporate veil.
Legislation along these lines is urgently needed.
• Each of the competencies identified should become part of a training and cyclical
refresher training requirement aimed at building the schemata necessary to intervene in and
manage accidents, particularly for the dominant coalitions of high reliability organisations.

Finally, central to the assumptions underpinning this entire research, but which did not
form part of the discovery process, is the impression gained by the researcher that members of
dominant coalitions are pathologically consumed with 'doing' and 'acquiring'. The outcome of
many accident scenarios would be very different if they at least balanced this drive with some
concern for 'being' and 'giving'. This returns us to Hiedegger's quest to understand 'being',
introduced in the Introduction (chapter 1) as Eeyore's metaphysical engagement with ontology
and phenomenology (Heidegger and Krell, 1993; Heidegger, 1927).
' I ' m not sayi ng there won 't be an Accident n ow, m i n d you . They're fu nny things,
Accidents. You neve r have them ti l l you' re having them.'
A.A. M i lne, The House at Pooh Corner.

The issue developed in this thesis is that they are preventable, you have them BEFORE you
have them. They are in train long before they happen.

The task for regulators, through policy and intervention, seems to require them to ensure
that the members of the dominant coalition of high reliability organisations act with a measure of
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diligence and altruism toward others. However, this may not be possible in the light of the findings
that significant numbers of people in dominant coalitions have personality disorders that are
sufficiently serious to be formally diagnosed as having narcissistic, antisocial, or psychopathic
personalities. The need for regulatory control over high reliability organisations, therefore, should
incorporate the notion that managerial psychopaths must not be allowed to act out their impulses
simply because those impulses arise in them.
Perhaps Shakespeare sums it up best:
The world i s stil l deceived with ornament.
I n l aw, what plea so tai nted and corrupt,
But, being seasoned with a gracious voice,
Obscures the show of evi l? . . .
What damned error, but some sober brow
Wi l l bless it, and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fai r ornament?
There is no vice so si mple, but assumes
Some mark of vi rtue on his outward parts.

Merchant of Venice, Act 3, Sc 2.

Is there a way of ensuring high reliability safety? The French solved the problem over 200
years ago. They passed a law requiring the explosives manufacturer to live on the explosives
storage premises, with hisfamily.
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This thesis stands in memory of Allan Greenwood, my brother-in-law, who died in a
preventable underground mine accident at Leinster, depriving two innocent babies of a father and
a young wife of a loving husband. Requiescat in pace. Fiatjustitia!
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10. 1 A ppendix 1
1 0. 1 .1 HyperRESEARCH Text Data Coding (Next Page)

The following example is incorporated in the text at Figure 3.6.2: 1 14 and is included here in
a larger more readable form. This sample examines and locates a single usage of the concept of
'diagnostic failure'. This particular usage of 'diagnostic failure' is one of twelve examples occurring
in the reference Ch 13 Long 198-22 (Chapter 13 of the Longford Case pages 198 -222). Appendix 2
reveals that there were twenty one occurrences of 'diagnostic failure' identified across the five cases
and that 'diagnostic failure' is one of two hundred and sixty identified code descriptors. Note that
in keeping with the HyperRESEARCH methodology the actual term 'diagnostic failure' may or may
not occur in the selected text. The term is applied at the discretion of the researcher to indicate the
main thrust of the selected passage of text. The discretionary nomination of descriptive terms to
passages of text under examination is described in Chapter 3 on Methodology.
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event, its requ l rements op pear to hove been more strlnoenl than those of the
LWMM and ii is convenient thuefore to proceed upon the basis tt.it the LWMM
contained the applicable instructions. Shift handovers 13.91
The shift
handover requirement con be stated oi mply. It required panel operators, at the
conclusion of eech shif , to • .. meet "ith tho i r relief M the Control Room to hand
over the operation of lhei rare• and to dlscuos th& content of the ... log·· .

active fs i I ures of i ndividuals
attention to risk
bypoosing sofety requ iroments
cascadl ng effects
change related risk
communicetion
defect reporting
djagrmlic fo, I ure
diligence end propriety
discreponcies in reporting
equl pment defects
fei I ure to exercise competenci
failure to grasp "hole ofsysle
failure to notify sofety concer
feedbock
h8zord identification
ignored "ernino•
inedequote monitoring of hllzor
i nodequate response
Ina ppropriate behaviour
ineppropriate res poMe
l nottenllon
Incompetence
I neviteble Incident

information failure

1 3. 92
P. nomber of operet,ons personnel ~re ooked about the form snG
content of handover communications On the ..,hole, the evidence revealed that
verbal discussioM be-JI o~rotors usually did 8CCOmpony ohlr1 change, but
often ,..ithout any real effort to convey process problems or to dioc~ the
content of Igo enlrle$. Tllo length of the d1,-:us,ions tended to depend on lhe
d1ocretlon of the operator ond they predominantly concerned product lssim,
auoh a11 VENCorp gos demerm ot ~ ro.)es
13.93
The evJdenceaTllet~ port,culor shortcomings In the hendo110r
Uiocuss,0113 that twir P,lece for the ohifu Immediately before the ..ccJdeld on 25
September I 99
13 94
Most sron1f)cont ...as the content of the handover diocU9sfon et the
commencement of the crlticel dllY shifl on 25 ~ptember There "ere
ohortcom1 ngs M the qch81'!1!' of lnformetion thet took piece bet...een the night
thift operotor, Olaaon, and hfa n,lle-,mg panel operator , Word, 01S$0n
j dentif1ed problems 'which he had experoenoed dunno the night ... 11n the reteof
condensete comi no Into trio st UQCOtchen from ~bore tie elso ~ reference
to cold condensete ~mpere\jJr~ .,.h,lch he hod ex,Perlenced in ~bsorber 8 and to
problems ..,.hieh 1"' 21 I
hod experienced in conjrol I m19 the tempereture of fh1s -rber throughout \he
sn ft. tie mode no reference, ho"w'ever, to the off-scele, high co.ndensete leyel• in
A~rber B, or to the f~uent occurrence of TC9B lnterfen,nce ...Ith l'!Vel
control, both of ,..hlch t,o lvld txperlenced during the night. Nor dl
rofen,nal to t he frequent Incidence of olerm l(Ornlngs eotnovl
during hi• aliift. T ~ ...arplngs had accompanied the high conde~
the TC9B DV6rrlde, Nor die! he convey ti, Ward the feet that the elerJm for ~igh
Aworber 8 condeosate lf\i~Ja111),f TC98 l nlerference ',fOrt sll It ect1ve e.t Iha
chlflll!! of shit\. ll)lli~nq,m.~nly that the levels ""ere ,1111 high, bot that l evel
~ntrorl\e,f,1111 ll9 ),ie~ r~J.nod 11',1 lhe time oOhe change.

I nformetlon verification
judgement
knwledge management rreme
latent fei I ure-communicetion
materiel condftlons
13.95
Because the olarms essociated -.,ith high condensate levels in Absorber
feedback
8 end TC9B OYerride hod been eckno..,ledged "611 before the concl us Ion of his
I nedequate mon!tori ng of hazer shift, Word ,.,a, not presenled "ith any audible alarm ,;gnal for tnese alarms at
the time he rel laved Olsson. As a conoequence, the ocllve state of these olsrms
I nformatlon failu re
lotent foil ure - commu nlcatlon l(OU ld not h8Ve been lmmedietel11 epl)8rent to him end "'ould not ho\/0 become

10.2Appendix 2
1 0.2.1 The full code descriptor list - Excel Pivot table.
Sum of Frequency
Code
accident conditions
accountability
action plan
active failures
active failures of individuals
administrative politics
administrative procedures
ambiguous behaviour modeling
attention to risk
attribution of cause
auditing system
autopoietic behaviour
blaming
breach of law
bypassing safety requirements
careless navigation
cascading effects
cause and response
cause immediate
cause of accident
cause real
ceo lying
certificate of competency withdrawn
Challenger - 0-rings
change related risk
colateral casualties
collision
collusion
communication
communication downwards
competencies
complex - tightly coupled
complex management system
compliance
compliance with national standards
computerised information
conflict of interest
conflicting evidence
contamination of evidence
contempt for regulations
coronial inquiry
corporate memory
corrupt management
corruption
criminal offence
critical performance indicators
critical safety indicators
cultural attitude to regulation

Case
lllawarra

Lonqford

Moura

2

1
1
1
1

Seaview

Westralia

1

1

1
1

2
2

2

2

3

1

2
4

1
1

2
2

4

1

3

2

1

4

2

2

1
1
5

1

2

1
1

1
1

4

4

7

1

1
1
9

5

2
2

1

8
1

9

1

22
2

26

2

44

1
1
1

1
1

2
1

2

1
4

1
8
1

2

1
3

1
1

1
1

2

1

1
1
7
1
3

1
1

7
1
8

4

1

5

7
7
7
1
1

1
1
1

1

8

7

6

5

3

3

6
2

1

1
1
5

Grand Total

2
4

1

1
1
7
1
3

8
5

8
5

3

3
4

1
1
4

1

6
6
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cultural factors
culture of denial
currency of competence
debriefing
decision making
defect reporting
design failure
detailed guidelines
diagnostic failure
diligence and propriety
disasters are preventable
discrepancies in reporting
dispassionate discourse
dominance of CEO
dominant coalition
doubt about capability
duplicitous conduct
economic factors
enforcement
ensuring safety
equipment defects
erroneous management paradigm
error detection
escape routes
espoused values
ethical implications
ethics
executive summary
expired medical certificate
external agencies
failing to keep or supply records
failure of materiels
failure of organisational memory
failure of procedures
failure of regulator
failure of responsibility
failure of safety systems
failure of training
failure to conform to guidelines
failure to dicriminate signals
failure to enforce regulations
failure to exercise competencies
failure to grasp whole of system picture
failure to monitor operating conditions
failure to notify safety concerns
failure to perform HAZOP study
failure to provide safe environment
failure to utilise information
failure to utilise records
false representation
falsifying maintenance reports
falsifying records
favoured treatment
feedback

2

2
5
1

3

2

12
7

5
16

4

4

2
2

2
5
2
19

3
2
3

2
2
3
5
1

6
2
1
6
1
3

12
12
6
4
3
4
10
5
8
4
9
2
4
7

3
3

4

4

21
24
1
8
2
5
2
1
19
2
2
2
11
7
11
5
5
13

4
12

3
4

7
15
20

4

4

2

3

3

5
4
4
5

3

2
2
1
2
4
9
3

2
2

1
3
10
6
2
17
17
37
14
6
4
3
10
11
5
8
10
9
2
4
7
5
4
4
7
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fire on ship
firefighting procedures
firefighting renetry procedures
first order attribution of cause
flexible fuel hoses
foresight
fuel leak
graduated response
habituation to warning signals
hazard identification
HAZOP
hierarchy of knowledge
high reliability - many eyes
ignore legislation
ignored warnings
improvised safety standards
inadequate maintenance
inadequate monitoring of hazard signals
inadequate response
inadequate supervision
inappropriate behaviour
inappropriate response
inattention
incentives
incident reporting system
incompetence
increased risk
individual responsible for safety decisions
inevitable incident
information failure
information gathering
information overload
information verification
injury response
institutional timidity
insufficient information
integrity
irrational reasoning
judgement
Kletz's org memory
Kletz's organisational memory
knowledge management
knowledge management framework
lack of understanding
I atent errors
latent failure+local triggers+active failure
latent failure-communication
legislative framework
lessons from previous accidents
lessons learned
limited operator knowledge
limited risk assessment
lives lost
local triggering event

4

2

2

2
3

2
3

8

4
2
2
4
5
2
2

6

2

8
2
2

9

9

5

3

1
3
4

7

7

3

4

5

2
2

2
12
3
2

4

5

5
5
2
5
23
1
3
14
11
5

2
4

8

5
3

3

8

3

3

2
2

7
4

2
3
2
3

6

2
5
4
4
4
15
5

2

2

10
11
3
4

7

6

2

2

10

13

8

2

2

2
3
4
5
2
3
2
1

3

2
4
2
3
5

9

326

maintenance
maintenance documentation
maintenance management
management contradicted
management interference
management neglect
management speak
management system failure
management systems
managerial dysfunction
managerial responsibility
mandatory responses to warning signs
materiel conditions
media scrutiny & PR
mine disasters not explained by NAT
misconduct
misinformation
misplaced reliance on SSM
misplaced trust
multiple factors
navigation aids
negligence
normal accident theory
ohs act
operating outside limits
operational deficiencies
opportunistic behaviour compromising safety
organisational failure
overloading
perfunctary inspection
pilotage factors
Piper Alpha - inspectorate independence
poor documentation
poor safety record
post hoc forensic recording
practically preventable
practice subverted by SSM
practices invalidated safe procedures
pressure to break rules
primary responsibility
principle one motivation
principle three auditing
principle two decision making
principles of risk control
prior knowledge
priorities
priority of production
procedures
propriety
pseudopsychology
questionable behaviour
questionable rationalisation
reasonably forseeable
Reason's latent errors

4
3
3

2

4
5
6

2

2

7

6
1

9

5

2
2
2
3

6
3
4

3

1
3
6

3
4

2
3
3

1
12
2
2
11
4
12

2

7

11
3
4

1
8

1
3

2
11

5
2

5
3
4

3

10

4

7

2
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
3

16

2
5
4

3
2

2

2

2
4
3
2
3
2
2
3
2
3
23
3
6
6
2
1
3
1
6
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regulator arrogance
regulator dominated by regulated
regulator incompetence
regulator unable to enforce compliance
regulatory independence
regulatory regime
rel ationship between regulator and regulated
reliance on oral communication
reliance on personal experience
resolute intervention
response
risk management system
role of government
role of regulator
sacrifice of safety for economic reasons
safety as a cost
safety equipment deficiencies
safety incentives
safety management systems
safety reporting procedure
schedule
self congratulatory discourse
serious risk ignored
shared beliefs - memes
situational risk factors
specification failure
speculation
standards sacrificed
surveillance procedures
suspension warranted
symptoms demand investigation
system failure
systemic management failure
terms of reference
training
Turner- energy+misinformation
Turner v Perrow
un antici pated interaction of multiple failures
un anticpated factors
unauthorised passenger operations
uncertain information
underutilised expertise
unsafe organisation
upward communication
vigilance
wages and conditions
warning signs ignored
warnings ignored
whistle blower
written reports iqnored
Grand Total

2
1
2

1
1
4

2

1
1

3
2
2
1
4
1
1
2

1
2
6
1
1
1
4
1
1
1

1

2

1

6

3

1
5
1
1
2
2

8
1

2
1

2

6

2
1
1
6

2

1
1
8
2
5
3

4
6

1
5
1
5
2
16
2
3
1
1

1
1
2
2
4
1
9
2
2

4
1

2

2
1
1

2
1

4

6

6
1

4
3

1

499

101

1

2
1
1

162

424

1 37

2
1
3
1
1
8
6
4
3
3
5
4
2
2
4
1
4
1
14
1
1
2
10
1
10
3
1
3
12
1
8
5
28
5
14
10
1
7
6
4
5
1
3
1
17
1
5
5
1
1
1 323
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10.3 Competency Unit Example
10.3.1 Unit Descriptor
Unit (unique descriptor for the
com etenc ie HROS100E)

Manage the Deontological Ethical Values and
Princi les of Hi h Reliabilit Or anisations

Unit Descriptor

This unit addresses the ethical conduct required
of those governing high reliability organisations
(Dutv of Care - Deontoloqical Ethics)

j Key Area
Element
1 Apply ethical standards of
duty

2. Deal with ethical problems
in senior management role

I Ethics and Accountability
Performance Criteria
l Per onal work practices comply with safety system ethics tandard ,
policy and/or guldelines
2 Verbal and written advice and repons contain information which is
impartial, substantiated, accurate and complete
3 Organisational re ources are u ed in accordance with safety system
ethics standards, policy and/or guidelines
4 Conflicts of interest are identified, addressed and documented in
accordance with safety system management policy and procedures
5 Relationships with the public and busine s contacts comply with
ethic 'tandards, policy and guidelines
6 takeholder · and the public who deal wlth the organisation are
provided with information on the ethical values and standards of the
organisation
1 Situations which po e ethical problems are resolved or referred to in
accordance with organisational values
2 Decision-making proces es u ed to resolve ethical problems are
recorded in accordance with organisational ethical policies and
procedures
3 Organisational policies / codes on the prevention and reporting of
unethical conduct are accessed and applied

Range of Variables The Range of Variables provides information about the context in which
the unit of competency is carried out. It allows for differences between States and Territories
and the Commonwealth, and between organisations and workplaces. It allows for different work
requirements, work practices, and knowledge.

The Range of Variables also provides a focus for assessment and relates to the
unit as a whole.
Legislation and guidelines may
• legi lation for safety system management; freedom of information
include
• equal employmem opponuniry and anti-discrimination law
• safety system standards
• Ministerlal directions
• State/ferrltory or Commonwealth codes of ethics
• organisational codes of conduct
• et of value
•organisational mission and values statements
• organisational policy, procedures/guidelines
• government policy
• professional codes of ed1ic and conduct
• equlty guidelines, workplace diversity guidellnes
Work practices may include

Processes for resolving issues

• relation hips wi1.h work colleagues, external individuals and
organi ations (in addition to actual work practices)
• accessing relevant standards and other information
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may i nclude

Eth ical values and princi ples may
i nclude

Referrals of ethical problems may
include

Conflicts of interest may include

Unethical conduct may include

• withdrawing from a situation
• using models of ethical decision-making
• reflection, discussion, seeking clarification from others
• respect for the law
• natural justice
• integrity
• objectivity
• accountability
• honesty
• openness
• responsibility
• impartiality
• diligence
• trustworthiness
• confidentiality
• respect for persons
• responsible care
• vigilance
• probity
• economy and efficiency
• procedural fairness
• i.e. the right to be heard/put your case
• the right to be informed of a complaint or case against you
• the right to know reasons for decisions affecting you
• the right to privacy
• the right to representation; the right to silence; the decision maker
should not be a judge in his;her own cause
• line management
• chief executive officer
• government commissioner or comission
• safety system standards body
• organisational ethics committee
• internal grievance mechanisms
• confidant programs (ie whistleblower protection programs
• organisational professional reporting procedures)
•unions and professional bodies
• ombudsman
• both potential and actual conflicts
•bribery
• improper use of official information
• gifts
• entertainment
• outside employment
• favours for friends
• relatives
• memberships of organisations
• political activity
• financial and non-financial conflicts
• fraud, corruption, maladministration and waste
• unauthorised access to and use of information, money/finances,
vehicles, equipment, resources
• improper public comment on matters relating to the organisation
• falsifying records
• giving false testimonials;
• dishonesty
• improper use of telephones, credit cards, frequent flier points, e
mail and Internet
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• extravagant or wasteful practices
• personal favours
• preferential treatment
• compromising behaviour including bullying or sexual harassment
• directing others to act unethically
• oppressive / coercive management decisions
• resorting to illegality to obtain evidence
Ethical problems which may need to
be referred rather than resolved at
this level may include

• conflict between safety system standards and personal values
• conflict between safety system standards and other standards eg
professional standards
• conflict between safety system standards and directions of a senior
manager, board, or Minister
• tension between two "rights" eg right to corporate 'in-confidence'
information versus right to freedom of information, or obligation to
speak out about knowledge of fraud or corruption versus improper
public comment on organisational matters
• conflict regarding issues of personal and organisational intellectual
property
1. Specific Organisation Issues
2. Specific Stakeholder Issues
3. Specific Political Issues

Evidence Guide (identifies critical aspects of evidence underpinning ksa's,
resources and context needed for assessment, requirements to assess
competencies toaether, and consi stency matters in performance aooraisal)

Critical as pects of evidence

• integrated demonstration of all elements and their related
performance criteria; and
• knowledge of State/ferritory/Commonwealth Acts governing
organisational values, and code/s of ethics/conduct; and
• knowledge of fundamental ethical principles (particularly
deontological ethics), and how these relate to the safety system; and
• evidence of ethical conduct in a range of generalist or specialist work
activities e.g. monitoring vigilance systems, safety system checking,
delivering client services, using financial resources, procuring goods or
services, etc

I nterdependent assessment of
u nits

Pre-requisite units: Nil
Co-requisite units: Nil
Co-assessed units: This unit of competency should be assessed with a
range of (2 or more) generalist or specialist units of competency in the
Certificate IV in Safety System Management.

Underpinning knowledge

Underpi n n i n g s k i l l s

• the nature of ethics and ethical values
• fundamental ethical principles such as justice, respect for persons and
responsible care
•values of high reliability organisation and its responsibilities and role
in public and workplace safety
• natural justice / procedural fairness
• equal employment opportunity, equity and diversity principles
• where to access ethical decision-making models
•other ethics standards e.g. professional standards
• procedures for declaring conflicts of interest
• protocols for reporting fraud, corruption and maladministration
• objectivity / impartiality
• conceptual and analytical
• evaluation of conflicting requirements
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Resource implications

• decision-making
• information technology skills for preparing written advice and reports
requiring precision of expression
• using an Internet web browser to access legislation and codes of ethics
• reading complex and formal documents such as legislation and codes
of ethics and applying them to work practices
• adjusting communication to suit different audiences
• cross-cultural competency, including gender and disability
simulated workplace for off-the-job assessment using scenarios, case
studies or role plays; access to a workplace for those not employed

Consistency of performance

assessment to be conducted over time across a range of workplace
scenarios to assess consistency of performance

Context of assessment

this competency may be assessed on or off-the-job

Key Competency Levels (seven work related general competencies essential for
effective artici ation in H ROs at Senior Level)
Collect,
analyse and
organise
information

Communicate
ideas and
information

Plan and
organise
activities

Work with
others
and in
teams

Use
mathematical
ideas and
technologies

Solve
problems

Use
technology

Level
Level
Level
Level
Level
Level
Level
Level 1 = use routine approaches; 2 = select from routine approaches; 3 =
establish new approaches
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